Semiconductors play a critical role in economic growth, scientific innovation as well as national security. After the Biden administration took office, it has been regarding China as America’s top strategic competitor and semiconductor as a key area...
Semiconductors play a critical role in economic growth, scientific innovation as well as national security. After the Biden administration took office, it has been regarding China as America’s top strategic competitor and semiconductor as a key area of U.S.-China strategic competition, and was committed to forming a semiconductor alliance to serve the national interests of the United States. After the Yoon Seok-youl government took office, the focus of Korea’s foreign policy shifted to upgrading the U.S.-Korea alliance and attaching importance to the construction of the U.S.-Korea semiconductor alliance. As the U.S.-Korea semiconductor alliance will greatly reshape China’s economic, technological and security environment from the outside, how Beijing responds to this has become a matter of concern. As far as the motivation of the U.S.-Korea semiconductor alliance is concerned, China’s cognition is mainly based on various logics that can be explained by different branches of IR theories. In the face of the construction of U.S.-Korea semiconductor alliance, this paper attempts to explore China’s response with the wedge strategy in the theory of alliance of IR. Unlike the economic and business circles, which regard the U.S.-Korea semiconductor alliance as a pure economic alliance, the Chinese political elites and the international relations academia tend to regard it as an alliance aimed at containing China, which is emphasized by the wedge strategy theory, and they at the same time believe that the alliance has its own limits, not only far less stable than the U.S.-Korea military alliance, but also harms Korea’s economic interests and diplomatic autonomy. Therefore, China has responded through both internal and external policies, including domestic substitution, policy declaration, diplomatic struggle against the United States, pressure on Korean economy and public opinion, and promotion of Sino-Korean semiconductor cooperation. China’s wedge strategy makes full use of its own advantages, trying to use prealignment, disalignment, and even dealignment and realignment to divide the U.S.-Korea semiconductor alliance. This strategy has already reached some of its goals, but whether it can succeed remains to be seen.