보호막과 모니터링 - 조직경제학적 관점에서 본 합작기업의 파트너간 분업구조 : 보호막과 모니터링 = Protection and Monitoring：Explaining Inter-Partner Division of Labor in Joint Venture Companies from an Economics of Organization Perspective

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 논문은 조직경제학적 관점에서 합작기업의 파트너간 분업구조 결정에 영향을 미치는 요인들을 실증적으로 연구한다. 본 논문에서는 합작기업의 분업구조가 상대방으로부터 자신의 핵심 노하우와 전략적 자원을 보호하고 동시에 상대방의 기회주의적 행동 가능성에 대해 모니터링하기에 효과적인 방향으로 결정된다고 보고, 대안적 분업구조 유형들이 보호막과 모니터링 효과에 있어서 어떤 차이가 있는지에 초점을 맞추어 합작기업의 분업구조 결정을 설명한다. 170개의 합작기업들에 관한 자료를 사용한 실증연구의 결과, 조직경제학적 관점에서 제시한 네가지 가설들이 모두 지지되었다. 즉 본 논문의 결과에 따르면, 합작투자에 중요하고 희소한 기술적 노하우가 많이 투자되고, 모기업들 간 시장 중복 정도가 높아서 상대가 자신의 노하우를 쉽게 학습할 수 있을수록, 합작에 참여하는 기업들은 자신의 전략적 자원을 상대로부터 보호하기 위해 기능별 분업구조를 선택할 가능성이 높은 것으로 나타났다. 또한 본 연구의 결과는 파트너의 대체가능성이 낮아서 상대가 합작관계에서 기회주의적으로 조기에 철수하는 경우 높은 손실이 발생할 가능성이 크고, 동일한 상대방과 과거 협력경험이 없어서 상대방의 기회주의적 성향에 대한 지식이 없는 경우에는, 상대방의 기회주의적 행동의 가능성을 직접 모니터링하거나 그들의 노하우를 학습하여 상대방의 철수에 대비할 수 있도록 혼합형 결합구조를 선택할 가능성이 높다는 것을 보여주었다. 조직경제학적 관점에 기반한 본 연구의 결과는 과업 효율성과 같은 기술적 요인이나 신뢰와 같은 사회관계적 요인에 주로 초점을 맞추어 왔던 합작이나 제휴에 관한 기존 연구들에 중요한 보완적 관점을 제공할 것으로 기대된다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The current study examines the factors that may affect the structure of division of labor between partner firms in joint venture companies from an economics of organization perspective. In most of the existing studies, structures of interfirm cooperation, such as joint ventures and strategic alliances, have been analyzed from one of the following two perspectives: 1) a relational perspective that emphasizes the importance of trust-based social relations between partner firms, and 2) a technical functionalist perspective that highlights the crucial role of functional necessities in terms of technical efficiency. In contrast, our study pays attention to the observation that as an unexpected consequence of such preoccupation with these two dominant perspectives, most existing studies have wittingly or unwittingly belittled the far more fundamental nature of inter-firm cooperation as an economic relation between corporate actors who pursue the maximization of self interests.
Thus, the current study aims to provide an important complementary perspective to the existing literature of inter-firm cooperation by focusing explicitly on the economic aspects of cooperative relations between corporate actors. Accordingly, the theoretical framework of the current study draws heavily on the economics of organization literature, such as transaction cost economics and agency theory. While these two theoretical traditions of the economics of organization literature are interested in different subject issues, both are based on the same assumption of opportunism which Oliver Williamson defines as ‘the pursuit of self-interest with guile.’ That is, regardless of theoretical traditions, studies in the economics of organization literature assume that economic actors often hide or distort information, break promises, and change their stances to pursue their interests. As a consequence, both traditions of the economics of organization literature have common interests in how to monitor and prevent the alter’s opportunistic behaviors efficiently.
We argue that the forms and processes of inter-firm cooperative relations are significantly affected by the needs for monitoring and safeguarding against opportunistic behaviors emphasized in the economics of organization literature, as well as by relational characteristics or functional imperatives stressed in existing studies. The empirical study of the current paper concentrates on figuring out what determines the structure of inter-partner division of labor in joint venture companies which provide a highly interesting setting for studying inter-firm cooperative relations owing to their unique nature that encompasses characteristics of both markets and hierarchies. Assuming that the structure of inter-partner division of labor in joint venture companies will be determined in the direction that is more efficient 1) in protecting core knowhow and strategic resources from extraction attempts by the partner and 2) in monitoring the possibility of opportunistic behaviors by the partner, the current study compares two alternative structures of inter-partner division of labors-the functional division structure and the mixed structure. While employees dispatched from different parent companies work closely with each other on a daily basis mixed together in most functional departments in the mixed structure, they work separately from each other by taking exclusive responsibilities in different functions in the functional division structure.
According to the results of our probit regression analyses using an original data-set of 176 international joint venture companies, all of the four hypotheses that we suggested based on the economics of organization perspective were supported. Results of our study show that when scarce and critical technological know-how is invested in joint venture companies or when the partner can easily learn the focal firm’

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 〈초록〉
• Ⅰ. 서론
• Ⅱ. 기업간 협력의 리스크와 합작기업의 조직설계
• Ⅲ. 연구모형과 가설：합작기업에서 파트너간 분업구조
• Ⅳ. 연구방법과 분석
• Ⅴ. 토론 및 결론
• 참고문헌
• ABSTRACT

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