중국입법권 행사의 권한 문제 검토

이성연 경북대학교 법학연구원 2020 법학논고 Vol.0 No.71

The National People's Representative System is China's fundamental political system, and it exercises the state's legislative power exclusively and exclusively. China's legislative powers, like most countries, are determined by the constitution and laws. According to the Chinese Constitution, the National People's Congress and the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress stipulate in principle that they exercise national legislative power. In addition, the National People's Congress, as the leading legislative body in China, has the power to enact and amend criminal, civil, state organizations and other basic laws, and also has the power to amend the constitution. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress has the power to make and amend all other laws, except for the laws enacted by the National People's Congress, and During the closing period of the National People's Congress, the laws enacted by the National People's Congress can be partially secured and amended. Both the National People's Congress and the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress can exercise legislative power, but both have advantages and disadvantages. That is, the authority of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress originates from the National People's Congress and is bound by the National People's Congress. Therefore, the legislative power of the National People's Congress has the status of the first legislative power and has full legislative power, but the legislative power of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is limited by the legislative power of the National People's Congress and has the second legislative power. However, when the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress exercised its legislative power, problems such as ambiguity in the concept of basic laws and other laws besides the basic laws, continuous expansion of legislative powers, and representativeness arise. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the definition of the concept of the Basic Law, and it is necessary to control the exercise of legislative power of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress through the supervisory authority of the National People's Congress over the legislative actions of the standing members of the National People's Congress. In addition, it is necessary to improve the election method as a way to secure the representation of the National People's Congress. 전국인민대표대회제도는 중국의 근본적인 정치제도로써 국가의 입법권을 독점적 배타적으로 행사한다. 중국의 입법권한도 대부분의 국가처럼 헌법과 법률에 의해서 확정된다. 중국 헌법에 의하면 전국인민대표대회와 전국인민대표대회 상무위원회가 국가입법권을 행사한다는 원칙적인 규정을 하고 있다. 또한 전국인민대표대회는 중국의 최고의 입법기관으로서 형사, 민사, 국가기구 및 기타 기본법률을 제정하고 개정할 권한을 가지고 있으며 또한 헌법에 대한 개정권한을 가지고 있다. 전국인민대표대회 상무위원회는 전국인민대표대회가 제정하는 법률이외의 기타 모든 법률을 제정하고 개정할 권한을 가지고 있으며 전국인민대표대회 폐회기간 동안 전국인민대표대회가 제정한 법률에 대해 부분적인 보안과 개정을 할 수 있다. 전국인민대표대회와 전국인민대표대회 상무위원회는 모두 입법권을 행사할 수 있지만 양자는 우열이 존재한다. 즉, 전국인민대표대회 상무원회의 권한은 전국인민대표대회에서 기원하며 전국인민대표대회에 구속되기 때문에 전국인민대표대회의 입법권은 제1의 입법권의 지위를 가지며 완전한 입법권한을 갖지만, 전국인민대표대회 상무위원회의 입법권은 전국인민대표대회의 입법권한에 의해서 제약을 받으며 제2의 입법권한을 갖는다. 그러나 전국인민대표대회 상무위원회가 입법권을 행사에 있어서 기본법률과 기본법률외 기타법률의 개념의 불명확성, 입법권의 지속적인 확대, 대표성 등의 문제가 발생하고 있다. 따라서 기본법률의 개념정의를 명확히 할 필요가 있으며, 전국인민대표대회 상무위원의 입법행위에 대한 전인대의 감독권한의 실질화를 통해서 전국인민대표대회 상무위원회의 입법권 행사에 대한 통제를 할 필요가 있으며, 전국인민대표대회의 대표성을 확보하기 위한 방법으로 선거방식을 개선할 필요가 있다.

