중국 반독점법상 독점합의에 관한 고찰

김현아 ( Hyun A Kim ) 안암법학회 2011 안암 법학 Vol.0 No.34

The exclusive agreement in China is defined as "an agreement, decision and other cooperative behavior which excludes or limit the competition between managers at competition." The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law divides such an exclusive agreement into a horizontal exclusive agreement and a vertical exclusive agreement and lists under such a division and stipulates that what is included in such a listed type is violation. An agreement which is not included in the listed type but has a competitive limitation can be regulated if the implementing agency of the government recognizes it. In addition, the law has an application exemption stipulation if provided under a law reflecting a positive side of an exclusive agreement. It is pointed as an issue that the court cannot correct an error of the implementation agency. Since the stipulations related to an exclusive agreement regulate only what is in principle, the necessity of detailed guidelines is presented. As the Anti-Monopoly Law is implemented in China, it is highly possible that the Anti-Monopoly Law is positively applied to an exclusive agreement which met a difficulty with the implementation of the law due to lack of legal basis of the conventional laws. Countries around the world are favorable toward the trend of strengthening the implementation of the competition law, and it is a general prospect that in China too, the implementation of the Anti-Monopoly Law will strengthen the competition law against the violations of competition order in China. So, Korean enterprises should take every measure in preparation for the positive application of the Anti-Monopoly Law by checking the business practices done in the past.

대리점 거래에 대한 연구

강선희(Sun Hee Kang),조성국(Sung Kuk Cho) 중앙법학회 2013 中央法學 Vol.15 No.4

Up to now, Korean Commercial Code doesn`t have special provision on a dealership agreement. Generally, Unfair trade practices in dealership agreement are restrained by Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act of Korea (herein after “Korean Anti-Monopoly Act”)Article 23. Lately, with so-called ``Namyang Dairy Products Co., Ltd. affair`` as a momentum, the issue related with unfair practices such as ``Pushing-Out`` in distributorship agreement looks set to spread to the society at large. Political community also seeks to counteract those problems with legislative measures. It is to enact a special act for regulating distributorship agreement or to revise the Korean Anti-Monopoly Act. Unfair trade practices through the Fair Trade Commission Survey revealed the following: Forced Purchase, Forced Sales Target, Imputed Cost of Sales Promotion·Salesperson`s Wages, Demand Money and Valuables, Offering Disadvantages, Unfair Reject of Returns, Unfair Intervention in Management and Unfair Termination of Contract, etc. Typically, these unfair trade practices in the market are due to an imbalance of power. First and foremost, it is necessary to find nature and to set up concept of dealership agreement. The purpose of discussion is to set up fundamental concept of dealership agreement and to provide an institutional strategy for resolving unfair trade practices. Dealership agreement is continual trade relationship between a provider and a dealer who wants to sell goods in his own name through purchase and consignment trade for some period of time. That is, purchase trade is to buy from provider and resell goods in the dealer`s name and for the dealer`s profit. Consignment trade is to buy goods in the dealer`s name and to sell them to large scale retailer for the provider`s profit. There are Institutional strategy for resolving unfair trade practices: Restitution Order, Punitive Damage, making the best use of Claim System for Accusation Duty or Small & Medium Business Administration etc.

중국에서의 가격카르텔 규제강화에 따른 기업의 대응방향에 관한 소고

김경석(Kim Gyung Seok) 중앙대학교 법학연구원 2014 法學論文集 Vol.38 No.3

The new Anti-Monopoly Law prohibits many practices that have previously been common in China, and business operators found to be in violation of the law face significant penalties (up to 10% of turnover, in many cases). Businesses with operations, customers or investments in China should carefully consider how the Anti-Monopoly Law affects them, and take appropriate steps to ensure compliance. The Anti-Monopoly Law prohibits "monopoly agreements" - agreements between competing businesses or trading partners containing certain restrictions on competition. "Horizontal" monopoly agreements include agreements between competitors to fix prices, limit production or sales volumes, share markets, restrict technology purchases or development, or to boycott competitors or customers. "Vertical" monopoly agreements include agreements between a company and its trading partners to fix resale prices, or to restrict minimum resale prices to third parties. In the China, The Anti-Monopoly Law came into existence in August 2007. Anti-Monopoly Law of China includes not only companies established in the China but also foreign companies that conduct the business there and so it will be applied to Korean corporations. Therefore, they will be under the effect of the Anti-Monopoly Law of China and need to make provisions for it.

