The Origins of US Regulation on Allies’ Nuclear Latency : How Varied Threat Levels Shaped US Cold War Policy on South Korea and Japan = 미국의 동맹국 핵잠재력 규제의 기원: 한국과 일본에 대한 미국의 냉전기 정책을 중심으로

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The United States has pursued a different degree of regulatory policies towards nuclear latent capabilities of South Korea and Japan, adopting a strong regulatory policy towards South Korea while being lenient on Japan despite many similarities that its two East Asian allies shared with one another. What motivated the US to follow such varied policy directions? This paper aims to contribute to the study of US regulatory policy on its allies’ nuclear latent capabilities by addressing the cause of such policy difference towards South Korea and Japan during the Cold War. Through extensive research on primary and secondary sources using the process-tracing method, this paper argues that the different degree of US Cold War regulatory policies towards its two East Asian allies largely originated from varying threat levels posed to the US by North Korea on one hand and the Soviet Union and China on the other. The US assessed South Korea as strategically not a vital ally because its chief role as an ally was to balance the North Koreans who posed little threat to the US, while Japan was assessed to be one of the most crucial allies for the US because its primary role as an ally was to balance the Soviets and Chinese who were both significant threats to the US. This in turn caused South Korea to continuously worry about US abandonment, whereas Japan had relatively high trust in the credibility of the American security commitment. Consequently, South Korea had been much more inclined towards going nuclear than Japan as a means of survival, and this resulted in greater need for the US to strongly regulate South Korea’s nuclear latent capabilities to prevent indigenous nuclearization, while there was little reason for the US to adopt such a stringent regulatory policy on Japan due to its low likelihood of going nuclear. The findings of this research have both academic and empirical implications, not only enriching the study on nuclear latency and US regulatory policy on its allies but also illustrating the conditions under which the US may relax its regulatory policy towards South Korea to the level comparable to the one enjoyed by Japan to the present day.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

냉전 기간 미국은 한국의 핵잠재력에 대해 강력한 규제 정책을 취했으나 일본의 핵잠재력은 상대적으로 약하게 규제했다. 동아시아의 두 동맹국을 상대로 미국이 이처럼 서로 다른 수준의 규제 정책을 취한 이유는 무엇인가? 본 연구는 냉전 기간 한국과 일본의 핵잠재력에 대해 미국이 취한 규제 정책 수준의 차이는 당시 북한과 소련, 중국이 미국에 가하던 위협 수준의 차이에서 기인했다고 주장하고자 한다. 냉전 시기 북한은 미국에 있어 큰 위협이 아니었으나 소련과 중국은 미국을 심각하게 위협하는 국가들이었다. 이로 인해 미국은 자국에 약한 위협인 북한을 견제하는 성격이 강한 동맹국이었던 한국의 전략적 가치는 낮게 평가한 반면, 자국에 심각한 위협인 소련과 중국 견제가 주된 역할인 동맹국이었던 일본의 전략적 가치는 높게 평가했다. 이 때문에 한국은 미국의 잠재적인 방기 가능성에 대해 크게 우려하게 되었으나 일본은 미국의 안보 공약에 높은 신뢰를 보이며 방기 가능성을 낮게 판단했다. 따라서 한국은 미국의 방기에 대비하여 핵무장을 추구할 강한 동기를 갖게 되었고, 반면 일본은 미국의 안보 공약을 신뢰했기에 자국의 생존을 보장하기 위한 핵무장 동기가 강하지 않았다. 그 결과 냉전 시기 미국은 핵무장 가능성이 높다고 판단한 한국에는 강한 규제 정책을, 핵무장 가능성이 낮다고 판단한 일본에는 약한 규제 정책을 취하게 되었다. 본 연구는 이러한 주장을 검증하기 위해 과정추적법을 사용하여 한국어, 영어, 일본어로 작성된 다양한 1차, 2차 사료들을 깊이 있게 분석하였다. 본 연구 결과는 핵잠재력에 대한 연구 및 동맹국에 대한 미국의 규제 정책 연구에 기여할 수 있으며, 향후 미국이 한국을 상대로 유지해온 강한 규제 정책을 완화할 조건을 제시할 수 있다는 점에서 의의를 갖는다.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• ABSTRACT i
• 국문 초록 iii
• TABLE OF CONTENTS v
• CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1
• 1.1. Overview 1
• 1.2. Argument 3
• 1.3. Literature Review 7
• 1.3.1. Strategic Interest and Its Impact on Nuclear Regulation 7
• 1.3.2. New Nuclear Test and Its Impact on US Nuclear Regulation 15
• 1.3.3. Impact of US Domestic Politics on Nuclear Regulation 18
• 1.4. Research Methods 20
• 1.5. Research Significance 24
• 1.5.1. Academic Significance 24
• 1.5.2. Real-Life Policy Significance 25
• 1.6. Outline 27
• CHAPTER 2. US REGULATION ON SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN 28
• 2.1. Strong US Regulation Towards South Korea’s Nuclear Latency 28
• 2.1.1. US Regulation Towards South Korea’s ENR Technology 28
• 2.1.2. US Regulation Towards South Korea’s Delivery System 33
• 2.2. Weak US Regulation Towards Japan’s Nuclear Latency 37
• 2.2.1. US Regulation Towards Japan’s ENR Technology 37
• 2.2.2. US Regulation Towards Japan’s Delivery System 41
• CHAPTER 3. SOUTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR LATENCY AND THE US 45
• 3.1. Weak North Korean Threat to the US 45
• 3.2. South Korea’s Low Strategic Value to the US 56
• 3.3. South Korea’s High Fear of US Abandonment 67
• 3.4. High Likelihood of South Korea’s Nuclearization 75
• 3.5. Strong Regulation Necessary to Stop South Korea Going Nuclear 84
• 3.6. Alternative Explanation: South Korea’s Bad Reputation as Rogue State? 93
• CHAPTER 4. JAPAN’S NUCLEAR LATENCY AND THE US 96
• 4.1. Strong Soviet and Chinese Threat to the US 96
• 4.2. Japan’s High Strategic Value to the US 105
• 4.3. Japan’s Low Fear of US Abandonment 114
• 4.4. Low Likelihood of Japan’s Nuclearization 120
• 4.5. Strong Regulation Unnecessary to Stop Japan Going Nuclear 127
• 4.6. Alternative Explanations: Japan’s Non-Nuclear Norm and Good Timing? 135
• CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 141
• 5.1. Summary 141
• 5.2. US Regulations in the Post-Cold War Era 143
• 5.3. Implications 151
• REFERENCES 157