전후 일본의 국가 대전략과 북일관계

강용범 ( Jiang Long-fan ),왕해범 ( Wang Hai-fan ) 조선대학교 동북아연구소 2016 동북아연구 Vol.31 No.1

In history, the Korean peninsula has been an advanced base of Japan to pursue local hegemony through force and realize an ambition to achieve Mutual Prosperity in East Asia. After World War II, Japan has had a final goal of recovering the position and status of a normal country and furthermore, raising its status to one of the top countries in Asia. In the process of realizing such a national strategy, its colonial rule in the past has become a setback which can not be overcome. In 1965 when the Cold War was at its peak period, under the active intervention of the U.S.A, South Korea and Japan normalized diplomatic relations. Therefore, a better relationship with North Korea has become an important task for Japan`s diplomacy before and after the war. Japan`s politicians said that Japan does not have any strategies. However, to look at the policies against North Korea which have been developed for about 20 years after the Cold War, it can be understood how clever Japanese strategies against other countries are. First of all, through normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea, it recovered the status and position of a normal country. Then, under the pretext of the security threat of North Korea, it realized “Military Power” and furthermore it joined in six-party talks to intervene in the multilateral security talks and were prepared for a great military power. As well, Japan`s policy against North Korea has adhered to nuclear technology ,missiles, and kidnapping out of the fundamental problems of reflection, apology and compensation. In addition, as Japan has had worse relations with China and South Korea, and is isolated diplomatically, it attempted to escape from this crisis through mitigation of relations with North Korea, and for security law and constitution revision, it mentioned the North Korean Threat Issue to reinforce restraint. After the 4th North Korea Nuclear Test, relations between North Korea and Japan faced the worst crisis. North Korea dismantled a special investigation committee into Japanese kidnappings and Japan has implemented more independent and resolute restraints as well as restraints in the U.N. Security Council. To the Abe administration which has actively executed Constitutional reform, it is suggested that the severe threat of North Korea and aggravated relations between the two countries would be a more desirable strategy.

헤이세이(平成) 시기 일본의 대외전략과 한일관계

이기태 한국일본학회 2020 日本學報 Vol.0 No.124

This paperThe current work attempted to clarifyies how Japan’s foreign policy was rooted in their moves to turn Japan into a “more normal country” in line with changes in the international strategic environment during the Heisei era (平成, 1989-2019). It also explains that the ROK-Japan relations were marked by conflict and cooperation in terms of security and history along the path to become a normal country. Japan’s foreign policy during the era sought to move away from the Yoshida doctrine and toward becoming a “normal country.” With the end of the Cold War and Gulf War in 1991, a debate within Japan on normalcy began which was centered on two aspects: began: U.N.- and multilateraliam- centered, and the U.S.-Japan alliance–centered. Japan’s step towards normalcy developed into centering on the alliance throughout the era and Japan is almost getting moved closer to becoming a normal country by the second Abe Cabinet. In comparison to the foreign policy pursued in a consistent way to make Japan a normal country, conflict and cooperation was constant between Korea and Japan in terms of history and security. Historical issues regarding on compensation for war-time wrongs and damages during the colonial era, drafted workers, comfort women, Dokdo, Japanese history textbooks and the Yasukuni Shrine were the sources of discord. In the meantime, bilateral security cooperation including North Korea’s nuclear issue made continuous progress when it comes toin terms of security. However, the South Korean President, Moon Jae-in’s peace and prosperity policy for the Korean Peninsula, and policy towards North Korea have caused conflict between South Korea and Japan. 본 연구에서는 헤이세이 시기(平成, 1989-2019) 동안 일본의 대외전략이 국제전략환경 변화에 따라 ‘보통국가화의 강화’라는 흐름에서 지속되었음을 밝힌다. 그리고 이러한 보통국가화의 흐름에서 한일관계는 안보와 역사, 양 측면에서 ‘협력’과 ‘갈등’이 혼재되어 나타났다는 사실을 설명하고자 한다. 헤이세이 시기 일본의 대외전략은 기존의 요시다 노선에서 벗어나 ‘보통국가 일본’을 지향하였다. 냉전 종식과 함께 1991년 걸프전 이후 일본 내에서 보통국가 논의가 시작되었고, ‘유엔 및 다자주의 중심’과 ‘미일동맹 중심’의 2가지 측면에서 보통국가 노선에 대한 논의가 존재했다. 결국 헤이세이 시기 동안 일본의 보통국가 노선은 미일동맹을 중심으로 하는 형태로 발전하였고, 제2차 아베 내각에서 거의 완성 단계에 도달했다고 평가할 수 있다. 헤이세이 시기 일본의 대외전략이 보통국가화라는 일관된 방향으로 진행된 것과 달리 한일관계는 역사와 안보 분야에서 ‘갈등’과 ‘협력’이 반복되는 형태로 진행되었다. 즉 역사 문제와 관련해서는 전쟁 및 식민지 피해 보상 문제, 징용자 및 위안부 문제, 독도 문제, 역사교과서 문제, 야스쿠니 신사 문제 등이 지속적으로 갈등 요소로 나타났다. 한편 안보 문제와 관련해서는 북핵 문제 등을 둘러싸고 한일 안보협력이 지속적으로 진전되었지만, 최근 문재인 정부와 아베 정부에서는 문재인 정부의 대북 정책과 평화번영의 한반도 정책을 둘러싼 인식 차이로 전방위적 한일 ‘갈등’ 양상이 나타나고 있다.

