미국 연방민사소송에서의 궐석판결

오대성 한국민사소송법학회 2013 민사소송 Vol.17 No.2

Default judgment is a binding judgment in favor of either party based on some failure to take action by the other party. Most often, it is a judgment in favor of a plaintiff when the defendant has not file an answer to a complaints or has failed to appear before a court of law. The failure to take action is the default. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure provides that the court may enter default judgment against defendant if he fails to file an answer to complaints. Usually, this does not even involve a hearing. In such cases, obtaining Judgment is a purely administrative act, which is one refers to it as ‘entering’ Judgment. Final judgment will be entered in claims for specified sums, whereas Judgment for damages to be decided will be entered in claims for unspecified amounts. Because in most cases entering default judgment is an administrative process, there is no investigation of the merits of the claim. The court, therefore retains wide powers to set aside on a motion by the defendant This article looks over Judgment in default mainly focusing on the federal rule of civil procedure. If needed, reference from state system will be alluded. In the following paragraphs topics on default Judgment will be tackled on. Topics are on the meaning, the history, the grounds, the process, the method, and relief of a default Judgment. Furthermore, the problems behind them will be pointed out and ways to improve these problems will be suggested. This discussion is meaningful for it presents implications that could be applied to the development of non-pleading Judgment system of Korea.

역사판단과 정치판단: 도덕 판단의 매개가 필요 없는가?

이양수 ( Yang Soo Lee ) 한국해석학회 2015 해석학연구 Vol.36 No.-

이 글의 목표는 아렌트 정치판단 이론에 내재하고 있는 역사판단과 정치판단의 긴장 관계를 비판적으로 독해하는 것이다. 아렌트의 심미화된 정치판단 이론은 서구 정치철학의 독특한 이론 가운데 하나로 인정되고 있다. 하지만 정치판단에 대한 해석을 두고 주석가들의 상이한 견해가 존재한다. 특히 정치판단이 행위자보다관망자의 관점에서 불편부당성을 획득할 수 있어야 한다는 아렌트의 주장은 역사판단과의 유사성 때문에 논란의 중심에 선다. 이 글에서 나는 두 가지 목표를 염두에 두고 있다. 첫째, 아렌트의 정치판단 이론이 역사 판단에 크게 의존하고 있으며, 따라서 정치판단과 역사판단이 동일구조임을 보여줄 것이다. 둘째 나는 아렌트의 이런 입장에 비판적 입장을 취하면서 도덕 판단이 이 둘 판단 모두에서 요구됨을 보여준다. 내 주장은 역사 판단과 정치 판단에서 도덕 판단이 배제될 수 없다는 것이다. 특히 칸트의 희망 개념에 의거해 도덕 판단이 제도적 차원에서 변증법적으로 매개되어야 하는 이유를 찾아본다. 여기서 ‘교화된 공중’이라는 시민의 관점이 요구되는 이유가 제시된다. The purpose of the paper is to critically examine the tension between historical judgment and political judgment which is inherent in Hannah Arendt``s theory of political judgment. Arendt``s aesthetization of political judgment has been regarded as one of the most original thoughts to escape the labyrinth of politics. Arendt claims that impartiality can be achieved through historical judgment from the point of view of the spectator. In this paper I have in mind two basic claims that are relevant to the critique against Arendt``s attempt to aestheticize politics. First, I shall show that Arendt``s theory of political judgment might be based on the analysis of historical judgment, hence arguing for the equivalence between historical judgment and political judgment. Second, I shall try to take a critical stand against the equivalence between historical judgment and political judgment. In so doing, I shall argue that moral judgment is required to mediate between these two judgments. It is my claim that moral judgment cannot be excluded from both historical judgment and political judgment. Moral judgment on the basis of Kant``s sense of hope can be dialectically reconciled at the institutional level where the perspective of “educated public” emerges as moral agent of collective decision.