공정거래법상 수직적 공동행위의 규제에 관한 연구

이호영 한국경영법률학회 2011 經營法律 Vol.21 No.4

The currently debated issue of regulating unilateral conducts under the Korea Anti-Monopoly and Fair Trade Act (the KAFTA or the Act) is closely related to the issue of regulating vertical cartels under the Act. So far, the law enforcement against the improper cartels under the Act by the Korea Fair Trade Commission has focused solely upon horizontal agreements. Such law enforcement was presumably affected by the law enforcement against improper restraints under the Japan by the Japan Fair Trade Commission. However, this does not have any statutory ground in the KAFTA nor competition policy justifications. Such law enforcement approach to improper cartels under the Act may make vague the fundamental distinction between concerted conducts and unilateral conducts and cause serious problems in the competition law regulatory system under the Act. It may make the regulation of improper cartels incomplete and cause unnecessary confusion on regulating unilateral conducts under the Act. Regulating vertical cartels is one of the urgent tasks not only for improving law enforcement against improper cartels under the Act, but also for having the overall competition law regulatory system more advanced.

Special Articles on Fair Trade Law : So-called Vertical Dimension in the Cartel Case: Long Way toward Establishing the Clear Distinction between Concerted and Unilateral Conduct under the Korean Antitrust Law Regime

( Ho Young Lee ) 서울대학교 법학연구소 2015 Journal of Korean Law Vol.15 No.1

The Korea Fair Trade Commission have long stuck to law enforcement policy that Article 19 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act which prohibits anticompetitive concerted practices applies to horizontal agreements only, while most anti-competitive vertical agreements have been judged by ‘the likelihood to impede fair trade’ standard under Article 23. This does not, however, have any statutory ground or antitrust policy justification. Such law enforcement approach to vertical restraints may make prohibition on unreasonable concerted practices under the MRFTA insufficient and cause unnecessary confusion in regulating unilateral conduct under the Act. Fortunately, the KFTC and courts which reviewed the KFTC’s decisions recently showed signs of changes where a non-horizontal agreement was in issue. However, this does not seem enough to change antitrust rules governing vertical restraints under the MRFTA in near future. A consistent and systematic approach is requested for establishing the clear distinction between concerted and unilateral conduct under the Korean antitrust law regime by restoring law enforcement against anti-competitive vertical agreements as an unreasonable concerted practice. In process of such development, of cause, a due respect should be paid to predictability on the side of business communities.

So-called Vertical Dimension in the Cartel Case

이호영 서울대학교 아시아태평양법연구소 2015 Journal of Korean Law Vol.15 No.1

The Korea Fair Trade Commission have long stuck to law enforcement policy that Article 19 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act which prohibits anticompetitive concerted practices applies to horizontal agreements only, while most anti-competitive vertical agreements have been judged by ‘the likelihood to impede fair trade’ standard under Article 23. This does not, however, have any statutory ground or antitrust policy justification. Such law enforcement approach to vertical restraints may make prohibition on unreasonable concerted practices under the MRFTA insufficient and cause unnecessary confusion in regulating unilateral conduct under the Act. Fortunately, the KFTC and courts which reviewed the KFTC’s decisions recently showed signs of changes where a non-horizontal agreement was in issue. However, this does not seem enough to change antitrust rules governing vertical restraints under the MRFTA in near future. A consistent and systematic approach is requested for establishing the clear distinction between concerted and unilateral conduct under the Korean antitrust law regime by restoring law enforcement against anti-competitive vertical agreements as an unreasonable concerted practice. In process of such development, of cause, a due respect should be paid to predictability on the side of business communities.

