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      통화통합의 정치적 동인: 유럽의 경험과 동아시아에의 함의 = Political Motivations for Monetary Integration: The European Experience and the Implication for East Asia

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      The purpose of this paper is to investigate the political motivations behind the European monetary integration and draw implications for the future of the East Asian monetary integration. Regardless of its economic rationale and effect, monetary integration proceeds as a series of political choice on the issue of monetary sovereignty. The European experience reveals that those political factors working on the international, regional, and domestic levels determine the destiny of this choice. The fundamental motivation behind the European monetary integration was to revise the hegemonic international monetary order in such a way to protect and promote European common interests. With this being a fundamental rationale, the political conflict among the European countries on the asymmetric nature of the European Monetary System(EMS) and the domestic political considerations to secure monetary policy commitment have finally led to the launch of a monetary union.


      This experience highlights the fundamental importance of the revisionist consensus on the future development of East Asian monetary integration, which, by and large, is not mature yet. Yet, once this precondition is satisfied, the oft-cited obstacles to the monetary integration in East Asia, political mistrust and institutional deficit, are likely to be transformed into the political raw materials for the institutional evolution.
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      The purpose of this paper is to investigate the political motivations behind the European monetary integration and draw implications for the future of the East Asian monetary integration. Regardless of its economic rationale and effect, monetary integ...

      The purpose of this paper is to investigate the political motivations behind the European monetary integration and draw implications for the future of the East Asian monetary integration. Regardless of its economic rationale and effect, monetary integration proceeds as a series of political choice on the issue of monetary sovereignty. The European experience reveals that those political factors working on the international, regional, and domestic levels determine the destiny of this choice. The fundamental motivation behind the European monetary integration was to revise the hegemonic international monetary order in such a way to protect and promote European common interests. With this being a fundamental rationale, the political conflict among the European countries on the asymmetric nature of the European Monetary System(EMS) and the domestic political considerations to secure monetary policy commitment have finally led to the launch of a monetary union.


      This experience highlights the fundamental importance of the revisionist consensus on the future development of East Asian monetary integration, which, by and large, is not mature yet. Yet, once this precondition is satisfied, the oft-cited obstacles to the monetary integration in East Asia, political mistrust and institutional deficit, are likely to be transformed into the political raw materials for the institutional evolution.

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 배병인, "환율제도의 정치적 결정 요인: 당파성 모형과 제도 모형의 경험적 분석" 한국정치학회 44 (44): 29-44, 2010

      2 김영철, "외환위기 이후 동아시아 지역주의: 한,중,일 3국을 중심으로" 극동문제연구소 21 (21): 1-31, 2005

      3 유재원, "아시아 통화위기와 지역통화제도의 모색" 4 (4): 43-69, 1999

      4 申寬浩, "동아시아 단일통화지역의 가능성과 금융협력의 방향" 한국경제의 분석패널 8 (8): 119-188, 2002

      5 김진영, "동아시아 금융통화협력의 진전과 전망" 극동문제연구소 23 (23): 213-242, 2007

      6 Baer, Gunter D, "“The Werner ReportRevisited,” Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union,Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community" Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 53-60, 1989

      7 Thompson, Earl A, "Who Should Control the Money Supply?" 71 (71): 356-361, 1981

      8 Majone, Giandomenico, "Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and FiduciaryRelations in EU Governance" 2 (2): 103-122, 2001

      9 Herrendorf, Berthold, "Transparency, Reputation, and Credibility UnderFloating and Pegged Exchange Rates" 49 (49): 31-50, 1999

      10 Bernhard, William, J., "ThePolitical Economy of Monetary Institutions" 56 (56): 693-723, 2002

      1 배병인, "환율제도의 정치적 결정 요인: 당파성 모형과 제도 모형의 경험적 분석" 한국정치학회 44 (44): 29-44, 2010

      2 김영철, "외환위기 이후 동아시아 지역주의: 한,중,일 3국을 중심으로" 극동문제연구소 21 (21): 1-31, 2005

      3 유재원, "아시아 통화위기와 지역통화제도의 모색" 4 (4): 43-69, 1999

      4 申寬浩, "동아시아 단일통화지역의 가능성과 금융협력의 방향" 한국경제의 분석패널 8 (8): 119-188, 2002

      5 김진영, "동아시아 금융통화협력의 진전과 전망" 극동문제연구소 23 (23): 213-242, 2007

      6 Baer, Gunter D, "“The Werner ReportRevisited,” Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union,Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community" Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 53-60, 1989

      7 Thompson, Earl A, "Who Should Control the Money Supply?" 71 (71): 356-361, 1981

      8 Majone, Giandomenico, "Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and FiduciaryRelations in EU Governance" 2 (2): 103-122, 2001

      9 Herrendorf, Berthold, "Transparency, Reputation, and Credibility UnderFloating and Pegged Exchange Rates" 49 (49): 31-50, 1999