이사의 경영판단과 업무상 배임

강동범 梨花女子大學校 法學硏究所 2010 法學論集 Vol.14 No.3

In connection with the debate whether director’s business judgment constitutes a crime of occupational breach of trust or not, this study is focused on the issue that the crime of occupational breach of trust depends upon the acceptance of business judgment rule. Without considering the principle of the business judgment rule, ⅰ) the majority’s point of view is that it is not a trust breaching, based upon one’s own agreement or a presumption of consent to the risk transactions. The others view this matter from a different standpoint, too. ⅱ) A risk transaction which directors pass careful judgment under the reasonable information for the good of the company is not a trust breaching at all or at least without an intention. ⅲ) A transaction in the director’s normal business operation is an acceptable reason for the exemption of illegality. On the contrary, some people think that it is necessary to interpret the crime of occupational breach of trust with considering the business judgment rule, because of the unification of the law and order, the specialty of the business judgment and the needs to restrict the trust breaching. From this perspective, the concrete views are as follows: ⅰ) it is necessary to have deliberate intentions. ⅱ) it is appropriate to act as a principle of limitation, in case that it causes overburden to directors when considering the crime of occupational breach of trust. ⅲ) there is a need to extend the case, which is not accepting the violation of a regulation of the crime of occupational breach of trust. There is an argument whether the court accepts the business judgment rule or not. However, the court does not seem to accept it until now, because there is no comment about its requirements and so on. Nevertheless, the court says that the strict level of translation should be maintained that the intention of crime is submitted just in case intentional behavior is identified. In this sense, it seems like “deliberate” intention is required. These views have problems as follows: based on one’s own agreement or a presumption of consent, it is virtually unacceptable to the corporate. According to the deliberate intention theory or precedent, the intention consists of willful negligence as well. However, there are few business judgments which don’t care about the possibility of making loss (Common business judgments are based not on risk-avoiding but on risk-taking). Ftakinat rn ris, it is impossible to deny the intention. In addition, the purpose of the business judgment rule is alrn dy rnflected on the translation of the crime of breach of trust. There-tae, it is not necessary to intrlluce this principle to the Criminal Law so that to limitking).stablishment of the crime. Furthermoae, it is not logical to say that the business judgment rule should be considered by translating the crime of breach of trust restrictively. Because this rule is already reflected to the translation of the crime and there is no specific standard to limit it. Besides, it is not proper to limit the crime just a case of business judgment. Therefore, director’s sincere and fair business judgment is not applicable to trust breaching. 이 글은 이사의 경영판단이 업무상배임죄를 구성하는가와 관련하여, 미국판례에서 유래하여 우리 상법은 물론 형사법에도 최근 그 도입이 논의되고 있는 경영판단원칙의 도입 여부가 업무상배임죄의 성부에 영향을 줄 것인가를 검토하였다. 다수 견해는, 특별히 경영판단원칙을 고려하지 않고 모험거래에 있어 본인의 동의 또는 추정적 승낙을 근거로 배임행위에 해당하지 않는다고 한다. 그 외에 이사가 회사의 이익을 위해 합리적인 정보에 기하여 신중하게 판단한 모험거래는 배임행위가 아니거나 고의가 없는 결과가 된다는 견해, 이사의 정상적인 업무수행 과정에서의 거래행위는 위법성이 조각된다는 견해가 있다. 이에 반해 법질서통일, 경영판단의 전문성･특수성 존중, 배임행위의 제한필요성을 이유로 경영판단원칙을 업무상배임죄의 해석에 고려하여야 한다는 입장도 있다. 그 구체적인 방법으로, 의도적 고의가 필요하다는 견해, 배임죄의 성부에 있어 이사에게 과중한 책임이 지워질 경우에 한계원리로 작용할 수 있도록 함이 타당하다는 견해 그리고 본인동의이론과 경영판단원칙을 도입하여 경영의 논리를 기초로 업무상배임죄의 구성요건해당성을 인정하지 않는 경우를 확장할 필요가 있다는 견해가 있다. 판례가 이사의 업무상배임죄와 관련하여 경영판단원칙을 수용하고 있는가에 대해 논란이 있으나 문제된 사례에서 경영판단원칙의 요건 및 그것에 해당하는지를 전혀 언급하고 있지 않다는 점에서 아직은 이 원칙을 형법에 수용하지 않았다고 할 것이다. 다만 판례는 의도적 행위임이 인정되는 경우에 한하여 배임죄의 고의를 인정하는 엄격한 해석기준이 유지되어야 한다고 하여, 업무상배임죄의 고의에 관하여 ‘의도’적 고의를 요구하는 듯한 설시를 하고 있다. 이들 견해는 다음과 같은 문제점이 있다. 동의나 추정적 승낙을 근거로 할 경우 법인인 회사는 사실상 동의할 수 없다는 점에서 문제가 있다. 의도적 고의필요설이나 판례와 같이 고의제한으로 접근할 경우 고의는 미필적 고의를 포함하는데 손해의 가능성에 대한 인식이 전혀 없는 경영판단은 거의 없으므로(통상의 경영판단은 위험의 회피가 아닌 감수를 전제) 고의를 부정하기는 불가능하며, 경영판단에 대해서만 의도적 고의로 제한해서 해석할 이론적 근거가 없으므로 타당하지 않다. 또한 경영판단원칙이 추구하는 목적은 이미 배임죄의 해석론에 반영되어 있으므로, 이 원칙을 직접적으로 형법에 도입하여 배임죄의 성립을 제한할 필요는 없다고 생각한다. 나아가 배임죄를 제한해서 해석하는 방법으로 경영판단원칙을 고려하여야 한다는 주장 역시 타당하지 않다. 왜냐하면 이 원칙은 이미 배임죄의 해석에 반영되어 있고 제한할 구체적인 기준을 제시하지 않고 있으며, 경영판단의 경우에 한하여 배임죄를 제한하여야 하는 것은 아니기 때문이다. 즉 배임죄(업무상배임죄 포함)의 구성요건 중 타인의 사무처리를 엄격하게 해석하고, 손해발생을 법문언대로 침해범으로 해석하여야 한다는 것은 경영판단에 대해서만 적용되어야 하는 것은 아니다. 따라서 이사의 성실하고 공정한 경영판단은 배임행위에 해당하지 않는다고 보아야 한다.

