企業支配構造와 株主行動主義의 法的 含意 : 機關投資者를 中心으로

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In this study, shareholder activism by institutional investors in corporate legal review of the impact of the comparison. To solve the problem of corporate governance in developed countries, as well as the theory and doctrine, and the business environment are also factors to consider. Development of Secondary markets in the UK and the U.S., shareholders are not directly involved in corporate governance, by public pension funds in the stock sales, M&A through business self-regulation is working. On the other hand, financial capital is dominated by industrial capital of Germany, institutional investors, shareholders of the Bank are directly involved in corporate governance as a founder. In addition institutional investors in Japan, especially the Main creditor is participating in the corporate decision-making structure and management monitoring system is operational, the capital market is to occur through a hostile M&A was not easily occur.
Whereas in Korea, the role of the Banks in corporate governance is extremely limited. Separation of past Government Policies in the financial industry and financial institutions to limit the equity investment, it was through a corporate governance is prohibited. Thus, institutional investors in Korea has been the subject of corporate management was not involved in the disciplinary approach. But recently, the opening of the capital markets and the financial and social development, coupled with indirect securities companies, insurance companies, mutual funds, banks, institutional investors, pension funds in size each year and the trend is growing. December 1997 IMF as the financial crisis, the strength of corporate governance reform originated as a highly realized, IBRD revised as required by the Korea Commercial Law, and to attract foreign capital to invest in the capital market was opened. In order to facilitate the restructuring of insolvent companies to foreign direct Investment was needed. Foreign institutional investors led by hedge fund focusing on acquiring undervalued companies, short-term shareholder value was to obtain revenue. Eventually hedge funds have reaped huge profits by acquiring distressed lenders after the country's 1997 financial crisis and selling them later. These investors are pension funds according to the flow on the basis of their ownership, their voting rights at the general shareholders' meeting to vote on the agenda began. As such Institutional Shareholder Activism to perform their purpose is to improve the profitability of institutional investors from the activity.
However, the financial capital on the basis of short-term profit seeking type of shareholder activism in 2008, the U.S. sub-prime mortgage-induced System Risks in the international financial crisis has been blamed for causing. U.S. institutional investors in London to establish a subsidiary (company) or Special Purpose Company was through them concentrated in high-risk derivatives transactions. The real assets are not secured debt shadows as the collapse of the financial risk management in the aftermath of stress exert was go out and spread all over the world. Institutional investors, financial greed is a moral being criticized, many of shareholder activism at the core of the economic system is hidden behind suspected corporate governance research is rare.
Business environment of the 21st century, based on the fund shareholder activism by institutional investors due to the era of reform and there, we've experienced so far, thinking about the fundamental values ​​and a new interpretation is needed. Now is the time for Shareholder Activism by institutional investors to proxy voting. To restore the international competitiveness of enterprises, and also to maintain and enhance the importance of institutional investment is obvious. For this reason, shareholder activism by institutional investors should be introduced to enable the functionality and validity of the theory is based. Therefore, the company at the same time to compare the system of shareholder activism in pursuit of profit, and not for the purpose to improve corporate governance in line with the discussion of the revision of the law is needed. Institutional investors in corporate governance and institutional guarantees that when voting, shareholder activism can occur due to shareholder activism to prevent abuses of the legal system improvement is required.
This paper is for institutional investors in shareholder activism proactive perspective. Vote of the voting rights of institutional investors ultimately the company's profit and durability without compromising corporate governance designed to have a positive impact on the objective. In order to ensure effectiveness of shareholder activism in corporate governance changes to occur as the protection of interested parties, the acceptance of social responsibility issues was reasonable for review. Our corporate governance structure to resolve the issue, compared to foreign jurisprudence of corporate governance and business environment that affects all elements included in the study was discussed. Shareholder activism around the world on the basis of the voting rights, and minority shareholder rights and shareholder litigation through involvement and pressure management to give a variety of ways. In this paper, the core of the voting rights of institutional investors and shareholders involved in the company's ongoing and will ensure that profit. Pros and cons of these shareholder activism by institutional investors to improve the corporate governance structure will provide appropriate incentives.
Chapter 1, the first premise of corporate governance as a private company to develop from a listed company to introduce the history was written. The first section contains the existing research on corporate governance was cited. As the massive capital, according to the industrialization caused the separation of ownership and management of side effects, resulting from the separation of ownership and professional management of governance issues and point out the problem of controlling shareholders. This prevents side effects would be the objective.
Chapter 2 discusses the development mentioned in the introduction of corporate governance in order to improve the effectiveness of the meaning and examined. The premise of corporate governance based on the agreement of the interested parties is considered first. In addition, according to the company's shareholders is actually the Companies Act must study what reality looks like reaction norms can be improved. Theory of comparative law on corporate governance, corporate governance review and abroad about whether the global standard of corporate governance is examined whether a similar purpose.
