한국경제학과 한국경제 : 이론과 실제의 상호작용을 중심으로

임종철 성균관대학교 사회과학연구소 1983 社會科學 Vol.20 No.1

[논문]한국 남부 해안 퇴적 점토층의 압축특성

임종철,수닐,권정근 釜山大學校生産技術硏究所 2006 生産技術硏究所論文集 Vol.65 No.-

한국에서는 대규모의 간척, 개간이 실시되고 있으며 급속한 사회기반시설과 주돼사업의 진행 때문에 지반 개량은 더욱이 증가하고 있다. 보통 이 지역에서의 연약 퇴적 점토는 20m -70m 사이의 연속한 두께의 층으로 연구된다. 개간 설계를 위해서 압밀 거동 파라미터가 요구된다. 해안의 연약 점토와 충적층의 연약 점토 퇴적층에서 압축특성 조사를 위해 일차원압밀시험을 실시한다. 이 논문에서는 (1) 일차원압밀동안에 1차 압축과 2차 압축거동, (2) 장기적인 2차 합축(크리프),(3) 고유지수의 상관관계,이 논문에 제시된 지수들의 상관관계의 분석으로 새로운 방정식을 제시하였다.

부산지하철 공사현장의 호박돌층 판정사례

임종철 부산대학교 생산기술연구소 2001 生産技術硏究所論文集 Vol.60 No.-

學校組織에서의 權威

林鐘徹 釜山敎育大學校 1993 부산교육대학 논문집 Vol.29 No.1

Authority relationships constitute an integral part of life in formal school organizations. The essence of most student-teacher, teacher-administrator, subordinate-superior, or parent-teacher relations is the authority component. Like this, the authority is very important concept in schools. Now, the authority comes under challenge and the degree of the exercise of the authority comes down in school organizations. Added to this, the meanings of the authority and its synonymous concepts are mingled with and misused by many individuals now and then. The purpose of this study was to examine the essence of the authority, to have a view of the authority, and to present the alternative plans to raise the degree of the exercise of the authority in school organizations. The main results of the study are as follows : They accounted for difference between the authority and its synonymous concepts such as power, influence. and authoritarianism. Though the degree of the exercise of the authority comes down, there be skeptical of the existence of society without the authority. On the contrary it should be to be raised in the characteristics of school organization. And so it was suggested that alternative plans are to exercise what types of the authority, to choose which situations to be used for the authority, and to understand how methods to be used for the authority in school organizations.

칼 멩거 硏究

林鍾哲 서울大學校經濟硏究所 1998 經濟論集 Vol.37 No.1

칼 멩거(Carl Menger)가 1871년에 간행한 Grundsatze der Volkswirtschaftslehre는 4부로 구성되는 멩거 경제학 체계 중 총론부분에 불과한 것이었다. 그 때문에 "Erster, allgemeiner"이란 표제를 갖고 출판되었다. 그러나 2-3년 후 바로 시작한 보완ㆍ확충작업은 제1부에 후속되는 제2부 소득이론, 제3부 생산이론, 제4부 현실경제론을 집필하는 데 바쳐지지 않았고 제2-3부는 단편적인 메모로 그치고 제4부는 아이디어조차 메모되지 않았다. 멩거의 서거 후 아들 칼 멩거(Karl Menger)가 편집ㆍ출판한 제2판에서는 제4장 제3절에서 '人間經濟의 두 가지 基本方向'을 다룬 것이 가장 중요한 수정이자 증보였었다. 이 대목에서 멩거는 초판에서 경제학적 고찰의 대상이 안된다고 하였던 비경제재문제를 심도있게 다루었다. 그러나 그는 비경제재까지 포함한 '一般理論'을 정립하는 데까지 이르지는 못했다. 멩거 이후 두 가지 기본방향의 문제를 본격적으로 연구한 경제학자는 칼 폴라니(Karl Polanyi)였다. 그러나 그 역시 이 문제를 다룬 연구는 미완의 원고로 그치고 말았다. 이 논문은 멩거에서 폴라니에 이르기까지 멩거가 식별한 절약화ㆍ경제화 방향과 기술적ㆍ경제적 방향에 관한 연구가 어떻게 진전되었는가 하는 점을 중심으로 멩거 체계를 살펴본 것이다.

