힘의 불균형 계약관계에서 甲의 상호작용공정성이 乙의 몰입, 도덕적 해이 및 지각성과에 미치는 영향 = The Effects of Principal's Interaction Justice on Agency's Commitment, Moral Hazard, and Perceived Performance in Power-Asymmetry Relationship

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The objective of this article is to analyze interaction justice as an antecedent of agency's commitment, moral hazard and perceived performance in power-asymmetry relationship. The franchise system to study in this research is a good example of power-asymmetry called as principal-agency relationship. Hypotheses based on justice theory, role-script theory and reciprocity norm theory were empirically tested. Major findings in this study as follows: First, principal's interaction justice increase agency's commitment and decrease its moral hazard. Especially interaction justice has more effect on commitment than moral hazard. Secondly, agency's positive attitude called as commitment decrease its moral hazard. So we can say that it is efficient to curb negative behavior by positive attitude. Third, agency's commitment and moral hazard have positive effect on its perceived performance of the relationship. Until now we has studied not principal's behavior but agency's behavior, especially the negative side. Based on these findings we can say that we as a principal don't want agency's negative behavior, we must act according to the justice principle and reciprocity principle.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 문제제기 및 연구목적
• Ⅱ. 관련이론 및 주요개념
• 1. 프랜차이즈시스템과 도덕적 해이
• 2. 역할이론과 공정성 및 몰입
• 3. 교호성 규범
• Ⅲ. 상호작용공정성, 몰입, 도덕적 해이 및 지각성과
• 1. 본부의 행동이 가맹점의 행동에 미치는 영향
• 2. 가맹점의 행동: 몰입과 도덕적 해이
• 3. 가맹점의 행동과 지각성과
• Ⅳ. 연구개념 및 자료수집
• 1. 연구개념의 작업정의 및 측정
• 2. 자료수집: 표본 및 조사방법
• Ⅴ. 척도의 정제 및 가설검증
• 1. 척도의 정제 및 연구개념 간의 상관관계분석
• 2. 가설검증
• Ⅵ. 연구결과의 논의, 시사점 및 연구의 한계
• 1. 연구결과의 논의 및 시사점
• 2. 연구의 한계 및 이후 연구를 위한 제안