1970~1980년대 중국의 핵전력 강화 노력과 핵 억제전략

박병찬 (재)한국군사문제연구원 2022 한국군사 Vol.11 No.-

China has been threatened by the West several times since the 1950s and its nuclear deterrence capabilities have been recognized as an indispensable tool for its nuclear deterrence strategy. This has demonstrated for China’s successful development of its first nuclear bomb on October 16, 1964. Since then its was a report that China has possessed about at least 50 nuclear warheads by the end of the 1960s. Compared with numbers of nuclear warheads of United States and the Soviet Union China has been regarded as an absolute inferiority disposition of demonstrating its nuclear deterrence capabilities. However, during the period ranging from the 1970s to the 1980s, China has increased its nuclear deterrence capabilities in saying its approximately 230 numbers of nuclear warheads in the year of 1989. In addition China has developed its so-called nuclear triads: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) deployed land nuclear sites, nuclear-powered submarines equipped with submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and H-series strategic nuclear bomb-equipped long-range bombers known as H-6 aircraft. This indicates that China has changed its concept of nuclear deterrence strategy from existent deterrence strategy to minimum deterrence strategy. Moreover, China also demonstrated its nuclear deterrence strategy known as concept ambiguity of using its nuclear weapons because of its weakness and limits of facilitating nuclear weapons and capabilities. In conclusions China continues to increase its nuclear deterrence capabilities and its nuclear arsenals regarding to its sufficient nuclear deterrence capabilities and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) wants to qualitative leading as well as quantantative comparison with United States mainly. Chinese nuclear strategy will be more innovative reform to meet its nuclear deterrence capabilities in either qualitative or quantile comparison.

북한의 최소억제 역량 확보에 대비한 한국의 독자억제책 제안

박휘락 (사) 한국전략문제연구소 2020 전략연구 Vol.27 No.2

This paper is written to find out how to prepare a self-reliant nuclear deterrence strategy for South Korea, when the US's extended deterrence promise could not be implemented because of a North Korean nuclear attack threat to the United States. North Korea is in the course of developing Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) that could strike the US with nuclear weapons. This paper revisits nuclear deterrence theories for a small non-nuclear state, assesses the status of the US' extended deterrence for South Korea and North Korea's challenge to the extended deterrence. It finally evaluates the current South Korean own nuclear deterrence posture and makes a few recommendations for South Korea. As a result, this paper found that the US has become more reluctant in implementing its extended deterrence for South Korea as North Korea has strengthened its nuclear power. North Korea is about to succeed in developing its ICBMs and SLBMs to strike the US mainland. However, South Korea's own nuclear deterrence posture appears to be far less than required. South Korea needs to reinforce its concept of Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR), which was developed during the last Park Administration. At the same time, it should try to strengthen its potential capabilities for the development of nuclear weapons quickly, when necessary. It needs to conduct preemptive strikes and/or preventive strikes, if necessary. It also needs to reinforce its defense posture against a possible North Korean nuclear attack with people's strong will to defend their country at all costs. 본 논문은 북한이 대륙간탄도탄(ICBM)과 잠수함발사탄도탄(SLBM)의 완성에 가까워짐에 따라 미국의 확장억제 이행이 어려워지고 있고, 따라서 한국은 독자적 북핵 억제방책을 모색해야 한다는 문제의식에서 작성되었다. 이를 위하여 비핵국가의 핵억제에 관한 이론을 검토하였고, 미국의 확장억제와 이를 무력화하려는 북한의 도전 노력을 살펴본 다음에, 독자적 억제에 관한 한국의 현 실태를 평가하여 한국이 추가적으로 노력해야할 몇 가지 과제를 제시하였다. 분석의 결과, 북한의 핵능력이 고도화됨에 따라서 미국의 확장억제 이행이 더욱 불확실해지고 있는데, 한국은 독자적 억제 노력을 등한시하고 있다고 진단하였다. 이제 한국은 박근혜 정부 때 정립한 후 중단된 한국형 응징보복(KMPR) 태세를 재강화하고, 그의 구현을 위한 능력을 보강할 필요가 있다. 유사시 조기에 핵무기 개발을 보장할 수 있는 잠재력을 구비해야할 것이다. 또한 예방타격 차원에서 선제타격을 적극적으로 감행할 수 있는 태세를 구비하고, 종심지역에 대한 미사일방어와 핵민방위 태세를 강화함으로써 응징보복의 확실성을 강화할 필요가 있다. 국토 수호에 대한 국민들의 결의를 강화함으로써 북한이 핵무기 공격을 쉽게 감행하지 못하도록 만들 필요가 있다.

