
http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.
변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.
김건우 성균관대학교 법학연구소 2013 성균관법학 Vol.25 No.1
Analytic jurisprudence can be understood as an application of the ideal of conceptual analysis as pursued by contemporary analytic philosophy into legal theory. The ideal represents the belief that conceptual analysis would reveal the a priori and universal features of law. According to this belief, conceptual analysis is value-neutral and autonomous since it relies upon the first-person intuitions of the analyst herself. Another way of seeing analytic jurisprudence is to see it in its own history, i.e, the history from Austin, via Hart, to Raz and Coleman. Their analytic jurisprudence involved the ideal of conceptual analysis as its common and essential element. Hart' legal theory, in particular, opened a new horizon of legal philosophy---analytic jurisprudence. At the same time, however, such an inquiry lost its rich content and a variety of approaches it had been proud of. The inquiry has become that of a sort of "exclusion" and "subtraction." Of course, these limitations leveled against analytic jurisprudence would not go for the entire members of it. This is because, as suggested above, insofar as Hart's analytic jurisprudence is concerned, it deserves to be 'non-analytic' In that it is anti-essentialist, hermeneutic and constructive in a sense. Therefore, if assuming that there is no room for such disagreement, the main history since Hart can be summarized as an attempt to share the limitations of analytic jurisprudence stated above, on the one hand, and challenge and offer an alternative to it, on the other.
19세기 독일 전기산업의 창조적 기업가* - 베르너 폰 지멘스(Werner von Siemens)의 기업정신과 경영방식 -
김건우,나인호 한국세계문화사학회 2012 세계 역사와 문화 연구 Vol.0 No.26
"Technology in Germany," a symbol of entrepreneurial spirit and a global company, Siemens Ltd. founder Werner von Siemens the right of the cornerstone was laid by. Comprehensive academic and business perspective to integrate the universal meaning of his Enterprises is the use of electricity in scientific and technical. In addition, Siemens is it only has limited electrical engineering business in the points, in almost every area of the field and involved all parts of the world has entered the market with the viscosity should be considered. Based on aggressive investments and development of a thoroughgoing technological superiority to gain a competitive edge entrepreneurial spirit at the time, the German chemical industry, electrical industry, with the industrialization era in 1870 was reminiscent of the protagonist with. His entrepreneurial spirit and management in a way a global electrical industry in Germany has a world-class competitiveness and Britain's "made in Germany" the highest performance and quality product to the center was transformed into the image. Externally, Russia, the United Kingdom in other countries such as Europe Direct Sales of goods on the market dive, the telegraph construction and management orders was awarded. He has conducted global operations. And the patriarchal corporate management gained through high loyalty and unity. Since 1858 wages were paid bonuses to employees, bonuses For this purpose, a fixed amount of net income from 1866 was used. And has been running a variety of incentives, especially for all employees with company pensions, widows, orphans insurance carried. These insurance, as well as other policies affect the welfare of the country were affected. Welfare policies of these companies today Siemens' entrepreneurial self-awareness is an essential part of the form. Werner von Siemens and the business end of the study, plus the technical superiority of the company's competitiveness at the same time secured the creative entrepreneur, it's based on strict patriarchal family-centered management policies and overseas markets than domestic markets with an emphasis on contemporary thought any company, also, have been hard to pioneer.(Daegu University)
자연주의 법인격론의 도전 ―토마시 피에트르지코브스키의 이론을 중심으로―
김건우 한국법철학회 2022 법철학연구 Vol.25 No.3
