In this thesis, I argue the problems raised by K. Brad Wray on the scientific realism be solved within the existing theory of realism. Ray’s critique of realism can be summarized as the following three arguments. First, the success of scientific the...
In this thesis, I argue the problems raised by K. Brad Wray on the scientific realism be solved within the existing theory of realism. Ray’s critique of realism can be summarized as the following three arguments. First, the success of scientific theories is relative to the standards set by scientists and the level of competing theories. Therefore, the realists’ claim that the success of scientific theories is an index of truth is wrong. Second, there are two questions on the suces of science that anti-realists can answer, whereas realist cannot. Third, some realists contend that the use-novel predictive success is the index of truth, but there are some counterexamples
In response to Ray’s first criticism, I argue that the use-novel predictive success is not relative. The use-novel predictive success is not related to the standards set by scientists and the level of competing theories. For the Wray’s second criticism, I argue that realists can also answer his two questions. This is because many realists support the selective realism, that only parts of the theory that contributed to success are true. Regarding the third criticism, I show that the phlogiston theory Ray mentioned as one of the counterexamples is not in fact a counterexample. The use-novel predictive success of the phlogiston theory was derived from the true part of phlogiston theory in the light of modern chemistry.