The philosophy of time . v. 1 , The reality and language of time

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 자료제공 :
• Volume I: The Reality and Language of Time
• Part 1: McTaggart’s Paradox
• 1. J. M. E. McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, Mind, 17, 1908, 457?74.
• 2. C. D. Broad, ‘Ostensible Temporality’, An Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy, vol. 2, (Cambridge University Press, 1938), pp. 264?81, 288?317.
• 3. A. N. Prior, ‘Changes in Events and Changes in Things’ (Lindley Lecture) (University of Kansas Press, 1962).
• 4. D. H. Mellor, ‘McTaggart’s Proof’, Real Time II (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 70?83.
• 5. Steven Savitt, ‘A Limited Defense of Passage’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 38, 3, July 2001, 261?70.
• 6. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘McTaggart’s Paradox Defended’, Metaphysica: International Journal of Ontology and Metaphysics, 3, 1, 2002, 11?25.
• 7. Josh Parsons, ‘A-Theory for B-Theorists’, Philosophical Quarterly, 52, 206, 2003, 1?20.
• Part 2: Old B-Theories of Time
• 8. C. D. Broad, ‘Time’, in James Hastings et al. (eds.), Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, vol. 12 (Scribners, 1921), pp. 334?9, 345.
• 9. Bertrand Russell, ‘On the Experience of Time’, Monist, 25, 1915, 212?33.
• 10. J. J. C. Smart, The Space-Time World, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 131?42.
• 11. Nelson Goodman, ‘Of Time and Eternity’, The Structure of Appearance (Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 287?301.
• 12. Richard Gale, ‘Tensed Statements’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 12, 1962, 53?9.
• Part 3: New B-Theories of Time
• A. Token-Reflexive and Date-Analysis of Tensed Sentences
• 13. J. J. C. Smart, ‘Time and Becoming, in Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, (Kluwer, 1981), pp. 3?15.
• 14. Quentin Smith, ‘Problems with the New Tenseless Theory of Time’, Philosophical Studies, 52, Nov. 1987, 371?92.
• 15. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘The A Defense of the New Tenseless Theory of Time’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 41, 162, 1991, 26?38.
• 16. Joshua Mozersky, ‘Tense and Temporal Semantics’, Synthese, 124, 2, 2000, 257?79.
• 17. Heather Dyke, ‘Token, Dates and Tenseless Truth Conditions’, Synthese, 131, 3, 2002, 329?351.
• 18. Laurie A. Paul, ‘Truth Conditions of Tensed Sentence Types’, Synthese, 111, 1, 1997, 53?71.
• 19. Quentin Smith, ‘The "Sentence-Type" Version of the Tenseless Theory of Time’, Synthese, 119, 3, 1999, 233?51.
• 20. Joshua Mozersky, ‘Smith on Times and Tokens’, Synthese, 129, 3, Dec. 2001, 405?11.
• B. Alternative Analyses of Tensed Sentences
• 21. Graham Priest, ‘Tense and Truth Conditions’, Analysis, 46, 1986, 162?6.
• 22. D. H. Mellor, ‘Tense’s Tenseless Truth Conditions’, Analysis, 46, 1986, 167?72.
• 23. Graham Priest, ‘Tense, Tense, and TENSE’, Analysis, 47, 1987, 184?7.
• 24. Michelle Beer, ‘A Defense of the Co-Reporting Thesis of Tensed and Tenseless Sentences’, Philo, 10.1 (Spring/Summer 2007).
• 25. Quentin Smith, ‘Can the New Tenseless Theory of Time Be Saved By Individual Essences?’, Philo, 10.1 (Spring/Summer 2007).
• 26. Michelle Beer, ‘On the Individual Essences of Moments of Time’, Philo, 10.1 (Spring/Summer 2007).
• 27. D. H. Mellor, Thinking in Time, Real Time II (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 58?69.
• 28. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘Two Versions of the New B-Theory of Language’, in Quentin Smith and Alexandar Jokic (eds.), Time, Tense and Reference (MIT Press, 2003), pp. 271?303.
• 29. Heather Dyke, ‘A New Metaphysical Strategy: Lessons Learned from the Philosophy of Time’, Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy (Routledge, 2007), pp. 37?62.
• Volume II: Timeand Metaphysics
• Part 4: The Full Future Theory
• 30. George Schlesinger, ‘Temporal Becoming’, Aspects of Time (Hackett Publishing Co., 1980), pp. 23?6, 30?3, 140?1.
• 31. J. Bigelow, ‘Worlds Enough for Time’, Nous, 1991, 1?20.
• 32. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘Bigelow, Possible Worlds and the Passage of Time’, Analysis, 54, 4, Oct. 1994, 244?8.