'전후’와 폭력 : 한국전쟁, 기지, 원자력

서동주(Seo, Dong-ju) 고려대학교 일본학연구센터 2015 일본연구 Vol.24 No.-

이 글은 냉전의 시간을 ‘전후’라는 감각으로 산다는 것이 어떻게 가능했는지를 냉전의 폭력을 둘러싼 담론의 분석을 통해 살펴본 것이다. 이 문제를 제기한 이유는 이런 감각이 유지되는 동안에도 ‘전후’ 일본은 냉전과 ‘연루’되어 있었다는 사실에 있었다. 이것을 생각할 때 의 존재가 중요하다. 무력에 의한 분쟁해결을 ‘영구히’ 포기한다는 내용을 담고 있기에 줄곧 ‘평화헌법’이라 불린 은 냉전이라는 적대성의 세계로부터 일본을 ‘분리’시키는 논리적이고 때로는 정서적인 근거였기 때문이다. 이 존재하는 ‘전후’의 일본은 ‘평화’의 장소이며 전쟁과 같은 ‘폭력’과 무관하지 않으면 안 된다. 여기서 ‘전후’라는 공간이 ‘외부=전쟁/내부=평화’와 같은 폭력을 둘러싼 지정학적 상상력을 동반하게 됨을 알 수 있다. 그런 의미에서 ‘한국전쟁’, ‘기지’, 그리고 ‘핵=원자력’은 ‘헌법=전후’에 대한 중대한 위협이 아닐 수 없다. 이런 것들은 부단히 일본과 냉전의 ‘연루’를 상기시키며, 따라서 ‘전후’가 설정하는 상상적 경계의 ‘교란’을 의미하기 때문이다. 현실에서 일본은 결코 냉전의 외부에 있지 않았다. ‘전후’와 ‘냉전’의 경계는 ‘이데올로기(허위의식)’에 가까운 것이었다. 그러나 일본인들에게 냉전의 시간은 자신들의 시간과 무관하게 인식되었고, 따라서 ‘전후’ 관념의 이데올로기적 성격도 거의 의식되지 않았다. 그렇다면 ‘전후’의 담론 안에서 침범하는 냉전의 폭력은 어떻게 처리되었던 것일까? ‘전후’의 이데올로기적 성격은 어떤 의미작용을 통해 ‘은폐’되었던 것일까? 분석의 결과를 정리하면 다음과 같다. 한국전쟁이라는 폭력과 재일조선인의 폭력은 외부화=타자화의 방식으로 ‘전후’와 분절되고 있었다. 한편 일본 내부에 존재하는 냉전적 폭력을 상징했던 미군의 폭력은 1950년대 ‘가해자의 폭력’으로 표상되었지만, 기지의 편재성이 사라진 1960년 이후 일본의 안보와 관련된 ‘수호자의 폭력’으로 전환되는 과정을 밟았다. 그 결과 1950년대의 맥락 안에서 재일조선인과 미군기지는 냉전의 폭력을 ‘전후’의 공간으로 유입하는 침입자의 표상을 부여받았다는 점에서 동렬에 위치했다. 핵이라는 또 하나의 냉전적 폭력이‘평화이용’이라는 담론과 결부되어 ‘전후’일본에 수용되는 과정을 살펴보면서, ‘피폭의 기억’이 핵에너지의 도입을 거부하는 논리가 아니라 일본인이야말로 핵의 평화적 이용을 실현할 수 있는 ‘유일한 주체’라는 담론을 지탱하는 근거가 되고 있음도 확인했다. The purpose of this article is to show how it was possible for the Japanese people post-war to live under their new peace constitution in the time of the Cold War through an analysis of the discourse surrounding the violence of the Cold War. This is a problem in the sense that post-war Japan is not often thought of as a major factor in the Cold War. When considering this issue, it is important to consider the Constitution of Japan because it, the peace constitution, resolves that Japan permanently refrain from conflict settlement by force. The Constitution thus separated Japan from the world of the Cold War on logical and sometimes emotional grounds. Such a Japan is a place of peace independent of violence, such as war. Thus the Constitution was accompanied by a geopolitical imagination which envisioned the external as war and the internal as peace. In that sense, the Korean War, US military bases and nuclear power were regarded as serious threats to how post-war Japan viewed itself. Such events were constant reminders that Japan was involved with the Cold War, disturbing the imaginary boundaries set by the constitution. This article deals with the following issue: How can the reality of post-war Japan be reinterpreted and converged in the imaginary post-war? To this end, this article has reviewed representations of Cold War violence by targeting the discourse of the peace movement, fiction, pop culture, and news articles. The Korean War and Korean-Japanese conflicts were regarded as external party violence and, in that way, kept separate from post-war Japan. Meanwhile, the U.S. military bases in Japan, throughout the 1950s, were represented as perpetrators of violence. However, since the number of bases plunged in 1960, American violence was converted in Japan to mean guardian of violence. In the context of at least 1950, Korean, Japanese and U.S. military bases were considered to be outside intruders capable of implicating Japan in the Cold War. Finally, nuclear energy is used in conjunction with the discourse of peace, I looked at the process of the acceptance of nuclear power in Japan. Here, it was confirmed that Japanese memories of atomic warfare did not stand in the way of the introduction of nuclear energy. This gave rise to the idea that only Japan could achieve the peaceful use of nuclear power.