Chapter 3, Section 1 of the study of shareholder activism in order to define the concept of the Shareholder Activism. Comparative law perspective, the United States developed through case study of the scene by the American corporate governance is accepted in South Korea is expected to be appropriate suggestions. Section 2 of the legal analysis of the institutional investors, pension funds and hedge funds, in-depth discussion about the role of the study. Which is also a major shareholder activism related cases discussed. Section 3 of the introduction of the shareholder activism bring up the problems that occur. Positive role in shareholder activism is reviewing whether to be.
Chapter 4, in order to accommodate shareholder activism on issues corresponding to the above-mentioned solution presented. As a shareholder activist shareholder activism by improvement projects to enable the Monitor function, stressed the need to reform the legal system. However, institutional investors, such as the legal theme, according to the exercise of voting rights investor protection, capital supply function was assumed that must be maintained.
Chapter 5, Last part of this paper, perspective on the company's philosophical leitmotif of corporate governance, which is called shareholder activism beating waves, the cause of the wave of institutional investors seeking the maximum profit analyzed. And the winds and waves will be always on the side of the ablest Shareholders. The regional capital market does not establish self-regulation system is a reflection of what the main subject of discussion again emphasizes implications. Thus, the growth of local institutional investors in the securities industry is important to the change. The direction of Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism is the subject of Institutional Investors transparent disclosure of important voting.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

在本研究中，根据机构投资人的股东行动主义对企业的影响为比较进行了探讨。为了解决问题，针对企业支配构造的关联理论和学说、企业环境所带来的影响等要素来进行研究。在发达的英国和美国，股东们并不直接参与企业决策，而是通过股票出售与收购等市场的自律规制来统治企业经营，或者以公基金为中心并通过决议权来行使自身的需求事项，从而实现资本市场。另一方面，在德国，银行资本支配产业资本，作为机构投资人的银行直接成为股东或者贷款人，并对企业产生影响；在日本，机构投资人，特别是主要交易银行，直接参与决策过程，并且按照企业经营的监测，通过股票市场来防止恶意收购的发生。另一方面，在韩国之所以限制银行的作用，是因为政府将金融和产业分离，并利用其分离政策和金融机构的股票投资来限制企业支配。并且，在韩国，机构投资人作为主体来参与经营的规律方法并不能实现。但是，近来，以投资市场的开放和间接金融以及社会发展和证券公司、保险公司、集合投资机构、银行、储蓄银行、年金基金为代表的机构投资人的规模每年都在增长，这在有价证券市场中的比重和影响力以绝对的或者相对的趋势在增加。1997年12月，以起源于IMF救济金融的财团企业为中心，在企业支配结构的改革强度高涨的同时，根据世界银行（IBRD）的需求来对应国际竞争力。并且为了吸引外国资本的投资，鼓励企业支配结构收纳在商法中。这是因为，为了促进不实企业的构造调整，确实需要海外资本。当时，以外国机构投资人为中心，大量买入低估企业的股票使股东的价值迅速增大。年金机构投资人也以自身所持有的股份为基础，在股东总会上开始一边行使决议权一边为了实现自己的需求而积极变化并逐步发展股东行动主义。机构投资人行使股东行动的本来目的是为了使机构投资人自觉的提高效益而使用的手段，但是以金融资本为基础的追求短期效益的股东行动主义作为2008年美国的次级抵押贷款，被指定为在全世界金融危机中引发系统风险的原因。这是因为机构投资人在海外设立子公司或者特种目的法人并集中在高危险派生金融商品交易的同时，并没有考虑到风险。这样，长时间积累下来的债务且没有实物资产的撑腰，影子金融的破产导致全世界金融系统的瘫痪，全世界各地都受到其余波的影响。机构投资人对金融的贪欲是道德的灾难，但是事实上更是由于股东行动主义后，对其上市股票公司制度的企业支配结构并没有考虑到位造成的。