판결의 하자(瑕疵)의 소송상 취급 - 판결의 편취를 중심으로 -

손한기 한국민사소송법학회 2015 민사소송 Vol.19 No.1

Minor defects on a Judgment are treated as cured(settled) when the judgment becomes a final one and take effects. But defrauded judgments, obtained by cheating the opposite party or the trial court, cannot be justified by simply emphasizing the legal stability. The basic procedural methods for redressing the injustices are retrial and supplementary appeal through which the defrauded judgement itself can be nullified. But when a defrauded judgment enters into enforcement, there arise issues for redemptions of the infringed properties. In general, to remove the binding forces, i.e., res Judicata and power of execution, of a defrauded judgment, the deceived can choose his(her) remedy among a retrial and a supplementary appeal, and in some cases, he(she) will be endowed with claim objections (Vollstreckungsgegenklage). But there are vehement controversies surrounding the applicability of the retrial and the supplementary appeal on certain special cases. We can see the most problematic case when a plaintiff files a suit with a false address of the defendant to bring about the mis-service of litigation documents on a disguised defendant and thus hamper the procedural activities of the real defendant. In this case, the judgement is bound to be delivered to the disguised defendant and the real defendant fail to notice even the rendering of the judgment. The established precedents of the Supreme Court and majority opinion of scholars hold that retrial(or supplementary appeal) cannot be applied on this case, in spite of the article 451 of Civil Procedure Law which provides such a situation to be one of the retrial grounds. They assert that the service of judgment on a disguised party cannot take effect and the case is still pending in the trial court. Thus the defeated party should file an ordinary appeal to higher courts in lieu of a retrial or a supplementary appeal. But it seems to be natural, taking the article 451 into consideration, to permit the defeated party to file a retrial or a supplementary appeal disregarding the validity of the judgment service. When the defrauded judgment came into enforcement, another difficult problem arises surrounding the recovery of the property loss of the defrauded party. It must be recovered through a restitution suit against the opponent or through a suit seeking for damages. But, in general, judgment enforcements cannot constitute unjust enrichments or torts. The Supreme Court holds that enforcement of a judgment does not constitute an unjust enrichment. So, the party seeking for the restitution, should annul the defrauded judgment through retrial prior to the restitution suit(except the above false-address case). Majority of scholars support this opinion. Unlike the above unjust enrichment suit, The Supreme Court shows a little mitigated attitude to a suit seeking for damages. It grants the direct filing of a damage suit without nullifying the enforced judgment when the infringement of the procedural rights of the defrauded party is excessively severe.

미국 민사소송에서의 약식재판(Summary Judgement)

오대성 한국민사소송법학회 2010 민사소송 Vol.14 No.2

Summary judgment is a procedure by which a party can obtain a final determination on the merits without the necessity of a full trial. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) governs the procedural requirements for summary judgment motions in federal court. It states summary judgment is proper when 『the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.』Under Rule 56, a party may move for summary judgment at any time until thirty days after the close of discovery. The summary judgment process begins with the filing of a motion for summary judgment. Unless a party to the suit files a motion for summary judgment, no court has the power to render a judgment. The motion for summary judgment must expressly present the grounds for summary judgment. Although the main purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials, it also can function to simplify trial. Even if the summary judgment obviates the need for a trial, it does not impinge upon any jury trial rights. This is because the standard for obtaining summary judgment requires in part a finding that there is no fact issue to send to the jury. The court on summary judgment decide that one party necessarily would suceed if the case went to a jury. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 was amended lagely in 2009. Therefore it is necessary to introduce American summary judgement. Thus this article is studied about its procedure, requirements, burden of proof, order, appeal, etc., in America civil procedure. This article may be helpful to improve our system of civil procedure.