不平等深化過程의 展開로서의 韓國의 工業化, 1910~1963(其一)

林鍾哲 서울大學校 商科大學 韓國經濟硏究所 1964 經濟論集 Vol.3 No.1

1 It was not until 1876 that Korea, the hermit nation of Oreient, opened her door wide to the world and let the Western civilization come in along with the then prevalent capitalistic mode of production. Once planted, capitalism broke open her way into every part of the until then feudalistic society of Lee Dynasty, smashing away the last remnants of the old structure of social and economic hierarchy. It seemed that capitalism was bring about a new society promising equality and affluence to all by breaking down the Oriental despotism and introducing a new way of life and a novel mode of economic activites. It was, however,a fatal misfortune for Korean people that the capitalistic development was carried out by foreign capitalists who committed expropriation devouring every gain form industrialization of Korea and shifted the burden to Korean people. Capitalism, as Schumpeter aptly put it, is by nature a form or method of economic change and not only never is but never can be stationary. It was no exception in Korea though it was an alien one introduced by foreigners. By incessantly revolutionizing the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying and incessantly creating a new one, capitalistic process of creative desturction succeeded in accumulating a vast heap of wealth during the last half-century. Hundreds of factories manufactured a variety of conveniences and necessaries of life and in the show window of modern department store, ever kind of goods which make modern living pleasant attracted and allured the eyes of Korean people. The wealth the capitalistic method of production brought about seemed to contribute to the welfare of the masses of people and to bring forth a sound and balanced development of korean economy. But what actually happened since the open-door only proved that this expectation was nothing but an illusion. As mentioned above, the capitalism, planted on this land by foreign capitalists, only contributed to the exploitation of Korean people by them, and the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, made the exploitation more complete. In one extreme, there was a handful of Japanese rulers and capitalists, with some comprador capitalistic middle-men of Korea around them, enjoying all the benefits of industrialization and in the other extreme, millions of people, driven almost to starvation, hardly managed to live on what little residual the capitalistic rulers sparingly gave them. The capitalistic process of creative destruction bestowed the gifts of creation to the capitalists and destroying at the same time the roots of life of the people, forged out a massive and formidable mechanism of inequality and left a deep scar upon the economic structure of Korea. This essay is a study in the shadow part of industrialization as a disequalizing process. 2 In the long struggle of powers over Korea, the Japanese Empire emerged out as a victor at last and under the protection of her political and military influence Japanese capital flowed into Korea seeking after profit. The Japanese capitalism had not completed the promitive accumulation of capital until then, with the result that the capital flowed in to Korea was not industrial capital but commercial and usury capital. It, nevertheless, played a decisive role to destroy the old-fachioned cottage industry of cotton weaving and spinning by importing cheap manufactured textile of Western countries, and after the destruction of apparently idyllic life Table 1. The Balance of Trade of Korea (1,000 Won) Year Import Export Deficit 1876.7.1 ∼1882.6.30 4,603 5,103 +500 1890 4,753 3,576 -1,177 1895 8,339 2,773 -5,606 1900 11,069 9,568 -1,501 1905 32,971 7,916 -25,055 1910 39,781 19,913 -19,866 Total※ 392,767 176,554 -216,213 Source: History of Korean Trade, ed. by Korean Trade Association ※Total from 1876 to 1910 except 1883, 1884, 1885 and 1886 Table 2. The Outflow of Gold (1,000 Won) Year To Japan To China Total 1893 425 494 919 1894 639 295 934 1895 953 400 1,353 1900 3,065 568 3,633 1905 5,205 2 5,207 1908 4,771 0 4,771 Total※ 48,435 5,921 55,353 Source: Statistical Year Bank, Govt. of Chosen ※Total from 1893 to 1908 of Korean people, they lent the impoverished people the money on usury terms which the transition from natural to money economy made them need badly. (Korean people had been poor indeed before the open-door of 1876 but it cannot be denied that the Japanese merchants adventurer made them orse off.) The devastating effect of foreign capitalistic exploitation can be traced out in Table 1 and 2 in the preceeding page. The exports mainly consisted of rice, thus preventing the backwash effect of Japanese agricultural backwardness from making their rate of industrial growth slow down and at the same tiem driving Korean people to under-nourishment by reducing the per capita comsumption of rice. On the other hand the import largely consisted of cotton cloths. Thus smashed down with the old cottage industry (the main source of cash income) the poor were constrained to run to Japanese usurers offering themselves as their victims. In perfect accordance with these changes, the factories built in Korea were largely rice-mills for the processing of rice for export to Japan and some breweries. Table 3 shows the number of factories for each industry. Table 3. Number of Factories by Industries Industry Before 1901 1901 - 1904 1906 - 1908 Total rice-mill - 11 20 31 brewery 9 4 7 20 brick - 6 7 13 iron 1 6 3 10 cotton - 2 - 2 others 4 9 19 32 Total 14 38 56 108 Source: Statistical Year Bank of the Bank of Chosen, 1948 The above-mentioned are some of the characteristics of the opening-up process of Korea during 1876-1910. 