      10 Bernhard, William, J., "ThePolitical Economy of Monetary Institutions" 56 (56): 693-723, 2002

      11 Kindleberger, Charles P, "The World in Depression: 1929-1939" University of California Press 1973

      12 Tavlas, George S, "The Theory of Monetary Integration" 5 (5): 211-230, 1994

      13 Friedman, Milton, "The Role of Monetary Policy" 58 (58): 1-17, 1968

      14 Tsoukalis, Loukas, "The Politics and Economics of European MonetaryIntegration" Allen and Unwin 1977

      15 Rogoff, Kenneth, "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an IntermediateMonetary Target" 100 (100): 1169-1189, 1985

      16 Grieco, Joseph M, "The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Unionand the Neo-Realist Research Programme" 21 (21): 21-40, 1995

      17 Snidal, Duncan, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory" 39 (39): 579-614, 1985

      18 Hoffmeyer, Erik, "The International Monetary System: An Essay in Interpretation" North-Holland 1992

      19 Solomon, Robert, "The International Monetary System, 1945-1981" Harper & Row 1982

      20 Fratianni, Michele, "The European Monetary Systemand European Monetary Union" Westview Press 1992

      21 Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso, "The European Monetary System: A Long-termView, In The European Monetary System" Cambridge UniversityPress 369-384, 1988

      22 Frankel, Jeffrey A, "The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria" 108 (108): 1009-1025, 1998

      23 Milesi-Ferretti, "The Disadvantage of Tying Their Hands: Onthe Political Economy of Policy Commitments" 105 (105): 1381-1402, 1995

      24 McNamara, Kathleen R, "The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in theEuropean Union" Cornell University Press 1998

      25 Kindleberger, Charles P, "The Benefits of International Money" 2 (2): 425-442, 1972

      26 Mundell, Robert A, "The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Internaland External Stability" 9 (9): 70-79, 1962

      27 Giavazzi, Francesco, "The Advantage of Tying One’sHands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility" 32 (32): 1055-1075, 1988

      28 Henning, C. Randall, "Systemic Conflict and Regional Monetary Integration:The Case of Europe" 52 (52): 537-573, 1998

      29 Bayoumi, Tamim, "Shocking Aspects of EuropeanMonetary Unification" National Bureau of Economic Research 1992

      30 Barro, Robert J, "Rules, Discretion, and Reputationin a Model of Monetary Policy" 12 (12): 101-121, 1983

      31 Kenen, Peter B, "Regional Monetary Integration" Cambridge University Press 2008

      32 Gowa, Joanne, "Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and SmallGroups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory?" 41 (41): 304-324, 1989

      33 Wihlborg, Clas, "Optimum Currency Areas Revisitedon the Transition Path to a Currency Union, In Financial Regulation andMonetary Arrangements After 1992" North-Holland 279-297, 1991

      34 McKinnon, Ronald I, "Optimum Currency Areas" 53 (53): 717-725, 1962

      35 Bayoumi, Tamim, "One Money or Many? Analyzing the Prospects for MonetaryUnification in Various Parts of the World" Department of Economics, PrincetonUniversity 1994

      36 Eichengreen, Barry, "One Money for Europe? Lessons from the USCurrency Union" 5 (5): 117-187, 1990

      37 Flood, Robert P, "Monetary Policy Strategies" 36 (36): 612-632, 1989

      38 Melitz, Jacques, "Monetary Discipline and Cooperation in the EuropeanMonetary System: A Synthesis, In The European Monetary System" Cambridge University Press 51-78, 1988

      39 Giavazzi, Francesco, "Limiting Exchange Rate Flexibility:The European Monetary System" MIT Press 1989

      40 Dyson, Kenneth H.F, "Italy and EMU as a ‘VincoloEsterno’: Empowering the Technocrats, Transforming the State" 1 (1): 272-299, 1996

      41 Frankel, Jeffrey A, "Is EMU More Justifiable Ex Postthan Ex Ante?" 41 (41): 753-760, 1997

      42 Bayoumi, Tamim, "Ever Closer to Heaven?: An Optimum-Currency-Area Indexfor European Countries" CIDER(Center for International and Development Economics Research),University of California 1996

      43 Walsh, James I, "European Monetary Integration and Domestic Politics:Britain, France, and Italy" Lynne Rienner Publishers 2000

      44 Goto, Junichi, "Economic Preconditions for AsianRegional Integration, In MacroeconomicLinkage: Savings, Exchange Rates, and Capital Flows" University of Chicago Press 359-388, 1994

      45 박성훈, "EMU 모형에 비추어 본 동아시아 통화통합의 경로" 대외경제정책연구원 8 (8): 145-194, 2004

      46 Fleming, J. Marcus, "Domestic Financial Policies Under Fixed and UnderFloating Exchange Rates" 9 (9): 369-380, 1962

      47 Sandholtz, Wayne, "Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht" 47 (47): 1-39, 1993

      48 배병인, "Adaptational Pressure, Domestic Politics and the Evolution of the European Monetary System" 한국국제정치학회 49 (49): 7-32, 2009

      49 Mundell, Robert A, "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas" 51 (51): 657-665, 1961

      50 Ungerer, Horst, "A Concise History of European Monetary Integration: FromEPU to EMU" Quorum Books 1997

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