헤이그 재판협약과 민사소송법 개정 논의의 필요성- 관할규정의 현대화 및 국제화를 지향하며 -

한충수 대한변호사협회 2020 人權과 正義 : 大韓辯護士協會誌 Vol.- No.493

At the Hague Conference on July 2. 2019. the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters(hereafter called Judgment Convention) was adopted, and the Final Act was signed. This is a new version of the 1971 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, which came into force in 1971. If the Judgment Convention takes effect in Korea, there will be some aspects that correspond to the indirect jurisdiction of the Korean Civil Procedure Act(KCPA) and the Korean Civil Execution Act(KCEA), but there will also be a conflicting phase. It is also possible to consider implementation legislation for the Judgment Convention, but it is more desirable to amend the relevant provisions of the KCPA and KCEA at this opportunity. In particular, the Judgment Convention does not prohibit the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments pursuant to domestic laws and other treaties, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction set out in Article 6 of the Judgment Convention in order to facilitate the distribution of judgments. Furthermore, we may declare that we will not apply the relevant regulations of the Judgment Convention, if necessary. Therefore, we will be able to maintain the basic lines of the domestic civil procedure law and civil execution law. Meanwhile, it is necessary to review the Judgment Convention in order to globalize indirect domestic regulations and reflect them in the relevant legal regulations. It is also necessary to modernize the domestic territorial jurisdiction regulations under the KCPA, which have not changed significantly since the enactment of the KCPA in 1960. This is because, unless the regulations for territorial jurisdiction under the KCPA are modernized, the basis for containing regulations related to international jurisdiction at an international level cannot be achieved. In the end, it is judged that the Judgment Convention not only provides a good opportunity to internationalize indirect jurisdiction regulations under the KCPA, but also provides a good opportunity to prepare detailed direct jurisdiction regulations. Therefore, research and discussion on this is desperately needed. We urge the establishment of the Civil Procedure Act Revision Committee as soon as possible. 2019. 7. 2. Hague 국제사법회의에서는 “민사 또는 상사에서 외국재판의 승인 혹은 집행에 관한 협약(Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters, 이하 “재판협약”이라 함)“이 채택되어 최종의정서(Final Act)가 서명되었다. 이는 1971년에 발효된 “Hague 민사 또는 상사에서 외국재판의 승인 및 집행에 관한 협약(Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters”, 이하 “71년 협약”이라 함)의 새로운 버전이라고 보면 정확할 것이다. 재판협약이 우리나라에서 발효된다면 민사소송법과 민사집행법의 간접관할 규정과 조응하는 측면도 있지만 충돌하는 국면도 존재하게 될 것이다. 이를 위한 이행입법을 하는 것도 고려할 수 있지만 이 기회에 민사소송법과 민사집행법의 관련 규정을 개정하는 것이 보다 바람직하다고 판단된다. 특히, 재판협약은 재판의 유통을 촉진하기 위하여 재판협약 제6조가 정한 전속관할에 따르는 것을 조건으로 국내법과 다른 조약에 따른 재판의 승인 및 집행 을 금지하지 않고 필요에 따라 관련 규정 등을 적용하지 않겠다고 선언할 수도 있으므로 얼마든지 국내 민사소송법 및 민사집행법의 기본 노선을 유지할 수 있게 된다. 나아가 국내 간접관할 규정을 국제화하는 차원에서 재판협약을 검토하고 이를 관련 법 규정에 반영할 필요성이 있다. 한편, 1960년 민사소송법 제정 이후 크게 달라지지 않은 민사소송법상의 토지관할 규정을 현대화할 필요가 있다. 토지관할 규정 자체가 현대화되지 않으면 국제적인 수준의 국제재판관할 관련 규정을 담을 수 있는 기초가 마련되지 못하기 때문이다. 결국 재판협약은 우리 민사소송법상의 간접관할 규정을 국제화할 좋은 기회가 될 뿐 아니라 나아가 세부적인 직접관할 규정 역시 마련할 수 있는 좋은 기회를 제공해 줄 수 있다고 판단된다. 따라서 이에 대한 연구와 논의가 절실히 필요하다. 조속히 민사소송법 개정위원회의 발족을 촉구한다.