美國 大統領의 立法에 관한 權限

尹明善(Yun Myung-Sun) 미국헌법학회 2008 美國憲法硏究 Vol.19 No.1

Under the governmental structure of the Federal Constitution, legislative power is assigned to the Congress only and the president has veto power to check over the legislative power. Article one section one confers the legislative power with the words, ""All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States."" The executive has no direct legislative power; nowhere is the President given law-making authority. But the President's duties are not all purely executive in nature. The President is also associated by Constitution or practice with the legislative process in any form. The executive does in fact have a law-making power since the beginning of the Republic. Beginning with Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, there has been an exponential growth in the Presidential legislative powers not in the sense of formal authority but by way of effective control over Congressional legislation. Today the Executive is so dominant in the legislative process that the President may be considered to be the ""chief legislator."" The President as chief legislator operates in at least four discrete, yet overlapping ways: ① through formal and informal interactions with Congress; ② through the issuance of executive orders and other directives; ③ through his power to interpret statutes, whether or not in formal rule-making, and ④ through appointment of Justices of the Supreme Court. The second and third of these methods of presidential legislation are entirely executive, but the first and last involve formal action by Congress. Executive law-making takes two direct forms of executive orders and other directives which outnumber by far the statutes passed by the Congress each year. The President has also the duty to take care that the law be faithfully executed; this duty can be fulfilled through interpreting statutes. The President can and does influence the course of constitutional construction by exercising the power to appoint Justices of the Supreme Court and other federal judges, even though the Senate must approve nominees. He thus is an influential lawmaker, a participant in the continuing process of updating the Constitution. The legislative veto power places the President directly into the legislative process. Every bill which shall have passed two houses of Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented th the President: if he approves he shall sign, but if not he shall return it with his objections to the house in which it shall have originated to reconsider it. If both Houses repass the bill by a two third vote, the bill then becomes law over the veto. The importance of this veto power is not its actual use, but the threat of its use. At any rate, this veto power has played in securing the constitutional order and in protecting individual constitutional rights and minority's interests. And if any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law; this is called pocket veto. One of the shortcoming of the Constitution is that the President dos not have an 'item veto'. Today, however, item veto is recognized as an useful tool for the efficiency of legislation. The President's formal power over legislation is the first onewhich is formed through interactions with Congress. The Constitution authorizes the President to undertake policy initiatives. First, the President is required from time to time to inform Congress as to the ""State of the Union."" Second, the President may make legislative proposals to the Congress for its consideration as he shall judge necessary and expedient. Third, the President used to send messages, annual or special, to inform the Congress the direction of executive policy over legislation. And the President may convene both houses of Congress, or either of them on ""extraordinary occasions."" This power might be used to legislate special rules to overcome crises. These mechanisms are indirect methods to participate in the legislative process; nevertheless, playing the bridge role between the President and Congress. Through this role, the President has exercised a critical role in legislation, resulting in the presence of the imperial presidency. We should remember that the most important factor of successful legislation in fact lies in a political leadership.