• 33. Quentin Smith, ‘The Logical Structure of the Debate about McTaggart’s Paradox’, Philosophical Research Archives, 24, 1988?9, 371?9.
• 34. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘McTaggart Paradox and Smith’s Tensed Theory of Time’, Synthese, 107, 1996, 205?21.
• Part 5: The Open Future Theory
• 35. C. D. Broad, ‘The General Problem of Time and Change’, Scientific Thought (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1923), pp. 53?84.
• 36. M. Dummett, ‘Truth and the Past?Lecture 3: The Metaphysics of Time’, The Journal of Philosophy, C, 1, Jan. 2003, 38?53.
• 37. Michael Tooley, Time, Tense and Causation (Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 13?20, 33?42, 152?4, 303?5.
• 38. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘Tooley on Time and Tense’, in L. N. Oaklander (ed.), The Importance of Time (Kluwer, 2001), pp. 3?12.
• 39. Storrs McCall, ‘A Dynamic Model of Temporal Becoming’, Analysis, 44, 1984, 172?6.
• 40. Graham Nerlich, ‘Falling Branches and the Flow of Time’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76, 2, June 1998, 309?16.
• 41. Storrs McCall, ‘Time Flow Does Not Require a Second Time Dimension’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76, 2, June 1988, 317?22.
• 42. Craig Bourne, ‘When am I? A Tense Time for Some Tense Theorists’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80, 3, Sept. 2002, 359?71.
• Part 6: Presentism
• 43. Robin Le Poidevin, ‘Temporal Solipsism’, Time, Change and Contradiction: A Defense of a Tenseless Theory of Time (St Martin’s Press, 1991), pp. 36?57.
• 44. William Lane Craig, ‘McTaggart’s Paradox and Temporal Solipsism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79, 1, 2001, 32?44.
• 45. William Lane Craig, Tense and Temporal Relations, American Philosophical Quarterly, 38, 1, 85?97.
• 46. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘Presentism: A Critique’, in Hallvard Lillehammer and G. Rodriguez Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, With His Replies (Routledge, 2002), pp. 196?211.
• 47. Quentin Smith, ‘Time and Degrees of Existence: A Theory of "Degree Presentism"’, in Craig Callender (ed.), Time, Reality and Experience (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 119?36.
• 48. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘Time and Existence: A Critique of Degree Presentism’, in Maria Elisabeth Reicher (ed.), States of Affairs (Ontos Verlag, 2008).
• 49. Ned Markosian, ‘A Defense of Presentism’, in Dean Zimmermann (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. I (Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 47?82.
• 50. Simon Keller, ‘Presentism and Truthmaking’, in Dean Zimmermann (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. I (Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 83?104.
• 51. Craig Bourne, ‘A Theory of Presentism’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 36, 1, 2006, 1?23.
• 52. M. Joshua Mozersky, ‘Bourne-Again Presentism’ (new for this collection).
• 53. Michael Rea, ‘Four-Dimensionalism’, in Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 246?80.
• 54. M. Oreste Fiocco, ‘A Defense of Transient Presentism’, American Philosophical Quarterly, Oct. 2007.
• Volume III: Time, Experience and Freedom
• Part 7: Thank Goodness That’s Over!
• 55. A. N. Prior, ‘Thank Goodness That’s Over’, Philosophy, 34, 1959, 12?17.
• 56. Murray MacBeath, ‘Mellor’s Emeritus Headache’, Ratio, 25, 1983, 81?8.
• 57. D. H. Mellor, ‘The Presence of Experience’, Real Time II (Routledge, 1998), pp. 39?46.
• 58. Michelle Beer, ‘Prior’s "Thank Goodness That’s Over" Objection to the B-Theory’, Chronos: Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society VII, 2004?2005, 32?7.
• 59. Heather Dyke and James Maclaurin, ‘"Thank Goodness That’s Over": The Evolutionary Story’, Ratio, XV, 2002, 276?92.
• 60. Maxwell Goss, ‘Temporal Belief and Temporal Experience’ (new for this collection).
• Part 8: The Presence of Experience
• 61. William Lane Craig, ‘The B-Theorist "Tu Quoque" Argument’, Synthese, 107, 2 1996, 249?69.
• 62. Joshua Mozersky, ‘A Tenseless Account of the Presence of Experience’, Philosophical Studies, 129, 3, 2006, 441?76.
• 63. Yuri Balashov, ‘Time of Our Lives: Negotiating the Presence of Experience’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 42, 4, 2005, 295?309.
• 64. William Lane Craig, ‘Wishing it Were Now Some Other Time’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62, 1 2001, 159?66.
• 65. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘Be Careful What You Wish For: A Reply to Craig’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76, 1, 2008, 156?63.
• 66. Simon Prosser, ‘Could We Experience the Passage of Time?’, Ratio, 20,1, 2007, 75?90.
