In Defense of the Safety Condition for Knowledge

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

According to the safety condition for knowledge, a subject S knows that p only if S’s belief that p could not easily have been wrong. Despite its attractions as a modal condition on knowledge, there have been two important lines of objections to the safety condition. One is that safety is unnecessary for knowledge. The other is that the safety condition is insufficient to eliminate the kind of epistemic luck that undermines knowledge. This paper argues that both objections can be met by more precisely formulating the safety condition. In particular, I argue that the safety of a belief is determined by the method through which the belief is formed, where the method is individuated contextually on the basis of our theoretical practical interests in evaluating the belief.

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