미국 연방의회의 입법에 관한 권한 및 한계에 관한 연구

이환경 제주대학교 법과정책연구원 2024 法과 政策 Vol.30 No.2

미국의 입법권은 연방의회의 고유한 권한으로서, 미국 연방헌법 제1조에 규정되어 있다. 연방의회의 입법권은 내재적 제한과 외부적 제한을 받는다. 내재적 제한이란 연방헌법 제1조에 열거된 사항에 국한되는 제한을 말하며, 외부적 제한이란 권력분립과 연방주의 원리 등에서 도출되는 제한을 말한다. 연방의회의 입법권은 내재적 제한과 외부적 제한을 받지만, 그 범위는 매우 광범위하다. 연방의회는 국가의 모든 사무에 관한 입법권을 가지고 있으며, 이를 통해 국가의 정책을 결정하고 국민의 권익을 보호한다. 연방의회의 입법권은 필요하고 적절한 조항과 묵시적 또는 내재적 권한에 의하여 확장되어 왔다. 필요하고 적절한 조항은 연방의회가 국가의 필요와 적절성을 이유로 입법권을 행사할 수 있는 것을 의미한다. 묵시적 또는 내재적 권한은 연방의회의 입법권이 연방의회의 다른 권한에서 유추될 수 있다는 것을 의미한다. 연방의회의 입법권은 내재적 제한과 외부적 제한을 받는다. 내재적 제한이란 연방헌법 제1조에 열거된 사항에 국한되는 제한을 말하며, 외부적 제한이란 권력분립과 연방주의 원리 등에서 도출되는 제한을 말한다. 결국, 미국의 입법권은 다음과 같은 특징을 가진다. ① 내재적 제한과 외부적 제한을 받는 제한적 권한, ② 국가의 모든 사무에 관한 광범위한 권한, ③ 필요하고 적절한 조항과 묵시적 또는 내재적 권한에 의한 확장 등이 그것이다. 오늘날 미국의 입법권은 위임입법의 증가로 인해 사실상 행정부에 의해 장악되고 있다. 위임입법이란 행정부에 법률의 구체적인 내용을 정할 수 있는 재량권을 부여하는 것을 말한다. 위임입법의 증가로 인해 행정부는 법률을 제정하는 것뿐만 아니라, 법률의 내용까지도 사실상 결정할 수 있게 되었다. 이는 연방의회의 입법권을 약화시키고, 행정부의 입법권을 강화하는 결과를 초래하고 있다. 미국의 입법권은 국민의 의사를 반영하기 위한 권한으로 볼 수도 있다. 미국은 민주주의 국가로서, 국민의 의사가 국가의 정책에 반영되어야 한다는 것이 기본 원칙이다. 연방의회는 국민의 대표기관으로서, 국민의 의사를 법률에 반영하는 역할을 한다. 따라서 연방의회의 입법권은 국민의 의사를 반영할 수 있도록 충분한 범위의 권한을 부여하고 있다. 미국의 입법권은 내재적 제한과 외부적 제한을 받는 제한적 권한이지만, 국가의 모든 사무에 관한 광범위한 권한을 가지고 있다. 또한, 필요하고 적절한 조항과 묵시적 또는 내재적 권한에 의하여 확장될 수 있다. 그러나 오늘날에는 위임입법의 증가로 인해 사실상 행정부에 의해 장악되고 있으며, 의회가 국민의 의사를 반영하기 위한 권한으로 볼 수도 있다. The legislative power of the United States is unique to the Congress and is stipulated in Article 1 of the United States Federal Constitution. The legislative power of the Federal Assembly is subject to intrinsic and external restrictions. Intrinsic restrictions refer to restrictions limited to the matters listed in Article 1 of the Federal Constitution, and external restrictions refer to restrictions derived from the separation of powers and the principle of federalism. The legislative power of the Federal Assembly is subject to inherent and external restrictions, but its scope is very broad. The Federal Assembly has legislative power over all affairs of the state, which determines the state's policies and protects the rights and interests of the people. The legislative power of the Federal Assembly has been extended by necessary and appropriate provisions and implied or inherent powers. Necessary and appropriate provisions mean that the Federal Assembly can exercise legislative power on the grounds of the needs and appropriateness of the state. Implicit or intrinsic power means that the legislative power of the Federal Assembly can be inferred from other powers of the Federal Assembly. The legislative power of the Federal Assembly is subject to intrinsic and external restrictions. Intrinsic restrictions refer to restrictions limited to the matters listed in Article 1 of the Federal Constitution, and external restrictions refer to restrictions derived from the separation of powers and the principle of federalism. In the end, the legislative power of the United States has the following characteristics. ① They include restrictive powers subject to intrinsic and external restrictions, ② broad authority over all affairs of the State, and ③ necessary and appropriate provisions and extensions by implied or intrinsic authority. Today, legislative power in the United States is actually dominated by the administration due to the increase in delegated legislation. Delegated legislation refers to giving the administration discretion to set specific details of the law. Due to the increase in mandated legislation, the administration can not only enact laws, but also decide the contents of laws. This has resulted in weakening the legislative power of the Federal Assembly and strengthening the legislative power of the executive branch. The legislative power of the United States can also be viewed as an authority to reflect the will of the people. As a democratic country, the basic principle is that the will of the people should be reflected in the policy of the country. The Federal Assembly is the representative body of the people and plays a role in reflecting the will of the people in the law. Therefore, the legislative power of the Federal Assembly gives a sufficient range of authority to reflect the will of the people. Legislative power in the United States is a limited authority subject to intrinsic and external restrictions, but it has extensive authority over all affairs of the state. It can also be extended by necessary and appropriate provisions and implied or inherent authority. However, today, due to the increase in delegated legislation, it is actually dominated by the administration, and Congress can be seen as an authority to reflect the will of the people.