지식관리를 통한 재량기준 구체화 - 식품위생법상 ‘청소년 주류제공’사건을 중심으로 -

배유진 한국공법학회 2015 공법연구 Vol.44 No.2

오늘날 우리 사회는 지식 즉, 데이터가 힘이 되는 지식기반사회로 이행하고 있고, 행정 역시 데이터를 통한 지식기반 정부로 진화되어야 한다. 특히, 침익적 행정으로 국민에게 다가가는 제재데이터는 민주적 통제수단으로서의 가치를 지녀야 한다. 따라서 그러한 규범은 그 기준과 절차, 재량 등에 있어서 민주적 합의를 토대로 정당성이 확보되어야 하고, 이를 뒷받침하기 위해서는 치밀하고 세세한 입법과정이 중요하다. 본고에서는 제재적 행정처분의 법적성질에 관하여 학설과 판례를 살펴보고 이해조절적인 관점에서 그 성질을 법규인 재량규정으로 보고자 하였다. 이런 제재적 행정처분이 실무상 어떻게 적용되고 있는지 식품위생법상 “청소년 주류제공”사건의 처분과 재결을 중심으로 살펴보았다. 특히, 사건접수 건이 많은 경기도 행정심판위원회와 서울시 행정심판위원회를 선정하여 관련 청구사유, 처분사유, 재결사유의 분석을 하였다. 청구사유에서는 신분증 검사여부에 대한 상황내용이고, 개인사정에 따른 유일한 소득원의 생계수단과, 어려운 경제상황을 들고 있다. 서울시 소속 처분청과 경기도 소속 처분청의 처분은 청구인의 청소년에게 주류를 제공한 정황상의 사유 중 신분증 확인여부의 사정 즉, 신분증검사를 소홀히 한 점, 청소년이 신분증을 위조하여 제시하면 적극적인 기망행위로 인해 주류를 제공한 점, 고의로 제공한 것이 아니라는 주장을 거의 고려하지 않고 위반사실만을 경찰서의 진술서 등을 통해 고려하고 있다. 그리고, 검찰청에서 “기소유예”를 받았는지 “벌금”을 부과 받았는지에 따라서 단순ㆍ획일적으로 처분을 하고 있다. 처분에 대한 청구인의 개인사유에 대해 처분청은 청소년의 보호와 법에서 규정하고 있는 영업자의 준수사항을 강조하고 다른 영업자와의 형평성을 주장하면서 재량준칙에서 정하고 있는 상한선을 최대한도로 처분하고 있다. 또한 서울시 행정심판위원회와 경기도 행정심판위원회의 재결결과 재결사유를 살펴보면, 두 위원회 모두 처분청의 위반사실과 그에 대한 법에서 규정한 대로의 처분자체는 적법타당하다고 보고 있다. 다만, 서울시 행정심판위원회의 재결에서는 경기도 행정심판위원회 보다 기각판단을 좀 더 많이 하고 있고, 청구인이 검찰청에서 “기소유예”를 받았을 경우 처분청에서 일반기준을 적용하여 그 최대치인 2분의 1의 감경으로 처분했으면 서울시 행정심판위원회는 기각결정으로 더 이상 감경해 주지 않는다. 이에 반해 경기도 행정심판위원회는 처분청이 일반감경기준으로 2분 1의 감경을 해주었더라도, 청구인의 사유를 고려하여 다시 감경해주는 판단을 하고 있다. 하지만, 일부인용의 판단사유를 보면, 사건마다의 청구사유와 처분사유를 고려한 세세한 판단이 되고 있지는 않고 있다. 따라서 처분기준의 투명성과 신뢰성을 위해 청구사유, 처분사유, 재결사유의 유형적 세분화를 통해 다양한 요소와 경중으로 반영할 수 있도록 데이터 정량화ㆍ구제화가 이루어져야 한다. 또한 전자정부에서의 지식행정이 체계적인 지식관리로 이루어져야 하는 중요성과 행정심판의 대상이 되는 위법성과 부당성의 구분 및 그 의미, 시ㆍ도 재결편차를 통한 자치권보장, 위원회의 재결의 범위 한계 쟁점 등에 관한 이슈들을 도출하고 있다. 궁극적으로 지식관리가 무엇보다도 중요하며 지식관리는 정형화ㆍ유형화ㆍ체... Today, our society is changed to the knowledge-based society where the data means the power. For that reason, its administrative system should evolve into a knowledge-based government through the data. In particular, the restricted data approaching to the public in terms of restrictive administration should have a value as a means of democratic control. Therefore, such norms must ensure the legitimacy on the basis of democratic agreement when it comes to the standards, procedures and discretion. In order to support this, the legislation should be precise and detailed. This paper looks at the theory and cases about the legal nature of restrictive administrative measure as well as evaluating such nature as a discretionary provisions as legal precedents from a perspective. In this case, we focused on how such restrictive administrative measure is applied in practice by looking at the dismissal and judgment of a case of “Providing Alcohol to the Youth” in Food Hygiene Law. Especially, the reasons for appeal, dismissal and judgement from the Administrative Judgment Committees of Gyeonggi-do and Seoul Metropolitan City, which have a number of cases received, were analyzed. In short, the reason for appeal was about the situation on ID card checks, followed by the sole source of income and difficult economic situation due to personal reasons. The disposition from disposing authorities of Seoul and Gyeonggi-do hardly considers the claim for ID card check negligence, providing alcohol to the youth with false ID card by aggressive deceit or on purpose, but only the fact of violation with the statement from the police amongst the circumstantial reasons for the applicant providing alcohol to the youth. And it dismisses according to the result on whether it is a “deferred prosecution” or a “fine”, which is pretty simple and standardized. As for the applicant's personal reasons for dismissal, the disposing authority emphasizes the protection of young people and compliance of a business set by the law, in addition to arguing the fairness with other business and dismissing the maximum limit set by the rule of discretion. Also, looking at the reasons for judgment in judgment result from the Administrative Judgment Committees from Gyeonggi-do and Seoul Metropolitan City, both Committees regard the fact of violation and the dismissal, as required by the law, reasonable for disposing authorities However, the ruling of Seoul Administrative Judgment Committee(SAJC) is somewhat more overruled than Gyeonggi-do. If the applicant receives the “deferred prosecution” from the Public Prosecutors' Office, the disposing authority applies the general criteria and reduces up to half, which is the maximum amount, the SAJC overrules and does not reduce it any more. On the other hand, Gyeonggi-do Administrative Judgment Committee(GAJC) reduces once more after considering the applicant's reasons, even if the disposing authority already reduced half the amount in terms of general reducing criteria. But, by looking at the reasons for judgment for some cases, not every case has a detailed judgment considering the reasons for appeal and dismissal. Hence, the data should be quantified and materialized so that the dismissal criteria can be reliable and transparent in terms of various factors and severity with tangible diversification of the reasons for appeal, dismissal and judgment. In addition, the issues such as the importance of making systematic knowledge management in e-government, the classification and meaning of illegality and unfairness that are the subject of administrative judgment, guaranteed rights to autonomy by judgment deviation in cities and provinces, and the limits of scope of judgement by the Committees. Ultimately, the knowledge management is very important and it should be structured, materialized and systematized. In doing so, one can see the facts that this can promote a systematization of exercising the discretion and ...