한일수교와 일본표상 -1960년대 전반기의 한국영화와 영화검열-

오영숙 ( Young Sook Oh ) 한양대학교 현대영화연구소 2010 현대영화연구 Vol.6 No.2

This paper seeks to closely examine the characteristics and contexts of the Park Jung-Hee regime`s cultural politics and Korean Cinema in the first half of the 1960s by focusing on the truth behind censorship and cinematic phenomenon during a specific era before and after the establishment of amity between Korea and Japan. Korea-Japan amity was meant not only to develop Korea-Japan relations but an issue of legitimizing the Park Jung-Hee regime and as a critical plan intimately correlated to establishing the nation`s future. The Park Jung-Hee regime actively pursued a Korea-Japan summit for the purpose of economic development and concluded a Korea-Japan framework agreement in 1965, establishing amity and normalizing diplomatic relations. However, the majority of citizens found the government`s consistent humiliating and modest posture throughout the process of establishing this agreement problematic and began to express intense infuriation. The opposition struggle of the Korea-Japan agreement culminated with a student protest on June 3, 1964 and went on to expand further than mere anti-Japanese sentiment to rage at the Park Jung-Hee administration`s betrayal of nationalism and democracy, an administration who had previously committed publicly to uphold `national democracy`. Meanwhile, there was the rise of Japanese culture in Korean society which began in the early 1960s. In the 1950s, the Rhee Seung-man administration cried out for a `clean sweep of Japanese ways` and suspended all exchanges between Korea and Japan. However, subsequent to the April revolution and the seizure of power by the Democratic Party, humanitarian exchange along with cultural exchanges between Korean and Japan were generously permitted. As a result of print materials, music, and movies, the domain of popular culture and the so-called `Japanese rage` began to stir. Looking ahead at the point of signing the Korea-Japan agreement, the discussion enters a more serious level than that of Japanese films, Korean films and their exchanges. The movie industry began to accelerate the production and distribution of Japanese cultural goods. The Korean movie industry conveyed three different postures regarding Japan around the same time. 1) Adhering to the equation of `Japanese ways = box office hit`, various methods were utilized to attract Japan unto the screen 2) Adapting to the opposing atmosphere of the Korea-Japan agreement and appealing to the anti-Japanese sentiment of citizens by advocating nationalism. 3) Providing imaginary reconciliation via the narrative and spectacle of attaches between Korean and Japanese(romance, family relationship) in which beautiful and good Japanese woman sacrifice herself for Korean lover or persons. Although these three tendencies seem to be contrary to each other, these cinema was addressing the dual identity of Korean people as colonial subject. They reflect public need to solve the problem imaginarily by socially symbolic act such as cinema and cultural exchange. These cultural efforts were made vigorously to seek new relationship with Japan but reached a deadlock by the Park Jung-Hee regime`s cultural politics and cinema censorship. In the first half of 1960s, cinema censorship and policies of cinemas in regard to Korea-Japan relations were oppressive but more or less unprincipled, temporary or easily fluctuating. Ultimately, one government`s cultural policies acted as the leading cause to the promotion of malformations of Korea-Japan relations. Fixation on anti-communism became linked to the fear of cultural exchanges between Korea and Japan, the inconsistencies of the censorship policy extinguished the trust cultural artists had in the government and in tandem, disheartened the volition of Korea-Japan cultural exchanges. Furthermore, the anti-Japanese sentiment maintained by citizens was utilized as a foreign alibi to prop up the Park Jung-Hee regime`s inability to hold a liberal posture towards the Korea-Japan cultural exchanges. Such cultural policies of the Park Jung-Hee regime ultimately became the cause of discord between economic, political, and cultural levels of the Korea-Japan relations during the Cold War period, which more or less languished in a state of disproportionate deformity.

