국회 입법과정의 분석과 개선방안 -제18대 국회를 중심으로- = Legislative Process of the 18th National Assembly: Analysis and Suggestions

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In the 18th National Assembly, the ruling party had an overwhelming voting power because the general election for the Assembly was a honeymoon one. It meant that the Executive was naturally able to have a great influence on the Assembly and to take the initiative in the legislative process. According to a statistical analysis on the legislation of the 18th Assembly, however, many bills introduced by the Executive as well as by the members of the Assembly were abandoned while alternatives to them were proposed by the standing committees and the passage`s rate of the Executive`s bills was not so high as expected. In addition, the bills proposed by the assemblymen, though great in quantity, were passed to a slight degree. Concerning legislation by assemblymen, today, much more requested is the improvement for the quality rather than the activation of legislation. The legislative process should be prudent and reasonable in order that legislation may reflect accurately the will of the people and consider their interests carefully. But the 18th Assembly`s legislative process showed the pathological phenomena described as ``violent Parliament``, ``hasty legislation``, and ``bypass legislation``. National Assembly Act (NAA) has been amended for the advancement of the legislative process (May 2, 2012). The key points are as follows: limitation of the power of ex-officioreference of the Speaker, limited permission of filibuster for minority`s free discussion harmonized with majority rule, introduction of fast- track and of automatical reference to the committees or the plenary session for legislative efficiency, strengthening regulations and sanctions for the order of legislative process etc. However, it is regrettable that the pre-regulatory screening system has not been introduced so as to prevent the bypass legislation. Norms as a system is necessary because of human weakness and wickedness. The behavior of legislators can be, to some extent, orientated and regulated by some institutional incentives. What effect these institutional arrangements, introduced just before the 19th National Assembly, can take in the future will be a new research project.