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      • KCI우수등재

        駐베트남 한국 공관원 송환을 위한 신호게임, 1975-1980

        조동준(JO Dong-Joon),차지현(CHA Ji-Hyun) 한국국제정치학회 2014 국제정치논총 Vol.54 No.1

        The paper provides answers to the two puzzles in the process where the Government of the Republic of Korea tried to repatriate the detained/prisoned diplomats after the fall of Saigon from 1975 to 1980. First, the Republic of Korea did not make the imprisonment/detainment of the diplomats public, censored the news in any domestic media outlet, and maintained a low-key stance on the negotiation process to repatriate them. As its polity was authoritarian in the 1970s, the Republic of Korea could not utilize media outlets and create domestic audience cost to make its signals credible in the negotiation process with the Government of Vietnam. Second, the Republic of Korea paid ex ante costs to make its messages credible to the Government of Vietnam. The Vietnamese Government responded to South Korean diplomatic maneuvers proportionally to the cost which South Korean Government took prior to the delivery of its messages to the Government of Vietnam.

      • KCI우수등재

        교범이 된 거짓말

        조동준(Jo Dong-Joon) 한국국제정치학회 2007 국제정치논총 Vol.47 No.4

        This paper shows that Trollope ploy, a negotiation tactic for a receiver to interpret unclear offers or agreements favorably to its interests, was not applied in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite the fact that several participants of the ExComm proposed it, Attorney-General Robert Kennedy did not use the ploy in the private negotiation with Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on 27 October 1962. While the United States government kept the documents related to the crisis classified, the allegation that the Kennedy Administration relied on the tactic has evolved into a myth and even a manual in international negotiation. The Clinton Administration utilized Trollope ploy in interpreting the Carter-Kim agreement in June 1994. President Clinton referred to the ploy as the US response to the Cater-Kim agreement, which was broadcasted by CNN on June 16, 1994. The Clinton Administration added North Korea's unilateral freezing of nuclear activities and no refueling into the agreement. North Korea accepted the two additional conditions to reopen the dialogue between the two states. Costly Signaling Theory provides a hint to explain why the Kennedy Administration could not utilize the tactic in the Cuban Missile Crisis, while the Clinton Administration did it in June 1994. As the domestic audience cost of Khrushchev's public message on 27 October 1962 was higher than that of his private letter on the previous day, the Kennedy Administration came to believe that the public message was more honest than the private message. Meanwhile, though the Carter-Kim agreement did not meet the US demand upon North Korea, the Clinton Administration believed that the Carter-Kim agreement had honest messages toward the United States. The possible US annulment would have brought a severe domestic audience cost against the North Korean leader, as it would have tainted the North Korean leader's credibility.

      • KCI우수등재

        대외정책연구 현황과 평가

        조동준(Jo Dong-Joon) 한국국제정치학회 2007 국제정치논총 Vol.46 No.S

        This paper reviews the foreign policy studies in Korea in the last five decades. First, it shows that the portion of the classes related to foreign policy studies is slightly more than 10% in the college curricula of the 29 major research and education programs in political science or international studies; that is approximately 10% in the Korean Journal of International Relations from 1963 to 2005. Korean scholars of foreign policy studies still tend to select foreign cases rather than domestic ones, though their attention to domestic cases has increased since the 1980s when Korean underwent the democratization and its international status was enhanced. Second, this paper discovers that some rigorous comparative methods and statistical methods have been frequently employed since the 1980s, even though single case studies have been popular. The introduction of these rigorous research methods serves as a momentum for the integrated cumulation and rigor of the foreign policy studies in Korea. Third, this paper raises a suspicion of file box problem in the foreign policy studies. The academic journals tend to accept papers, whose research outcomes are consistent with previous findings or imported models. This suspicion implies that the academic circle of foreign policy studies should implement some measures to cope with file box problem.

      • KCI우수등재

        미ㆍ중 대화에서 나타난 적수게임과 동맹게임

        조동준(Jo Dong-Joon) 한국국제정치학회 2005 국제정치논총 Vol.45 No.3

        This paper argues that the Sino-American dialogue in the 1970s led the United States to take different policies between Korea and Vietnam in the mid-1970s. The United States and China, who wanted not to be dragged into militarized conflicts by their allies in Korea and Vietnam, agreed symmetrically to restrain the two Koreas from initiating militarized conflicts. This symmetrical understanding led the United States to provide a moderate amount of military and economic assistance to the South Korea and check the South Korean military buildup. Also, it allowed the United States to ignore a series of the North Korean moves for normalization in the late 1970s. In contrast, China refused to restrain the North Vietnam from subverting the South Vietnam in the dialogue, while asking the United States to keep the Vietnamization defensive only. The United States had to provide a large amount of military and economic assistance to placate South Vietnamese complaints. Also, it had to negotiate directly with the North Vietnam for its withdrawal, while employing militarized initiatives to pressure its counterpart stay in peace talks. Furthermore, it had to accept most of the North Vietnamese peace conditions.