특집논문 : 일본, 적대와 연대의 이중주 -1950년대 한국지식인들의 대일인식과 한국문화(학)

이봉범 ( Bong Beom Lee ) 한국문학연구학회 2015 현대문학의 연구 Vol.0 No.55

Northeast Asian Paradox Phenomenon makes people focus on the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty which is the origin of current relationship between Korea and Japan. The Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty acquires starting point meaning since the 8.15 liberation movement. This thesis has tried to find out the origin, considering 65system as a knot for the relationship between Korea and Japan. This thesis mainly explores two things. First, how 1950s`` perception of Japan has been made and spread out. Second, how Syngman Rhee government``s anti-Japanism and Korean intellectuals perception of Japan to cultural aspect has been realized. Korean intellectuals`` perception of Japan based on historicity, distinctiveness and newness in 1950s. And its anti-Japanism spread out through economic, exclusive theory, realism and fatalism. It is from not the colonizing mentality but the holding, mixing, interruption of a Korean-Japanese Conference. For the intellectuals, it was the time when they were ‘empirically’ confirmed that Japan was merely an invasive, aggressive or incursive counterpart, not a cooperative one because Japan was only of militarism or left wing in 1950s. Decolonizing of Japanese imperialism was achieved under the dissolution of SCAA. In 1950s’, Japanism was prevalent and even accelerated despite of extreme exclusion of Japanese style. Japanism was inevitable due to the psychological mechanism against Japan as a two-fold existence of denial, hatred/ imitation, chase, under anti-Japanism, even though they had tried to plant negative images through government supply including clean sweep of Japanese style exercise. It was not Japan, but ourselves that caused it. Censorship over Japan culture leads to not only abolishment of import but also crackdown on the introduced Japanese culture. And the logic of danger and pornography works. However; excessive regulation makes this situation worse. It proves the Japanese value more. The censorship encouraged the cultural tartaric. Pro-Japanese problem in 1950s had become public as the process of establishment of art academy. Pro-Japanese problem promoted Korean intellectuals`` institutional reinstatement. Elevation of emotion for anti-Japanism and pro-Japanese literature reinstatement are contrasted with each other. And this is the intellectuals`` recognition of Japan in 1950s’. This period was the period when we were locked in ‘empirical’ anti-communism and ‘empirical’ anti-Japanism.

한일대륙붕공동개발을 둘러싼 일본의 정책결정과정 : 외교사적 추적

박창건 ( Park¸ Chang-gun ) 현대일본학회 2020 일본연구논총 Vol.52 No.-

The purpose of this study is to examine how Japan's policy-making process has unfolded over the joint development of the continental shelf between Korea and Japan. The focus of this discussion is to trace the history of how the policy-making process resulted in the negotiations, as well as the approval and ratification by Japan, leading up to the joint development of the Korea-Japan continental shelf. Specifically, this study analyzes the following policy-making processes based on the rational actor model and the incremental model: 1) the reasons Japan participated in the ECAFE survey; 2) the decisive reason for Japan carrying out joint development of the Korea-Japan continental shelf; and 3) why Japan pursued joint development of the continental shelf with China. This approach can help us understand how a national action strategy, formed through confrontations and compromises, was established in Japan’s foreign policy decision-making process over joint development of the Korea-Japan continental shelf. Despite the possibility of China’s fierce protest against such a joint development, and the decreased national interest to compensate for domestic oil shortages that surfaced from the first oil shock, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made the policy decision as a single, rational actor to consider the geopolitical relationships with its neighbors. The agreement on the Korea-Japan continental shelf was left incomplete; however, analyzing the policy goals and the means that the two governments tried in order to maximize the win-sets for the common bilateral interest (as well as how the policy-making process developed) will be a stepping stone to redefining the joint development of the continental shelf.

