Mutual Fund Voting and Pension Ties : Evidence from Proxy Voting

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Because mutual funds are the largest equity holders and because the retirement assets that are managed by mutual funds have been growing, mutual fund managers may have more incentives to support management in order to attract and retain pension business. I explore whether pension business ties have an impact on voting behaviors of mutual funds by examining the link pension business ties between mutual funds and the firms to actual mutual fund voting outcomes. At the fund family level, I find a positive relation between pension ties and mutual funds’ voting support for management. This relation becomes stronger when there is a voting divergence among funds within the same families. At the individual fund level, I find that individual funds are more likely to vote with management if they are included as one of the investment options of the pension plan of their portfolio firms. This suggests that the SEC should at least consider the recent petition from the AFL-CIO proposing that the SEC require mutual funds to disclose business ties with the firms in which they invest.

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