情意主義 倫理設과 그 問題點의 理解 = The Understanding on Ethical Emotivism and Its Problem

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This paper aims at analyzing the meaning of the emotive theory of ethics and at examining what its problem is. The emotivists treat moral judgement as an emotive expression which does not make cognitive statements. Emotive statements lack an objective referent; such statements, being devoid of factual content, are not statement of which true and false may be predicated. That is, there are not even statements, but these that elicit emotions and moods are solicit attitudes.
Moreover, Stevenson maintains that the essential employment of moral judgement is not indicate facts, but to create an influence, i. e., to influence the attitudes of another. Eventually the termination of ethical disputes coincides with attitudinal agreement. Then, normative ethics seeks to resolve not disagreement of belief, but disagreement in attitude.
We admit that emotivism is valid to some degree in analyzing moral judgement. However, that would invalidate all actions in the denial to value - apprehensions. Above all, since the emotivists seek to persuade others that all views are false except their own, which states that there is no truth on value, then their own system is also void of truth nor can any value be ascribed to it. It is a big mistake of emotivists that the value skeptic who denies all values tacitly appeals to values for support of their own theory.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 序論
• Ⅱ. 道德的 知識의 否認
• Ⅲ. 情意主義 學者들의 見解
• Ⅳ. 情意主義 理論에 대한 批判
• Ⅴ. 結語