3 Hardly had the Japanese empire annexed Korea in 1910 when the Governor of Chosen (Japanese governor in annexed Korea) issued "Company Act", and prohibited the establishment of business enterprise under license. The intention was apparently to keep the native capital from being invested in modern industry, thus shutting out the Korean people from participation in the productive activity. Economic Apartheid policy was deliberately pursued by the Japanese rulers to the benefits of Japanese capitalists and the result was that almost all the companies and corporation were owned by Japanese, and accordingly nearly all the business enterprises were carried out by Japanese. This fact is shown in Table 4. The jointly established companies are to be regarded as Japanese-owned, because the Korean partners were, with few exception, compardors whom the Japanese masters utilized for the betterment of public relations in a insurgent and discontented colony. Table 4. Number of Company Owned by Each Nation Year Owner Number Capital 1911 Japanese 109 10,510,550 Korean 27 7,395,000 Joint 71 21,860,900 1915 Japanese 147 16,055,500 Korean 39 9,636,840 Joint 29 27,424,400 1917 Japanese 177 59,192,200 Korean 37 11,518,140 Joint 13 5,986,000 1920 Japanese 414 330,762,950 Korean 99 45,276,200 Joint 29 41,445,000 The Japanese capital that flowed into Korea was largely invested in the field of commerce and transportation and what little capital invested in the manufacturing industry was concentrated to rice-mill with an intenton to supply Japan with food and raw materials. Table 5. Industrial Product Porduct Number of Factory Value (Won) cotton 15 5,642,189 gold 311 24,975,028 rice-mill 427 65,308,756 tobacco 21 25,708,921 alcohol drinks 223 6,847,693 As an inavoidable result of the distortion in manufacturing industry, Korea had to depend for the necessaries and conveniences heavily on the import from Japan. Trade pattern created at the time of the opening-up before Japanese annexation continued to exit. In 1920, the main import was cotton cloths and the main export was rice. The balance of trade was still unfavorable to Korea. Table 6. Balance of Trade (Unit : Won) Year Import Export Deficit 1910 19,913,843 39,782,756 19,868,913 1915 49,492,325 59,199,357 9,707,032 1920 191,958,694 238,956,413 46,997,719 Source: Statistical Year-Book, Gov't of Chosen,1920. The shutting out of national capital from participating in the productive activities in the field of manufacturing industry and the lop-sided investment of Japanese capital to the field of commerce and agriculture distorted the gorwth of Korean economy and resulted in the Table 7. Exports and Imports Commodities in 1920 (10,000 Won) Exports Imports rice 7,701 cotton cloths 3,068 soy bean 1,729 millet 1,809 fish 1,215 coal 1,702 iron 605 other cloths 1,701 cotton 601 inequality of income between and Korean, and among Korean comprador capitalists, laborers and peasants. Though we cannot prove this fact directly by comparing the income distribution among them because of the non-availability of statistics on it, we can, nevertheless, prove it by some roudabout procedure, that is, by comparing the average wage-rate of city and farm laborers of each nation. We can see that averag wage-rate of Korean labors was only two-thirds of that Japanese. Table 8. Wage-rate by Nations (1920) Occupation Japanese Korean carpenter 3.84(Won) 2.60(Won) brick-layer 4.12 2.65 shoes-maker 3.05 2.10 barber 2.46 1.51 dyer 2.88 1.46 farm laborer 1.72 1.11 Another indirect proof is the change in the post-office savings by each nation. Table 9 shows that despite the spread of knowledge about the post-office as convenient institution for saving, the average amount of savings by Korean decreases while that of Japanese increases. It can by presumed to be another aspect of increasing inequality. Table 9. Post-Office Saving by Nations (Per Capita) Year Japanese korean 1910 28.9(Won) 5.4(Won) 1915 29.7 2.2 1920 48.2 2.1 Source: Statistical Year-Book, Gov't of Chosen,1920. We can add one more proof of the fact. That is the decreasing per capita consumption of rice by Korean. In 1910 the per capita consumption of rice was 0.7 suk (equal to 130ℓ) but it decreased to 0.6 suk (equal to 110ℓ) in 1920, while the Japanese consumed 1.1 suk(equal to 200ℓ). It is shown in Table 10. Table 10. per Capita Comsumption of Rice Year Per Capita Consumption Year Per Capita Consumption 1910 0.697 suk 1912 0.639 suk 1914 0.739 1916 0.747 1918 0.669 1920 0.612 Source: Statistical Year-Book, Gov't of Chosen,1920. Gradually in the course of 10 years of annexation, the Japanese rein over Korea grew tight, their accumulated capital grew strong enough to do away with native middleman and defeat Koraean national capital. The industrialization in their home country was nearly complete. There came a change in the economic role of Korea as a commodity market of Japanese goods. The Japanese captialists could afford to invest their surplus capital in the construction of light-industry in Korea. The surplus of primary products exploited from Korea, together with that of their own was large enough to supply light industry with more raw-materials. Under these circumstances the "Company Act" came to mean a fetter upon them for further industrialization of Japan. It was very wise of them and very natural that they abolished the "company Act" in April, 1920. The abolition of the Act made a new era in the industrialization of Korea. Korea was through the first stage of industrialization and started into the second stage. The first stage covering from 1910 to 1920 can be designated as the period of establishing the desequalizing mechanism.

