계약을 통한 공급 사슬 조정이 공급 사슬 이윤과 품질 관리에 미치는 영향

김성기(Sung ki Kim),박상욱(Sang wook Park) 한국생산관리학회 2018 韓國生産管理學會誌 Vol.29 No.1

본 논문은 공급 사슬 계약(supply chain contract)을 통한 공급 사슬 조정이 각 구성원의 가격과 품질 관리에 미치는 영향에 대하여 연구하였다. 공급 사슬은 하나의 공급자와 하나의 생산자로 구성되어 있으며 생산자가 주도자 역할을 수행한다. 제품의 수요는 소비자 가격과 제품 품질에 영향을 받으며 품질은 각 구성원의 품질 향상 노력에 의해 결정된다. 우리는 기업 간 거래에서 흔히 사용하는 도매가 계약(wholesale price contract) 모형을 기본으로 하여 수익 공유 계약(revenue sharing contract), 비용 공유 계약(cost sharing contract), 수익-비용 공유 계약(revenue-cost sharing contract)의 세 가지 다른 계약의 도입에 따라 구성원의 가격과 품질 관련 의사 결정이 어떻게 변화하는지 연구하고, 그에 따른 각 구성원과 공급 사슬 전체 이윤의 변화를 비교 분석하였다. 그 결과 비용 공유 계약을 사용하면 제품의 품질은 향상되고 생산자의 이윤은 증가하지만 공급자의 이윤은 하락할 수 있으며, 수익 공유 계약을 사용하면 양 측의 이윤은 상승하지만 제품의 품질은 하락할 수 있음을 보였다. 또한 이윤과 품질을 모두 향상시키기 위해서는 수익-비용 공유 계약을 사용해야 함을 보였다. 우리는 분석을 통해 계약을 통한 공급 사슬 조정이 공급 사슬 품질 관리(supply chain quality management)에 주는 함의를 제시하였다. This study investigates the effects of supply chain contracts on optimal pricing and quality choices of supply chain members through game theoretic approach. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, acting as chain leader. Demand is affected by the price and product quality. The quality is determined by the quality improvement efforts of each member. We examined whether adoption of the three contracts (for cost sharing, revenue sharing, and revenue-cost sharing) coordinate the supply chain and how it affects two members’ quality improvement efforts by comparing them with a typical wholesale price contract. We found that the product quality level and manufacturer’s profit is higher than wholesale price contract under the cost sharing contract, but they are not with the supplier’s profit. The revenue sharing contract ensures higher profits for the manufacturer and retailer, but the product quality level decreases. We reveal that only the revenue-cost sharing contract can enhance the product quality level and the supply chain member’s profit simultaneously. We suggest important guidelines for adopting a contract for supply chain quality management.

The Scope of ESG-Related Obligations Under International Supply Contracts* -Focusing on the Obligations related to the Social Factorsㅡ

김효정 국제거래법학회 2022 國際去來法硏究 Vol.31 No.2

The recent trend emphasizing ESG has brought a shift in the corporate management paradigm. ESG goes beyond the emphasis on corporate social responsibility and extends the legal liability of corporations for breach of contractual obligations. If the contract does not contain explicit and specific provisions regarding ESG-related obligations, it is difficult to define the content and scope of ESG-related obligations. This article examined how S-related obligations, especially the obligations related to the human rights and work environment can be derived under traditional contract law principles and reviewed how S-related obligations can be effectively incorporated into contracts. This article focused on the legislation and precedents in the United States and made a practical implication for Korea. S-related obligation can be divided into (1) the obligation to accurately state S-related information, and (2) the obligation to perform social factors. First, regarding the obligation to accurately state S-related information, the US courts does not interpret S-related information as “material” fact that companies have duty to disclose. According to the US precedents, the materiality could only be established when there is physical defect relating to the central function of the product or a safety defect causing a safety hazard. And the claims based on aspirational statements articulating a company’s forward-looking goals also have been dismissed. Unless the S-related statements of a company amount to concrete and specific commitments, the company will not be held liable for violating the consumer protection laws. On the other hand, California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (hereinafter “CTSCA”) is a positive step to combat forced labor and human trafficking in supply chain, but it has some structural deficiencies; (1) it merely mandates disclosure of information and does not ask for accurate and up-to-date information to be disclosed, and (2) it does not establish sufficient penalty scheme for the non-compliance by companies. Next, regarding the obligation to perform social factors, it is difficult for a buyer who does not exercise control over a foreign supplier’s way of performing work or the employment of workers to be obligated to manage the social factors in international supply chain unless expressly provided in the contract. And international norms such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP) and the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, etc. are insufficient to recognized as a binding “usage”. When incorporating S-related obligations into a contract, it is important to provide explicit regulations on the disclosure and performance of social factor in the contract. This article examined the American Bar Association’s Model Contract Clauses (hereinafter “MCCs”) version 1.0 and version 2.0, and recommended companies to use MCCs version 2.0 in practice. MCCs version 2.0 manages supply chains balanced and efficient way by establishing a regime of human rights due diligence. Considering the above analysis, the implications for Korea can be summarized as follows. Regarding the practical implications, Korean companies need to make more concrete and specific commitments on S-related information rather than making abstract and aspirational forward-looking statements. Accordingly, the S-related liabilities of companies will be recognized in more cases, but it will ultimately contribute to realizing the ESG value in the international supply chain. And when concluding international supply contracts, Korean companies can efficiently manage social factors in international supply chains by inserting model contract clauses such as MCCs version 2.0, which introduces human rights due diligence system, into contracts. As a legislative implication, it is desirable for Korea to enact a special law regulating international supply contracts in the near futu...