미국의 국가안보와 핵억지 전략의 변화: 트루먼-트럼프 행정부까지

김일수 ( Kim Ilsu ),유호근 ( Yoo Ho Keun ) 한국세계지역학회 2019 世界地域硏究論叢 Vol.37 No.4

미국은 가장 먼저 핵 전력을 갖추었을 뿐만 아니라 핵을 통한 안전보장과 핵 억지를 통한 국제관계의 독점적 영향력 확보를 실천해 옮겨왔다. 냉전시기 미·소간 핵억지 전략의 핵심은 핵 보복 능력을 확보한 ‘공포의 균형(balance of terror)’으로 상호 핵무기 사용을 자제하게 하고 억제하도록 하였다. 탈 냉전기에 미국의 핵억지 전략은 소련 이외의 위협으로부터 미국과 우방국을 보호하는 전략으로 바뀌었다. 9.11테러 이후 미국은 러시아 이외에 중국, 북한, 이라크 등 미국이 현상타파국으로 인식한 국가로부터의 핵과 미사일 위협에 대비하고자 하였다. 미국은 보복 능력의 향상에 초점을 두면서 핵을 사용한 선제공격의 옵션까지 고려한 핵 억지력을 강화해오고 있다. 트럼프 행정부는 북한의 핵 위협에 따른 핵 공포로 인해 주변국들이 핵무기를 보유하고자 하는 충동을 없애야 하는 도전에 직면하고 있다 이 논문의 목적은 미국의 국가안보 전략으로서 핵 억지가 어떻게 시작되었으며 어떤 양태로 트럼프 행정부까지 지속하였는지에 대해 역사적인 맥락에서 살펴보는 것이다. 이런 목적에서 본 연구에서는 우선, 핵 억지이론의 기본 개념과 원칙, 역사적 변화과정을 분석하고 있다. 둘째, 냉전이 종식되고 경제적인 상호의존이 심화하고 있는 국제체제 환경 하에서도 미국의 핵 억지 전략이 파기되지 않고 지속되는 이유를 분석하는 것이다. 이를 위해 미국의 국가안보전략으로서의 핵억지의 유용성과 함께 각 행정부 시기별로 어떻게 억지 전략이 유지·변화되었는지를 살펴볼 것이다. 또한 트럼프 행정부의 억지 전략이 북한과의 관련성 속에서 탐색할 수 있는 이론적 정책적 함의를 분석한다. The United States has not only been equipped with nuclear power first, but has also carried out the security of nuclear power and the monopoly influence of international relations through nuclear deterrence. The core of the nuclear deterrence strategy between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War was the “balance of terror,” which secured nuclear retaliation. In the post-cold war, the US nuclear deterrence strategy has been changed to protect the US and its allies from threats other than the Soviet Union. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States sought to prepare for nuclear and missile threats from countries other than Russia, including China, North Korea, and Iraq. The United States has been strengthening its nuclear deterrence, focusing on improving retaliation capabilities and considering options for nuclear preemptive strikes. The Trump administration is facing a challenge to rid the neighboring countries of the urge to possess nuclear weapons because of nuclear fears from North Korea’s nuclear threat. This paper aims to analyze the historical context why nuclear deterrence as a U.S. national security strategy began and has maintained to date. In doing so, we revisit fundamental concepts and principles about nuclear deterrence. Second, we explain why the U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy has not been scrapped in the wake of the end of the Cold War. To this end, we conduct a literature review, summarize prior research regarding the theory of nuclear deterrence. We discuss why U.S. administrations from Truman to Trump still believe nuclear deterrence as viable and necessary as a national security strategy. Finally, we discuss how the Trump administration’s deterrence strategy is being applied to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. We conclude that the U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy has been characterized by substantial continuity than change for more than four decades.

