RISS 검색 - 국내학술지논문 상세보기

국문 초록 (Abstract)

기업들의 금융관련 불법 비리 행위의 폐해가 증대함에 따라 미국 증권거래위원회(SEC) 등 규제감독기구와 사법당국은 이러한 행위의 사전적 방지와 조기 적발을 위하여 개인이 기업비리와 ...

기업들의 금융관련 불법 비리 행위의 폐해가 증대함에 따라 미국 증권거래위원회(SEC) 등 규제감독기구와 사법당국은 이러한 행위의 사전적 방지와 조기 적발을 위하여 개인이 기업비리와 불법행위에 관한 미공개 내부정보를 직접 관계당국에 제보할 수 있는 ‘내부제보자’(whistleblowers)제도를 활용하여왔다. 최근 국제금융위기를 초래한 월가(Wall Street)의 대규모 금융비리 재발방지를 위하여 2010년 7월 제정된 ‘Dodd-Frank 월가개혁 및 (금융)소비자 보호법’(DFA)과 이에 의거한 미국증권거래위원회(SEC)의 ‘내부제보자조항시행규칙’이 가장 강화된 형태의 대표적인 것으로 평가 받고 있다.
현행 DFA체제하에서 내부제보적격자를 자연인(natural persons)으로 한정하고 있는데, 이는 또 다른 내부제보자제도를 활용하는 법인 the False Claims Act에서는 인(person)으로 규정하여 비자연인(Entities)도 내부제보자로 허용할 수 있는 여지를 두고 있는 바와 대비되는 것이다. 본고에서는 그 배경을 살펴본 후 내부제보자 범위를 각종 단체, 기업, 협회, 조직, 법인체 등 비자연인으로 까지 확대할 필요가 있음을 논하였다. 이러한 필요성은 세 가지 이점에 바탕을 두고 있다. 첫째, 제보 건수의 획기적 증가와 제보내용의 질적 향상을 기대할 수 있다. 이를 통하여 감독당국의 금융비리 사전예방 및 법 집행 역량 향상 등 DFA가 추구하는 목표를 보다 효과적으로 달성할 수 있을 것이다. 둘째, 제보자의 다양화, 제보 건수 증가로 내부제보가 상대적으로 보편화되고, 내부제보행위 및 제보자에 대한 낙인효과 등 사회의 부정적 인식이 완화되어 비리 제보의 양성화 활성화를 기대할 수 있다. 셋째, 증거부족 등 제보내용의 정확성이 결여되어 제보를 주저하거나 개인이 혼자 힘으로 제보하기 어려울 경우라도 관련단체 등의 뒷받침도 가능하여 제보가 법적인 조치로 이어질 확률이 높아진다.
본고는 내부제보자 범위의 확대는 경쟁우위 확보 및 무고 목적의 내부제보 남용, 금전적 보상을 위한 내부제보 남발 가능성 등 부정적 효과에 대해서도 논하였다. 그러나 종합적인 관점에서 비자연인이 내부제보자의 범위에 포함될 때 긍정적 효과가 부정적 효과를 압도하는 것으로 결론지었다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In the aftermath of numerous corporate scandals in recent history that have shocked nations and generated enormous financial losses to investors around the world, the US Congress clearly recognized that the regulators and law enforcement authorities needed help in identifying and preventing fraud on timely basis. Help that Congress made available to the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter referred to as “SEC”) was help from individual whistleblowers who report information relating to fraud and other violations of law directly to external law enforcement authorities. In this article, the term, “whistleblower,” refers to a person who makes an allegation of misconduct to an external authority.
Congress enacted on July 21, 2010 the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter referred to as the “DFA”) which, among others, established the most fortified whistleblower incentive and protection system seen in any federal law to date.
This article contends that the scope of whistleblowers covered by the DFA should be expanded to include entities, such as corporations, firms, associations, organizations, partnerships, limited liability companies, businesses or trusts (collectively, “Entities”). The SEC clarified in the Final Rule on Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions (hereinafter referred to as the “Final Rule”) that only natural persons are eligible whistleblowers under the DFA since the term used in the DFA is “individual”and not “person” as was the case in the False Claims Act.
While agreeing that SEC’s interpretation of the word, “individual,” as used in the DFA is a reasonable one, this article takes the view that the scope of whistleblowers should be reviewed and revised to include Entities because an important goal of the whistleblower program of the DFA is to enhance the law enforcement capability of the regulators by encouraging whistleblowers to provide quality leads directly to the regulators in a timely manner. More specifically, allowing such Entities to qualify as whistleblowers under the DFA will result in a much greater volume of tips in general and of high-quality tips in particular being submitted to the SEC on timely basis. Allowing a broad array of Entities to qualify as whistleblowers under the DFA will also have the added effect of legitimatizing the very act of whistleblowing by making it more commonplace and customary, thereby causing the public to regard it as less stigmatizing. The ultimate outcome that is desired is that more individuals and Entities would be encouraged to provide tips since the prevalence of whistleblowing will likely make the act of whistleblowing more socially acceptable and morally respectable. Individual whistleblowers who are not certain about the accuracy or relevance of their information would also be able to leverage on the resources of the Entities if they wish to assess the quality of their information or likelihood of successful enforcement action, or if they want to join forces with the Entities to strengthen their case.
To assess the full effect of allowing Entities to qualify as whistleblowers, this article will also address the potentially negative aspects of the proposal. Potential abuses of the whistleblower program such as frivolous or fraudulent reports being filed by competitors or labor unions, are explored as well as the potential side effect of special interest groups or civil societies propping up to take advantage of the financial reward stipulated under the DFA .
This article concludes by asserting that the harms or abuses that can be anticipated by the expanded definition of whistleblowers are outweighed by the benefits and urges that Entities be allowed to qualify as whistleblowers under the DFA. Inclusion of Entities in the definition of whistleblowers will go long way in the prevention of fraud and enforcement of securities laws by enlisting private sector resources, both the individual and organizational whistleblowers, to act as SEC’s eyes and ears in detecting corporate wrongdoing early on.

