테러와의 전쟁을 위한 무력사용

張信(Shin Chang) 대한국제법학회 2005 國際法學會論叢 Vol.50 No.3

오랜기간 선제무력사용이론은 국제법학에서 논란을 제공하고 있다. 미국에 있어서 예방적 무력사용이론의 토대는 1992년 당시 조지 부시 대통령의 “국방계획지침’에서 발견되지만, 10년후 조지 W. 부시 대통령은 미국의‘국가안보전략’에서 이러한 정책을 공식화되었다. 그런데 NSS에서는 ‘선제무력행동’을 자위권의 범주에 포함시키고 있다. 국제법은 지난 수세기 동안 국가가 자위권을 행사함에 있어 일단 먼저 공격을 받아야 할 것을 요구한 것은 아니었다. 그런데 NSS에 따르면 모든 국제법학자가 동의하는 것은 아니지만, 원칙적으로 예방적 자위권은 국제법에서 허용되는 것이라고 보는 것이다. 결국 이러한 입장에서 ‘급박성’이라는 개념을 확대적용하려는 미국의 정책이 선제무력사용이론에서의 새로운 논란의 핵심이라고 할 수 있다. 그렇다면 미국에게 선제무력사용을 정당화하기 위한 방법은 어떠한 것이 있겠는가? 달리 말하면 오로지 자위권의 행사만이 미국이 원용할 수 있는 유일한 법적 근거인가? 여기서 긴급피난(긴급상태)은 원용될 수 없는가? 그래서 본 고는 국제법상 국가책임의 조각사유 중 하나인 긴급피난에 초점을 맞추고자 한다. 더 나아가 테러와의 전쟁과 긴급피난의 원용가능성을 살펴보고자 한다. 결론적으로 긴급피난은 ‘전통적’인 테러에 대하여는 적용하기 어려우나, ‘새로운’테러, 즉 대량살상무기를 갖춘 테러리즘에 대하여는 그 원용가능성을 쉽게 부인하기 어렵다고 본다. 다만 실제 적용함에는 ‘급박성’요건이 계속 논란을 가져올 수 있을 것이다. 이러한 견해에 입각하여 국제법위원회의 국가책임에 관한 규정초안(2001. 제 25조), 기타 국제사법기관의 판결, 국가실행, 국제법학자의 학설, 국제사법재판소의 관련 판결을 고찰하였다. Among the most controversial concepts in the agora of international legal minds is the theory of pre-emptive use of force. Although some argue that the seeds of the strategy of pre-emptive force may be found in the 1992 "Defense Planning Guidance" U.S. President George Bush announced. After 10 years later, it has been codified by the George W. Bush in the U.S. National Security Strategy. It perceives "acting pre-emptively" as being within the right of self-defence. For centuries international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Hence the NSS document finds that anticipatory self-defense is permissible in international law, even if not all international law scholars agree. The U.S. efforts to broaden the concept of "imminence" are the central legal issue in the new strategy of preemptive use of force. At a more practical level, it might be asked how the United States would justify a preemptive use of force where the use of force was found necessary. Put another way: Is the preemtive use of force only legally conceivable under self-defense? Or does international law already provide a more suitable excuse for the use of force in exceptional circumstances? It is suggested that a defense for the use of force might be found in the necessity excuse. So this article addresses the controversial issue of the possibility of excusing the use of force by reference to necessity. This leads to a more specific examination of use of force against terrorism and the necessity excuse. Based on this study, it is concluded that the necessity excuse is not normally available in the case of use of force against "traditional" terrorism. With regard to the "new" terrorism, including terrorism employing weapons of mass destruction, the necessity excuse may be appropriate but the issue of imminence will continue to cause problems in considering preemptive strikes. Under that direction, the main part of this Article examines the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts(2001, Art.25 Necessity), the opinions of international judicial bodies, of states, and of international legal scholars, and of International Court of Justice.