한국의 ‘최소핵심억제’ 개념과 확보전략

김익만 ( Lkeman Kim ) 한국군사학회 2024 군사논단 Vol.117 No.-

This article attempts to conceptualize the idea of independent nuclear deterrence for the Republic of Korea(ROK) in the context of the glowing nuclear capabilities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea(North Korea), which poses a significant threat to the ROK. Firstly, the international norms surrounding the Korean Peninsula, inclusive of bilateral, regional and global agreements or treaties, are examined and assessed from the perspective of the ROK North Korea has seemingly breached most stipulations pertaining to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NP'I). On the basis of the NPT spirit, non-nuclear-weapon states should be protected from the threat of legitimate nuclear-weapon states, and much more strongly from any threat of an unlawful nuclear-weapon state. The ROK(South Korea) is the only country both abided by all rules of nuclear non-proliferation and wholly threatened by unlawful nuclear weapons at the same time. Secondly, some nuclear deterrence theories, encompassing extended deterrence, proportional deterrence, and minimum deterrence, are analyzed in the context of South Korea's unique position While the United States has consistently served as a reliable security ally for South Korea, the development and deployment of North Korea's ICBMs, capable of reaching the US mainland, has dramatically altered the strategic landscape. Now, South Korea is facing a blackmail threat of nuclear destruction from the North, while only one ally's resolve may be fluctuating according to the President's temper, congressional structure, and public opinion of Americans who are also faced with the blackmail. Lastly, the ''Minimum Essential Deterrence of the Republic of Korea signifies a disciplined and humble deterrence, aiming for minimalistic warheads and specifically targeting the political and economic nucleus and the leadership responsible for deciding and executing a nuclear assault. The ''Minimum Essential Deterrence is a prudent exercise of indigenous right of self-defense, adopts 'no first use' policy and aligns well with the provisions of the NPT. It accepts international control through United Nations Command and IAEA, which would be a first and giant leap towards complete control of nuclear weapons by international organs and the ultimate abolition of them.