수익공유계약, 환매계약, 단순선형가격계약에 관한 대면 행동 실험 연구

서승범 대한경영학회 2023 大韓經營學會誌 Vol.36 No.11

수익공유계약과 환매계약은 공급사슬에서 단순선형가격계약을 사용했을 때 나타나는 이중한계비용화 현상을해결하기 위해 고안된 계약 형태이다. 이중한계비용화 현상이란 공급 사슬 내 기업들이 하나의 기업으로 통합되어있을 때보다 개별 기업으로 분리되어 있을 때 수익이 더 낮은 현상을 나타낸다. 이론적으로 수익공유계약과 환매계약은단순선형가격계약보다 더 높은 성과를 가져오는 것으로 밝혀졌지만, 행동적인 연구방법론을 사용한 선행 연구에따르면 실제 사람이 의사결정을 할 때에는 이론과는 다른 행태를 보인다는 것 역시 보여졌다. 실제로 수익공유계약과 환매계약이 사용되는 경우가 많지 않은데 그 이유로 공급사슬 내 실제 기업 의사 결정자의선택이 이론에서 예측하는 것과는 다른 것을 들 수 있다. 공급사슬 계약과 관련해서 그동안 다양한 행동적 실험들이이루어졌고, 여러 가지 실험 환경에서 피실험자들은 어떤 의사 결정을 내리는지에 대해 관찰하였다. 특히 대부분의실험에서는 계약 상대방이 누구인지 모르거나 상대방이 사람이 아닌 컴퓨터인 상태에서 계약 의사 결정을 보았다. 이는 현실에서 이루어지는 공급사슬 계약 관련한 다양한 측면 중 일부에 집중하기 위해 의도적으로 조성된 것이나현실에서는 계약 상대방이 누구인지 알 수 있다는 사실을 불가피하게 반영하지 못했다. 본 연구에서는 특히 대면 상황에서 도매상과 소매상 역할을 하는 피실험자가 세 가지 계약에 대해 어떤 의사결정을 내리는지에 대해 실험적으로 탐구하였다. 실험에서 수요가 불확실한 상태에서 도매상은 계약의 계수를 정하고, 이를 본 소매상이 재고량을 정했다. 그 결과, 단순선형가격계약의 경우 이중한계비용화 현상이 이론적인 예측보다적게 나타나고, 수익공유계약에서는 도매가격이 최적 수준보다 작게, 환매계약에서는 더 크게 지정되는 것을 관찰했다. 전체이익 면에서는 환매계약이 수익공유계약보다 더 크고 소매상은 환매계약을 더 선호하는 것으로 나타났다. Revenue sharing contracts and buyback contracts are designed to address the double-marginalization problem that may occur when simple linear price contracts are used in supply chains. Double-marginalization refers to the phenomenon where companies in a supply chain are less profitable when separated into individual entities than when integrated into a single company. In the supply chain literature, various means were proposed to overcome double-marginalization. Among these, revenue-sharing contracts and buyback contracts are widely studied. In the revenue-sharing contract, the supplier earns additional revenue from the sales of the retailer besides the initial wholesale revenue. In the buyback contract, the retailer can resell its leftover inventories to the supplier. While these two contracts appear superficially different, mathematically they are equivalent. For a given parameter set of the revenue-sharing contract, an equivalent parameter set for the buyback contract can be constructed to provide the same amount of cash flow in every situation. It has alson been theoretically shown that the performance of revenue-sharing contracts and buyback contracts are higher than that of simple linear price contracts. However, prior behavioral research has also indicated that real people make different decisions than the theory predicts. In practice, revenue sharing contracts and buyback contracts are not as frequently used and the reason can be traced back to the fact that the decision-making in practice might be different from the one predicted by theory. There have been many behavioral experiments with various settings on supply chain contracts. In particular, subjects had to make decisions without knowing who the other party of the contract is or the other party was a computer. Those settings were deliberately composed to focus on specific aspects of real-world supply chain, but they did not reflect the fact that two decision makers of the contract may know each other. In this study, we experimentally explore how subjects taking the roles as wholesalers and retailers make decisions about the three contracts, especially in face-to-face situations. The experiment was conducted on undergraduate students. Two subjects made one group and each of them took the role of the supplier and the retailer. The groups were allowed to make face-to-face communication. The demand was assumed to follow the discrete uniform distribution from 1 to 20 and the consumer price of the product was given as 12. The production cost was given as 3. No salvage value was assumed. The same group went through the experiment for the simple linear contract, the revenue-sharing contract and the buyback contract. Overall, there were two separate experiments and in each of them, the sequence of the contracts that the subjects are exposed to was altered to figure out the possibility of the learning effect. In the first experiment, the subjects encountered the simple linear contract - the revenue-sharing contract – the buyback contract and the subjects in the second one encountered the simple linear constract – the buyback contract - the revenue-sharing contract. For each of the contracts, 10 stages of contracting game were executed and hence overall the subjects went through 30 stages. Following the tradition of supply chain contract literature, we assume that the supplier first determines the parameters of the contract and next, the retailer determines the inventory to purchase in each of the stages. The uncertain demand is realized after all the players determined their parameters and the resulting profit for each of the player is calculated. In the next stage, the supplier and the retailer adjusted their parameters and encountered the new demand. All the subjects went through the basic education of the newsvendor model before the experiments. Nine hypotheses regarding the performances of the contracts are constructed. We observed that double-marginaliza...

