외부감사인 강제교체에 따른 보수주의 성향

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

We investigate the relationship between auditor conservatism and auditor changes. In specific, we explore whether the mandatory or voluntary auditor changes affect auditor conservatism during the sample period of 2006-2008. Auditor selection mechanism has been switched from the auditor assignment rule to the market competition rule in 1982, in order to improve the quality of financial information. However, the market competition rule is criticized for impairing auditor independence due to increased pressure on auditors who want a long-term audit engagement. In 2006, the Korean regulatory body introduces the mandatory auditor rotation rule which firms have to switch their incumbent auditors to new auditors if they are audited by the same auditors during the last 6 years. The rule intends to protect auditor independence. It is believed that auditors can maintain auditor independence because the mandatory auditor rotation rule provides the lower quasi-rent for new auditors (DeAngelo 1981; Geiger and Raghunandan 2002). Prior literature shows that the voluntary auditor changes under the market competition rule may affect the new auditors` audit decisions. In particular, the newly hired auditors prefer more conservative accounting treatments in order to reduce audit failure risks stemming from information asymmetry between the auditors and the new clients (Shin et al. 2007). Since the mandatory audit rotation rule allows the client firms freely choose the new auditors, the mandatorily changed auditors may face the identical audit risks faced by the voluntarily changed auditors. That is, regardless of the mandatory or voluntary changes, the newly hired auditors may ask more conservative accounting treatments in order to alleviate the audit risks from their lack of experiences with and knowledge of the new clients. On the contrary, the mandatorily changed auditors` audit risks may be different from the voluntarily changed audits` risks. While Dhaliwal et al. (1993) and Jenkins and Velury (2008) show that some firms have an incentive to voluntarily change their incumbent auditors to increase the reported earnings (i.e., earnings management), the firms that have to change their incumbent auditors due to the mandatory auditor rotation rule may not have an earnings management incentive. In other words, voluntarily changed auditors are likely to be more conservative for new client rather than mandatorily changed auditors, because auditors with voluntarily changes may face high audit risk that may cause the negative effect on the investors` decision (Hackenbrack and Hogan 2002). This argument leads to our hypothesis that the level of conservatism is lower when the firms change the incumbent auditors mandatorily than when they change the auditors voluntarily. Our model first uses the Penman and Zhang`s (2002) conservative measure. The results show that the C score and the Q score of the mandatorily changed auditors are lower than the voluntarily changed auditors: The coefficient for the dummy variable of the mandatory auditor change (MAN) is significantly negative at least 1% level in Penman and Zhang`s (2002) measure. We further use the Beaver and Ryan(2000), Basu`s (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar`s (2005) models for the conservatism measure. The results confirm that the new mandatorily changed auditors are less conservative than the voluntarily changed auditors. These results support the argument that the mandatorily changed auditors evaluate their audit risks lower than the voluntarily changed auditors` risks because the mandatory auditor changes are not occurred for the earnings management purpose and/or the newly hired auditors can research potential clients` business situations in advance. Additionally, we examine the Penman and Zhang`s (2002) conservative measure of the mandatorily and voluntarily changed auditors between KOSPI-listed firms and KOSDAQ-listed firms. We find that the new mandatorily changed auditors are less conservative

참고문헌 (Reference)

1 정태범, "회계법인 강제교체제도에 대한 검토" 한국세무학회 9 (9): 313-342, 2008

2 신용인, "초도감사 보수할인이 감사품질에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 32 (32): 173-208, 2007

3 문상혁, "정보비대칭성에 따른 보수주의의 차별적 인식" 한국회계학회 31 (31): 215-242, 2006

4 곽수근, "유가증권상장, 코스닥등록 및 비상장기업의 감사보수 결정요인에 관한 비교분석" 한국회계학회 19 (19): 197-230, 2010

5 강내철, "보수주의와 이익분포의 변형" 한국회계학회 31 (31): 85-112, 2006

6 김정옥, "보수주의와 발생액" 한국회계학회 18 (18): 1-31, 2009

7 백원선, "보수주의, 이익지속성 및 가치평가" 한국회계학회 29 (29): 1-28, 2004

8 한길석, "내부회계관리제도의 도입이 보수주의에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구" 한국회계정보학회 27 (27): 179-200, 2009

9 최현돌, "기업지배구조가 회계정보의 보수성에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 31 (31): 145-174, 2006

