이명박 정권 출범 시기의 정부조직법 개정에 대한 분석 = 수정된 행위자중심 제도주의 시각에서

국문 초록 (Abstract)

이 글은 2007년 대선 후 정부조직법 개정 과정에서 이명박 당선자 측이 애초 생각했던 ‘2처 13부 16청’의 작은 정부 구상을 실현시키지 못하고 ‘2처 15부 17청’이라는 다소 어정쩡한 결과에 도달한 현상을 Scharpf의 행위자중심 제도주의 이론에 입각하여 설명한다. 어느 행위자도 완벽한 합리성을 갖고 있지는 않으면서 동시에 자기중심적으로 생각하는 당파적 합리성을 보유하고 있다. 그 결과 다원화된 민주주의 사회에서는 이런 행위자들이 제도적 틀 내에서 서로 협상하고 타협하면서 정책을 결정해나갈 수밖에 없는 것이다. 정부 조직 개편도 마찬가지다. 헌법, 국회법 같이 의사결정 과정을 규율하고 있는 제도적 틀 내에서 거부권을 가지고 있는 행위자들이 서로 조금씩 양보하면서 결정할 수밖에 없는 것이다. 노무현 정권의 ‘4처 18부 17청’을 거의 그대로 존치시키자는 민주당과 ‘2처 13부 16청’으로 축소시키자는 한나라당이 16일여의 분배 협상을 통해 도달한 결과는 ‘2처 15부 17청’이었다. 이외에 몇몇 정부위원회, 그리고 존치된 부처들의 기능 및 권한 등에서도 변화가 합의되었다. 그러나 어느 일방의 의사가 100% 반영되지는 않았다. 이것도 아니고 저것도 아닌 어정쩡하게 보이는 결과가 다원주의적 민주주의 사회가 찾아낼 수 있는 최선의 대안일 가능성이 높다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This paper explains the phenomenon from the perspective of actor-centered institutionalism that the newly coming Lee Myong-Bak government did not realize its own plan on the government formation of two offices, thirteen ministries, and fourteen administrations right after the 2007 presidential election and instead reached a bit dubious result of two offices, fifteen ministries, and seventeen administrations. No actors have a complete rationality and so every actor has a partisan rationality tending to think egocentrically. Consequently in pluralized democratic society these actors have no choice but to negotiate and compromise each other within institutional frameworks in order to make policy decisions. The same may be said of government organization revamp. The actors with veto power within the institutional frameworks which provide official decision-making procedures such as the Constitution and the National Assembly Law have to concede each other to make decisions. The Democratic Party that argued that the formation of the Rho Moo-Hyun government of four offices, eighteen ministries, and seventeen administrations should be maintained and the Grand National Party that argued that the formation should be decreased into two offices, thirteen ministries, and sixteen administrations reached the result of two offices, fifteen ministries, and seventeen administrations through sixteen day-longnegotiations. In addition, consensuses on the functions and authorities of some government commissions and several unchanged state apparatuses were concluded. However, no side imposes its own idea one hundred per cent. A bit seemingly questionable result that is not this nor that may be the best result that pluralistic democratic societies can find and reach.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 논문요약
• Ⅰ. 서론
• Ⅱ. 이론적 논의 및 분석틀 구성
• Ⅲ. 대선 후 정부조직법 개정 과정의 전개
• Ⅳ. 협상 과정 분석
• Ⅴ. 맺음말
• 〈참고문헌〉
• [Abstract]

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