공급망 글로벌최적화를 위한 반품계약 및 수익공유계약 비교분석

구평회(Pyung-Hoi Koo) 대한산업공학회 2024 대한산업공학회지 Vol.50 No.4

Effective supply contract designs are essential for ensuring coordination among the supply chain members involved. Two typical coordinated contracts are buyback contracts and revenue-sharing contracts. This study investigates how the contract parameters are designed in each contract type for channel coordination and explores the relationship between these two supply contracts. We especially examine the supply contract designs under various market power structures among supply chain members. Furthermore, we analyze the relationship between the profit volatilities in the two contract types. The results demonstrate that, with appropriate parameter design, these contracts fundamentally exhibit no difference in terms of profit volatility as well as expected profit. This study contributes to the understanding of supply chain contracting by shedding light on the nuanced relationship between buyback and revenue-sharing contracts.

Investigation of Impact of Revenue Sharing Contract on Performance of Two-Stage Supply Chain System

유정석 한국유통과학회 2022 유통과학연구 Vol.20 No.6

Purpose: The revenue sharing contract has been used in various industries and it is expected to coordinate the individual companies’ operations in a way to improve the whole supply chain performance. This study evaluates the performance of the revenue sharing contract to find out whether this contract achieves its original goal, the supply chain coordination. Research design, data, and methodology: The profit optimization models are developed to represent two stage supply chain system with a supplier and a buyer. By using the numerical examples of the proposed mathematical models, this study examines whether this supply chain contract coordinates the supply chain system. Results: The numerical examples show that the revenue sharing contract does not make the same supply chain profit as the centralized system does. With the proper combination of the wholesale price discount rate and revenue share ratio, both manufacturer and retailer can obtain increased profits from the revenue sharing contract. Conclusions: The outcomes of the numerical analysis imply that the revenue sharing certainly improves the supply chain performance but it does not fully coordinate the supply chain system. By controlling the wholesale price and revenue share ratio, every supply chain member can be beneficiaries of this supply chain contract.