지방분권을 위한 자치입법권 구축방안

정주영 ( Jeong Joo-young ) 연세법학회 2021 연세법학 Vol.38 No.-

It is difficult to say that the autonomous legislative authority of local governments in Korea is the legislative power in its original sense. The Korean Constitution restricts the high authority in autonomous decision-making and local council, which is the representative body of residents, by stipulating that the exercise of autonomous legislative power should be exercised within the boundaries of national laws. In other words, in the local autonomy system in Korea, it is difficult to say that the essential function of self-government legislation is being realized. Local autonomy systems centered on local councils contribute to the realization of vertical separation of powers. In other words, the ordinance-making power of the local council performs the functions of cooperation and control over the legislative power of the National Assembly and can be used as a means of vertical separation of powers. Many foreign countries in the form of a federal state or a single state give legislative power to states or local governments (compared to Korea, mainly metropolitan or higher-level local governments) to divide the state and legislative power and seek vertical separation between the federal and state and local governments. The revision of the constitution and local government law, which emerged to overcome the lack of autonomous legislative power, cannot be evaluated as an alternative to overcome the existing problems, and it may have gone against securing and establishing autonomous legislation. Although local governments' autonomous legislative power is a key and essential high authority for guaranteeing the local government system, it is still not fully guaranteed, which can only be seen as a result of acknowledging itself that it is not local autonomy but simple administrative autonomy. There is an urgent need for a drastic improvement in the legislative power of local autonomy guaranteed as a constitutional system. In the absence of autonomous legislative power so far, local governments must now be granted autonomous legislative power, and the status of local councils that actually have autonomous legislative power, and furthermore, the relationship and system between local governments and the state must be discussed at the same time. In Korea, the state makes laws and regulations, and the state directly enforces them. In this regard, there is no system in which local governments can actively participate in the process of making laws, and there is no judicial remedy (e.g., constitutional wish of local governments) to dispute infringement of local governments' autonomy. In the end, it does not conform to the basic legal principles, such as the distribution and attribution of administrative authority and the subject of administrative authority, and the subsequent legislative authority - inconsistent with the attribution system of authority and office work. As a result, the state controls the entire process of legislation and execution of local governments' own affairs with an upper hand in legislative and executive power over state affairs. In the current situation where the local autonomy system is being implemented, this offbeat is bound to accompany several subsequent problems. In order to achieve true local autonomy, it is necessary to classify the state to play a role in planning, coordination, and management across the country, and local governments to play a role in enforcing national laws. First, through the amendment of the Constitution, the stages of administration must be clearly set in the order of state-wide local governments-basic local governments in the Constitution. At least in the Constitution, matters concerning the allocation of state power (legislative power, administrative power, and judicial power) between the state and metropolitan local governments (decentralization of state power) are stipulated, and local autonomy is a principle. Second, if it is difficult to amend the Constitution, it is a plan to more clearly classify and define the affairs of the state, metropolitan local governments, and basic local governments by revising the Local Autonomy Act. It stipulates clear state affairs, affairs performed by the state and metropolitan local governments in competition, and clear regional local government affairs, and all other affairs are defined as those of basic local governments. In the end, based on this, the right to self-government legislation will be guaranteed within a clear area. It is a very significant direction for the flow of research on autonomous legislative rights to move beyond the interpretation of the existing constitution and local autonomy laws to discuss decentralization of state and local legislation, reorganization of the administrative system, and specific guarantee of the constitutional local autonomy system. Through this study, we hope that a constitutional amendment containing the full reform of the local autonomy system, that is, the fundamental reform of the local autonomy system, will be born, and that it will be meaningful as a starting point for subsequent reform tasks.

