In Being and Time, Heidegger defines philosophy as universal phenomenological ontology. In terms of its object, philosophy is ontology. In terms of its method, philosophy is phenomenology. Yet, there is a tension between these two terms. Philosophy as...
In Being and Time, Heidegger defines philosophy as universal phenomenological ontology. In terms of its object, philosophy is ontology. In terms of its method, philosophy is phenomenology. Yet, there is a tension between these two terms. Philosophy as ontology should raise not just the ontological inquiry into the Being of entities, but the fundamental ontological inquiry into Being in general. However, philosophy as phenomenology is, by definition, a method that starts from entities to reach at most the Being of the entities. Thus, the tension is that phenomenology does not seem capable of attaining the ultimate end of fundamental ontological inquiry, the meaning of Being in general. This paper nevertheless assumes that phenomenology is capable of attaining the meaning of Being in general. In other words, it assumes that universal phenomenological ontology is possible. Based on this assumption, this paper outlines the two-step procedure of universal phenomenological ontology, which is demonstrated in the fundamental ontology of the subject in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and the fundamental ontology of Dasein in Being and Time. To reach the meaning of Being in general, phenomenology has to pursue not just the ontology of any entity, but the fundamental ontology of the transcendental entity. Yet, the two-step procedure reveals that it is not possible to immediately proceed with the fundamental ontology of the transcendental entity proper. The first step is regional ontology. The regional ontology begins with entities that are not the transcendental entity. From the entities, it reaches the Being of entities. From the Being of entities, it reaches the region of Being. Only insofar the region of Being is reached, phenomenological ontology is able to transition from the regional ontology to the fundamental ontology, which is the second step. With the region of Being, fundamental ontology interrogates the transcendental entity that constitutes the region of Being. From the transcendental entity, it reaches the Being of the transcendental entity. Finally, from the Being of the transcendental entity, it reaches Being in general. Ultimately, this paper reveals that the logic that underlies the two-step procedure is a paradigm of philosophy that defines universality as essentially finite. Such a paradigm of philosophy affirms that the finite region of Being which the finite transcendental entity makes possible lays claims to universality. Thus, the universality of universal phenomenological ontology turns out to be universality defined as finite.