특수 항공기 공급계약의 법적 성질 -구매규격서상 성능요건 미달을 이유로 한 계약해제의 정당성- [1] 서울고법 2011. 9. 29. 선고 2011나13939 판결 [2] 서울중앙지법 2010. 12. 17. 선고 2009가합32275 판결

권창영 ( Kwon Chang-young ) 한국항공우주정책·법학회(구 한국항공우주법학회) 2016 한국항공우주정책·법학회지 Vol.31 No.2

항공우주분야에서 특수 목적 항공기 이외에도 시제기, 무인비행장치, 우주발사체 등 다양한 형태의 제작물공급계약이 증가하고 있다. 도급인의 입장에서는 거액의 비용을 지출하여 제작물을 공급받기로 예정되어 있었는데, 제품의 품질과 성능의 기준을 제시하는 구매규격서가 부실하거나 성능미달여부를 판단할만한 능력이 부족한 경우에는 목적 달성 불능 이외에도 막대한 시간과 비용을 소모하게 된다. 수급인으로서도 계약 목적 달성에 필요한 성능과 품질을 갖춘 제작물을 공급할 능력이 없음에도 불구하고 무리하게 계약을 체결하게 되면, 일의 미완성에 따른 매몰비용과 계약해제에 따른 손해배상을 감수하여야 하므로 막대한 손해가 발생한다. 대상사안에서 피고는 원고에게 구매규격서에 규정된 바와 같이 ILS Offset비행이 가능한 Happy Box 방식에 의한 항공기를 납품하도록 하였으나, 원고는 RNAV 방식에 의한 항공기를 납품하려고 하였다. RNAV 방식에 의하여도 ILS지상신호의 검사가 가능하더라도 원고가 주장하는 방식으로 제작된 항공기는 구매규격서에서 요구한 ILS Offset 비행기능을 갖추지 못하여 피고가 구매규격서에서 요구한 목적을 달성할 수 없으므로, 이를 이유로 한 피고의 계약해제가 적법한지 여부가 문제되었다. 이 사건 계약의 목적물인 항공기는 부대체물에 해당하므로 이 사건 계약은 도급의 성질을 가지고, 따라서 이 사건 계약에서 일이 완성되었다고 하려면 항공기의 주요구조 부분이 약정된 대로 제작되어 사회통념상 일반적으로 요구되는 성능을 갖추고 있어야 한다. 그런데 원고가 납품한 항공기는 구매규격서에서 요구한 ILS Offset 비행기능을 갖추지 못하여 피고가 구매규격서에서 요구한 목적을 달성할 수 없으므로 중대한 하자가 있고, 이러한 하자는 원고가 보수하는 것이 불가능하므로, 이를 이유로 한 피고의 계약해제는 적법하다. In the aerospace field, besides special purpose airplanes, contracts for supply of various types of products such as prototypes, unmanned aerial vehicles and space launch vehicles are increasing. In the case of the contractor, it was planned to spend a large amount of money to supply the production, but if the purchase specification that presents the quality and performance standard of the product is poor or lacks the capacity to judge the performance, consuming enormous amounts of time and money. Even if the undertaker does not have the ability to supply the products with the required performance and quality to achieve the purpose of the contract, he/she must pay the cost of burial due to the incompleteness of the work and the compensation for the cancellation of the contract. In this case, the defendant ordered the plaintiff to supply the aircraft by the Happy Box method, which is capable of ILS Offset flight as specified in the Purchase Specification, but the plaintiff attempted to supply the aircraft by the RNAV method. Although the ILS ground signal can be inspected by the RNAV method, the aircraft manufactured in the manner claimed by the plaintiff does not have the ILS Offset flight function required by the purchase specification, so the defendant can not achieve the purpose required by the purchase specification. It was a question of whether a defendant`s cancellation of contract was legitimate. The aircraft, which is the object of this contract, is a subordinate substitute, so the case contract is of undertaking. Therefore, in order to complete the work in this contract, the major structural parts of the aircraft must be manufactured as agreed and have the performance generally required in the social sense. However, the aircraft delivered by the plaintiff has serious defects because the defendant can not achieve the purpose required by the purchase specification due to the lack of the ILS Offset flight function required by the purchase specification. This deficiency is impossible for the plaintiff to repair, so the defendant `s cancellation of the contract is legitimate.

