기술특례상장기업을 대상으로 투자자의 비합리적인 심리지수와 합리적인 심리지수가 장기성과에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구

김성신 아시아.유럽미래학회 2022 유라시아연구 Vol.19 No.4

The study analyzed whether abnormalities in stock prices that occur after initial public offering can be explained by investor sentiment indexes for technology-specific listed companies and general listed companies. In this regard, the investor sentiment index was classified into an unexplained irrational part and a rational part based on economic fundamental. The investment sentiment index was orthogonalized with the relative strength index, psychological line index, adjusted turnover rate, and trading volume using Yang and Zhou (2015) methodology, and then new variables were calculated through principal analysis. According to Seok et al. (2019), a new variable was used as a dependent variable, and the macroeconomic environmental factors such as excess return on the stock market, term spread, credit spread, firm size, book to market ratio, and price to earnings per share ratio were analyzed. The estimated residuals and forecasts were used as substitutes for the irrational investment sentiment index and the rational investment sentiment index, respectively. The results of the empirical analysis of this study are as follows. First, according to the test results of the average difference between major variables for technology-specific listed companies, the return on total assets was relatively low, and the debt ratio, public offering amount, one-year turnover rate, and buy-sell imbalance of individual investors for one and two years were high. In terms of long-term performance, the industrial adjusted return for two years was relatively low. Second, according to the results of the generalized least squares regression analysis on long-term performance for one year after IPO, the turnover rate showed a negative (-) relationship except for some models. The public offering price adjustment rate showed a positive (+) relationship with long-term performance in some models, and the stock price fell when individual investors bought excessively. Irrational investor sentiment showed a positive (+) relationship with long-term performance in all models. In the emerging market, it can be seen that the price error phenomenon is not properly corrected due to the lack of smooth arbitrage and short selling. Rational investor sentiment showed a positive (+) relationship with long-term performance because it reflected expectations for the market outlook and information on the company's fundamental. Third, even when it was expanded to long-term performance for two years, irrational investor sentiment maintained a positive (+) relationship with long-term performance and was not confirmed in rational investor sentiment. Return on total assets showed a positive (+) relationship with long-term performance in some models, and investors seem to focus on the company's actual business performance after realizing the wrong belief in listed companies. Looking at the long-term performance of technology-specific listed companies and general listed companies for two years, the decline in the long-term performance of technology-specific listed companies was more serious.

상장회사를 어떻게 규제할 것인가?

김화진 서울대학교 법학연구소 2008 서울대학교 法學 Vol.49 No.1

The draft new Commercial Code contains special rules for governance of listed companies. These rules have been moved from the Securities and Exchange Act that will be abolished with the implementation of the new Financial Investment Services and Capital Market Act in early 2009. This Article reviews and comments on the key provisions of the draft bill. This Article takes a structural approach to the regulatory framework for listed companies. The current regime as well as the draft bill does not focus on the inherent differences between closed companies and public (listed) companies. To date, the rules for listed companies have been promulgated whenever ad hoc regulatory needs arose. The outcome was unbalanced and somewhat confused system of today. This Article proposes the legislature to begin with a thorough contemplation on the differences between closed companies and listed companies in terms of investor protection. This Article also criticizes the current discrimination amongst listed companies based on the asset size, and suggests the legislature to focus also upon the number of shareholders. Then, the Article goes on comprehensively discussing such issues as independent director, preemptive right, appraisal right, takeover defensive tactics, stock options, cumulative voting, and shareholder rights. It critically analyses the draft bill from the perspective of investor protection in a globalizing world. It emphasizes the need to perform empirical studies regarding those important issues to secure the legitimacy for special rules of listed companies. Finally, this Article points out the importance of the enabling approach to the regulation of listed companies. The draft new Commercial Code contains special rules for governance of listed companies. These rules have been moved from the Securities and Exchange Act that will be abolished with the implementation of the new Financial Investment Services and Capital Market Act in early 2009. This Article reviews and comments on the key provisions of the draft bill. This Article takes a structural approach to the regulatory framework for listed companies. The current regime as well as the draft bill does not focus on the inherent differences between closed companies and public (listed) companies. To date, the rules for listed companies have been promulgated whenever ad hoc regulatory needs arose. The outcome was unbalanced and somewhat confused system of today. This Article proposes the legislature to begin with a thorough contemplation on the differences between closed companies and listed companies in terms of investor protection. This Article also criticizes the current discrimination amongst listed companies based on the asset size, and suggests the legislature to focus also upon the number of shareholders. Then, the Article goes on comprehensively discussing such issues as independent director, preemptive right, appraisal right, takeover defensive tactics, stock options, cumulative voting, and shareholder rights. It critically analyses the draft bill from the perspective of investor protection in a globalizing world. It emphasizes the need to perform empirical studies regarding those important issues to secure the legitimacy for special rules of listed companies. Finally, this Article points out the importance of the enabling approach to the regulation of listed companies.

