The global economic crisis from 2007 to 2009 was the most serious crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, and gave the global economy a large shock. It evoked not only the problems of privatization of profits, which are accompanied by socializ...
The global economic crisis from 2007 to 2009 was the most serious crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, and gave the global economy a large shock. It evoked not only the problems of privatization of profits, which are accompanied by socialization of the losses, but also provoked debates on the cause and solution of the crisis. There are many theories regarding the cause of the crisis: one theory is based on failure of regulation, and attributes the cause to the lack of supervision in the financial markets. Another theory attributes the cause to financialization followed by an unstable expansion of finance. Yet another theory is based on Marxian crisis theory of falling rate of profit, which views decrease of the rate of profit since 1970s in major developed countries as the main cause of the crisis.
This study focuses on whether financialization can explain the change in Korean economy. According to this theory, financial instability is a key factor that causes economic crisis in a system dominated by finance. Korean economy has rapidly developed thanks to a series of measures favorable to financialization that are based on the American financial model, including liberalization of the interest rate in 1991; and since 1997, restructuring of the financial industries; the open financial market; and the abolition of various regulations.
Some data suggest that financialization gave rise to larger instability and less investments, and subsequently led to an overall recession in Korean economy. But contrary to these explanations, the amount of the corporate financing has been growing steadily and also, the decrease in investments by firms was caused not by financialization but by demand-side factors or/and the decline of profitabilities.
Meanwhile, there are arguments that the Korean economy has to move from a bank-oriented system to the Anglo-American market-oriented system. But the collapse of the five biggest investment banks has debunked this belief.
Empirical studies on the financialization of Korean economy with the indicators applied to the analyses of American economy show that the level of the financialization in Korea is insignificant.
In terms of dominance of finance, except for the growth of the ratio of the volume of financial assets to tangible assets in non-financial corporate after 2000, there is no symptom that indicates financialization or the establishment of finance-led accumulation regime. The study was done using figures such as ratio of operating surplus of non-financial firms to financial firms, ratio of financial outflow to operating surplus in non-financial firms, non-financial to financial profitability in manufacturing firms, and debt ratio in non-financial firms.
In terms of the change of the financial structure, although a trend of growing financial industries is indicated by some figures related to the scale of the stock market, share of institutional stock holders, and the ratio of the volume of stock to debt in non-financial firms, it is not enough to support that the system of Korean economy moved from a bank-base to a capital-market-base.
This study points out the deficiencies of the financialization thesis, which suggests that the financial instability or financial fragility were the causes of the global economic crisis during 2007-2009 and argue that we have to consider the long-term decline of major developed countries since the 1970s in order to find an accurate solution. In addition, I argue that the thesis of finance-led accumulation regime cannot explain the characteristics of the change of Korean economy by using time-series analysis of finincialization including data during the 2007-2009 global economic crisis.