(The) U.S.-ROK-China 'Romantic Triangle' and the North Korean problem

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The primary stakeholders in the North Korean nuclear dilemma have collectively failed to reach a solution due to the strategic rivalries that divide them. I first outline the strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China and the corresponding roles of North Korea and South Korea in this greater hegemonic competition. I then explain North Korea’s nuclear pursuit as a quest for security against internal and external threats, and the security dilemma that results as this objective directly undermines U.S. and allied security. Theories of alliance formation offer varying predictions of secondary state behavior (South Korea) when confronted with a rising power (China). Alliance transition theory states that as a rising challenger camp reaches near-parity with a status quo camp, there are heightened risks of great power war and realignment with the rising power. As the North Korean nuclear problem metastasizes against the backdrop a regional power shift, a transition from the United States to China as the vital actor in the North Korea dilemma could weaken the U.S.-ROK alliance and catalyze a strategic ROK realignment with China. I trace the transition from a U.S.-ROK ‘stable marriage’ during the Cold War towards a more equilateral U.S.-ROK-China ‘romantic triangle’ in the present, whereby the U.S. and China seek to leverage the North Korean problem as a means to strengthen influence over South Korea. I then analyze the risks that China’s rise and DPRK nuclearization pose for the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance under the Moon and Trump administrations, such as a failure of deterrence, discrepancies in North Korea policy, economic coercion, and war. A final discussion of diplomatic pathways and outcomes of decnuclearization suggests that any diplomatic outcome in the near-term will require strategic concessions by the U.S. which could unravel the U.S.-ROK alliance. In the context of negotiations, I illustrate how Washington and Beijing each utilize their respective sources of leverage to carve a pathway to denuclearization that aligns Seoul’s interests with their own and alienates their strategic rival.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• I. Introduction..........................................................................1
• II. Theoretical Framework
• 2.1 Balance of Power Politics......................................................7
• 2.2 Power Transition Theory and Alliance Transition Theory..........11
• 2.3 Alliance Security Dilemmas and the Threat of Decoupling.........18
• III. China, North Korea, and the Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance
• 3.1 U.S.-China Great Power Rivalry
• 3.1.1 The U.S. Hub-and-Spokes Alliance System and the China
• Challenge…………………….................................................24
• 3.1.2 The Evolution of U.S. Security Partnerships in Asia………..29
• 3.1.3 Issue Linkage: North Korea, the South China Sea, Trade, and
• Taiwan......................................................................................36
• 3.1.4 The Enduring View of North Korea as a Strategic Asset........42
• 3.2 The North Korean Pursuit of Security
• 3.2.1 Strategic Objectives of the Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs...........................................................................49
• 3.2.2 Why the United States Cannot Accept a Nuclear North Korea.......................................................................................55
• 3.3 The U.S.-ROK-China ‘Romantic Triangle’
• 3.3.1 The Emerging Romantic Triangle.................................62
• 3.3.2 The U.S.-ROK Divide: Domestic Politics and Alliance Friction....................................................................................70
• 3.3.3 Novel Challenges for Moon and Trump: Deterrence,
• Reassurance, and U.S.-ROK-China Trilateral Cooperation...79
• 3.3.4 THAAD..........................................................................90
• 3.3.5 The Diplomatic Dilemma: Pathways and Outcomes of Denuclearization.....................................................................99
• IV. Conclusion: A Way Forward....................................114
• V. References...........................................................................117