LINKAGES BETWEEN PATENT PROTECTION AND STRATEGIC R&D POLICY: CASE OF THE EXOGENOUS REGIME OF IPR PROTECTION

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This paper explores strategic R&D policy when countries’ regimes on
protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) are exogenously given under
the multilaterally agreed disciplines. Under the weak enforcement regime,
domestic and foreign R&D activities are strategic complements rather than
strategic substitutes and hence R&D reaction curves are upward sloping.
Government wishes to subsidize its domestic firm’s R&D in the presence of
sufficiently weak IPR protection, because it is able to encourage R&D by the
foreign rival firm, and greater R&D investment of foreign rivals increases
the profits of the domestic firm.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This paper explores strategic R&D policy when countries’ regimes on
protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) are exogenously given under
the multilaterally agreed disciplines. Under the weak enforcement regime,
domestic and foreign R&D activities are strategic complements rather than
strategic substitutes and hence R&D reaction curves are upward sloping.
Government wishes to subsidize its domestic firm’s R&D in the presence of
sufficiently weak IPR protection, because it is able to encourage R&D by the
foreign rival firm, and greater R&D investment of foreign rivals increases
the profits of the domestic firm.

참고문헌 (Reference)

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