敎育實習의 實態分析과 그 改善方案

林鐘徹 부산교육대학교 초등교육연구소 1992 초등교육연구 Vol.2 No.-

It is believed that student teaching is the most significant aspect of teacher education. Despite knowledge of research on teaching, learning, and educational psychology, many critics have charged that student teaching has not developed a sound theoritical basis, and has no uniform or standard structure. In addition to this, student teaching is influenced by social and educational changes. Hence student teaching has to be inquiry on and on. The employed methods were analysis of reference books and statistical treatment of questionnaires. Findings from these data were discussed in regard to the student teaching periods, the local co-operating schools as practicing schools, the number of student teachers per class, the qualifications of co-operating teachers, the improving measures for student teaching administration in the attached elementary school and co-operating schools, the welfare of student teachers, the criterion of the importance of student teaching contents, and the improving measures for teachers college curriculum and student teaching programs.

韓國의 經濟成長

林鍾哲 서울大學校 經濟硏究所 1976 經濟論集 Vol.15 No.4

主要輸出商品의 比較優位分析 : 主要品目의 Relative Share Index를 中心으로 Relating with Relative Share Index of Major Items

林鍾哲 서울大學校 商科大學 韓國經濟硏究所 1968 經濟論集 Vol.7 No.4

不平等深化過程의 展開로서의 韓國의 工業化, 1910~1960(基 2) : A Tentative Approach

林鐘哲 서울大學交 商科大學 韓國經濟 硏究所 1964 經濟論集 Vol.3 No.3

Ⅰ. The Growth of Modern Business Enterprise. After the abolition of the notorious "Company Act" in 1920, modern business enterprises mushroomed overnight in Korea. Native businessmen rushed into establishing industrial companies and whatever resources available for them were invested in industry and trade. The years subsequent to Independent Movement of March 1, 1919 could be called the period of nation-wide modernization and it was not exceptive in the field of industry and trade. Companies owned by Korean increase from 99 in 1929 to 362 in 1936. But ten years of discrimination under the Company Act gave irrecoverable injuries to them. Exploitations by Japanese rulers were so ruthless to them that they could not stand on equally competitive footing even after the discirminative law ceased to work. We could find out that the native capital invested in modern enterprises shrunk from 57 million yen in 1920 to 42 million yen in 1936 while that of foreign (mainly Japanese) enterprisers increased from 1,264 million yen to 5,541 million yen during the same period. During that time average annual investment amounted to 270 million yen, of which more than 220 million yen was supplied from outside of Korean territory. In 1921, Japanese enterprisers owned 669 companies and the total capital amounted to 1,264 million yen while Korean enterprisers owned 123 companies and capital invested by them amounted to 57 million yen. After 16 years of free competition, the former owned 2,254 companies and the capital amounted to 5,541 million while the latter owned 362 companies and the capital amounted to 42 million yen. We can see clearly that the average size of Japanese companies has grown larger and larger, and that of Korean has shrunk smaller and smaller. In 1936, the share of Korean in productive activities (except for agriculture) was only 2%. Industrial activities have grown by about 350% during that time. It is obvious that industrialization had a beneficial effect on the living of Korean people. Nevertheless, no one could deny that almost all the fruits of industrialization had been taken away to Japan or distributed exclusively to Japanese settlers. Ⅱ. Changes in the Industrial Structure. The changes in industrial structure were remarkably quick during that time. The capital invested in manufacturing industry were nearly 8 times as large in 1936 as in 1921. More than three quarters of net investment were concentrated to the secondary industry. The share of secondary industry in total national products rose from 15.8% in 1921 to 36% in 1936. Notwithstanding this change, the share of capital invested in tertiary industry was still over 60% even in 1933 and dropped to less than 40% just after the Japanese imperialists had conquered