북한의 핵억제론과 핵억제력: 이론적 검토와 현실적 수용의 문제

이헌경 사단법인 한국평화연구학회 2009 평화학연구 Vol.10 No.3

Deterrence is a measure not to deliver a pre-emptive attack in term of giving fear of an unacceptable level of damage in a retaliatory blow even after having carried out a surprise first strike against the deterrer. North Korea would forward nuclearization with such a nuclear logic. Its nuclear holding can be considered from a point of view of self-defense and deterrence. It has a weak persuasiveness logically that the nuclear states' possessing nuclear weapons is acceptable, but not to the non-nuclear ones. Therefore, the Non-proliferation Treaty regime contains a contradiction. Unless this contradiction should not be acceptable, the world will be faced with threat more and more. If the states that have nuclear technology and materials develop nuclear weapon with a logic of self-defense and nuclear deterrence power, the world will be laid under nuclear fear. North Korean logic of nuclear deterrence focuses on having nuclear deterrence. It has played a role as military means for acquiring rewards rather than war prevention, and North Korea throughout nuclear weapon holding used to seek after nuclear threat and blackmail. Considering this attitude, North Korean holding of nuclear deterrence will not be acceptable. Even though its act of nuclear bomb test, processing of nuclear facilities, and reprocessing of plutonium in the fuel rods in the meantime would be caused by relativity, it would have intention of acquiring compensations as much as possible. This, as a strategy of obtaining rewards by means of increasing of action crisis, has intimidated regional stability and peace. It is possible that North Korea will do such actions continually, and this will produce an unstable Korean peninsula situation by the action-reaction process. Apart from security factors, it is not conceivable that North Korea faced with serious food crisis spends huge sums of money in producing nuclear weapons. 억제는 상대방이 공격할 경우에 그들에게 감당할 수 없을 정도로 유효한 반격이 가해질 것이란 공포심을 주어 선제공격을 할 수 없게 하는 조치이다. 이러한 억제론을 내세우면서 북한은 핵무장을 추진해 왔다. 북한의 핵보유는 자위와 억제력 차원에서 고려될 수 있다. 이미 핵을 가진 국가의 핵보유는 인정되고, 그렇지 못한 국가의 핵보유는 인정되지 못하는 것은 논리적으로 설득력이 약하다. 그래서 NPT 체제는 모순을 포함하고 있다. 이러한 모순을 받아들이지 못할 경우, 세계는 더욱 더 위험에 처하게 된다. 핵기술과 장비를 가진 국가들이 자위와 억제력을 내세워 핵을 개발한다면 세계는 핵의 공포 속에 놓일 것이다. 북한의 핵억제론은 억제력 보유에 핵심을 두고 있지만 핵무기는 전쟁예방의 목적보다는 보상을 얻기 위한 군사적 수단으로 역할을 해 왔으며 핵보유를 통해 핵위협과 핵공갈을 일삼아 왔다. 이러한 태도를 볼 때, 불량국가로 간주되는 북한의 핵억제력 보유는 있어서는 안 된다. 핵실험, 핵시설 재가동과 폐연료봉 재처리 등 그동안 취한 북한의 행위는 상대성에 기인하기도 하지만 핵위협과 핵공갈을 통해 그들이 얻고자 하는 보상을 가능한 많이 챙기기 위한 것이었다. 이는 위기고조를 통해 보상을 얻으려는 전략으로 지역의 안정과 평화를 위협한 것이다. 북한은 앞으로도 계속 이러한 행위를 할 가능성이 있으며, 작용-반작용을 불러 일으켜 한반도 정세를 불안정하게 할 것이다. 안보적 요인 외 굶어죽는 주민이 늘 정도로 극심한 식량난에 처해 있는 북한이 엄청난 돈을 들여가면서 핵을 만든다는 것은 생각조차 할 수 없다.

Beyond the Nuclear Umbrella: Re-thinking the Theory and Practice of Nuclear Extended Deterrence in East Asia and the Pacific

Richard Tanter,Peter Hayes 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2011 Pacific Focus Vol.26 No.1

This paper provides an overview of the Nautilus Institute’s exploration of two inter-linked but highly contested aspects of the strategic nuclear situation on the Korean peninsula: the complexity and uncertainty associated with United States assurances of nuclear extended deterrence to South Korea (and Japan), and the potential contribution a nuclear weapon free zone to shifting the current impasse concerning North Korean nuclear weapons. The theoretical inquiry in to the current state of nuclear extended deterrence is followed by an examination of the necessity, viability and desirability of reformed versions of nuclear extended deterrence (such as collective deterrence), and of three conceivable generic alternatives to reliance upon nuclear extended deterrence: namely nuclear rejection, nuclear recession, and conventional deterrence (possibly combined with existential deterrence). A bilateral nuclear weapon free zone, with the door held open to North Korea to join at a later stage, would act as a circuit-breaker in the stalemated nuclear confrontation; prefigure a United States negative security guarantee to North Korea in a future rapprochement; and reduce ongoing regional anxieties by locking both South Korea and Japan into a legally binding non-nuclear security posture.