입법권의 한계와 정당성에 관하여

박성호 동아대학교 법학연구소 2024 東亞法學 Vol.0 No.104

법치주의는 사람에 의한 전단적 권력 행사로 인한 불법성과 폭력성을 제한하고 권력의 행사를 법에 근거하도록 제한하여 개인들의 자유와 권리를 보장하고 보호하고자 하는 원칙이다. 국가 권력은 헌법과 법률에 근거하여 행사되어야 하는바, 법치주의 원리로써 권력분립의 원칙, 신뢰보호의 원칙 등이 인정되고 있다. 권력분립의 원칙에 따라 우리 헌법 제40조는 “입법권은 국회에 속한다”고 규정하면서, 입법에 대한 권한은 국회의 고유한 권한이라는 점을 규정하고 있다. 여기서 헌법 제40조 규정에 의한 입법권의 한계와 실질적 정당성이 무엇인지 문제가 된다. 국회의 입법권은 헌법과 법률에 따른 절차적 정당성이 인정되어야 할 뿐만 아니라 입법의 권력을 국회에 위임한 구성원들의 의견과 의사가 반영되는 실질적 정당성을 가져야만 할 것이다. 여기서 입법권의 실질적 정당성은 입법의 목적과 관련될 수 있는바, 입법의 목적이 권력자 및 권력 집단을 위한 목적을 가진다면 입법의 실질적 정당성은 인정되기 어려울 것이다. 더욱이 권력 집단만을 위한 목적의 법에 근거한 권력의 행사는 합법적인 권력의 행사라기보다는 합법을 가장한 권력 집단의 공동체에 대한 폭력 행위에 불과할 뿐이라고 하는 것이 옳다. 또한 권력집단의 권력의 남용으로 인해 공동체는 내부는 혼란해 질 것이고 내부 분열에 의해 공동체는 폐망의 길로 갈 수 밖에 없다는 것은 역사적 사실들이다. 따라서 입법권 행사의 목적은 권력을 위한 목적만을 가질 수 없고 공동체와 구성원들을 위한 목적을 가질 때 실질적 정당성은 인정될 수 있을 것이다. The rule of law is a principle that guarantees and protects the freedom and rights of individuals by limiting the illegality and violence caused by the exercise of power by people and limiting the exercise of power to be based on the law. State power must be exercised based on the Constitution and laws, and the principle of separation of power and protection of trust are recognized as the principle of the rule of law. In accordance with the principle of separation of powers, Article 40 of the Korean Constitution stipulates that "legislative power belongs to the National Assembly," and stipulates that the authority over legislation is the unique authority of the National Assembly. Here, the question of the limitations and practical legitimacy of legislative power under Article 40 of the Constitution is a question. The legislative power of the National Assembly should not only be recognized for procedural legitimacy under the Constitution and laws, but also must have practical legitimacy that reflects the opinions and intentions of members who have delegated legislative power to the National Assembly. Here, the practical legitimacy of legislative power can be related to the purpose of legislation, so if the purpose of legislation has the purpose for those in power and power groups, it will be difficult to recognize the practical legitimacy of legislation. Moreover, it is correct to say that the exercise of power based on the law of purpose only for power groups is not a legitimate exercise of power, but rather an act of violence against the community of power groups disguised as law. It is also historical facts that the abuse of power by the power group will confuse the community inside, and the community will be forced to go down the path of abolition by internal division. Therefore, the purpose of exercising legislative power cannot be solely for the purpose of power, but practical legitimacy can be recognized when it is for the community and its members.

19세기 후반 독일 대의제 입헌국가의 입법권력의 지위 ―법치와 권력분립의 관점에서―

오향미 한국법철학회 2022 법철학연구 Vol.25 No.1

This paper examines the rule of law and the relation of state powers reconfigured by the constitutions of Prussia and Germany in the late 19th century, which stipulated the establishment of national representative and legislative power. German constitutional state construction reveals that the real status of legislative power depended on the historical formative process of legislative power that defies superficial understanding of the doctrine of the separation of the three powers: executive, legislative, judicative. Prussian-German legislative power illustrates the status of a constitution- based national representative body established under the dominant position of the executive and bereft of the right to participate in the government. The constitutional provisions that restricted the monarchical executive by the legislative power of the national representatives invoked debate over the exercising domain of the respective executive and legislative powers. To overcome the divide between the political and constitutional status of the legislative power, governmental formation out of bureaucrats and parliamentarians is suggested. Legislative power in the 19th century German constitutional state suggests that the practical status of legislative power was related with the process of its historical establishment, and the doctrine of separation of the three powers should be supplemented by their historical roles and the relation of the respective powers accordingly, and thereby legislative power could attain a real status and role under state powers. 이 글은 19세기 프로이센-독일이 헌법제정에 따라 국민대표체가 행사하는 입법권력을 새로이 설립함으로써 법치 그리고 국가권력 관계에 초래된 변화를 고찰한다. 법률은 실질적 법률과 형식적 법률로 이분되고, 군주의 행정명령권과 국민대표체의 입법권의 대상을 명확히 구분할 필요가 생긴다. 이 과정에서 권력분립론의 도그마에 따른 입법권력의 대상과 위상이 독일 입헌국가에서 그대로 작동할 수 없고, 현실적인 입법권력의 위상은 통치권 및 행정권과의 대결 속에서 역사적으로 형성된다는 것이 드러난다. 의회가 행정권의 우위 하에서 수립되고, 정부 구성에 참여하지 않는 19세기 후반 프로이센과 독일제국의 입법권력이 그 태생적 한계를 극복하고 국가대표체로 성장할 수 있는 방법으로 제시된 대안은 의회의원이 정부구성에 참여하는 것이다. 나아가 전통적인 관료제 정부에 민주적 대표성을 부여하기 위해 의회의원과 관료가 공동으로 정부를 책임지는 체제가 제안된다. 19세기 독일 대의제 입헌국가의 입법권력의 성립과 그 지위가 보여주는 것은, 실질적인 입법권력의 지위가 역사적 형성과정과 결부되므로 추상적 권력분립론은 각 권력의 역사적 역할과 실질적 관계에 의해 보충되고 수정됨으로써 현실에서 작동가능한 입법권력의 지위와 역할이 형성될 수 있다는 것이다.