유럽연합 수직거래에 관한 법률에 관한 연구: 지난 10년간의 경험

최요섭 ( Yo Sop Choi ) 한국경쟁법학회 2010 競爭法硏究 Vol.21 No.-

본 논문은 유럽연합이 2010년에 새로 입법한 수직거래에 관한 법률(EU Vertical Regulation 또는 Vertical Block Exemption Regulation)을 고려하여, 지난 10년간 유지해 온 현재의 법률을 분석하고 그 특징과 의미를 연구함을 목적으로 하고 있다. 1960년대 시카고학파의 등장 이래 수직거래제한(Vertical Restraint)에 관한 경제학적 논의와 경쟁법의 발전이 상당히 이루어져 왔다. 이러한 경제학의 영향은 유럽경쟁법(EU Competition Law)에 적지 않은 영향을 주었는데, 실제로 1999년 유럽연합 경쟁당국이 지금의 수직거래에 관한 법률을 도입하기 위해 많은 논의를 했었으며, 그 이후 10년간 위 법률은 많은 학자에 의해서 비판과 찬사를 동시에 받아온 것이 사실이다. 무엇보다 30퍼센트 시장점유율의 Safe Harbour 규정은 법률적 확실성(Legal Certainty)을 구축했으며 또한 수직거래의 효율성(Efficiency)과 브랜드간 경쟁(Inter-brand Competition)을 증진시켰다고 평가되고 있다. 지난해 9월에 발표한 새로운 수직거래에 관한 법률 초안대로, 올해 개정된 새로운 규정에서 이전의 공급자(Supplier)의 30퍼센트 시장점유율에 대한 적용제외 규정이 사업자(Undertaking)의 30퍼센트 시장점유율로 변경되었다. 이러한 약간의 변화 이외에 현재와 이전의 규정을 비교할 때 전체적인 골격은 크게 변하지 않았는데, 그것은 개정된 수직거래의 관한 법률이 여전히 최저재판매가격제한 (Minimum Resale Price Maintenance)을 강경하게 제한해야 할 규제 대상 (Hardcore Restriction)으로 규정하고 있기 때문이다. 특히, 지난 2007년 미국의 최저재판매가격제한에 대한 합리의 법칙(Rule of Reason)을 적용한 Leegin 판결의 영향을 고찰함으로써 이러한 유럽경쟁당국의 hard-core restriction 적용을 유지하는 것에 대해 비판하는 학자와 유럽연합 회원국 경쟁당국의 의견이 있었다. 물론 hard-core restriction인 최저재판매가격이 유럽조약 101조 3항에 의해 적용제외가 될 수 있으므로 당연위법(per se illegal)이라고 볼 수는 없으나, 사업자가 실제로 이러한 제외적용의 혜택을 받기는 어렵고 수직거래제한에 관한 지침 (Guidelines on Vertical Restraints) 또한 수직거래에 관한 법률이 hard-core restriction에 적용되지는 않는다고 설명하고 있다. 이러한 최저재판매가격에 대한 유럽경쟁당국의 hard-core restriction 접근방법은 빠른 시일 내에 변하지 않을 것이라는 것이 많은 학자들의 공통된 의견이다. 이 논문은 비교경쟁법적 연구 방법을 통해 유럽연합의 수직거래에 관한 법률 적용과 규정을 연구하고 현재 수직거래제한과 관련된 국내 공정거래법의 향후 과제를 살펴본다.