판결서의 증명력

이태영 한국민사소송법학회 2012 민사소송 Vol.16 No.2

A final judgment has res judicata effect only upon claims addressed by its dispositions but has no res judicata effect upon reasoning for the judgment. If the extent of res judicata effect is limited to claims included in dispositions of a judgment, it is impossible to avoid repeated relitigation based on the same facts in dispute, and distrust of the judiciary may be caused by inconsistent judgments on a prior claim and subsequent claims. Concerned over such problems, theoretical attempts have been continuously made to recognize the binding effect on reasoning for judgement. In connection with this problem,the Supreme Court of the Republic of Korea has accepted a written judgment as a written report presented to prove the facts accepted in the judgment and tends to recognize a strong probative force of a written judgment as evidence with regard to facts accepted in a final judgment. However, the tendency of such precedents involve many problems. Among facts accepted in a judgment, there are not only facts contested by parties and proved by evidence but also facts established by allocation of burden of proof or constructive admission, and thus it is necessary to separate such cases where facts are established by evidence from cases where facts are established by allocation of burden of proof or constructive admission. Since fact-finding in judgment has a nature of legal ruling, it is hard to accept a judgment as a report of facts. In addition, it is difficult to recognize the probative force of a written judgment as evidence in light of the structure of litigation or civil proceedings. Furthermore, a problem that the above-mentioned attitude towards precedents actually violates the principle of immediacy arises, since a written judgment is presented as evidence in a subsequent suit for trial with respect to matters already determined by the prior judgment. The res judicata effect affects only parties to a lawsuit. However, if the probative force of written judgments as evidence is recognized, it results in recognizing the binding effect of judgment on a prior lawsuit to third parties, who were non-parties, and thus it is likely to debilitate the principle of relativity of res judicata effect. Considering such problems, it is necessary to review the attitude of cases that recognize the probative force of written judgments as evidence and to pro-actively examine the collateral estoppel doctrine that Japan has adopted.