Manchuria and made her their new market. In 1921, the share of national capital in primary industrial enterprise, in secondary industry and tertiary industry were 5%, 1.5% and 6.9% respectively, and after ten years of free competition the share reduced to 0.7%, 2.1% and 1.2% respectively in 1929. Evidently, native enterprisers and native capital were literally shut out from participating in economic activities contrary to what the Japanese rulers reported proudly then. In the still predominantly agricultural economy, industrial plants more than doubled during 1921∼36, and the industrial products more than tripled. But still in 1936, nearly one-third of industrial products were produced in primitive cottage industry, and less than another one-third were the products of rice-mill industry. Industiral products in the true meaning of the word accounted only little more than one-third of all industrial products. Early in the 1930's remarkable changes were seen in industrial structure. By then, rich water power resources were found and water power plants were constructed. With cheaper and richer electric power, a number of up-to-date chemical and heavy industries came to be established. The most notable among them are Heung Nam Fertilizer Plant and Sungjin Steel and Iron Plant. The change in the shares of heavy and light industrial plants is shown in the following table. 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 Heavy and chemical industry 28.3% 29.0 30.1 33.6 33.8 33.9 36.5 39.8 Light industry 71.7% 71.0 69.9 66.4 66.2 66.1 63.5 60.2 In 1929, little more than 10 thousand workers were employed in chemical industry while in food industry more than 30 thousand workers were employed and weaving and spining industry, nearly 20 thousand workers were employed. But by 1936, the workers employed in chemical industry outnumbered that of the food-industry by 6 thousand. The products of heavy and chemical industry amounted to 305 million yen. It accounted nearly 42% of total industrial products. But the local distribution of industry was extremely uneven. The heavy and chemical industry was concentrated to the northern half, and light industry was concentrated to the southern half of the country. Nearly 73% heavy industry (including chemical and electric power industry) located to the north of the 38th parallel and more than 75% of light industry located to the south. This unevenness in the local distribution of industry was intentionally pushed by Japanese rulers under the phrase of "Industrial North and Agricultural South" because the northern half of Korea is rich of power and mineral resources whereas the southern half is agricultural district. But this proved to be fatal blow to the south only too soon. During that time Korea traded exclusively with Japan and the share of trade with third country was less than 14%. The balance of payments had been unfavorable all the time except for 1924 and 1925. and the trade gap widened from 14 million yen in 1921 to 169 million yen in 1936. The share of food-stuff and raw material was 10.4% in import trade in 1921 and 21.6% in 1936 while that of finished goods had been more than three-quarters of imports. On the other hand, export of Korea composed of predominantly primary goods. In 1921, the share of food-stuff and raw-material in export trade was 65,6%. It dropped to 53.5% in 1936 s mentioned above, one-third of industrial products were produced in primitive farm-house and so we can guess that much of finished goods exported from Korea was not what can be called as manufactured goods. Rice export accounted always for one-half of her exports and because of it the living standard of Korean people was worsened year by year. Ⅲ. Change in the Living Standard. Per capita consumption of rice dropped from 0.66 suk in 1921 to 0.437 suk in 1936 while that of Japanese remained 1.2 suk during that time. It was a hard blow to Korean who live on rice. Average wages were lower than Japanese laborers by 40∼50% and their real purchasing dropped by 52% during the same time. Post-office savings increased from 2.45 yen to 3.32 yen per person who had savings account, but that of Japanese were 18 times as much.