The purpose of this study is to analyze North Korea’s negotiation strategies with the Republic of Korea, exhibited during inter-Korean military talks, and to deduce our response strategy. In other words, through this research, I examined what object...
The purpose of this study is to analyze North Korea’s negotiation strategies with the Republic of Korea, exhibited during inter-Korean military talks, and to deduce our response strategy. In other words, through this research, I examined what objectives North Korea desires to achieve through their negotiation strategies,what strategies and major negotiation practices, distilled main issues during negotiations, and proposed a strategic direction we should adopt in preparation of a resumption of negotiations.
The focus of this study lies on Chapter 3, "Main Issues and Strategic Direction during Negotiations." I presenteda total of eight main issues, including 1) the Northern Limit Line and the Special Peace and Cooperation Zone in the West Sea and 2) the issue of the United States Forces Korea and combined ROK-US military exercises. In addition, I analyzed and assessed North Korea’s arguments and ROK’s response logic in the past. Furthermore, based on these analyses, the study presents the future strategic direction in two aspects: one, software (response strategy) and the other, hardware (response system).
From the software aspect, I propose formulation of a military grand strategy. Also, in this very structure, I stress the need to craft elaborate response logic and grounds regarding the main issues at hand with North Korea and for negotiation representatives to have thorough knowledge on the aforementioned issues. This is because only through these measures can we overwhelm the opponents should these issues are addressed again. Furthermore, we must install a system that will compel North Korea to execute agreements rather than produce new agreements and instill in North Korea the perception that abiding by agreements will benefit North Korea and not doing so will hurt North Korea.
On the hardware side, I underscore the necessity of a control tower that will oversee negotiations with North Korea. A majority of issues raised during talks with North Korea requires associated ministries and departments to combine their capabilities; therefore, in order to integrate competing interests among these different departments, we need a central organization that can act as the brain among these departments. Since the new Park administration in the Republic of Korea installed the Office of National Security Strategy, this new office can adopt that central role. Furthermore, in order to lead future military talks, we must produce top negotiation experts. We must establish policies that can lay a foundation to produce these experts. As part of an expedited solution, we need to reestablish the North Korea Policy Bureau in the Ministry of National Defense.
North Korea’s negotiation strategies are extensions of its communization strategy of the Republic of Korea. It has no interest in improving the inter-Korean relations or in building trust. In order to execute a confidence building process with North Korea, we must build a foundation of confidencewith strong deterrence as its basis, be patient and execute prior agreements one-by-one based on consistent principles.