• Part 9: Time and Consciousness
• 67. Gustav Bergmann, ‘Duration and the Specious Present’, Philosophy of Science, 27, 1, Jan. 1960, 39?47.
• 68. Ronald C. Hoy, ‘A Note on Gustav Bergmann’s Treatment of Temporal Consciousness’, Philosophy of Science, 42, 1, Dec. 1976, 610?17.
• 69. Barry Dainton, ‘Time and Consciousness, Time and Space (Acumen Publishing, 2001), pp. 93?109.
• 70. Robin Le Poidevin, ‘Memory and the A-series’, Time and History (Ontos Verlag, 2006), pp. 31?42.
• Part 10: Freedom
• 71. Jan Lukasiewicz, ‘On Determinism’, in Storrs McCall (ed.), Polish Logic: 1920?1939 (Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 19?39.
• 72. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘Freedom and the New Theory of Time’, in Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), Questions of Time and Tense (Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 185?205.
• 73. Joseph Diekemper, ‘B-Theory, Fixity, and Fatalism’, Nous, 41, 3, 429?52.
• 74. Michael Rea, ‘Presentism and Fatalism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84, 4, Dec. 2006, 511?24.
• Volume IV: Time and Physics
• Part 11: The A-theory and Special Relativity
• 75. Kurt Godel ‘A Remark About the Relationship Between Relativity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy’, in Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher Scientist (Open Court Publishing Company, 1949), pp. 557?62.
• 76. Hilary Putnam, ‘Time and Physical Geometry’, Journal of Philosophy, 64, 1967, 240?7.
• 77. Howard Stein, ‘On Relativity Theory and Openness of the Future’, Philosophy of Science, 58, 1991, 147?67.
• 78. Lawrence Sklar, ‘Time, Reality and Relativity’, in Richard Healey (ed.), Reduction, Time and Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 129?42.
• 79. Quentin Smith, ‘The Incompatibility of STR and the Tensed Theory of Time’, in L. Nathan Oaklander (ed.), The Importance of Time (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), pp. 153?6.
• 80. Simon Saunders, ‘How Relativity Contradicts Presentism’, in Craig Callender (ed.), Time, Reality and Experience (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 277?92.
• 81. William Lane Craig, ‘The Metaphysics of Special Relativity: Three Views’, in William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith (eds.), Einstein, Relativity and Absolute Simultaneity (Routledge, 2007).
• 82. Yuri Balashov and Michel Janssen, ‘Critical Notice: Presentism and Relativity’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54, 2003, 327?46.
• 83. C. Bourne, The Present Dialectic in Special Relativity, A Future for Presentism (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 160?86.
• 84. James B. Hartle, ‘The Physics of Now’, American Journal of Physics, 73, 2, 2005, 101?9.
• Part 12: The Direction of Time
• 85. T. Gold, ‘The Arrow of Time’, in S. T. Butler and H. Messel (eds.), Time (Pergamon Press, 1965), pp. 143?65
• 86. Adolf Grunbaum, ‘The Anisotropy of Time’, in T. Gold and D.L. Schumacher (eds.), The Nature of Time (Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 149?77, 245?7.
• 87. Lawrence Sklar, ‘Up and Down, Left and Right, Past and Future’, Nous, 15, 1981, 111?29.
• 88. Erwin Tegtmeier, ‘Direction of Time, A Problem of Ontology, not of Physics’, in J. Faye et al. (eds.), Perspectives on Time (Kluwer, 1997), pp. 183?91.
• 89. Mauro Dorato, ‘Absolute Becoming, Relational Becoming and the Arrow of Time: Some Non-Conventional Remarks on the Relationship Between Physics and Metaphysics’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 37, 3, 2006, 559?76.
• Part 13: Time Travel
• 90. David Lewis, ‘The Paradoxes of Time Travel’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 13, 1 1976, 145?52.
• 91. Paul Horwich, ‘Time Travel’, Asymmetries in Time (MIT Press, 1967), pp. 111?28.
• 92. Nicholas J. J. Smith, ‘Bananas Enough for Time Travel’, British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 48, 1997, 363?89.
• 93. D. H. Mellor, ‘Time Travel’, in Katinka Ridderbos (ed.), Time (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 46?64.
• 94. Simon Keller and Michael Nelson, ‘Presentists Should Believe in Time Travel’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79, 2001, 333?45.
• 95. Ted Sider, ‘Traveling in A- and B- Time’, Monist, 88, 3, 2005, 329?35.
• 96. Kristie Miller, ‘Time Travel and the Open Future’, Disputatio, 19, 1, 2005, pp. 223?32.
• Epilogue
• 97. D. H. Mellor, ‘Time’, in Frank Jackson and Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 615?35.