21세기 자위에 근거한 무력행사의 적법성

정경수(JUNG, Kyung Soo) 국제법평론회 2009 국제법평론 Vol.0 No.30

무력행사법(jus ad bellum)의 현대적 부활이자 국제법의 발전의 중요 성과로 인정받는 무력행사의 일반적 금지는 21세기 중대한 도전에 직면하게 된다. 한편으로는 새로운 형태의 테러, 소위 ‘메가테러리즘’(mega-terrorism)의 부상이고, 다른 한편에서는 이에 대응하는 대테러전쟁의 전개이다. 특히 미국의 선제적군사행동론에 입각한 테러와의 전쟁이 자위권 발동의 시간적 한계와 대상범위를 이완시키거나 해체시킴으로써 무력행사금지원칙의 중대한 변경을 가져왔는가라는 논란을 불러일으켰다. 미국의 선제적 군사행동론의 구체적 표현인 예방적 자위와 선제적 자위는 안전보장이사회와 회원국들의 일반적 지지를 받지 못함으로써 헌장 제51조의 자위권 행사요건에 새로운 변화를 만들어내지 못했다. 또한 이를 뒷받침하는 국가실행이 충분하지 않고 이를 반대하는 법적 확신이 지배적인 상황에서 관련 관습 국제법이 생성되거나 부상하였다고 볼 수 없을 것이다. 자위권 행사대상 범위와 관련하여 일반적인 테러에 대한 자위권 행사를 허용하는 헌장기관의 관행 역시 확립되지 않았다. 그리고 안전보장이사회는 테러집단의 정주국가를 대상으로 하는 자위권 행사를 명시적으로 허용한 적이 없으며, 테러집단의 테러공격에 대한 책임이 국가책임법상 정주국가에게 귀속된다고 인정하지도 않았다. 따라서 21세기 대테러전쟁을 통한 자위권 발동의 시간적 한계와 자위권 행사대상의 확대 시도는 기본적으로 20세기 후반 확립된 일반적 무력행사의 금지체계를 변경시키는데 성공하지 못했고, 그 결과 무력행사법에 관한 헌장체제의 패러다임은 여전히 지배적이라고 볼 수 있을 것이다. 20세기 후반의 자위에 관한 국제법이 21세기에도 그 근간을 유지하지만, 부분적으로는 21세기의 법 요청적 상황을 수용하여 자위의 개념이 확대되는 변화가 나타났다. 그것은 일반적인 테러와 중대한 테러를 구별하여 중대한 테러에 대해서는 자위권 행사가 인정되었는데, 이것은 자위가 비국가적 행위자에게도 적용된다는 적용대상의 확대를 낳은 것이다. 여기서 주목해야 할 바는 이러한 법변화에는 안전보장이사회의 역할이 절대적이었다는 점이다. 따라서 안전보장이 사회는 1945년 헌장체제가 훼손되지 않는 한 21세기 무력행사법의 변화과정의 중심에서 그 방향을 지배할 것이라고 예상할 수 있을 것이다. The prohibition of the use of force, which is recognized as a modern restoration of jus ad bellum and a significant achievement in the development of international law, faces new challenges in the 21st century. While it is challenged by the rise of a new form of terror or a rise of ‘Mega-terrorism’, it is also challenged by military countermeasures against terrorism. In particular, it gives rise to serious controversy on whether America’s preemptive military action doctrine is bringing considerable changes in the principle of the non-use of force by dissolving the conditions necessary to exercise self-defence such as time frame and the scope of target. The unilateral initiatives and acts of the United States, which has tried to legalize anticipatory/pre-emptive self-defence, have not generally supported by the UN Security Council and the Member countries, so that in effect they did not lower the criteria for justifying self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. Moreover, it is difficult to claim that such acts are supported under customary international law for it lacks sufficient state practice and opinio juris, considering that most states are against it. Regarding the scope of application for self-defence, there has been no general practice under the UN Charter which permits the act of self-defence against terrorists. Furthermore, the UN Security Council resolutions have not expressly authorized the right to self-defence against nations where terrorist organizations reside in, and it has not even found that acts of terrorists are attributable to the state. Therefore, the attempt to fight against terrorism in the 21st century by lowering the criteria for exercising self-defence, in terms of the time frame and the scope of target, has failed to transform the general criteria established in the late 20th century for the principle of the non-use of force. As a result, it can be concluded that the current principle enshrined in the UN Charter for the non-use of force is still dominant today. The law on the use of force established in the late 20th century has formed a fundamental basis for international law in the 21st century. However, the concept of self-defence has changed its scope of definition to accommodate contemporary situations in the new legal order. There is a distinction between serious and general forms of terrorism in that the right to self-defence was only recognized for serious acts of terrorism, and not for general acts of terrorism. It was a result of the tendency to expand the scope of application by including non-state actors as new actors of international law. It is worth noting that the UN Security Council played a crucial role in making such changes in the legal framework. Therefore, unless the 1945 Charter-based system is dismantled, it can be expected that the UN Security Council will be a dominant actor in guiding the evolutionary developments in the context of the principle of the non-use of force.