국제사법상 소비자계약의 범위에 관한 판례의 소개와 검토

석광현(Suk, Kwang Hyun) 한국국제사법학회 2016 國際私法硏究 Vol.22 No.1

오늘날 국제거래에 참여하는 소비자를 보호하고자 다수의 국제사법은 일정한 소비자계약의 경우 국제계약 일반과 다른 특칙을 도입하고 있다. 이것이 ‘국제사법에서 약자보호’의 문제이다. 2001년 7월 발효된 우리 국제사법은 제27조를 도입하였는데 이는 유럽공동체의 1980년 “계약채무의 준거법에 관한 협약(Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations)”(“로마협약”)을 본받은 것이다. 근자에 해외직구가 폭발적으로 증가함에 따라 소비자계약에 관한 국제사법의 특칙의 중요성이 주목을 끌고 있다. 로마협약은 소비자계약의 특칙을 규정하면서도 운송계약과, 상거소지 국가 이외의 장소에서 소비자에 대한 용역이 배타적으로 제공되는 계약에 대하여는 특칙의 적용을 배제하였고, 로마Ⅰ(제6조)도 그런 태도를 유지하면서 더 정치하게 규정한다. 그러나 우리 국제사법은 소비자보호를 취한 연결규칙을 도입하면서도 제외조항을 두지 않으므로 소비자계약의 범위를 둘러싸고 다양한 의문이 제기된다. 근자에 대법원 2014. 8. 26. 선고 2013다8410 판결(에어프랑스 사건)은, 운송계약과 상거소지 외 용역제공계약에도 제27조의 적용을 긍정하였고, 국제재판관할에 관한 서울중앙지방법원 2015. 10.16. 선고 2014가합38116 판결(구글 사건)은 무상계약에도 제27조가 적용된다고 판시하였다. 위 판결들은 국제사법의 문언에 충실한 것이나, 이 글에서 필자는 ‘목적론적 축소(대법원 판결에 따르면 목적론적 축소해석)’를 통하여 제27조의 적용범위를 제한할 수 있는지를 검토한다. 이는 국제사법의 맥락에서 법학방법론의 문제이다. 국제사법은 고도로 추상화된 법률이고, 민법이나 상법처럼 오랜 세월 동안 정비되어 온 법전과 비교할 때 흠결이 더 많으므로 법원의 적극적 역할이 요청된다. 구체적으로 필자는 이 글에서 국제사법 제27조의 적용범위를 개관한 뒤(Ⅱ.), 소비자는 자연인에 한정되는가(Ⅲ.), 무상계약인 소비자계약(Ⅳ.), 운송계약(Ⅴ.), 상거소지 외 용역제공계약(Ⅵ.)과 일부 금융 관련 소비자계약(Ⅶ.)의 순서로 제27조의 적용 여부를 논의하고, 이어서 법학방법론과 관련하여 제27조의 목적론적 축소(Ⅷ.)를 다룬 뒤에 마지막으로 소비자보호와 일반적 예외조항인 제27조의 관계를 논의한다(Ⅸ.). 요컨대 국제사법에서는 다른 법률과 비교할 때 상대적으로 목적론적 축소의 가능성을 더 적극적으로 검토할 필요가 있다. 잊지 말아야 할 것은, 그와 동시에 변화하는 상황에 대응하여 국제사법을 더욱 정치하게 다듬어야 하므로 입법론에도 항상 관심을 가져야 한다는 점이다. Nowadays, private international law legislations of many countries have introduced special rules applicable to consumer contracts in order to protect consumers participating in international transactions. This is an issue regarding the protection of weaker parties in the context of private international law. Article 27 of the Private International Law Act of Korea (“KPILA”), which took effect in July of 2001, is modeled after the “Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations” (“Rome Convention”) of 1980 of the then European Communities. With the drastic increase in overseas direct purchases, the importance of special rules of the KPILA applicable to consumer contracts have drawn the attention of the public. The Rome Convention (Art. 5), which sets forth special rules applicable to consumer contracts, includes several exceptions for contracts of carriage and contracts for the supply of services, where the services are to be supplied to the consumer exclusively in a country other than that of which he has his habitual residence (“contracts for the supply of services in a foreign country”). The Rome I Regulations (Art. 6) have introduced more refined rules, while in principle, maintaining the position of the Rome Convention. However, the KPILA does not include any exceptions to the special rules applicable to consumer contracts, and because of it, various questions arise under the KPILA with respect to the proper scope of the consumer or the consumer contract. Recently, the Supreme Court Judgment of August 26, 2014 (Air France Case) held that Article 27 is applicable to contracts of carriage and contracts for the supply of services in a foreign country. In addition, the lower court judgment of the Seoul Central District Court on October 16 of 2015 held that Article 27 is applicable to gratuitous contracts (Google Case). The conclusions of the court judgments are true to the text of the KPILA. The author examines whether the scope of application of Article 27 can be restricted by the so-called “teleologische Reduktion (teleological reduction)(according to the Supreme Court judgment, teleological restrictive interpretation)”. This is an issue of the so-called “Methodenlehre” in the context of KPILA. The KPILA is an act with a high degree of abstraction and has more lacunae than the Civil Act and the Commercial Act, which have been refined over a long period of time. Korean judges, therefore, are required to take a more active role when interpreting or dealing with the provisions of the KPILA. More concretely, this article deals with the following issues: overview of the scope of Article 27 of the KPILA (Chapter Ⅱ.), whether the consumer is limited to natural persons (Chapter Ⅲ.), gratuitous consumer contracts (Chapter Ⅳ.), international contract of carriage (Chapter Ⅴ.), contracts for the supply of services in a foreign country (Chapter Ⅵ.), consumer contracts related to finance (Chapter Ⅶ.), and the teleological reduction of Article 27 in the context of methodological theory of law (Chapter Ⅷ.). Finally, this article discusses the relationship between Article 27 and Article 8, the general exception clause of the KPILA (Chapter Ⅸ.). In short, Korean judges should take a more active role when dealing with the provisions of the KPILA compared to when dealing with other acts. At the same time, it needs to be kept in mind that we should continue to pay attention to the legislation, so that the KPILA can keep pace with ever-changing circumstances.

