LOCAL INTERACTION, ALTRUISM AND THE EVOLUTION OF NETWORKS

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

We consider evolving networks on which players interact locally. In an
evolutionary environment, players can increase their fitness either by
changing their behavior or by changing their neighbors. We propose a static
solution concept, what we call Stable Network Configuration (SNC). Roughly
speaking, it requires that no player in the population distribution will change
his type by imitating his best-performing neighbor, nor change his neighbor
by rewiring his links. We characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the symmetric SNC in a network formation situation associated with the
Prisoner's Dilemma game. Unlike the result by Eshel et al. (1998) that was
obtained in a fixed circular network, all altruists and all egoists fare equally
well and all altruists have links with some or all egoists in the symmetric
SNC.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

We consider evolving networks on which players interact locally. In an
evolutionary environment, players can increase their fitness either by
changing their behavior or by changing their neighbors. We propose a static
solution concept, what we call Stable Network Configuration (SNC). Roughly
speaking, it requires that no player in the population distribution will change
his type by imitating his best-performing neighbor, nor change his neighbor
by rewiring his links. We characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the symmetric SNC in a network formation situation associated with the
Prisoner's Dilemma game. Unlike the result by Eshel et al. (1998) that was
obtained in a fixed circular network, all altruists and all egoists fare equally
well and all altruists have links with some or all egoists in the symmetric
SNC.

참고문헌 (Reference)

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