북한의 핵억제론: 교리, 전략, 운용을 중심으로

김성철 사단법인 한국평화연구학회 2014 평화학연구 Vol.15 No.4

Whereas previous studies on North Korea’s nuclear program focused on its motivation of the weapons development and on international negotiation processes regarding the issue, this article concentrates on analyzing North Korea’s nuclear deterrence, particularly its doctrine, development of deterrence strategy, strategic utility, and types of nuclear operations. Since it advocated nuclear deterrence for the first time in June 2003, North Korea has maintained that the deterrence would protect national sovereignty and prevent nuclear wars and that the country would not exchange the nuclear weapons for other gains. The upholding of nuclear deterrence, a sharp turn from the previous rhetoric of peaceful use of nuclear power, stemmed from the threat of the Bush administration’s preemptive attack policy in the post-9.11 era. North Korea's doctrine of nuclear deterrence was legalized in April 2013 when the Supreme People’s Assembly adopted the Law of Nuclear Weapons, whereas its unofficial elements appeared in other government statements and media coverages. North Korea’s nuclear deterrence is of a limited utility because of the asymmetry in nuclear capability in comparison to the United States; however, North Korea tries to achieve a certain level of effectiveness of the deterrence through maneuvering ambivalence between threat and blackmailing and demonstrating rational irrationality. North Korea strategically operates the nuclear deterrence to bring a change of the existing status quo on the Korean peninsula; the typical means are, and will be, limited conventional attacks and demands for nuclear arms control negotiations. 지금까지 많은 연구가 북한의 핵개발 동기와 의도, 그리고 비핵화를 위한 협상과정을 분석했던 반면, 본 논문은 북한의 핵억제론 자체에 관한 연구로서, 핵억제 교리(또는 핵교리), 미국 안보전략과의 관계, 핵전략과 한계, 핵운용 유형 등을 규명한다. 북한은 2003년 6월 최초로 “핵억제”를 주창한 이후 국가주권 보호와 전쟁방지가 목적이며 핵이 협상대상이 아니라고 일관해왔다. 핵억제 주장은 “핵의 평화적 이용”이라는 과거의 수사에서 크게 선회한 것으로서, 핵억제 필요의 근거로 9.11 이후 미국이 채택한 선제공격론을 들고 있다. 북한의 핵교리는 2013년 4월 핵보유법제화와 여타의 정부 성명 및 매체들을 통해 구체적인 실체를 드러냈다. 북한의 핵억제는 핵능력의 비대칭성으로 미국의 확장억제에 비교되지 않아 억제력의 효용은 제한된 반면, 모호성을 통한 위협의 고저조절, 합리적 비합리성의 연출 등으로 일정한 효과를 노리고 있다. 북한의 핵운용은 핵군축협상 주장과 군사적 균형 변화 추구 등으로 한반도 및 동북아에서의 <현상타파> 전략을 꾀하고 있다. 본 연구는 핵능력의 비대칭적 상황에서 핵약소국이 현상유지 타파를 추구하는 핵운용 전략을 조명해주는 의미를 지닌다.

미국의 확장억제 강화방안: 북한 전술핵 위협과 한미 통합 핵억제를 중심으로

설인효,손한별 국가안보전략연구원 2023 국가안보와 전략 Vol.23 No.2

This article proposes ways to enhance U.S. extended deterrence in the face of North Korea’s development of tactical nuclear weapons. It posits that a gap may exist in the deterrence posture of the Korea-U.S. alliance, which can be bridged by the inclusion of “tactical nuclear weapons” in its extended deterrence measures. The emergence of a new nuclear age, shifts in the global nuclear balance, and North Korea’s nuclear development have prompted changes in the deterrence calculation method. The potential for North Korea to exploit the gap in the Korea-U.S. alliance and extended deterrence further underscores the need for strengthening extended deterrence. The article advocates for a scientific and meticulous re-evaluation of the North Korean nuclear threat, a re-examination of the discourse on nuclear deterrence, and the development of novel measures, including tactical nuclear weapons. Notably, the integration of South Korea’s advanced conventional forces into the U.S. “conventional and nuclear integration” system is seen as a promising way to enhance the Korea-U.S. alliance’s deterrence posture.