외국판결의 승인에서의 공서 위반 심사의 대상

이필복 사법발전재단 2018 사법 Vol.1 No.44

In Supreme Court Judgment 2009Da22549 Decided May 24, 2012, the Supreme Court of Korea rendered the first-ever ruling that explicitly stated the subject matter for examination of Public Policy Exception rule in the recognition of a foreign judgment, the reference period for examination of the requirements, and the general examination criteria. In the subject case, the Supreme Court: (a) held that the judgment rendered by a Japanese court, i.e., dismissal of claims seeking compensation for damages and payment of outstanding wages by Koreans who were subjected to forced labor during the Japanese occupation, could not be recognized under the Korean legal order; and (b) declared that “not only the text of a foreign judgment but also the rationale of the decision (ratio decidendi) and the consequences arising from the recognition of such foreign judgment” ought to be examined when determining whether to recognize a foreign judgment. Nevertheless, it remains unclear as to which specific part of the ratio decidendi of a foreign judgment shall be examined. “Public policy,” which is a criterion for the recognition of a foreign judgment that conflict with the principle of prohibition of a review of a foreign decision on the merits of the case (révision au fond), is a term encompassing both “substantive” and “procedural” aspects, and is considered as the minimum intervention required to preserve a sovereign country’s fundamental values, such as social integration and legal order. Taking account of the purpose and substance of the requirements for applying the public policy exception rule, the concept of res judicata under each country’s law may be somewhat weakened. Therefore, the “consequence of recognition of a foreign judgment,” which constitute subject matter of public policy examination, supra, shall not be limited to the “consequence of recognizing the res judicata of a foreign judgment” but rather be construed to encompass the “overall and indirect impact of recognition on a nation’s legal order.” The scope of res judicata is a minimum requirement but the general examination criteria is not confined to that scope. Thus, the scope of ratio decidendi may be deemed to encompass the “determination of matters necessary for the conclusion of judgment,” rather than being limited to the “determination of matters that had a direct affection on the text of a decision.” If a Korean court were to deny the recognition of a foreign judgment by applying the public policy exception rule on the part that did not directly affect the text of a decision, it may go against judicial economy and cause outcomes unfavorable to a party who won a suit. Nonetheless, if there exists grounds for applying such public policy exception rule to the effect that is absolutely intolerable under Korean legal order, a Korean court may have sufficient reason to deny the recognition of a foreign judgment. In the subject case, given that it is unclear as to which specific part of the ratio decidendi of the Japanese court’s judgment was deemed by the Supreme Court of Korea as the subject matter for examination to determine the applicability of the public policy exception rule, it is difficult to readily conclude which of the scope, as seen supra, the Supreme Court adopted. Going forward, a wide array of case studies need to be accumulated so as to establish a more accurate and clear criteria on the subject matter for examination of Public Policy Exception rule in the recognition of a foreign judgment. 대법원 2012. 5. 24. 선고 2009다22549 판결(이하 ‘대상판결’)은 공서 위반 심사의 대상과 그 심사의 기준 시점, 공서 위반 심사의 일반적 기준까지 추상적 법률론으로서 분명하게 제시한 최초의 판결이다. 대상판결은 일제강점기 강제징용을 당한 노동자들의 손해배상청구와 미지급 임금청구를 기각한 일본판결은 우리 법질서에서 승인될 수 없다고 판단하였다. 대상판결은 외국판결 승인에 있어서 ‘외국판결의 주문뿐 아니라 이유 및 외국판결을 승인할 경우 발생할 결과’까지 심사하여야 한다고 선언하였다. 그러나 위와 같은 추상적 법률론의 제시에도 불구하고, 구체적으로 외국판결의 이유 중 어떠한 부분이 공서 위반 심사의 대상이 될 것인지에 관한 기준은 아직 불분명한 채로 남아 있다. ‘공서’요건은 외국 판결에 대한 ‘실질재심사 금지의 원칙’과 긴장관계에 있는 승인의 요건으로서, 주권국가가 독립된 자신의 법체계의 정합성을 유지하고 사회 공동체의 통합을 유지해주는 기본적인 가치를 보존하기 위해 필요한, 외국판결에 대한 최소한의 개입이다. 여기의 공서에는 ‘실체적 공서’와 ‘절차적 공서’의 양자가 포함된다. 이러한 공서 위반요건을 둔 취지와 그 내용을 고려한다면, 공서 위반의 심사대상이라는 맥락에서는 각 국내법상의 기판력 개념을 일정 부분 후퇴시킬 수 있다. 따라서 공서 위반요건의 심판대상인 외국판결 ‘승인의 결과’는 ‘외국판결에 기판력을 인정하는 결과’라는 형식적인 결과에 한정할 것이 아니라, ‘국내 법질서에 대한 파급효(波及效)’를 의미한다고 봄이 타당하다. 기판력의 범위는 공서 위반 심사대상의 최소한을 구성하지만, 심사대상이 기판력의 범위에 한정되는 것은 아니다. 따라서 심사의 대상이 되는 이유의 범위 또한, ‘주문에서의 판단에 직접적인 영향을 미친 쟁점에 관한 판단’에 한할 것이 아니고, ‘판결의 결론에 이르는 과정에서 필요한 쟁점에 관한 판단’이면 공서 위반의 심사대상으로 삼을 수 있다고 할 것이다. 판결 주문에서의 판단에 직접적인 영향을 미치지 않는 쟁점에 관한 판단 부분이 공서에 위반한다고 하여 승인을 거부하는 경우, 소송경제와 승소 당사자의 불이익을 초래할 수 있다. 그러나 그 판단에 우리 법질서에서 도저히 수인할 수 없는 공서 위반 사유가 있는 경우에는 그러한 판단을 승인하지 않을 이익이 있다. 대법원이 대상판결에서 어떤 사항을 대상으로 삼아 공서 위반 심사를 하였는지 자체가 다소 불분명하기 때문에, 현재로서는 대법원이 대상판결에서 심사의 대상이 되는 이유의 범위에 관한 위 두 견해 중 어느 견해를 채택한 것인지 단정하기 어렵다. 앞으로 다양한 사례의 축적을 통해 외국판결 승인에서의 공서 위반요건의 심사대상에 관한 정확하고 분명한 기준이 정립되기를 기대한다.