Component Outsourcing Contracts in a Two-Component Assembly System

김은갑 대한산업공학회 2009 산업공학 Vol.22 No.2

This paper considers a two-component assembly system that makes different types of purchasing contracts by component type and studies the issue of coordinating those contracts. Acquisition of type 1 component is based on the long-term contract. In contrast, type 2 component is intermittently purchased under the sort-term contract. We identify the structural properties of the optimal short-term contract and investigate how the changes in system parameters affect the optimal performance. To provide managerial insights, we compare the short-term and long-term contracts for type 2 component and discuss the conditions that make the short-term contract preferable to the long-term contract. We also present a result which shows that coordinating the contracts of type 1 and type 2 components can be significantly profitable over uncoordinating them.

Supply Chain Coordination Investigation using a Bidirectional Option Contract: The Case of Unrealized Demand

Chirakiat Saithong,Sukitjar Kongdee,Piyamas Wattanawichian 대한산업공학회 2020 Industrial Engineeering & Management Systems Vol.19 No.2

This research considers a simple two-stage supply chain comprised of a distributor and a supplier. A bidirectional op-tion supply contract was applied to deal with the problems of volatile demand, a long lead time, and a short selling season for a single type of product. The main research objective was to investigate whether this supply contract helps coordinate the supply chain in the case where demand is unrealized at the beginning of the selling season. It was found that, in the case of unrealized demand, this supply contract could not help coordinate the supply chain. On the contrary, comparing with the case demand was assumed as a realization at the beginning of the selling season (as in the existing literature), the supply contract helped coordinate supply chain.

생산자-판매자 2단계 공급망에서 이익배분율과 판매자 위험 성향을 고려한 반품계약에 대한 연구

구평회 한국경영공학회 2020 한국경영공학회지 Vol.25 No.3

Purpose This paper addresses a supply contract problem for a two-echelon supply chain (SC) consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer where products are sold during a selling season. A buyback supply contract is a supply contract strategy to tackle a double marginalization problem caused by a commonly-used wholesale contract. This paper addresses the problems associated with a profit share between manufacturers and retailers, and the retailer's tendency toward risks. Methods The relationship between the retailer's share of an SC's profit, and the optimal combination of wholesale and buyback price is examined. A revised buy-back contract is presented for risk-averse retailers where the retailer’s profit share is maintained while profit variability is controlled under a target level. Mean-variance analysis is applied in the new buyback algorithm. Results Numerical examples are given and the performance of the revised buyback contract is examined. The effect of changes in wholesale prices and buyback prices on total supply chain profits is examined through numerical analyses. Conclusion The presented algorithm makes it possible to realize a target profit while satisfying a retailer’s risk level. Future works about supply contracts are discussed for real-world market environments.