미국 대통령의 헌법상 전쟁권한에 대한 국제법 규범 통합에 의한 입법적 규제

이재영 한양법학회 2019 漢陽法學 Vol.30 No.1

The U.S. Constitution accords the President the power to serve as the commander-in-chief of U.S. armed forces and also grants the Congress the power to declare war and the power to provide for and maintain military forces and traditionally brought about debates on the division of war powers between the President and the Congress. The key issue is whether either the President or the Congress has the superior war power. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 spurred the Bush doctrine. As the debates go through the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the pendulum has considerably swung to the president-centered view. In international law, the use of armed force by a state is generally prohibited under UN Charter Article 2(4) and only exceptionally allowed in such a case as self-defense under UN Charter Article 51. The Bush doctrine has caused serious controversies because its underpinning is the expansive view of the right to self-defense: the pre-emptive self-defense. The Bush doctrine justifies the use of force even in the absence of, or not necessarily in an immediate response to, armed attack by a state. The U.S. Constitution does not clearly set out whether the President can initiate war in the absence of congressional declaration of war and has left the question unsettled. In practice, the President has exercised his war power expansively and initiated almost all of the wars that the United Stated conducted thus far. This practice has been supported by the inherent prerogative theory and the theory of repetition-based validity. In addressing the question of the division of war powers, Judge Jackson’s three-prong test has been able to shed lights on the issue of the constitutionality of the president’s exercise of war powers. This test sets forth three kinds of situation when the constitutionality of the president’s exercise of war power is debated. The President may exercise the war power (i) in pursuance of congressional permission, whether explicit or implicit, (ii) in the absence of congressional permission or opposition, or (iii) in defiance of congressional intention, whether explicit or implicit. Through these three situations, the presumption of constitutionality of the President’s power ranges from the maximum to the minimum. The U.S. Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution in the aftermath of the Vietnam War in order to restrain the President’s exercise of war powers and also passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force(AUMF) in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The critical loophole has been that the Supreme Court in practice has avoided to carry out the judicial review on presidential acts of war on the basis of the political question doctrine. Given that the UN Charter and rules of international law specify conditions under which the right of self-defense can be limitedly exercised, an alternative way of restraining the president’s exercise of war power may be to incorporate such rules as necessity and proportionality into domestic legislations. It can harmonize both the needs for addressing new security threats such as terrorism and the regulatory demand for restraining the use of armed force, in a manner that respects the principle of separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances.

국제법상 무력행사금지의 원칙과 자위권

장신 한양대학교 법학연구소 2007 법학논총 Vol.24 No.2

The use of force is one of the most controversial areas of international law. States are divided as to the interpretation of the fundamental rules on the use of force in the UN Charter. The prohibiton of the use of force in Art. 2(4) is directed at inter-State conflicts. There is no agreement as to whether this allows the use of force for humanitarian intervention. The application of Art. 2(4) to civil wars is also problematic. The UN Charter also establishes a collective security system whereby the Security Council may respond to threats to the peace and acts of aggression. Charter VII sets out the framework for its enforcement action by the Security Council. And under Art. 2(7) these powers are not limited by the normal duty on the UN not to intervene in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States. Thus Chaper VII gives very wide powers to the Security Council. And the other main exception to the prohibition on the use of force is the right to self-defense under Art. 51. It is controversial whether this is a narrow right, available only in response to an armed attack, or whether it allows force in protection of nationals abroad or in response to terrorist attacks. Still there are many unresolved problems remained in this area and it should be wait for a long time to get through these complicated and important international law's examination.

2003년 미국-이라크 전쟁과 현대국제법의 과제

박기갑 ( Ki Gab Park ) 고려대학교 법학연구원 2006 고려법학 Vol.0 No.46