日米同盟と東北アジアの安全保障 - 日米安保協力の現狀と課題 -

鄭勛燮 동북아시아문화학회 2005 동북아 문화연구 Vol.1 No.9

Since the end of the World War Ⅱ,a primary objective of the U.S. policy toward the Northeast Asia has been the promotion of peace and stability on this area, that is first and foremost maintained by a credible deterrent against the possible Soviet aggression. The continued basing of the U.S. forces in Japan under the Japan‐U.S. Security Treaty makes this deterrent both possible and credible. Recently, the Japan‐U.S. alliance has been undergoing some changes. The changes stem from the end of the Cold War, September 11 terrorist attacks, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. These factors have forced Japan to form the new Japan‐U.S. security relations. Now, under the Global Posture Review (GPR) plan, Bush Administration is seeking to transform its military into a leaner, more mobile force to deal with the shifting post‐Cold War security environment. The Japan and U.S. also have been negotiating for more than a year over the reorganization of the U.S. forces in Japan. The U.S. still sees Japan as the linchpin of its security policy in the Northeast Asia. The purpose of this paper is mainly to analyze the present conditions and the issues of Japan‐U.S. security cooperation. This paper also examines about the correlation of a Japan‐U.S. alliance and the security of the Northeast Asia by considering the influences which Japan‐U.S. security cooperation has on neighboring countries.

만국략사(萬國略史)에 나타난 일본의존적 세계인식

정종원 한국근현대사학회 2022 한국 근현대사 연구 Vol.103 No.-

In the opening port era, Japan tried to put a Japan-relying view of the world to Koreans, that Korea must rely only on Japan. For the justification of Japanese interference and rule upon Korea, Koreans needed to rely on Japan. Mankukryaksa (A Concise World History), a world history textbook published by the editorial bureau of the Education Ministry in 1896, was the first world history textbook published by the Korean government. But Mankukryaksa was written by a Japanese councilor in Education Ministry, and its contents included a Japan-relying view of the world. Mankukryaksa emphasized it is the age of western powers invading the east, which continues the crisis of nations. But Mankukryaksa not only described western powers in a negative way but also negatively described most of the eastern countries. On the other hand, it described Japan as successfully cultural enlightenment through the success of the Meiji Restoration and a “powerful nation in the world” with great military strength. By emphasizing the western powers invading the east, dual narration of independence and crisis of nations, and contrasting descriptions of loser China and victor Japan, Mankukryaksa tried to make Korean see Japan as the only role model and saviour. The world history contents in Mankukryaksa were based on modern Japanese world history textbooks. And with the Japanese government's intention to make Koreans rely on Japan, some contents were added or erased. Through the Mankukryaksa’s contents and composition, which contains a Japan-relying view of the world, we can see that in the opening port era Japan tried to influence the Korean's view of the world for Japan’s rule of Korea. 개항기에 일본은 한국이 일본에게만 의존해야 한다는 세계인식을 한국인들에게 심어주려고 하였다. 일본의 한국에 대한 간섭과 지배를 정당화하기 위해서는 한국인들이 일본의존적인 세계인식에 물들어 있어야 했기 때문이다. 학부편집국에서 1896년에 간행한 세계사 교과서인 만국략사(萬國略史)는한국 정부에 의해 간행된 첫 세계사 교과서였다. 그러나 만국략사는 일본인학부고문관에 의해 서술된 것이었고, 그 내용은 일본이 한국에 퍼뜨리려고 하였던 일본의존적 세계인식을 담고 있었다. 만국략사는 당시의 세계가 서양 열강이 동양 국가들을 침략하는 서세동점의 시대임과 망국이 끊이지 않는 위기의시대임을 강조하였다. 그런데 만국략사는 서양 열강에 대해서 침략적이라고서술하였을 뿐만 아니라, 대부분의 동양 국가들에 대해서도 부정적으로 서술하였다. 반면 일본은 메이지 유신의 개혁에 성공하여 문명개화한 나라, 그리고막강한 군사력을 갖춘 ‘세계의 대강국’이 된 국가로서 호명되었다. 만국략사는 서세동점의 위기 강조, 독립과 망국의 이중적 서술 그리고 패배자 중국과승리자 일본이라는 대조적인 서술을 결합하여 일본을 한국의 유일한 모델이자, 유일한 구원자로 인식시키려 하였다. 만국략사 에 나타난 세계사 서술은 근대 일본의 세계사 교과서들을 기반으로 하고, 일본의존적 세계인식을 한국인들에게 전파하려는 일본 정부의 의도에따라 일부 내용이 첨가 혹은 삭제되어 만들어졌다. 만국략사의 일본의존적세계인식의 내용과 구성방식을 통해 개항기에 일본이 한국 지배를 위해 한국인들의 세계인식에까지 영향을 미치려 했음을 알 수 있다.

