According to Fichte and Hegel, all relationships of recognition presuppose the equal independence of both parties. Two subjects engaged in a relationship of mutual recognition must be regarded as independent beings with their individuality. The same p...
According to Fichte and Hegel, all relationships of recognition presuppose the equal independence of both parties. Two subjects engaged in a relationship of mutual recognition must be regarded as independent beings with their individuality. The same principle applies to the recognition relationship in upbringing. Even if a child appears in a fundamentally asymmetric relationship of total dependence on the mother in a ‘phenomenal’ sense, the caregiving relationship between mo ther and child can avoid becoming a distorted power dynamic only if the child is regarded ‘conceptually’ as an autonomous subject. However, Honneth, who emphasizes the strong dependency and emotional unity between mother and child, does not stress this conceptual aspect (that the child should be considered an autonomous subject from the very beginning) as much as might be necessary. Honneth’s approach is influenced by Donald Winnicott’s theory of mothering. However, it is questionable whether this can be considered a faithful interpretation of Winnicott because Winnicott views the child not merely as a weak and incomplete dependent being but as a proactive ‘subject’ who, from the outset, promotes their growth through an inherent ‘desire’ for selfpursuit. Fichte’s insight that there is a normative force within the humanshaped body from birth and Hegel’s declaration that “selfconsciousness is essentially desire” align with this perspective. All children, even if they appear weak, come into our world already possessing the ‘qualification and authority to become a unique autonomous subject’ from the beginning. A robust theory and practice of upbringing can only begin when this fact is given proper attention.