In this paper I introduced and examined a moderate naturalistic theory of legal personhood as recently proposed by Polish legal philosopher Tomasz Pietrzykowski. This theory motivates from his criticism of juridical humanism as a foundation of the modern Western legal tradition. According to the criticism, it is an ahistorical illusion to believe that anthropocentrism and juridical humanism are “the basis of the eternal and only possible legal system,” and therefore such a belief must now be abandoned. Pietrzykowski argues that unlike in juridical humanism, (legal) persons should no longer be equated with the holders of rights. (Conceptual separation of legal personality and legal rights!) In other words, legal persons are the bearer of rights and duties, but the reverse is not true. Therefore, Pietrzykowski rejects the dichotomy of “(legal) persons-things”, instead proposing a third category called ‘non-personal subjects’ between the legal persons and things. This is the case in certain categories where there is a natural foundation for the capacity for rational deliberation and planning. As a result, there can exist the entities (categories) that are legal subjects but not legal persons. Then I went on to critically examine Pietrzykowski’s proposal as follows. His proposal can be suitable and effective as a solution in relation to the rights issues of some entities requested in reality, such as animal protection. It may also serve as a version of theory of legal personhood based on moderate naturalism. However, it is not clear whether the theory offers a full, naturalistic explication of the meaning of legal personhood or legal subjecthood. In addition, even so, it can hardly be seen as successfully identifying its general meaning. This is because in terms of its logic, his proposal creates a kind of dilemma. In other words, applying the naturalistic criteria consistently to his proposals yields counter-intuitive results such that the legal personhood of anencephaluses, persistent vegetables and fetuses is denied, whereas applying them in an inconsistent and ad-hoc manner yields no such results but fails to produce a successful theory of legal personhood as a general and coherent one. 본고에서는 폴란드의 법철학자 토마시 피에트르지코브스키(Tomasz Pietrzykowski)가 근래 제안한 온건 자연주의적 법인격론을 소개하고 검토하였다. 이러한 제안은 서양 근대법의 토대라 할 법인본주의에 대한 그의 비판에서 비롯한다. 법인격에 대한 이해가 역사적으로 변화해왔다는 점을 들어, 인간중심주의와 법인본주의가 “영원하고 유일하게 가능한 법체계의 토대”라는 믿음은 몰역사적 착각(ahistorical illusion)이기에, 이제 그러한 믿음을 거두어야 한다는 비판이 그것이다. 구체적으로, 피에트르지코브스키는 오랫동안 법인본주의에서 그랬던 것과 달리 이제 더 이상 (법)인격을 권리 담지자와 등치로 놓거나 그 전제 요건으로 보아서는 안 된다고 주장한다. (법인격과 법적 권리의 개념적 분리!) 즉 어떤 것이 법인격임은 그것이 권리 의무의 담지자임을 함축하지만, 그 역은 성립하지 않는다는 것이다. 그래서 그는 ‘(법)인격-사물’이라는 이분법을 거부하면서, 대신 법인격과 사물 사이에 ‘비인격 주체’(non-personal subject)라는 제3의 범주를 설정할 것을 제안한다. 어떤 범주에 이성적 숙고 및 계획 능력에 대한 자연적 토대가 있는 경우가 그것이다. 그 결과, 법적 주체이면서도 법인격이 아닌 존재(범주)가 있을 수 있다. 이어 본고에서는 피에트르지코브스키의 이러한 제안을 비판적으로 검토하였다. 주요 내용은 다음과 같다. 그의 제안은 동물 보호 등 현실에서 요청되는 일부 존재자들의 권리 문제와 관련하여 적합하고 효과적인 해결책의 하나일 수 있다. 또한 그것은 온건 자연주의에 따른 법인격론의 한 버전으로서 제시할 만한 것이기도 하다. 하지만 그것은 자체로 법인격이나 법적 주체의 의미를 온전히 자연주의적으로 규명해주는 것인지가 분명치 않다. 뿐만 아니라, 설령 그것이 어떤 의미에서 온전히 자연주의적인 것이라 하더라도 법인격이나 법적 주체 일반의 의미를 성공적으로 규명해주는 이론이라고 보기는 어렵다. 왜냐하면, 그의 제안은 논리적 측면에서 일종의 딜레마를 낳기 때문이다. 즉 그의 제안에 자연적 기준을 일관되게 적용하면 우리의 규범적 직관에 반하는 당혹스러운 결과가 나오는 반면, 자연적 기준을 비일관적이고 임시방편적으로 적용하면 그 귀결이 그와 같은 당혹스러운 결과로는 나오지 않지만 그러한 임시방편적 조치로 인해 그의 제안은 하나의 정합적 일반 이론이 되기가 어려워지기 때문이다.
뇌자기공명영상에서 비특이적인 혈관성 부종을 보인 하시모토뇌병증
김건우,조남주,김병건,권오현,박종무,강규식,이웅우,이정주 대한신경과학회 2015 대한신경과학회지 Vol.33 No.3
Hashimoto’s encephalopathy (HE) is a rare autoimmune disorder characterized by a nonspecific encephalopathy with high titers of serum anti-thyroid antibody in the absence of other defined causes. A 54-year-old woman was admitted due to recurrent seizures and confusion. Her serum anti-thyroid antibody level was elevated, and brain MRI showed multiple instances of vasogenic edema. Her symptoms disappeared after treatment with high-dose steroids and antiepileptic drugs. We propose that HE should be considered in the differential diagnosis of multiple vasogenic edema on brain imaging.
뷰티서비스업 종사자의 멘토링 기능이 직무몰입에 미치는 영향 : 직무만족의 매개효과를 중심으로
김건우,김주연 한국미용학회 2018 한국미용학회지 Vol.24 No.1
The effect of the beauty service employee’s mentoring function on job satisfaction and job commitment. Out of these surveys, 80 questionnaires with no response or insincere responses were excluded; the remaining 440 questionnaires were used for final analysis and the SPSS v. 21.0 Statistical Package Program was used to analyze the data. The results, first, mentoring function all have a significant positive effect on job commitment. Secondly, mentoring functions all have a significant positive effect on the working environment satisfaction and colleague relations satisfaction. Thirdly, job satisfaction revealed a significant positive effect on job commitment. Fourthly, it was verified that job satisfaction had a mediating effect between the mentoring function and job commitment. In conclusion, it was confirmed that mentoring function is one of the most important factors in terms of a beauty service industry employee devoting himself/herself to their job with commitment, attachment, pride and passion.