생명윤리에서의 넓은 반성적 평형과 판단력

최경석 한국법철학회 2008 법철학연구 Vol.11 No.1

Wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) was first presented by John Rawls and developed by Norman Daniels. It was thought of primarily as a method for evaluating theories of justice (Rawls) or ethical theories (Daniels). Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress then considered WRE as an explicit methodology for biomedical ethics, that is, moral reasoning for the justification of moral judgments. Thus, I characterize the method of WRE as practical moral reasoning. The process of reaching a conclusion using the methods of WRE is characterized as a back-and-forth process of revision aimed at coherent comprehensive personal or group belief systems without incorrect beliefs. The question arises, however, as to whether the methods of WRE can give us determinate answers about what to do. But there must be different ways of revising beliefs depending on the exercise of judgment as a faculty of thinking. There is no algorithmic decision procedure. Some may expect a mechanical decision procedure by which to reach answers to the above questions, but this is misconceived. Our decision in unprecedented or unpredictable situations and circumstances cannot help calling for judgment. Judgment is not unique to the methods of WRE. Other methods, such as principlism and casuistry, also rely on judgment. When principlists attempt to apply moral principles to a particular case, they must decide which of their moral principles covers the case, just as a judge would have to decide which law or regulation is relevant to a given case. Because principles are abstract and general, they must be interpreted in the light of the details of the particular case. Thus, we arrive at conclusions from the interaction between universal knowledge(major premise) and particular knowledge(minor premise) in a practical syllogism. Casuists also call for the use of judgment. They usually suggest the use of analogical thinking employing paradigm cases. Similarities must be sought between a given case and paradigm cases. However, the recognition of similarity is not a mechanical procedure it requires judgment to determine which features of two cases being compared are relevant. The need for judgment implies that there are no determinate answers for resolving a conflict between two arguers following same method of reasoning. But the exercise of judgment is not a matter of mere taste or arbitrary preference. It requires its justification. There may be some principles and values to guide and regulate the exercise of judgment required in the methods of WRE. First, coherence, comprehensiveness, and the number of incorrect beliefs are not only criteria for comparing competing belief systems, but will also be values for a revision process. Second, we will pursue the maximization of coherence and comprehensiveness while minimizing revision, by revising peripheral beliefs rather than core beliefs in our belief system. Third, the efficiency of a revision process may be one of the important considerations tied to the choice of provisionally fixed beliefs. Wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) was first presented by John Rawls and developed by Norman Daniels. It was thought of primarily as a method for evaluating theories of justice (Rawls) or ethical theories (Daniels). Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress then considered WRE as an explicit methodology for biomedical ethics, that is, moral reasoning for the justification of moral judgments. Thus, I characterize the method of WRE as practical moral reasoning. The process of reaching a conclusion using the methods of WRE is characterized as a back-and-forth process of revision aimed at coherent comprehensive personal or group belief systems without incorrect beliefs. The question arises, however, as to whether the methods of WRE can give us determinate answers about what to do. But there must be different ways of revising beliefs depending on the exercise of judgment as a faculty of thinking. There is no algorithmic decision procedure. Some may expect a mechanical decision procedure by which to reach answers to the above questions, but this is misconceived. Our decision in unprecedented or unpredictable situations and circumstances cannot help calling for judgment. Judgment is not unique to the methods of WRE. Other methods, such as principlism and casuistry, also rely on judgment. When principlists attempt to apply moral principles to a particular case, they must decide which of their moral principles covers the case, just as a judge would have to decide which law or regulation is relevant to a given case. Because principles are abstract and general, they must be interpreted in the light of the details of the particular case. Thus, we arrive at conclusions from the interaction between universal knowledge(major premise) and particular knowledge(minor premise) in a practical syllogism. Casuists also call for the use of judgment. They usually suggest the use of analogical thinking employing paradigm cases. Similarities must be sought between a given case and paradigm cases. However, the recognition of similarity is not a mechanical procedure it requires judgment to determine which features of two cases being compared are relevant. The need for judgment implies that there are no determinate answers for resolving a conflict between two arguers following same method of reasoning. But the exercise of judgment is not a matter of mere taste or arbitrary preference. It requires its justification. There may be some principles and values to guide and regulate the exercise of judgment required in the methods of WRE. First, coherence, comprehensiveness, and the number of incorrect beliefs are not only criteria for comparing competing belief systems, but will also be values for a revision process. Second, we will pursue the maximization of coherence and comprehensiveness while minimizing revision, by revising peripheral beliefs rather than core beliefs in our belief system. Third, the efficiency of a revision process may be one of the important considerations tied to the choice of provisionally fixed beliefs.