목차 (Table of Contents)

Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Historical Background of the Whistleblower Program under the DFA
1. Securities Regulatory Area
2. False Claims Act

Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Historical Background of the Whistleblower Program under the DFA
1. Securities Regulatory Area
2. False Claims Act
Ⅲ. Characteristics and Motivations of Whistleblowers
1. Who are the Whistleblowers?
2. How does a potential Whistleblower decide to blow the Whistle?
3. Major Disincentives to Whistleblowing
Ⅳ. Benefits of allowing entities to qualify as whistleblowers under the DFA
1. Anticipated Potential Benefits from Entity Whistleblowers
2. Framework of the Whistleblower Program under the DFA
3. SEC’s Reasons for excluding Entities from the Definition of Whistleblower
4. Which Entities should be made eligible
5. Positive Outcomes of allowing Entity Whistleblowers
Ⅴ. Potential Harm anticipated by Inclusion of Entities as Whistleblowers
Ⅵ. Conclusion
Bibliography
국문요약

참고문헌 (Reference)

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2 Westman, Daniel P., "Whistleblowing: The Law of Retaliatory Discharge" The Bureau Of National Affairs, Inc 156-157, 2004

3 Bowers, John, "Whistleblowing: Law and Practice" Oxford University Press 2007

4 Keenan, John P., "Whistleblowing: A Study of Managerial Differences" 14 (14): 2002

5 Mesmer-Magnus, Jessica R, "Whistleblowing in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of Whistleblowing Intentions, Actions, and Retaliation" 62 (62): 277-297, 2005

6 Fanto, James, "Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate Inner Circles" 83 : 435-540, 2005

7 David, Ariane, "Whistleblowers: Who they are and how management should respond" 8 (8): 2005

8 Hamilton, Jesse, "Whistle-Blowers Seek SEC Bounties at a Rate of Seven per Day"

9 Moberly, Richard E, "Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis Of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win" 49-, 2007

10 Kohn, Stephen M., "The Whistleblower’s Handbook – A step-by-Step Guide to Doing What’s Right and Protecting Yourself" Lyons Press 2011