Counting Chickens : Examining the Reputation Effects of Economic Sanctions

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

While economic sanctions often have failed to accomplish policy concessions from the target state, scholars argue that policymakers still have an incentive to use sanctions due to their signaling effects. While empirical evidence is mixed regarding the use of sanctions as a signal of commitment, relatively little attention has been paid whether capitulating signals the lack of sender commitment. We argue that targets perceive senders that backdown frequently as “chickens” and, hence, they are less likely to acquiesce in sanction episodes by that sender. Through statistical tests, we examine the effects of previous and total backdowns on sender reputation via future sanction success. Results imply that senders should be wary of having chicken reputations, although targets look at different reputations depending on the development of the current sanctions episode.

참고문헌 (Reference)

1 Ang, Adrian, "When Do Economic Sanctions Work?: Asymmetric Perceptions, Issue Salience, and Outcomes" 60 (60): 135-145, 2007

2 Morgan, T. Clifton, "The Threat and Imposition of Sanctions: Updating the TIES dataset" 31 (31): 541-558, 2014

3 Smith, Alastair, "The Success and Use of Economic Sanctions" 21 (21): 229-245, 1996

4 Drezner, David, "The Sanctions Paradox" Cambridge University Press 1999

5 Kirshner, Jonathan, "The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions" 6 (6): 32-64, 1997

6 Drezner, Daniel W, "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion" 57 (57): 643-659, 2003

7 Allen, Susan Hannah, "The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions" 52 (52): 6-944, 2008

8 Allen, Susan, "The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure" 31 (31): 117-138, 2005

9 Krustev, Valentin L, "Strategic Demands, Credible Threats, and Economic Coercion Outcomes" 54 : 147-174, 2010

10 O’Sullivan, Meghan, "Shrewd Sanctions" Brookings Institution Press 2003

11 Peterson, Timothy, "Sending a Message: The Reputation Effect of US Sanction Threat Behavior" 57 (57): 672-682, 2013

12 Spaniel, William, "Sanctions, Uncertainty, and Leader Tenure" 59 (59): 735-749, 2015

13 Schwebach, Valerie L., "Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice" Macmillian Press 2000

14 Eaton, Jonathan, "Sanctions" 100 (100): 899-928, 1992

15 Weisiger, Alex, "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics" 69 (69): 473-495, 2015

16 Jervis Robert, "Psychology and Deterrence" Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1989

17 Dizaji, Sajjad Faraji, "Potential Early Phase success and Ultimate Failure of Economic Sanctions: A VAR Approach with an Application to Iran" 50 (50): 721-736, 2013

18 McGillivray, Fiona, "Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions" 48 (48): 154-172, 2004

19 Singer, J. David, "Peace, War, and Numbers" Sage 19-48, 1972

20 Marshall, Monty G, "POLITY Ⅳ PROJECT Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2006" 2007

21 Galtung, Johan, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia" 19 (19): 378-416, 1967

22 Chaitkin, Michael, "Negotiation and Strategy: Understanding Sanctions Effectiveness" NYU Center on International Cooperation 2010

23 Miers, Anne, "Multilateral Sanctions and Foreign Policy Success: Can Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth?" 28 (28): 117-136, 2002

24 Nooruddin, Irfan, "Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy" 28 (28): 59-75, 2002

25 Hensel, Paul, "Issue Indivisibility and Territorial Claims*" 64 (64): 275-285, 2005

26 Whang, Taehee, "International Signaling and Economic Sanctions" 41 (41): 427-452, 2015

27 Martin, Lisa L, "Interests, Power, and Multilateralism" 46 (46): 765-, 1992

28 McLean, Elena V., "Friends Or Foes? Major Trading Partners and The Success Of Economic Sanctions" 54 (54): 427-447, 2010

29 Baldwin, David, "Economic Statecraft" Princeton University Press 1985

30 Hufbauer, Gary, "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered:History and Current Policy" Institute for International Economics 1990

31 Eyler, Robert, "Economic Sanctions" Palgrave Macmillan Press 2008

32 Bilgrami, Jafar, "Dynamics of Sanctions in World Affairs" Atlantic Press 2004

33 Tomz, Michael, "Domestic Audience Costs In International Relations: An Experimental Approach" 61 (61): 821-840, 2007

34 Hart, Robert, "Democracy and the Successful Use of Economic Sanctions" 53 (53): 267-284, 2000

35 Frey, Bruno, "Dealing with Terrorism" Edward Elgar Publishing 2004

36 Martin, Lisa L, "Credibility, Costs, and Institutions: Cooperation on Economic Sanctions" 45 (45): 406-432, 1993

37 United International Press, "China suspended North Korea coal imports to not exceed quota" United International Press

38 Van Bergeijk, Peter A.G., "Biased Sanctions? Methodological Change in Economic Sanctions Reconsidered and Its Implications" 1-15, 2016

39 Lektzian, David, "An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success" 51 (51): 848-871, 2007

40 Lacy, Dean, "A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage:The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats" 66 (66): 25-42, 2004