김건우 한국법철학회 2023 법철학연구 Vol.26 No.3
There have been lots of attempts to somehow fictionalize or equate human beings with persons or legal persons, and such attempts have been a powerful way to understand and define human beings in (legal) philosophy. Since at least modern times, therefore, ‘personhood’ and ‘legal personhood’ have served not only as the primary entities of humanity’s epistemic and normative systems, but also as the macro-subjects of humanity’s universal history. In other words, the systems of human knowledge and law have served as a vessel to contain a ‘human being,’ a special being identified as a person. Now, can AI be a person or a legal entity? The interest in and debate over this question can be understood against this intellectual and practical background. Therefore, many commentators on the debate have actively used the close connection between ‘personhood’ and ‘legal personhood’ to support their views. According to this line of argument, ‘personhood’ is centered on human beings as natural persons and includes various metaphysical, moral, religious, and natural characteristics, but since AI lacks such personhood, it is impossible to grant or recognize legal personhood to AI. Alternatively, according to some proponents, it is possible to grant or recognize legal personhood to AIs because they have unique characteristics (e.g., functional autonomy) that are equivalent to or substitute for such personhood. However, I have pointed out that there is an assumption in both camps which has been taken for granted without sufficient justification, and for which there are counterexamples. The premise is that ‘personhood’ and ‘legal personhood’ are always or necessarily related to each other. Thus, arguably, there is no necessary or a priori basis for judging whether AI can be granted or recognized as legal personhood based on the same ‘personhood’ traditionally granted or recognized to humans. By doing so, I aimed to show that the arguments of both camps are not sound ones. 인간을 인격이나 법인격으로 의제하거나 그것과 등치시키려는 시도야말로 인간을 (법)철학적 견지에서 이해하고 규정하기 위한 유력한 방식의 하나였다. 그래서 적어도 근대 이후, 인격과 법인격은 세계에 대한 인류의 인식체계나 규범체계를 이루는 일차적 존재자(primary entities)이자 인류 보편사의 거시적주체로서 역할을 해 왔다. 달리 말해, 근대적 인식과 실천의 체계로서 인간의 지식체계와 법체계는 인격으로 대별되는 특별한 존재자인 “인간”을 담아내기 위한 그릇과 같은 역할을 해 왔다. 그렇다면 인공지능이 인격이나 법인격일 수 있는가? 이 물음에 대한 관심과 논의 양상도 위와 같은 지적·실천적 배경하에서 이해할 수 있다. 그래서 그러한 논의에 뛰어든 많은 논자들은 ‘인격’과 ‘법인격’이 ‘인간’을 연원으로 하고 둘 간에 밀접한 연관이 있음을 자신들의 견해를 뒷받침하는 논거로 적극적으로 활용해 왔다. 그래서 그들은 ‘인격’이 자연인으로서의 인간을 중심으로 하여 여러 형이상학적, 도덕철학적, 종교적, 자연적 특질을 그 내용으로 하는데, 인공지능에게는 그러한 인격이 결여되어 있기에, 인공지능에게는 법인격을 부여·인정하는 것 역시도 불가하다고 주장해왔다. (철학적 부정론) 이와 반대로, 어떤 논자들은 ‘인격’과 ‘법인격’ 간의 관계에 대한 앞서와 마찬가지의 논거를 취하는 한편 인공지능에게도 그러한 인격에 해당하는, 혹은 그것을 대체할 수 있는 고유한 특질(예: 기능적 자율성)이 있기에, 인공지능에게도 법인격을 부여·인정하는 것이 가능하다고 주장해 왔다. (철학적 긍정론) 이에, 필자는 (이러한 논쟁 자체에 답을 하기보다는) 그러한 논쟁이 교착상태에 빠지게 된 연원이 무엇인가를 몇 가지로 분석해 냈다. 첫째, 이 논쟁을 주요 논점별로 추출하고 분석해 냄으로써, 이들 논점이 논쟁 속에서 서로 구별되지 않고 뒤섞인 데다 충분히 해결되지 않은 것이 그 한 연원임을 밝혔다. 둘째, ‘인격’과 ‘법인격’이 서로 간에 항상적 연관이나 필연적 연관과 같은 특별한 관계 하에 있다는 암묵적 전제가 있으나, 이는 충분히 검토되지 않은 것임을 밝혔다. 인공지능에게 법인격을 부여·인정할 수 있는지를 전통적으로 인간에게 부여·인정된 것과 같은 ‘인격’에 의거해서 판단해야 할 필연적·선험적 근거는 없으며, 따라서 양 진영의 논변은 건전한(sound) 논변이 아니다. 셋째, 상기 철학적 논거에 입각한 긍정론과 부정론과는 별도로, 법인격 여부는 법이 정하기에 달린 문제라는 법률학적 논거에 의거해서 “법률학적 긍정론”과 “법률학적 부정론”을 고려할 수 있으며, 이러한 양론은 별도의 전망을 준다는 것이다.