의결권 최대화를 목적으로 하는 순환출자 해소 휴리스틱 방법

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Circular shareholding refers to a situation where at least three member firms in a business group have stock in other member firms and establish a series of ownership in a circular way. Although many studies have focused on the ultimate effect of circular shareholding on firm"s value and profitability, there have been few studies which address how to resolve circular shareholding from the perspective of optimization theory.
This paper proposes a heuristic method for identifying shareholdings which need to be cleared in order to settle the problem of circular shareholding in a business group. The proposed heuristic tries to maximize the sum of voting rights the controlling family has in its business group firms. The applications results confirm that the heuristic provides near-optimal solutions for most of 16 Korean large business groups involving circular shareholding.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Abstract
• 1. 서론
• 2. 순환출자의 문제점
• 3. 순환출자 해소를 위한 최적화 모형 연구 현황
• 4. 의결권 최대화를 위한 휴리스틱 방법
• 5. 예제 및 적용 결과
• 6. 결론 및 추후 연구과제
• 참고문헌

참고문헌 (Reference)

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