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      미국 경쟁법상 이윤압착(margin squeeze)에 대한 규제 동향 분석 = A Study on Jurisprudence and Precedents of a Margin Squeeze under the U.S. Antitrust Law

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      A margin squeeze can occur when an upstream firm sells an input for which there are no good economic substitutes to firms against which the upstream firm also competes in the downstream market. It arises where the margin between the downstream retail ...

      A margin squeeze can occur when an upstream firm sells an input for which there are no good economic substitutes to firms against which the upstream firm also competes in the downstream market. It arises where the margin between the downstream retail price and the wholesale price charged for an input is too small to allow a firm to survive as a retail competitor. This kind of business practice has been recently witnessed even in korean IT industries.
      The US Supreme Court has specifically addressed only margin squeezes by an integrated firm that has no duty under antitrust law to deal with its downstream rivals. The Court ruled that in such cases US antitrust law does not recognize margin squeezes as a standalone form of anti-competitive abuse.
      Nevertheless, there has been a general appraisal that a margin squeeze under the US antitrust law has been dealt with an flexible angle of regulation than that under the EU competition law. It may be the reason why analyses on the US antitrust law have been comparatively rare than on EU law.
      In this consideration, this paper tries to examine jurisprudence, regulation trends and legal precedents on a margin squeeze mainly in the US antitrust law. And it makes some comparison to EU competition law as a conclusion.

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 Yongmin Chen, "Vertical Integration, Exclusive Dealing, and Ex Post Cartelization" 38 (38): 2007

      2 Herbert Hovenkamp, "The Viability of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims" 51 : 2009

      3 "Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Declining to Join the US Department of Justice Recommendation that the United States Supreme Court Review the Decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in linkline Comms. v. Pacific Bell Telephone Company"

      4 Dennis W. Carlton, "Should "Price Squeeze" Be a Recognized Form of A nticompetitive Conduct?" 2008

      5 OECD, "Margin Squeeze-United States-, Working Party No.2 on Competition and Regulation"

      6 Herbert Hovenkamp, "Federal Antitrust Policy" West 2015

      7 Phillippe Chone, "Bruno Komly and Valerie Meunier, Margin Squeeze, Entry and "Umbrella Effect", Working Paper" 2010

      8 "Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Pacific Bell Tel Co. v. Link Line Comms, Inc. 2008 WL 2255265 (No. 07-512)"

      9 Phillip E Areeda, "Antitrust Law Vol III" B, Aspen Publishers 2008

      1 Yongmin Chen, "Vertical Integration, Exclusive Dealing, and Ex Post Cartelization" 38 (38): 2007

      2 Herbert Hovenkamp, "The Viability of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims" 51 : 2009

      3 "Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Declining to Join the US Department of Justice Recommendation that the United States Supreme Court Review the Decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in linkline Comms. v. Pacific Bell Telephone Company"

      4 Dennis W. Carlton, "Should "Price Squeeze" Be a Recognized Form of A nticompetitive Conduct?" 2008

      5 OECD, "Margin Squeeze-United States-, Working Party No.2 on Competition and Regulation"

      6 Herbert Hovenkamp, "Federal Antitrust Policy" West 2015

      7 Phillippe Chone, "Bruno Komly and Valerie Meunier, Margin Squeeze, Entry and "Umbrella Effect", Working Paper" 2010

      8 "Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Pacific Bell Tel Co. v. Link Line Comms, Inc. 2008 WL 2255265 (No. 07-512)"

      9 Phillip E Areeda, "Antitrust Law Vol III" B, Aspen Publishers 2008

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      학술지 이력

      학술지 이력
      연월일 이력구분 이력상세 등재구분
      2026 평가예정 재인증평가 신청대상 (재인증)
      2020-01-01 평가 등재학술지 유지 (재인증) KCI등재
      2017-01-01 평가 등재학술지 유지 (계속평가) KCI등재
      2013-01-01 평가 등재학술지 선정 (등재후보2차) KCI등재
      2012-01-01 평가 등재후보 1차 PASS (등재후보1차) KCI등재후보
      2010-01-01 평가 등재후보학술지 선정 (신규평가) KCI등재후보
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      학술지 인용정보

      학술지 인용정보
      기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
      2016 0.61 0.61 0.61
      KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
      0.66 0.79 0.779 0.25
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