Missile Test . . . or Test of the Six-Party Talks? = Missile Test . . . or Test of the Six-Party Talks?

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

By assessing the developments following the July 5, 2006 North Korean missile launches, the author argues that a quick resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue is nearly impossible. Discussion of each country`s cost-benefit analyses and the conflicting interests of the six parties will show that the search for nonviolent responses to the North Korean nuclear issue creates dilemmas for all of the countries: North Korea`s dilemma concerns the most fundamental question of identity change, while the other five countries` dilemma is simply about how to approach this problem. The paper analyzes how the Pyongyang leadership perceives the current international security environment and what its future strategy will likely be. Particular attention is paid to attempting to answer why North Korea cannot give up nuclear weapons and why the six-party talks are destined to fail. The newly developing diplomatic game since the July 5 missile tests is not only about the relationship between North Korea and the other five members of the Six-Party Talks, but also about the conflicting interests among defenders of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. The North Korean nuclear crisis cannot be resolved without an accompanying evolution in North Korean political identity. Since it is uncertain when and how regime transformation in North Korea will unfold, the Six-Party Talks process should continue, but measures for soft-landing contingencies also must be prepared. Accordingly, how to solve the North Korean nuclear issue is not the most relevant question at the moment; the more fundamental question is how to manage the North Korean regime, which has been the origin of every North Korean problem.