증권회사의 파산과 위험부담에 관한 법적 연구

맹수석(Soo-Seok Maeng) 한국기업법학회 2017 企業法硏究 Vol.31 No.1

최근 대규모 거래착오 사태와 그룹기업의 부실 등으로 증권회사의 파산이 금융시장의 불안을 고조시키고 있는데, 증권회사가 파산하는 경우 투자자보호 내지는 위험부담을 어떻게 할 것인가에 대한 법적 연구의 필요성이 부각되고 있다. 증권회사 파산시 현행 예금자보호법이나 자본시장법의 규정만으로는 투자자보호에 한계가 있다. 향후 증권회사의 파산이 예상되는 상황에서 투자자의 손실을 최소화하기 위해서는 사전적 보호제도 못지않게 사후적 투자자보호장치의 마련도 매우 중요하다. 이 연구에서는 각국의 증권회사 파산에 대한 비교법적인 연구를 통하여 향후 증권회사가 파산할 때 투자자보호 등을 효율적으로 도모할 수 있는 구체적인 방안을 모색해 보았다. 투자자를 충실히 보호하여 금융시장의 안정성을 도모하기 위해서는 자본시장법에 다각적인 투자자 피해구제장치가 강구되어야 한다. 먼저 증권회사 파산시 투자자보호대상을 확대할 필요가 있다. 현재 투자자 예탁금만 보호대상으로 하고 있는데, 주식이나 채권 등의 유가증권은 물론 선물이나 옵션 등도 보호대상에 포함시키는 방안을 고려할 필요가 있다. 아울러 금융투자업자의 부실한 투자조언 등에 의한 손해도 보호범위에 포함시키고, 투자자피해구제기금제도의 도입도 검토할 필요가 있다. 그러나 이 제도는 투자자의 감시를 통한 시장규율의 저해 등 도덕적 위험이라는 역기능도 있다. 따라서 투자자에 대해 손실금액의 일정 비율만 보호하는 공동보험제도를 도입하여야 할 것이다. 이와 함께 증권회사의 위험에 비례하여 구제기금을 부담시킬 필요도 있다고 본다. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, so-called financial advanced countries such as the US have been making multi-faceted measures to protect financial investors. In particular, there are many discussions being held on bearing risks in the event that a securities company goes bankrupt. Recently, there have been increased anxieties in the finance market due to bankruptcies of securities companies such as large-scale transaction mistakes and defaults of corporate groups. Therefore, legal studies on how to protect investors or bear risks when a securities company goes bankrupt are necessary. This study examined detailed restriction plans that can efficiently regulate investor protection, etc. in the event that a securities company goes bankrupt in the future through comparative legal research. There are limitations in providing sufficient protection for investors in the event that a securities company goes bankrupt with the current Depositor Protection Act. Therefore, in addition to regulations on sales behavior on financial investors in the Capital Market Act to provide proper protection to investors, it is necessary to apply strict regulations on financial products with concerns of loss of principal such as options. In particular, providing post-investment protection devices that protect against the loss for investors to minimize investor losses where bankruptcy of securities companies can be expected is essential. For this, an investor loss relief fund system should be implemented. Plans that prepare for the bankruptcy of financial investment businesses must be made to provide sufficient protection to investors in the securities market. This system, however, also has side effects such as increase of fund operation costs and moral hazards. Therefore, a co-insurance program that protects only a certain part of losses for investors like that of the EU should be introduced. In addition, the risks of securities companies should be accurately and objectively measured and they should be liable for payment to the fund accordingly, while coming up with plans to overcome information asymmetry so that securities companies make payments proportional to their level of risk to the fund.