10 김정옥, "기업의 특성이 회계보수성에 미치는 영향: 지배구조를 중심으로" 한국회계학회 31 (31): 69-96, 2006

11 김종일, "기업공개 결정요인에 대한 실증연구:코스닥시장 상장기업을 중심으로" 15 : 123-158, 2006

12 손성규, "교체를 앞둔 감사인의 특성" 한국공인회계사회 42 (42): 269-289, 2005

13 임영덕, "계속 감사기간과 감사품질에 관한 연구" 한국회계학회 31 (31): 183-214, 2006

14 손성규, "경영자-감사인간의 의견불일치와 감사인교체" 한국공인회계사회 20 (20): 205-229, 2008

15 김유찬, "경영자 지분과 이사회 특성이 회계정보의 보수성에 미치는 효과" 한국회계학회 17 (17): 225-265, 2008

16 김선미, "감사품질과 감사인 강제교체 및 자율교체" 한국공인회계사회 22 (22): 227-256, 2010

17 백원선, "감사인의 유형과 보수주의" 한국공인회계사회 21 (21): 241-260, 2005

18 손성규, "감사인교체의 주식시장반응에 관한 실증연구" 한국경영학회 33 (33): 1-1, 2004

19 강선민, "감사인 지정과 재량적발생액의 변화: 기업과 감사인의 역할" 한국회계학회 32 (32): 115-150, 2007

20 고대영, "감사인 선임 유형별 감사품질의 차별성에 관한 연구" 대한경영학회 77-101, 2007

21 박종일, "감사인 교체와 감사품질" 한국공인회계사회 19 (19): 191-226, 2007

22 박재환, "감사인 강제교체제도가 감사보수에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 17 (17): 137-160, 2008

23 노준화, "감사인 강제교체가 감사품질에 미치는 영향" 한국회계학회 34 (34): 1-29, 2009

24 李孝翊, "保守主義 適用과 監査人間의 品質 差異 硏究" 한국공인회계사회 38 (38): 1-35, 2002

25 Givoly, D., "The changing timeseries properties of earnings,cash flows and accruals:Has financial reporting become more conservative" 29 : 287-320, 2000

26 Qiang,X, "The Effects of Contracting,Litigation,Regulation,and Tax Costs on Conditional and Unconditional Conservatism:Cross-Sectional Evidence at the Firm Level" 82 : 759-796, 2007

27 Basu,S, "The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings" 24 : 3-37, 1997

28 Chaney, P. K., "Shredded Reputation:The Cost of Audit Failure" 40 : 1221-1245, 2002

29 Kothari, S., "Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual Measures" 39 : 163-197, 2005

30 Ruddock, C., "Non- Audit Services and Earnings Conservatism: Is Auditor Independence Impaired" 23 : 701-746, 2006

31 Hackenbrack, K., "Market Response to Earnings Surprises Conditional on Reasons for an Auditor Change" 19 : 195-223, 2002

32 Nagy,A.L, "Mandatory Audit Firm Turnover, Financial Reporting Quality, and Client Bargaining Power: The Case of Arthur Andersen" 19 : 51-68, 2005

33 Lys, T, "Lawsuits against Auditors" 32 : 65-93, 1994

34 Ball, R., "Is Financial Reporting Shaped by Equity Markets or by Debt Markets? An International Study of Timeliness and Conservatism" 13 : 168-205, 2008

35 Dye,R, "Informationally Motivated Auditor Replacement" 14 : 347-374, 1991

36 Myers, J. N., "Exploring the Term of the Auditor-Client Relationship and Quality of Earnings: A Case for Mandatory Auditor Rotation" 78 : 779-799, 2003

37 Ball, R., "Earnings Quality in U.K.Private Firms:Comparative Loss Recognition Timeliness" 39 : 83-128, 2005

38 Jenkins, D. S., "Does Auditor Tenure Influence the Reporting of Conservatism Earnings" 27 : 115-132, 2008

39 Li,D, "Does Auditor Tenure Affect Accounting Conservatism? Further Evidence" 29 : 226-241, 2010

40 Mansi, S. A, "Do Auditor Quality and Tenure Matter to Investors? Evidence From the Bond Market" 42 : 755-793, 2004

41 Dechow, P., "Detecting Earnings Management" 70 : 193-225, 1995

42 Watts,R.L, "Conservatism in Accounting.Part Ⅰ:Explanations and Implications" 17 : 207-221, 2003

43 Antle, R., "Conservatism and Auditor-Client Negotiations" 29 : 31-54, 1991

44 Beaver, W. H., "Biases and Lags in Book Value and Their Effects on the Ability of the Book-to-Market Ratio to Predict Book Return on Equity" 38 : 127-148, 2000

45 Geiger, M. A., "Auditor Tenure and Audit Reporting Failures" 21 : 67-78, 2002

46 Krishnan,J, "Auditor Switching and Conservatism" 69 : 200-215, 1994

47 DeAngelo,L.E, "Auditor Size and Audit Quality" 3 : 183-199, 1981

48 Kim, J. B., "Auditor Conservatism,Asymmetric Monitoring,and Earnings Management" 20 : 323-359, 2003

49 Chung, R., "Auditor Conservatism and Reported Earnings" 33 : 19-32, 2003

50 DeFond, M, "Auditor Changes and Discretionary Accruals" 25 : 35-67, 1998

51 Dhaliwal, D., "An Analysis of the Economic Factors Related to Auditor-Client Disagreements Preceding Auditor Changes" 12 : 22-37, 1993

52 Blouin J., "An Analysis of Forced Auditor Change:The Case of Former Arthur Andersen Clients" 82 : 621-650, 2007

53 Cahan, S. F., "After Enron:Auditor Conservatism and Ex-Andersen Clients" 81 : 49-82, 2006

54 Penman, S, "Accounting Conservatism,the Quality of Earnings,and Stock Returns" 77 : 237-264, 2002

55 Healy, P., "A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and its Implications for Standard Setting" 13 : 365-384, 1999