한국수어의 공간 활용 연구

이영재(Lee Youngjae) 국어문학회 2021 국어문학 Vol.77 No.-

본 논문은 한국수어의 공간 활용 방법에 대한 간략한 연구이다. 사실 농인의 언어 사용은 수어사전에 등재돼 있는 수어의 능숙한 사용보다 그 수어를 사용하여 수어공간 내에서 어떻게 활용을 하는가에 달려 있다고 해도 과언이 아니다. 한국수어의 동사를 일반동사, 일치동사, 공간동사 등으로 분류하여 논의하였다. 특히 일치동사를 더욱 세분하여 수직적, 수평적, 역행적 일치동사 등으로 나누어 논의하였고, 그 중 수직적 일치동사가 한국수어에 있어서 특징인 점을 논의하였다. 공간동사는 의미분류사와 함께 사용을 하는데 한국수어 연구에서 의미분류사에 대한 연구가 이루어지고 있지 않으므로 논의에 어려움이 있으나 미국수어의 의미분류사에서 참고할 점을 활용하여 한국수어의 공간동사를 간략하게나마 논의하였다. 수어공간을 지형적 공간과 통사적 공간으로 나누어 논의하는 것에 대해서는 문제가 없으나 수어공간이 지형적 공간과 통사적 공간으로 따로 존재하는 논의에 대해서는 부정적 입장임을 밝혔다. 이에 앞으로 수어공간에 대한 더 많은 연구가 필요함을 강조하였다. 또 시선(eye gaze) 처리에 따른 문법의 다양한 면도 고찰하였다. This paper is a brief study of how to utilize Korean Sign Language space. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the use of language by the deaf depends on how to use it in the sign language space rather than on the proficient use of the sign language listed in the sign language dictionary. Verbs in Korean Sign Language were classified into general verbs, agreement verbs, and spatial verbs. In particular, the agreement verbs were further divided into vertical, horizontal, and backward agreement verbs, and among them, the characteristics of the vertical agreement verbs in Korean Sign Language were discussed. Spatial verbs are used with semantic classifiers, but it is difficult to discuss because there is no research on semantic classifiers in Korean Sign Language studies, but the spatial verbs of Korean Sign Language were briefly discussed using references from American Sign Language classifiers. There is no problem with dividing the sign language space into topographical and syntactic spaces, but it is negative opinion about the discussion that sign language space exists separately as topographical and syntactic spaces. This emphasized the need for more research on sign language spaces in the future. We also consider various aspects of grammar according to eye gaze processing.

특집논단 : 허브 앤 스포크(Hub-and-Spoke) 담합의 개념 및 적용 요건 등에 관한 연구

백대용 ( Daeyong Baek ) 한국경쟁법학회 2015 競爭法硏究 Vol.32 No.-

Information about market conditions including a competitor’s price constitutes essential information to beat off fierce competition. Intense competition among distributors encourages them to do their best to secure the most competitive trade terms from suppliers, which, in turn, leads to competition among suppliers to offer better terms. Therefore, if competition authorities intend to intervene in competition among distributors, they need to exercise considerable caution in doing so. In this respect, strict criteria presented by the UK Court of Appeal in connection with the Hub-and-Spoke cartel are considered eminently reasonable and appropriate. It carries crucial implications for us that actual regulation on the Hub-and-Spoke cartel is extremely rare in the UK where there have been most discussions about the Hub-and-Spoke cartel. There is no specific legal provision about vertical agreement in Korea. The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act in Korea includes a specific provision that an agreement between business operators is required and does not separately regulate concerted practices. Therefore, it is necessary to clearly recognize that the Hub-and-Spoke cartel is a concept discussed subject to its causing the effects of a horizontal agreement where there is no horizontal information-exchange at all for the acknowledgement of a concerted practice based on information-exchange via the Hub-and-Spoke cartel as a collusive conduct. In conclusion, if it can be acknowledged that there is a horizontal agreement between business operators as there is horizontal exchange of information under the existing legal principles on collusion or only the existence of a simple vertical agreement is acknowledged, it is believed that there is no necessity for or practical benefit from the application of the Hub-and-Spoke cartel concept.

네이버-다음 동의의결(2014년)과 수직적 거래제한의 경쟁효과

전성훈,김종민,남재현 한국법경제학회 2015 법경제학연구 Vol.12 No.2

Advertisers put up their online advertisements through advertisement agencies. Internet portal service providers restricted the number of advertisers that agencies could attract from other competing agencies. In the consent agreement of Naver-Daum (2014), the restrictions imposed on advertisement agencies by Internet portals were under KFTC investigation. This article provides economic rationality behind such vertical restraints and explains why an Internet portal wants to put those restrictions on its own agencies in order to expand its market shares. 인터넷 검색 키워드광고 시장에서 광고주들은 광고대행사를 통해 인터넷 포털에 광고를 게재한다. 인터넷 포털 사업자들은 자신들의 광고대행사 간에“키워드 광고대행사 간광고주 이관제한”정책을 시행하여, 광고대행사들이 다른 광고대행사로부터 이전받을 수있는 광고주 수와 규모에 일정한 제약을 부과하였다. 본 논문에서는 공정위의 2014년 네이버-다음 동의의결을 광고주 이관제한정책을 중심으로 소개하고, 광고주 이관제한정책이가지는 경쟁효과를 분석한다.