상장회사를 어떻게 규제할 것인가?

금화진 ( Hwa Jin Kim ) 서울대학교 법학연구소 2008 서울대학교 法學 Vol.49 No.1

The draft new Commercial Code contains special rules for governance of listed companies. These rules have been moved from the Securities and Exchange Act that will be abolished with the implementation of the new Financial Investment Services and Capital Market Act in early 2009. This Article reviews and comments on the key provisions of the draft bill. This Article takes a structural approach to the regulatory framework for listed companies. The current regime as well as the draft bill does not focus on the inherent differences between closed companies and public (listed) companies. To date, the rules for listed companies have been promulgated whenever ad hoc regulatory needs arose. The outcome was unbalanced and somewhat confused system of today. This Article proposes the legislature to begin with a thorough contemplation on the differences between closed companies and listed companies in terms of investor protection. This Article also criticizes the current discrimination amongst listed companies based on the asset size, and suggests the legislature to focus also upon the number of shareholders. Then, the Article goes on comprehensively discussing such issues as independent director, preemptive right, appraisal right, takeover defensive tactics, stock options, cumulative voting, and shareholder rights. It critically analyses the draft bill from the perspective of investor protection in a globalizing world. It emphasizes the need to perform empirical studies regarding those important issues to secure the legitimacy for special rules of listed companies. Finally, this Article points out the importance of the enabling approach to the regulation of listed companies.

기업-투자자간의 관계성이 공개매수 위기 상황에서 투자자 충성도에 미치는 영향

김영욱 ( Kim Yeong Ug ),김찬아 ( Kim Chan A ) 한국PR학회 2003 PR연구 Vol.7 No.1

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the degree of the company-investor relationship correlates with investor royalty in the context of tender offer as a company crisis. This study surveyed 149 individual investors. There are no correlations among company-investor relationship, investor royalty, and perceptions toward the risk. The study found only the correlation between the degree of satisfaction about information and the company-investor relationship. These results reflected the current status of investor relations in Korea. Korean companies have Hot yet tried to build, retain and develop long-term relationships with individual investors. Investors also have managed their stocks to pursue the short-term profits. The results reflect the current trend and give inspirations of how to correct the profit-ridden investor relations. The importance of this study lies in the application of the relationship management paradigm into the investor relations field.

주식투자자의 행동이 투자자의 만족에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구

윤재희,송동근 동중앙아시아경상학회 2011 동중앙아시아연구 Vol.22 No.2

본 연구에서는 주식시장에서 주식투자를 하고 있는 주식투자자들의 만족정도에 미치는 영향요인들을 주식투자자 행동요인과 주식투자자 특성요인으로 구분하고, 주식투자자 행동요인은 위험선호도, 정보신뢰성, 내외통제성, 증권사서비스로 구분하고 주식투자자 특성요인은 투자규모와 투자경력으로 구분하여 이들 요인들과 주식투자자의 만족간의 영향관계를 알아보았다. 분석결과에 의하면, 위험선호도는 주식투자자의 만족과 유의한 정(+)의 영향관계가 나타났고 증권사서비스와 주식투자자의 만족과도 유의한 정(+)의 영향관계가 나타났다. 따라서 증권사서비스수준이 높을수록 투자자의 만족수준이 높아진다고 할 수 있다. 또한 투자경력기간과 투자자의 만족수준간의 관계를 알아본 회귀분석결과에 의하면 투자규모만 유의한 정(+)의 영향관계가 나타나 투자 규모가 클수록 만족수준도 높다고 할 수 있다. 본 연구의 유용성은 설문조사를 통해 우리나라 주식투자자의 만족수준의 영향요인인 주식투자자의 행동요인과 주식투자자의 특성요인이 주식투자자의 만족에 미치는 영향을 알아보았다는데 의의가 있다. 하지만 조사대상 범위가 한정되고, 정량적 자료를 이용하지 못하였다는 점 등이 한계로 지적할 수 있다. This study is intended to find out how much impact is given on the stock investor's satisfaction by various factors affecting investor satisfaction at the stock market. These factors are classified into investors' behavior and their characteristics. The relationship between these factors and investor satisfaction is researched in this study. More concretely, the behavior of stock investor is categorized into risk preference, information credibility, service by securities company, and the internal versus external control of reinforcement. The investors' characteristic factors are divided into factors such as investment amount and investment experience etc. According to this analysis, among stock investors' behaviors, the risk preference has a meaningful (+) relationship with investor satisfaction. The service of securities company also has a firm (+) relationship with investor satisfaction. According to the relationship between the investors' characteristics and investor satisfaction, only the investment amount has a meaningful (+) relationship with satisfaction of investor. This means that the investors with more investment amount in market tend to have higher level of satisfaction. The usefulness of this study is found in the process of knowing how much the satisfaction factors of Korean stock investor could give impacts to the investor satisfaction through a field research. The limitation of this study, however, can be indicated that the boundary of the field research was limited. In the future, the additional effort is needed to the generalization of the theory by more in-depth and longer term field research and subdivision of factors affecting on investor satisfaction.

