This study empirically analyzes whether increased fiscal transparency among Korean metropolitan governments mitigates the occurrence of political budget cycles prior to elections. Increased fiscal transparency, by facilitating the disclosure of inform...
This study empirically analyzes whether increased fiscal transparency among Korean metropolitan governments mitigates the occurrence of political budget cycles prior to elections. Increased fiscal transparency, by facilitating the disclosure of information, is expected to empower voters to more effectively evaluate the strategic actions of politicians. This, in turn, is anticipated to constrain politicians from pursuing short-term, populist policies, thereby mitigating opportunistic behavior. Utilizing a system GMM estimation approach, our analysis investigated whether fiscal transparency, as measured by information disclosure request disclosure rate, moderates the impact of elections on total government expenditures. The findings indicate that total expenditures increase in both election years and the preceding years. Furthermore, higher levels of fiscal transparency were found to mitigate the political budget cycles that typically occur prior to elections. This finding suggests that fiscal transparency can serve as an important policy instrument for effectively curbing political budget cycles.