      • KCI우수등재

        코로나-19와 지구화의 변화

        조동준(Dong-Joon Jo) 한국국제정치학회 2020 국제정치논총 Vol.60 No.3

        COVID-19 is unlikely to be a watershed in the history of mankind, considering COVID-19’s attributes and the interaction between viruses and humans. The mankind is expected to reach the threshold of herd immunity through vaccines which are likely to be introduced in 2021. Even if vaccines were not introduced, the mankind would reach the threshold through infections and would coexist with the virus eventually. Though it is not sure when vaccines are introduced and how long the immunity lasts, it is likely that the virus would be one of the contagious diseases in the history of mankind. Golobalization serves as a pre-condition for the COVID-19 pandemic. Viruses spread slowly and intermittently across a series of epidemics along adjacent communities in the pre-globalization era. Also, they slowly attenuated, while slowing spreading out. In contrast, long ranged human movements help new viruses spread worldwide and all regions have to undergo the massive infections in the globalization era. They attenuate, while the mankind experiences pandemics. COVID-19 will weaken the current globalization trend. States try to control the international human movements for public safety and promote the production of merit goods and medical supplies within their soil; economic actors will find a new balance between the risks associated with contagious diseases and their economic gains and will rearrange their global value chains; citizens will find a new balance between free movements and personal safety. The interaction among three groups will decide the future of globalization.

      • KCI등재

        북한의 핵능력 증가가 미국의 확장억제에 주는 함의와 대처방안

        조동준 ( Jo Dong-joon ) 한국국가전략연구원 2017 한국국가전략 Vol.2 No.1

        The US extended deterrence for the Republic of Korea has been a strategic asset for the peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. It has contributed to the prevention of militarized conflicts and escalations in the area. The United States pledged to provide nuclear umbrella to forestall any nuclear attack by the hostile nuclear powers from 1970s to 1990s. Also, faced with North Korea’s nuclear challenges since 2005, the United States and the Republic of Korea have developed a “tailored extended deterrence” which provides a set of detailed military play books to cope with the three contingencies: North Korea’s threat to employ nuclear or bio-chemical weapons, the imminence of its nuclear or bio-chemical attack, and breakouts of nuclear or bio-chemical attacks. North Korea’s nuclear challenges have been detrimental to the credibility of the US extended deterrence for the Republic of Korea. Though it has enough capabilities to carry out retaliatory attacks on North Korea, the United States has to bear the expected huge costs in its strategic calculations. Claiming that the US strategic interests in East Asia and Pacific have been within the range of its attacks, North Korea who has tried to show off its preemptive capabilities has challenged the US extended deterrence in the Korean Peninsula. The Republic of Korea has been seeking the US reassurance and exploring some alternatives, even the redeployment of some US nuclear weapons. The credibility of the US extended deterrence may ben increased by the three ways. First, the United States and the Republic of Korea may keep some US forward-deployed units and personnel in their positions and establish more joint units. These measures will increase the countries’ joint readiness to cope with North Korea’s military provocations and trigger the United States to carry out its security pledges. Second, the two countries may reaffirm the US extended deterrence at the summit level to increase the visibility of the US security commitments for the Republic of Korea. Also, the two countries’ legislatures may jointly reaffirm the US security commitments. Third, the two countries keep updating the military operation plan to cope with North Korea’s challenges and carry out joint military drills. These measures will signal the US willingness to keep its security commitments in the Korean Peninsula.

      • KCI등재

        사회세력과 담론 간 이합집산

        조동준(Jo Dong-Joon) 21세기정치학회 2015 21세기 정치학회보 Vol.25 No.1

        This paper shows that the three competing discourses related to slavery issues were interlinked with social forces in the 19th century England: political evangelism, ‘scientific racism,’ and liberalism. The three discourses came to be associated with social forces whose economic interests were compatible to the discourses. Also, it presents that the link between discourses and social forces reflects the changing economic environments. When the slavey was not abolished yet, commercial and industrial sectors allied with political evangelism and liberalism; plantation owners allied with Christian/‘scientific’ racism. In contrast, after the slavery was abolished, commercial and industrial sectors kept distances from political evangelism because of the economic dissonance between their economic interests and beliefs; plantation owners tried to invoke political evangelism to defend their economic interests. This case implies that researchers should extend the time span in their study of norms from emergence in domestic political configurations to internalization/adaptation. Multiple research paradigms need to be integrated in norm studies.

      • KCI우수등재
      • 제6장 : 동아시아 역내문제 해결방식의 특수성

        조동준 ( Dong Joon Jo ) 서울대학교 국제문제연구소 2014 세계정치 Vol.21 No.-

        This paper compares the regional governance mechanism across the five regions: Europe, Americas, Africa, Arab, and East Asia. There has been a strong tendency to solve international issues by means of dyadic diplomacy and universal international organizations in East Asia. Meanwhile, regional organizations in East Asia have been weak and merely functional. The weakness of regional organizations in East Asia is a striking contrast to the fact that East Asia has been tightly integrated in terms of economic relationships. It may be called as the “Asian paradox.” There seem to be two explanations to the “Asian paradox.” First, ri-valries have been rampant in East Asia. China, Japan, and Korea still have had rivalries among them. There have been two divided nations: Korea and China. There have been rivalries in Southeast Asia. These rivalries have been hampering the development of regional organizations in East Asia. Second, the regional identity has been weak in East Asia. The tradi-tional culture in East Asia traces back to the two great ancient civilizations: Chinese and Indian one. Western cultures have been influential in modern days. Furthermore, the Cold War divided the East Asia into two camps. The Sino-US rivalry in the post-Cold War era has hampered the develop-ment of the regional identity in East Asia.

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