중국 외국인투자 지주회사(투자성회사)의 현황과 발전방향

최갑룡 한중법학회 2014 中國法硏究 Vol.21 No.-

외국투자자가 설립한 투자성회사(이하 “투자성회사”)는 중국이 외국투자자를 위하여 특별히 인 정한 지주회사이다. 회사법과 외국인투자법제가 이중적으로 운영되는 중국의 법률체제로 인하 여 투자성회사는 독특한 특성을 가지고 있으며, 제도 또한 외자유치라는 특수한 목적을 위하여 도입되었다. 지주회사의 설립을 요청하는 외국투자자의 요구를 수용하고, 동시에 외자유치라는 국가적 목표를 달성하기 위하여, 투자성회사규정은 투자성회사가 투자한 회사에 대하여 외상투 자기업의 인정이라는 혜택을 부여하는 한편, 높은 수준의 최소 법정등록자본금을 요구하고 일 정한 투자목표를 달성하면 영업범위를 확장할 수 있는 조건을 설정하였다. 이러한 제도적 설계 로 인하여 많은 다국적기업이 중국에 투자성회사를 설립하였고, 이점에 있어서 투자성회사는 외자유치라는 최초의 도입목적을 상당부분 달성하였다고 할 수 있다. 그러나 중국의 내외자회사 동일대우 정책으로 외상투자기업에 대한 우대정책이 없어지고, 이에 따라 투자성회사의 장점도 감소하게 되어, 외자유치의 수단으로서의 투자성회사의 역할은 상당 히 제한될 수밖에 없는 현재의 상황에서 그 역할을 다시 정립할 필요가 있다고 할 수 있다. 이와 관련하여 우리가 주목하여야 할 것은 다국적기업이 투자성회사를 이용하는 이유가 지주회사라 는 형태가 일정한 지역에서 그룹형태의 회사를 운영하기에 매우 효율적이기 때문이라는 것이다 . 지주회사는 산형구조의 회사들 정점에서 그룹전체를 체계적으로 운영할 있고, 지분양수도를 통하여 그룹구성회사를 손쉽게 조정할 수 있으며, 투자수익도 쉽게 회수할 수 있는 장점이 있다 . 본 논문에서는 독특한 특성을 가진 투자성회사의 운영과 관련된 여러 가지 문제를 검토할 뿐만 아니라, 투자성회사에서 지주회사로서의 성격이 좀 더 강화되어야 할 필요성(외자유치를 위한 수단이 아니라)과 이렇게 성격이 바뀌는 경우 어떠한 변화가 추가로 필요한 것인가를 살펴보고 자 한다. 외자유치수단으로서의 투자성회사에서 지주회사로서의 투자성회사로 그 성격이 변화 된다면, 진입장벽을 낮출 수 있고, 여러 가지 행위제한도 해소가능하며, 이러한 변화의 결과로 적은 자본의 투자도 효율적인 투자활동을 위하여 투자성회사를 이용할 수 있게 되고, 이미 중국 에 여러 가지 투자를 한 투자자도 투자성회사를 이용하여 자신의 투자를 재조정할 수 있게 될 것이다. 이렇게 함으로서 외국투자자의 중국사업의 질을 한 단계 더 높일 수 있으며, 더 많은 외 국투자자가 중국에 투자하게 되는 선순환의 결과를 가져 올 수 있을 것이다. The Investment Company established by foreign investor(“the Investment Company”) is the holding company for foreign investor in China. it has unique characters due to Chinese legal system independently operating foreign investment law and Corporate Act, and specialized introduction purpose of the Investment Company, i.e., inducement of foreign capital in China. In order to permit for foreign investor to establish holding company, and at the same time to induce foreign capital to the highest degree, on one hand, the Regulation of Investment Company established by Foreign Investor(“the Regulation”) provides the advantage that the company invested by the Investment Company can be recognized as the Companies with foreign investment, on the other hand, it requires high level of paid-in-capital and permits wider business scope as the Investment Company achieves certain investment targets in the Regulation. Due to this institutional care, a lot of multinational corporations have established the Investment Company in China, in this respect, we can say the Regulation has achieved the goal intended at the starting point. But according to the equal treatment between the companies with foreign investment and domestic investment, preferential policies for the companies with foreign investment were abolished step by step and the advantages of the Investment Company also were disappeared. This means it is the time to review whether we can still regard inducement of foreign capital as the first institutional purpose of the Investment Company or not. We also consider why multinational corporations are using the Investment Company is that holding company is very efficient type to control a group of companies in certain area. Holding company can systematically operate a group of companies at the top of umbrella structure, easily include or exclude a member of the group with stock transaction, and also is very helpful to recover investment profit from the invested companies. In this paper, we are going to review not only several issues related with the operation of the present Regulation, but also the necessity to give more attention to holding company’s character(less to capital inducement vehicle's character) in the Investment Company and what kind of change should be followed according to change of its character. If the nature of holding company can be put before inducement of foreign capital as the purpose of the Investment Company, the entry barriers for the Investment Company can be lower and several restrictions also can be less strict, as a result of these changes, even small investment also can use the Investment Company for efficient investment activities in China and the investor who already has several invested companies in China can reorganize his investment with using the Investment Company. These can make foreign investors’ business in China raise a grade higher and let foreign investor more invest in China consequentially.