법률안거부권의 헌법적 의의

정철 세계헌법학회한국학회 2019 世界憲法硏究 Vol.25 No.2

In our constitution, coalition government is a possible means for solving the problem inherent in divided government. Yet the coalition government is very foreign to Korean peoples even though there have been some chances of it since 1990. In this circumstances, the veto power of president can be a useful means with which he/she may try to have a legislative dialogue with his/her counterpart : Congress. President can veto the legislation bill which has been passed by congressman and has been delivered to government if he/she presumes that the legislation bill is unconstitutional. He/she may have two options. The one is to veto the legislation bill. It means that he/she can eventually wield legislative power if Congress changes the legislation bill after the veto of him/her. The other is that he/she signs and promulgates it into new law and lets the court find and rectify the flaws that the new law has. Until now, majority opinion of scholars has considered the veto power of President as a tentative additional condition on legislation bill until congress eventually overrides the veto. I think this opinion underestimated the veto power of President in the legislative process. In addition, the majority opinion has supported the presumption that the President only could veto a legislation bill for the exclusion of erroneous one or unconstitutional one. It at most broadened the scope to the extent with which the President could veto any legislation bill which had been brought with unreasonable political pressure toward President without any financial bases. The opinion justified the narrowness of range by putting emphasis on the power with which Korean President(exactly the Government) unlike U.S. President can submit a legislation bill to Congress independently(Korean Constitution § 52). Yet, I think there aren't any grounds in Korean constitution(1987) on which we can limit the veto power of President. Korean constitution empowers the people to vote not only for representatives of Congress every 4 year, but also for president every 5 year. In contrast, in case of U.S. there are midterm elections with which the conflict of Presidential regime can be lessened by ruling party's winning over opposition party in one chamber or two. In addition, Korean constitution also did not clarify the circumstances or conditions for his/her using the veto power(Korean Constitution § 53 ii). Ultimately, it permits dual democratic legitimacy as J. Linz said. In constitution in itself, there are no useful and pertinent means to accommodate and harmonize the conflict on dual legitimacy between Congress and President except for the veto power of President. Therefore, I think it justifies the broadness of range for president's veto power. Also, it is necessary and reasonable to distinguish between the power to submit the proposals(legislative bills) for legislations by President(Government) and the power to bring the proposals into legislation which only Congress can do under limit of the veto power of President. 현행 헌법에서 이와 같은 분점정부의 갈등과 대립을 해소할 수 있는 방안으로 연립정부의 구성을 통한 권력의 분점이 가능할 수 있다. 그렇지만 아직까지 우리 대통령제에서 현실화된 경험이 없다는 점에서 현실적으로 대통령이 가진 법률안 거부권 즉 법률안재의요구를 통해서 국회와의 입법적 대화를 시도하는 것이 현실적인 방안이 될 수 있다. 대통령은 법률안의 위헌성을 인식한 후 법률안거부권의 행사를 통해 적극적으로 입법부가 제시한 법률안의 문제점을 지적할 수 있고 아니면 그대로 법률안을 확정하고 공포하여 법률의 무효화를 헌법재판소의 판단에 맡길 수도 있다. 전자의 노선을 선택하였다면 대통령이 법률안의 내용을 여러 관점에서 검토할 기회를 가지게 된다. 이후 국회가 대통령의 환부사유를 고려하여 새로 수정 혹은 변경한 법률안을 제출하는 방향으로 그 의사를 변경하였다면 이는 국회 스스로의 결정이라고 볼 수도 있지만 대통령의 환부사유가 입법과정 속에 반영된 결과라 볼 수 있다. 이것은 대통령의 법률안재의요구가 일종의 입법권의 행사라는 점을 보여주는 것이다. 그렇다면 종래 다수설은 대통령의 법률안거부권을 국회 입법권의 행사에 일종의 부관으로 파악하여 입법과정의 외생변수로 취급함으로써 대통령의 법률안거부권이 입법과정에서 미칠 수 있는 적극적인 영향력을 과소평가하였다고 여겨진다. 또한 종래의 다수설은 대통령이 가진 법률안거부권한을 단원제 국회의 경솔한 입법의 방지 차원 혹은 위헌적인 입법의 차단 좀 더 나아가면 집행할 수 없거나 부당한 정치적 압박을 가할 목적으로 의결된 법률안에 대해 행사가능하다고 보았다. 정부가 독자적인 법률안제출권을 가지고 있다는 점도 이런 제한적인 행사요건을 정당화하는 사유였다. 그렇지만 헌법 스스로 이원적인 민주적 정당성을 수용하고 있으면서 대통령이 국회의 입법권을 통제하도록 헌법이 부여한 법률안 거부권한을 제한적으로 해석해야 할 헌법상의 제한요건은 존재하지 않는다. 즉 국회의원과 대통령의 임기를 달리하면서 민주적 정당성의 일원화 가능성을 부여할 수 있는 동시선거의 가능성은 헌법 스스로 제한함으로써 분점정부의 출현을 가능하도록 하는 헌법구조에서 대통령이 입법권한을 헌법적으로 통제할 수 있는 중요한 수단을 약화시키는 해석론은 분점정부의 출현이 일상화된 헌법현실 속에서 그 타당성을 유지하기 힘들다고 하겠다. 더우기 미국과 달리 우리 헌법은 재의결정족수를 출석의원 3분의 2로 완화하여 재의결의 가능성을 높였고 국회구성을 변화시킬 수 있는 중간선거의 기회가 주기적으로 주어지지 않는 점을 고려한다면 거부권 행사상황을 제한적으로 해석할 필요는 없다고 여겨진다. 정부가 법률안제출권을 가지고 있는 점을 들어 거부권 행사요건을 제한해야 한다는 해석론 역시 분점정부의 상황에서 법률안을 확정짓는 권한과 법률의제화 하는 권한의 분명한 차이점을 구분하지 못하고 있다고 판단된다.

