정치적 의무의 정당성 여부에 대한 연구 : 정당화 이론들의 유형별 분류를 중심으로 = A Study on the Justification of Political Obligation; Focussed on the Classification of the Theories

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

I have classified the theories of political obligations into four categories and researched, respectively, their strong and weak points. My framework for classification is special-nonvoluntary requirements, special-voluntary requirements, general-nonvoluntary requirements, and general-voluntary requirements. ``Voluntary`` requirements are those moral requirements we have because of some voluntary performance on our part. ``Nonvoluntary`` requirements are those that fall us nonvoluntarily, by virtue of our occupying some nonvoluntary role or status. ``Special`` requirements are those that arise out of special relationships we have with specific persons or groups. ``General`` requirements are those that bind persons regardless of their special relationships, acts, or roles. Associative theories of political obligation understood our political obligations as a kind of associative moral requirements that attaches to an unchosen role of citizen. I have classified political obligations that arise from associative accounts as special-nonvoluntary requirements. These kinds of requirements can specify the objects of obligations, however, are unable to specify the contents of obligations and to motivate persons to practice them. Transactional accounts explain political obligations as those that arise from our some specific transactions or interactions with the state (or with our fellow citizens). I have included transactional accounts as special-voluntary requirements. These can specify not only the objects and the contents of obligations but also solve the problem of motivation. But, they have the flaws not to invent methods to get consents from people and to solve the problem of asymmetry between benefits and costs. Natural duty theories insist that our political obligations are implied by those moral duties that bind all persons naturally to promote some impartial moral good(e.g., justice, happiness or common good). I have assorted them to general-nonvoluntary requirements. These requirements are unable to specify to which institutions we are bound and to motivate persons to practice them. Self-restraint theory argues that our political obligations are occurred in our mind when we voluntarily decide to bind ourself to the state authority in order to overcome our weak motivation to cooperate with others and feebleness of our will to external temptations. I have classified political obligations that arise from self-restraint theory as general-voluntary requirements. These have the flaw to exclude those who will not bind voluntarily themselves to state autonomy from political obligation and the problem of particularity. Considering all of the above things, we need to develop theories of political obligations which are comprehensive and complex to cover four categories.