북한의 주변정세 인식과 대응전략 : The DPRK Foreign Policy Since the Perry Report 페리보고서 이후 북한의 대외정책을 중심으로 = North Korea's Perception of the External Environment and Its Strategy to Survive

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The great change within the former socialist bloc, the death of the former DPRK President Kim Il Sung, the severe economic problems, including shortages of food, have had great impacts on North Korea's external relations in the 1990s. At the end of the century, North Korea seemed to open the new era with Kim Jong Il by placing him as the chairman of the powerful Military Commission, the highest position in the DPRK. At the first session of the 10th Supreme People's Assembly, on September 1998, North Korea adopted a new constitution declared that it would not give up its socialist system under the slogan of "Strong and Prosperous State." In 1999, it seem more likely that Pyongyang has overcome the most serious economic setback caused by the shortages of food, and therefore will be more active in its foreign relations.
Since the 6th Party Congress, on October 1980, when the DPRK proclaimed that it would pursue Self-reliance, Friendship, and Peace as the three important foreign policy goals, Pyongyang has developed various strategies and tactics to fulfill those goals. While Pyongyang has maintained those official and declared diplomatic goals, it has also revealed its flexibility and practical rationality. In the context of the changing environment, the DPRK adhered to its principle of self-reliance, while practicing international cooperation. However, it has also shown mutually exclusive attitude in diplomacy; closed and isolated posture tempered with open and reform-mindedness; aggressive and active behaviors mixed with defensive and passive attitudes; and near brinkrnanship method of negotiation moderated with a business-like approach.
Throughout the 1990s, the DPRK has attempted to achieve at least three major tasks ill its international relations: survival of its system, economic development, and self-respect or national pride. The DPRK has perceived the Western world, including South Korea, to continue its containment policy against North Korea. Furthermore, Pyongyang has a strong doubt about the Western efforts to expand exchanges and cooperation with North Korea as being tricks of transforming the DPRK. On the other hand, the DPRK has a perception that there are some critical differences among Washington DC, Seoul, and Tokyo in dealing with Pyongyang. The order of preferences in foreign policy goals and capabilities of the three countries does not match perfectly. Thus, it seems quite natural that North Korea has made efforts to widen the gap among the three nations by concentrating on its diplomatic deals with Washington. The so-called "Tong-Mi-Bong-Nam" policy(Negotiating with the US while Keeping Out South Korea) signifies the reality of the DPRK's foreign policy at the turn of the century.
Under the new circumstance, a comprehensive approach with a package deal, including the easing of economic sanctions against the DPRK and the improvement of US-DPRK and Japan-DPRK relations, would help the DPRK adopt change and opening. This would finally lead to the elimination of the cold war structure on the Korean Peninsula. However, this change would not guarantee the improvement in inter-Korean relations. The Agreed Framework (The Geneva Agreement), although it solved the DPRK nuclear problem temporarily, never brought about the improvement of the inter-Korean relations. The Kumch'angri underground facility, which triggered another crisis on the Korean Peninsula, could keep on repeating in the future. On the other hand, if US and Japanese business firms could rush into North Korea as the economic sanctions against North Korea were relaxed, it would be possible for South Korea either to be included in or excluded from doing business with North Korea. It is necessary to maximize the positive effects and minimize negative effects, as much as possible, if the comprehensive approach to the Korean problem with a package deal is ever adopted.
The improvement of the US-DPRK relations could end the incentive for the inter-Korea dialogue. Thus, the United States should have close and sincere consultations with South Korean and Japanese counterparts prior to negotiations with the DPRK delegates. In response to Pyongyang's endeavors to exclude the South Korean government, the exchanges and cooperation between non-governmental agencies that Pyongyang permits, should be encouraged and supported.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 1. 문제제기
• 2. 북한의 기본 목표와 입장
• 3. 주변정세 인식
• 4. 북한의 대응전략
• 5. 맺음말