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      X-inefficiency and Privatization in a Mixed Duopoly

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A105874477

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

      The purpose of this study is two-fold: First, we investigate how X-inefficiency affects the behaviors of firms in a mixed oligopoly market. Second, we explore whether optimal subsidies can restore the social optimum like the previous literature on subsidization, with assuming that the efficiency of a public firm depends on the degree of privatization. The main results are as follows. First, despite higher marginal cost due to X-inefficiency, the price of a public firm tends to be lower than that of a private firm, when the degree of nationalization of the public firm is low enough. Second, if the marginal effect of nationalization on X-inefficiency measured at full privatization is relatively low and the elasticity of X-inefficiency measured at full nationalization is greater than the critical level, then the partial privatization is the optimal strategy from the social welfare viewpoint. Third, when an efficiency gap exists between firms, asymmetric subsidization can restore the social optimum, and the optimal subsidization level is not directly related to the degree of nationalization, but is affected by the efficiency gap. In addition, the subsidy for a private firm is larger than that for a public firm, which is relatively inefficient compared to the private firm.
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      The purpose of this study is two-fold: First, we investigate how X-inefficiency affects the behaviors of firms in a mixed oligopoly market. Second, we explore whether optimal subsidies can restore the social optimum like the previous literature on sub...

      The purpose of this study is two-fold: First, we investigate how X-inefficiency affects the behaviors of firms in a mixed oligopoly market. Second, we explore whether optimal subsidies can restore the social optimum like the previous literature on subsidization, with assuming that the efficiency of a public firm depends on the degree of privatization. The main results are as follows. First, despite higher marginal cost due to X-inefficiency, the price of a public firm tends to be lower than that of a private firm, when the degree of nationalization of the public firm is low enough. Second, if the marginal effect of nationalization on X-inefficiency measured at full privatization is relatively low and the elasticity of X-inefficiency measured at full nationalization is greater than the critical level, then the partial privatization is the optimal strategy from the social welfare viewpoint. Third, when an efficiency gap exists between firms, asymmetric subsidization can restore the social optimum, and the optimal subsidization level is not directly related to the degree of nationalization, but is affected by the efficiency gap. In addition, the subsidy for a private firm is larger than that for a public firm, which is relatively inefficient compared to the private firm.

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 이우형, "공기업의 비효율성과 정부보조금이 민영화에 미치는 영향" 한국경제통상학회 31 (31): 1-16, 2013

      2 Glazer, A., "Why Voters May Prefer Congested Public Club" 65 : 37-44, 1997

      3 Zikos, V., "Stackelberg Mixed Oligopoly with Asymmetric Subsidies" 12 (12): 1-5, 2007

      4 Nishimori, A., "Public Monopoly, Mixed Oligopoly and Productive Efficiency" 41 : 185-190, 2002

      5 유일호, "Public Finance in Korea since the Economic Crisis" 한국경제연구학회 9 (9): 141-177, 2008

      6 Wang, L. F. S., "Privatization, Efficiency Gap, and Subsidization with Excess Taxation Burden" 52 : 55-68, 2011

      7 Haskel, J., "Privatization and X-inefficiency: A Bargaining Approach" XLIII : 301-321, 1995

      8 Wang, L. F. S, "Privatization and Efficiency Gain in an International Mixed Oligopoly with Asymmetric Costs" 60 (60): 539-559, 2009

      9 Matsumura T., "Price versus Quantity in a Mixed Duopoly" 116 : 174-177, 2012

      10 Choi, K., "Price and Quantity Competition in a Unionized Mixed Duopoly:The Cases of Substitutes and Complements" 51 (51): 1-22, 2012

      1 이우형, "공기업의 비효율성과 정부보조금이 민영화에 미치는 영향" 한국경제통상학회 31 (31): 1-16, 2013

      2 Glazer, A., "Why Voters May Prefer Congested Public Club" 65 : 37-44, 1997

      3 Zikos, V., "Stackelberg Mixed Oligopoly with Asymmetric Subsidies" 12 (12): 1-5, 2007

      4 Nishimori, A., "Public Monopoly, Mixed Oligopoly and Productive Efficiency" 41 : 185-190, 2002

      5 유일호, "Public Finance in Korea since the Economic Crisis" 한국경제연구학회 9 (9): 141-177, 2008

      6 Wang, L. F. S., "Privatization, Efficiency Gap, and Subsidization with Excess Taxation Burden" 52 : 55-68, 2011

      7 Haskel, J., "Privatization and X-inefficiency: A Bargaining Approach" XLIII : 301-321, 1995

      8 Wang, L. F. S, "Privatization and Efficiency Gain in an International Mixed Oligopoly with Asymmetric Costs" 60 (60): 539-559, 2009

      9 Matsumura T., "Price versus Quantity in a Mixed Duopoly" 116 : 174-177, 2012

      10 Choi, K., "Price and Quantity Competition in a Unionized Mixed Duopoly:The Cases of Substitutes and Complements" 51 (51): 1-22, 2012

      11 Ogawa, A., "Price Competition in a Mixed Duopoly" 12 (12): 1-5, 2006

      12 Fujiwara, K., "Partial Privatization in a Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly" 92 (92): 51-65, 2007

      13 Ishibash, K., "Partial Privatization in Mixed Duopoly with Price and Quality Competition" 95 : 213-231, 2008

      14 Matsumura, T., "Partial Privatization in Mixed Duopoly" 70 : 473-483, 1998

      15 Fjell, K., "Mixed Oligopoly, Subsidization and the order of Firm’s Moves: the Relevance of Privatization" 83 : 411-416, 2004

      16 Myles, G., "Mixed Oligopoly, Subsidization and the Order of Firms’ Moves: An Irrelevance Result for the General Case" 12 : 1-6, 2002

      17 Poyago-Theotoky, J, "Mixed Oligopoly, Subsidization and the Order of Firms’ Moves: An Irrelevance" 12 (12): 1-5, 2001

      18 Cato, S, "Mixed Oligopoly, Productive Efficiency, and Spillover" 12 (12): 1-5, 2008

      19 Kato, K, "Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization, Subsidization, and the Order of Firms’ Moves: Several Types of Objectives" 96 : 287-292, 2007

      20 White, M. D., "Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization and Subsidization" 53 : 189-195, 1996

      21 Megginson, W. L, "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization" 39 : 321-389, 2001

      22 De Fraja, G, "Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly" 41 : 302-311, 1989

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      학술지 인용정보

      학술지 인용정보
      기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
      2016 0.22 0.22 0.26
      KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
      0.21 0.22 0.547 0.07
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