투자자-국가 분쟁 해결 제도(ISDS)에 관한 연구: 투자 유치국의 국내정치적 요인이 ISDS 제소에 미치는 영향을 중심으로 = Study on the Effect of Domestic Politics in Host Countries on Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This article examines the relationship between Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) and domestic politics in host countries. In existing studies, foreign investors' perspectives have mainly been explored as a reason for investment disputes. In contrast with previous studies, this study explores the domestic political factors of host countries and how they influence their ability to prevent and respond to ISDS. More specifically, this article argues that the more stable the host country's political system, that is, the more stable the democratic or authoritarian system is in the host country, the less ISDS takes place. This is because politicians in stable countries would prefer not to file with ISDS in order to maintain their power. In order to test these arguments, I conducted quantitative analysis in 127 countries from 1987 to 2020. As a result, an inverted U-shape relationship appears between the political system and the ISDS cases. In other words, in countries with stable democracy and authoritarian government, there are fewer ISDS cases, while in countries with unstable politics, many ISDS are filed.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 논문은 투자 유치국의 국내정치적 요인이 투자자-국가 분쟁 해결 제도(Investor State Dispute Settlement, ISDS)에 미치는 영향을 분석한다. 기존의 연구들은 주로 해외 투자자의 입장 에서 ISDS를 통한 투자 분쟁이 발생하는 이유를 설명하고 있다. 이와 달리 본 연구는 투자 유치국 의 입장에 초점을 맞춰 국내정치적 요인을 중심으로 어떠한 요인이 투자 유치국이 ISDS에 더 잘 예방 및 대응하게 만드는지를 살펴보고 있다. 구체적으로 본 논문은 투자 유치국의 정치체제가 안정적일수록, 즉 투자 유치국에 민주주의 혹은 권위주의 체제가 안정적으로 자리 잡고 있을수록 ISDS 제소가 덜 발생할 것이라고 주장한다. 이는 안정적인 국가의 정치인들은 자신들의 권력 유지를 위하여 ISDS로 인해 발생하는 위협을 회피하고자 하는 유인을 가지고 있기 때문이다. 이러한 주장을 검증하기 위하여 1987년부터 2020년까지 127개 국가를 대상으로 양적 분석을 실시하였다. 그 결과, 정치체제와 ISDS 제소 사이에는 뒤집어진 U자형(inverted U-shape)의 관계가 나타나고 있다. 즉, 민주주의와 권위주의가 안정적으로 자리잡은 국가에서는 ISDS 제소가 적게 나타나지만, 정치적으로 불안정한 국가에서는 ISDS 제소가 많이 이루어지고 있다.

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