代理理論이 會計硏究에 미치는 영향에 대한 考察 = The Influences of Agency Theory upon Accounting Research

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Recent developments in finance, economics and accounting research have led to reconsideration of the formal modelling of the demand for demand for accounting information. This area of research, generally termed information economics, has considered two broad sources of demand for financial information: stewardship and decision making.
Models that consider the stewardship demand for information have been called agency theory models. These models focus on agency relationship (or contracting relationship) in which the welfare of one individual (usually called principal) is entrusted to another individual (usually called agent). Broadly speaking, the demand for stewardship information relate th the desire: (1) to motivate agent behavior (incentive information) and to efficiently distribute risk (risk sharing information).
Both principals and agents are all confronted by uncertainty. The uncertainty will create a demand for contracting information and nature of that demand will depend on the nature of the uncertainty. In the section Ⅲ, this paper introduces two types of uncertainty (i. e. ex ante uncertainty and ex post uncertainty) and discuss the inefficiencies and welfare losses that may results. Furthermore, the third section analyzes a single agent's evaluation of alternative reporting system and a public agency's evaluation of alternative reporting requirements.
The section Ⅳ shows implications of agency theory for accounting research as followings:
(1) the contracting uses of accounting information is the most important uses and financial reporting has arisen in response to market demand for information required by considerations of contractual market efficiency.
(2) firm-level responses to accounting information and to investor activities are an integral element of the overall impact of accounting information on society.
(3) it is impossible to analyze management controls and incentive compensation plans without some knowledge of the theory of agency relationships.
(4) agency theory analysis does provide insights into the relative value of alternative reporting systems that serve as a basis for motivating managers and as a basis for risk sharing among managers and investors.
In conclusion, market-based research aimed at contracting uses of accounting information will be useful in developing empirical research and in providing insights to refine the positive hypotheses.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 序 論
• Ⅱ. 代理理論의 發展
• 1. 經營主義的 企業理論
• 2. 企業理論과 代理理論
• 3. 情報經濟學과 代理理論
• Ⅲ. 代理理論과 情報欲求
• 1. 受託管理情報에 대한 需要
• (1) 投資者와 經營者사이의 契約
• (2) 不確實性과 契約情報需要의 性格
• 2. 報告 시스템의 選好
• (1) 代理人의 경우
• (2) 會社全體의 경우
• Ⅳ. 代理理論의 會計硏究에 대한 示唆
• 1. 情報有用性의 槪念에 대한 示唆
• 2. 會計理論 接近方法에 대한 示唆
• (1) 企業行動水準硏究
• (2) 企業內部의 代理關係
• (3) 報告시스템의 設計
• Ⅴ. 結 論