Post-2028년을 대비한 일본의 대(對) 한국 협상 외교 : 한일공동개발구역(JDZ)에서의 협상력 강화를 위한 지연전략

박창건,변우희 국가안보전략연구원 2024 국가안보와 전략 Vol.24 No.3

This study sheds light on Japan’s diplomatic negotiation strategy towards South Korea in the context of the potential termination of the Korea-Japan Agreement concerning Joint Development Agreement of the Continental Shelf. The discussion aims to identify Japan’s direction for seabed resource development and continental shelf boundary delimitation in the post-2028 Korea-Japan Joint Development Zone (JDZ), and to explore corresponding countermeasures. Since the termination notice of the Korea-Japan Agreement concerning Joint Development Agreement of the Continental Shelf can be given from June 22, 2025, Japan is employing a delay strategy in the JDZ distribution negotiations to maximize its national interests. The delay strategy exhibited by Japan during the implementation of the Korea-Japan Agreement concerning Joint Development Agreement of the Continental Shelf is characterized by proceduralization, convergence, and flexibilization, aimed at setting negotiation endpoints and expanding the win-set to enhance negotiation power. However, it should also be noted that Japan’s delay strategy may lead to issues such as a decline in leadership in East Asian maritime governance, intensified maritime conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region, and deterioration of the new Korea-Japan relationship. Therefore, this study analyzes realistically acceptable options for Japan’s negotiation diplomacy with Korea at the turning point in the implementation of the agreement, June 22, 2025, and proposes an institutionalized model for sustainable cooperation in the JDZ.

전후 일본의 방위 구상: 일본 우익 세력의 자위대 구상과 그 실천 과정

서민교 서울대학교 일본연구소 2014 일본비평 Vol.- No.10

This paper analyzes the process of rearmament in postwar Japan from 1948 to 1950s during which the Self-Defense Force was established, and tries to understand how Japan’s rearmament was designed and what characterized its practical procedures. As the rearmament process became fully in progress in the 1950s, the recruitment of the military officials of the Imperial Army, the idea which was originally rejected, became inevitable. In this sense, it is essential to pay attention to the activities of the cooperative organizations such as Hattori Group (formerly organized by Imperial Army officials) as well as military advisor to prime minister Yoshida. On the other hand, even though both army and navy were “officially” dismissed after the war ended, the minespweeper units of the Imperial Navy remained undissolved. Unlike the case of the army, the networks of the navy personnel which centered around Japan Coast Guard was administered in a unified manner, and it is noteworthy that some of the former military personnel who assumed office had close personal connection with Yoshida. That is why this paper sheds light on the role of “Commssion Y.”Japan promised a large-scale rearmament to the US after the two signed MSA agreement in March 1954, which obliged the US to provide support for its allies and the US allies to strengthen their military capabilities. The SDF, often called “military without name” or “non-militaristic military,” which was the product of this agreement, began to function as a physical apparatus to take over Japan’s defense. Recently, there have been two conflicting arguments regarding Japan’s right of collective self-defense. When we look at the overall framework of these arguments, however, most agree that Japan should provide defense to the US “in such times as the United States is under attack by a third party.” In this reasoning, however, there still remains a crucial question as to whether defending of the United States is to be classified as “individual” or “collective” self-defense. If Japan accords itself the right of “collective” self-defense, the possibility for Japan to get involved in international conflicts led by the US becomes higher, because virtually there would be no restrictions on the use of force. After all, all these issues can be resolved if Japan takes on the constitutional revision. Yet there still remains a strong anti-revisionist sentiments among the Japanese people. Under these circumstances, it is crucial to pay attention how far the “interpretational revision” can suffice in dealing with Japan’s changing defense framework.