억제이론으로 본 중국의 핵억제전략

이재학(LEE Jae Hak)(李在鶴) 신아시아연구소(구 신아세아질서연구회) 2011 신아세아 Vol.18 No.2

1990년대 중반 중국 위협론이 처음 등장한 이후 안보전문가들은 중국의 군사대국화 가능성에 대한 우려를 꾸준하게 제기하고 있다. 중국의 군사적 위협에 대한 올바른 평가가 이루어지기 위해서는 군사력 자체에 대한 평가뿐만 아니라 군사력의 운용방법인 전략에 대한 평가가 병행되어야 한다. 중국의 재래식전력에 대한 전략은 반접근전략으로 개념화되어 이에 대한 대응전략을 모색하고 있다. 하지만, 중국의 핵억제전략에 대한 평가는 합의에 도달하지 못하고 있다. 중국의 핵억제전략에 대한 평가는 크게 두 번의 변화를 겪는다. 첫 번째는 1960년대부터 1980년대까지의 최소억제전략이고, 두 번째는 1980년대 후반 이후 등장한 제한억제전략이다. 그렇다면 중국이 추구해온 핵억제전략은 무엇이며, 이러한 전략을 추가하고 있는 이유는 무엇인가? 본 연구는 가장 억제전략의 이론적 측면에서 중국의 핵억제전략을 평가함으로써 중국이 추구해온 핵억제전략을 밝히고자한다. 그 결과를 바탕으로 중국의 핵억제전략이 가지는 함의를 도출함으로써 군사적 측면에서 중국의 부상을 평가하는 연구에 필요한 기반을 제공하고자 한다. 본문의 주장은 다음과 같다. 중국은 핵억제전략을 구현하기 위해 지속적으로 핵무기 현대화를 위해 노력해왔지만, 중국이 추구했던 핵억제전략을 구현하는데 필요한 요건을 모두 갖춘 적은 없었다. 최소억제전략을 추구하던 1980년대 중반까지 이에 필요한 능력을 갖추지 못했으며, 1980년대 중반 이후 제한억제전략을 추구하기 시작한 것으로 평가되지만, 아직까지 최소억제전략에 필요한 최소한의 요건만을 갖추고 있다. 그렇다면, 중국의 핵억제전략은 어떤 의미를 가지고 있는가? 본문은 3가지 관점에서 그 의미를 제시한다. 첫째, 중국의 핵억제전략은 자신들이 보유한 능력을 정치적으로 극대화해서 활용하는데 초점을 맞추고 있기때문에 군사적인 측면보다는 정치ㆍ외교적인 측면에서 의미가 더 크다고 볼 수 있다. 둘째, 중국의 핵무기 현대화는 중국이 보유하고 있는 핵무기의 신뢰성과 생존성에 대한 우려에의한 것으로 중국은 미국 및 러시아와 핵무기 경쟁을 하려는 것이 아니고 최소한의 억제능력을 확보하기 위해 지속적으로 노력하고 있다고 볼 수 있다. 마지막으로,중국이 핵억제 전략의 대상을 미국과 러시아를 제외한 비핵보유국 또는 주변의 핵보유국으로 할 경우 중국 핵억제 전략에 대한 평가 결과는 군사적인 유용성을 지닐 수 있다. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate China’s nuclear deterrence strategies by deterrence theories, and provide implications based on the evaluation results. China has been building up its nuclear forces even when the United States and Russia are reducing theirs. China’s nuclear strategy faced two changes. First one is minimum deterrence from the 1960s to the 1980s. Second one is limited deterrence since the late 1980s. Could China has achieved the purpose of their nuclear strategies? The conclusion is that China has never met the conditions that are required to implement their nuclear strategy. China could not be equipped with enough nuclear technology and arsenals for limited deterrence until the late 1980s, and since China changed its strategy into limited deterrence, China dose not has enough nuclear power for that until now. Then, what do their deterrence strategies mean for China? First, China may focus on political aspects of it rather than military usefulness. Second, China’s nuclear modernization may be driven by worries over the credibility and survivability of its ageing arsenal. China has not strived for parity with the United States. Rather, the aim has been maintenance of “minimum deterrence.” Third, their nuclear power has enough military usefulness not to superpower but to neighbor countries.

