This article will examine the contents of the Taska Mission Report which contains records of the Taska mission's 3 month activities in Korea serving as a special emissary from the President of the United States in April 1953. the United States were in...
This article will examine the contents of the Taska Mission Report which contains records of the Taska mission's 3 month activities in Korea serving as a special emissary from the President of the United States in April 1953. the United States were in need of bringing an an end to the Korean War as soon as possible, and they also needed some time to decide the magnitude of the Korean Assistant Program, not to mention preparing for it. In the meantime, the Korean government had to secure military support and financial aids from the U.S. in order to compensate for the heavy deficit in the national monetary system which was expected in case of a substantial buildup in the Korean military. So the Taska Mission was sent to Korea under orders of conducting a preliminary survey of the Korean situation which was required for determining the size of the Assistant program. And their mission also included developing methods and plans for reconstructing the Korean economy, which would eventually serve the best interest of the U.S. as well. To put the situation more directly, the Envoy had to determine the practical budget and viable methods for the U.S. financial aid to the Korean peninsula, in preparation for the U.S.' plan for the Korean military buildup which would see total of 20 individual divisions established in the process.
The Taska report contained the Nathan group's optimistic view of the Korean economical situation, and its position in the Korean relief issue. Relief, Reconstruction and Defense aid were key words of the Report. Yet the program's necessary nature, and the installation of a department to oversee the program were the only parts of the report that was agreed upon. The Korean Economy Reconstruction plan, which would help the Korean economy to stand on its own, and the suggestion that the Koreans' participation in the relief program's operation should be increased, were denied and not included in the U.S' policy regarding the Korean aid program. When the FOA was newly assigned as the official U.S. office in charge of Foreign Assistant programs in August 1953, Taska Report's suggestion of reorganizing the body for the Aid program resulted in the installation of an office of the Economic Coordinator inside U.N. Headquaters and its designation to serve as the overseer of the program. And the policy of extending economical aids only to address military contingencies, which had been a standing U.S. policy since the administration of Eisenhower, was confirmed once again.