21世纪的企业环境，是机构投资人的股东行动主义以巨额资金为基础的，也因此迎来了大改革时代。并且，迄今为止，还在对价值观和法的思考进行根本性的再探讨。股东行动主义时代的浪潮是不可抗拒的，企业为了恢复并提高国际竞争力，对于机构投资人的投资需求是必不可少的。股东行动主义机能的活跃化理论的必要性和妥当性存在于其中，且在研究公司法思想基础的同时超越股东行动主义的利益追求，为了不辜负扩大目标的要求，更加要实现法制度的论旨。特别是在企业支配机构投资人和行使决议权使制度实现的时候，为了防止因股东行动主义而产生的逆机能弊端，必须要建成制度基础。
本论文的目标是制订有关机构投资人的股东行动主义的事先对应策略，最终，机构投资人对于相关法制的改善方向是，在不危害企业的营利性和持久性的同时，在保护股东价值的情况下摸索与经营者相对应的方案。而且，在确保实效性的角度上，由于股东行动主义的原因，我们对有关企业支配构造的变化和利害关系人的保护、吸收社会责任问题的可能性进行了合理的探讨。为了解决问题，不仅反映了企业支配构造的相关理论和学说，也反映了对企业环境的影响等要素。对于股东行动主义的发现，不仅行使了机构投资人的决议权，也实现了少数股东权、诉讼、股东的参与方法等多样的手段。对于经营者行使影响力并实现股东价值，其目的是查看企业、机构投资人、公司法并比较外国的法制进行了探讨。法制整顿的目标是，机构投资人行使决议权从而改善企业支配构造，同时以有关资本的供给机能、投资者的保护为研究方向，则构成了下面的目录。
第一章中，以企业支配构造为前提，在个人企业的萌发中，发展了大规模的公开股票公司制度，以其现有的历史研究结果为基础进行了以下介绍。现代公司制度根据产业化的进行，一边形成巨大资本一边产生副作用；并认识到了所有和经营的分离、所有和支配的分离都始于专门经营体制的问题，还认识到了有关支配股东的公司以及其主人意识现象的问题。针对这些问题引进机构投资人的股东行动主义，并把它看作解决方法，依其使副作用最小化甚至防止副作用的发生。
第二章中，为了发展之前提起的论旨，对企业支配构造的意义和努力改善的过程进行了探讨。我认为改善企业支配构造的前提源于现实，围绕公司恰当的调整多样的利害关系，并发现公司法的实效性规范体系。并且, 具有有关公司法制度利害关系的主体股东实际上对公司法上的制度有怎样的反应，对其反应进行的研究可以提高法的现实规范力。比较关于企业支配构造的理论进行探讨后，指出了韩国企业支配构造的问题点，并且在企业支配构造中存在国际标准。关于必须遵守其国际标准的支配角度，是否的确存在企业支配构造的国际化标准，以及关于各国实施企业所有以及支配相关制度和习惯，是否依照国际标准向同一个方向集中，针对这些提起了疑问。
第三章中，积累关于股东行动主义的经验，通过考察美国事例的批判性思考，来作为我们收集美国式企业文化的补充策略，进而揭示了问题点。而且，在股票市场中，依靠机构投资人的股东行动主义是否对支配构造带来积极作用，对其进行了探讨。只是，考虑到调查对象范围在无限的变大，有关外国的事例，以股东行动主义最发达的美国为中心来介绍。
第四章中，对于提起相应问题的解决办法为方向，来谋求使股东行动主义的限制和逆机能的最小化。从企业支配构造的改善问题来看，为了使依靠股东行动主义的正向机能活跃起来，强调了整顿法制的必要性。从法的问题来看，依照行使机构投资人的决议权，为了不危害投资者的保护和资金的供给机能，以谋求企业和相应方案为目的提出了改善方法。
第五章中，对国内资本市场的自律法则没有确立的部分进行了反省，并再一次强调了有关前文论旨的启发点。关于支配构造改革的方向性、行使股东行动主义主体机构投资人的决议权的基本条件来看，为了确保其透明性，强调了政府的作用和意志的必要性。特别是追究所谓的企业支配构造的股东行动主义带来的影响来看，资本市场应该怎样具体的引进所谓的股东行动主义的浪潮，并设定其浪潮引发的企业支配构造模式和自律法则的资本市场，以接受先进的支配构造为手段进行了说明。

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 第1章 序 論
• 第1節 問題의 提起
• 第2節 論文의 構成
• 第2章 企業支配構造의 現狀과 限界
• 第1節 企業支配構造의 意義
• I. 企業支配構造 定義
• II. 企業支配構造 論議의 必要性
• III. 各國 企業支配構造의 現況
• 第2節 企業支配構造 改善의 努力
• I. 少額株主運動
• II. 會社法 改正經緯와 主要內容
• III. 政府의 企業規制 實態와 規制緩和
• 第3節 企業支配構造의 限界
• I. 國際化에 따른 資本市場의 開放
• II. 財閥과 少數株主 保護
• III. 企業支配構造와 利益集團
• 第3章 企業支配構造 變化動力으로서 株主行動主義
• 第1節 株主行動主義의 槪念
• I. 株主行動主義의 意義
• II. 株主行動主義의 順機能
• III. 株主行動主義의 逆機能
• 第2節 株主行動主義에서 機關投資者의 役割
• I. 機關投資者의 意義
• II. 機關投資者의 株主行動主義와 役割
• III. 株主行動主義의 主要 事例
• 第3節 株主行動主義 實踐과 企業支配構造의 交錯
• I. 經營權 威脅
• II. 機關投資者의 經營參與
• III. 經營者에 대한 監視
• 第4章 株主行動主義 受容을 위한 法的 課題
• 第1節 株主行動主義의 受容
• I. 機關投資者 規制緩和의 必要性
• II. 株主行動主義가 企業에 미치는 影響과 課題
• III. 株主行動主義 逆機能 抑制方案
• 第2節 受託者로서 機關投資者의 議決權 行使
• I. 機關投資者의 議決權 行使
• II. 議決權行使 指針
• III. 議案分析 또는 諮問서비스 活用
• 第3節 透明性 提高를 위한 公示制度의 整備
• I. 情報의 非對稱 問題
• II. 機關投資者와 一般投資者의 利害相衝
• 第5章 結 論