试论朝鲜核武化的逻辑路径——基于冷战后朝鲜半岛核安全 结构变化趋势的思考

Ma, Yunpeng,이성일 부산대학교 중국연구소 2017 Journal of China Studies Vol.20 No.2

After the Cold War, there are two major trends of the nuclear security structure on the Korean Peninsula: Firstly, North Korea has tried to replace the peninsula "one-way nuclear deterrent" structure with "asymmetric nuclear deterrent" structure, and form a "non-balanced nuclear deterrent" structure to strengthen nuclear weapons activities step by step; Secondly, the United States has been vigorously intervened in the Asia-Pacific affairs, implementing the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy, and taking the DPRK nuclear activities as a reason to strongly promote the missile defense system building in the East Asian region especially in the South Korea. Both of them are the result of the vicious interaction of safety in Korean peninsula, which may eventually change the nuclear security structure of Northeast Asia overall. North Korea's nuclear weaponization services as one of the core security issues of the Korean Peninsula after the Cold War, which is the result of the vicious interaction between the internal and external elements of the Korean Peninsula security structure. After the third nuclear test, the DPRK had taken the nuclear weapons as a strategic issue instead of tactical chips, which had been causing the Korean Peninsula security dilemma around the DPRK nuclear issue increasingly difficult to resolve. The study on the internal logic of the DPRK's nuclear issue may contribute to find negotiating space in a seemingly unexplained security dilemma. There are two basic forces which have been driving North Korea for nuclear power. On the one hand, it’s trying to reduce the possibility of waging "hot war" by the Korea-US alliance to maintain regime and system security through establishing an "asymmetric nuclear deterrent" structure with them. On the other hand, they try to weaken South Korea's dominance of the Korean Peninsula reunification issue and strive for the reciprocity on it. Under the impetus of the two major powers, the DPRK gradually built a prototype structure of the "asymmetric nuclear deterrent" against the ROKUS alliance after five nuclear tests. The structure of "nuclear deterrence without power equilibrium" is concerned with the steady growth of conventional armaments on the basis of steady economic development. This “nuclear deterrent” structure, legally defending the regime and system security, is the ultimate goal of North Korea's nuclear-weapon effort. If the DPRK regime eventually did not "collapse" under the internal and external pressure, it would work towards this ultimate goal. THAAD taken into the ROK may produce an illusion for the North Korea, that the nuclear weapons from the DPRK had formed an "asymmetric nuclear deterrent" structure with the KoreanAmerican alliance at least in the psychological level. THAAD may be taken as an excellent evidence by the North Korea, that the Korean-American alliance began to take strong reaction and hedge measures to deal with the new security structure in Korean Peninsula. When the North Korea believes that the "asymmetric nuclear deterrent" structure had been established and would not be broken in a short term, its nuclear activities will gradually enter into the "Nuclear Deterrence without Power Equilibrium "structural construction period. During the construction phase of the "Nuclear Deterrence without Power Equilibrium ", the nuclear weapons development will gradually give way to the conventional armaments promotion, at the same time, economic development which services as the prerequisite of conventional armaments promotion would become the basis and core work of the DPRK. At this stage, North Korea's demand for economic development is both a subjective desire and an objective necessity. Economic issues will provide a huge space for negotiating space to break the peninsula security dilemma.