미국헌법상 입법권을 둘러싼 행정부와 입법부의 관계

이광진(Lee, Kwang-Jin) 한양법학회 2014 漢陽法學 Vol.25 No.1

The principle of separation of powers is to ensure the fundamental rights of individuals as a principle of organization, on the other hand, it means the organizing principle of state power. The principle of separation of powers between the legislature branch and the executive branch is to determine as standard how to organize and operate in relation to the checks and balances. However, the delegation of legislative power is growing in modern state. As increased delegation of legislative power to the executive branch, it looked fo new ways to oversee and influence the exercise of executive power. A typical example is the legislative veto power that recognized to constitutional practices in the U.S. The legislative veto power places the executive branch directly into the legislative process. This legislative veto power has played in securing the constitutional order and in protecting individual constitutional rights and minority"s interests. The Korea Constitution is based on the principle of separation of powers given to the National Assembly for legislative and executive powers to be granted to the government. Yet the National Assembly and the Government are sharing the legislative powers. Under the Korea Constitution, the government structure adopted presidential system similar to the U.S. Federal Constitution. Therefore, I will look at the relationship between the executive branch and legislative branch on the legislative power surrounding the formation of the "checks and balance" "sharing of powers" in the U.S. Constitution. And then This is useful to direct control system over administrative rules by National Assembly.

중국의 입법권과 입법과정

전희 이화여자대학교 법학전문대학원 2015 Ewha Law Review Vol.5 No.2

국가의 입법권은 한 나라의 법체계 정비에서 가장 핵심적인 부분이며 입법기관의 가장 중요한 권한에 해당한다. 그 내용과 기능은 다양하고 여러 각도에서 연구의 필요성이 있을 것이나, 본 논문에서는 중국의 전체적인 입법권과 입법과정에 대한 개관을 하면서 입법사항에 관하여 정하고 있는 「입법법(立法法)」을 살펴보고자 한다. 중국의 입법기관은 전국인민대표대회와 그 상무위원회로 대표되며 입법기관의 입법권을 위임받은 국무원을 비롯한 지방 인민대표대회, 국무원 소속 중앙행정기관, 지방정부, 직할시 및 자치구, 경제특구 등은 수여된 범위에서 입법권을 행사하고 있는 실정이다. 입법과정의 체계화가 많이 이루어졌지만, 여전히 입법권의 행사가 명확하게 구분되지 못하며 통일적인 절차규범이 없다는 점, 현실적으로 전국인민대표대회 상무위원회가 가장 강력한 입법권을 행사한다는 점, 지방입법권의 입법남용 등 많은 문제점을 안고 있다. 중국에서 의법치국(依法治国)의 첫 해로 일컫는 2015년, 15년만의 입법법 전면 개정으로 그 첫걸음을 내딛은 것이라고 평가되고 있다. 그 동안의 많은 문제점들이 해결될 것으로 기대되고 여러 면에서 발전된 측면을 보이지만, 아쉬운 점 역시 없지 않다. 새로운 「입법법(立法法)」에 대해서 간략하게 검토 하고, 중국의 법제가 세계적으로도 인정받기 위해서 나아가야 할 방향을 모색하면서 진정으로 인민을 위한 입법, 중국의 특색을 지닌 수준 높은 입법을 기대해본다. Legislative power of the state is the most essential part of a country's legal system maintenance, and it can be said to be one of the most important rights of the legislator. The contents and functions are diverse and feel the need for its study in various ways, but in this study, it will look into the 「Legislation law (立法法)」 that China’s overall legislative and overviews the legislative process while the legislation stipulates about it. China's legislative body is represented by the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee and, including the State Council, entrusted with the legislative power of the Legislature, the situation is that provincial people's congress, the state council, the central affiliation government, local governments, municipalities and autonomous regions and special economic zones, and etc. are exercising legislative power in conferred range. Meanwhile the systematization of legislation were done many times, but still the exercise of the legislative power has not been clearly classified, and there lacks unified procedure norms, the national people's congress standing committee actually exercised the most powerful legislative power, Legislation abuse of the local legislative power, disorder, it is true that these problems are still existing. Starting with the revision of legislative process in 15 years, it is evaluated to be the first step forward. Many problems that were discussed until now are expected to be solved and developed in many ways that only the normative sides are seen, but there still exists unfortunate matters. Details about the issues of the new legislative act are simply overviewed and in order to find ways for Chinese legislation to be affirmed globally, we expect true legislation for people, qualified legislation with Chinese features.

중국의 입법절차와 법치주의

정철 한국입법학회 2007 입법학연구 Vol.4 No.-

This paper examine the china's law-making institutions, legislative process to verify the development of rule of law in china after the enactment of the new Legislation Law in 2000. After the review, This paper will evaluate the result which china has made after the enactment of the Legislation Law in the viewpoint of rule of law. There are three national organs with intrinsic legislative power. NPC(National People's Congress) is the supreme legislative organ in the Republic of China. The NPC has the power to enact and amend all basic laws. The NPC standing Committee has also authority to enact and amend all other laws except for those enacted by the NPC itself. Lastly, the State Council exercises legislative power in five different ways. Under the Constitution, the State Council has intrinsic power to enact administrative regulations for subject matters within its sphere of authority. Secondly, the State Council has the power to enact administrative regulations when such regulations are required to facilitate the enforcement or implementation of laws enacted by the NPC and its standing committee. Also the State Council may be authorized by the NPC or the NPC Standing Committee directly or thorough a law to enact administrative regulations before the formal enactment. The Saste Council also has the right to draft and to submit the legislation. The process of legislation in China is difficult to understand perfectly. First, Whether the Communist Party has played a important role in enactment of law has been in dispute. Some scholars in recent argue that the Communist Party rarely exert an influence on the specific legislation. Others until now have maintained Party Policy has some binding force in modern China. It is generally admitted that the Party have loosen the influence over the society gradually as the growing the private sector have grown especially after the economic open policy have rooted in every area of China. Newly enacted Legislation Law enabled the citizen to participate in the legislative process through a lot of channels. But notwithstanding the Legislation Law, private sectors in China has not until grown to be ready for the task. In addition, there are too many legislative institutions to clearly explain. For the more, the State Council has the intrinsic legislative power without any relation to the Congress. Also it is necessary to point out that some China's laws are not clear and certain. China had to enact a lot of laws to regulate the situation which China had not experenced before in a short term. This have caused China's legislative institutions to make laws in a very short time. Also China intentionally enacted the laws short and abstract for the local government to be able to come up with the local circumstance. Therefore, some law in China is inconsistent. To overcome these defect is urgent in the long road toward the rule of law. It is imperative to set up the new judicial review system in the outside of legislative institutions. To achieve the aim, it is necessary for private secters including interest groups to grow as in liberal-democracy countries.