회사의 규모에 따른 자본시장법의 공시규제 완화

서완석 사법발전재단 2015 사법 Vol.1 No.33

Softening of Disclosure Standards based on Company Size Suh, Wan-suk The foremost purpose of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (hereinafter ‘FSCMA’) is to protect investors. Disclosure systems, pursuant to the FSCMA, require securities issuers to provide necessary information so that investors can make their own decisions, and holds investors responsible for their own profits and losses. In that context, the importance of information disclosure-preferably full disclosure-cannot be stressed enough. However, from a cost-benefit perspective, there exists an imbalance where benefit (to investors from disclosure) exceeds cost (burden incurred by companies from disclosure). As such, the focus needs to be on adequately balancing the two-ensuring that information disclosure results in meaningful benefits for investors while helping companies alleviate cost burden from having to disclose useful and material information for investors. In countries with well-developed securities transaction markets, there is growing interest on how to determine the adequate scope of information to be disclosed to investors and how to effectively apply disclosure standards based on company size, through a fair cost-benefit comparison. This paper centers on a report submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2006 by the Advisory Committee for Small and Mid-sized Public Companies in the U.S., which has the most sophisticated disclosure system in place. At the same time, this paper explores countries that apply different disclosure standards depending on company size and its method of application, and its implication for Korea. Furthermore, this paper aims to examine ways to effectively apply disclosure standards in Korea by company size and how to determine the adequate scope of information for disclosure, such as requiring strict disclosure of information that may disrupt market order (e.g., breach of trust and embezzlement) and softening disclosure of information pertaining to issuance and distribution of securities. 우리나라 자본시장법의 가장 중요하고도 궁극적인 목적은 투자자보호이다. 그리고 공시제도는 증권의 발행인 기타의 자에게 증권의 투자판단에 필요한 중요 정보를 공시하도록 하고, 그 증권에 대한 투자판단 자체는 투자자의 자유로운 의사와 판단에 맡기며, 그에 따른 책임도 투자자가 부담하도록 하는 것이다. 그렇다면 투자자와 관련한 공시제도의 중요성은 아무리 강조해도 지나침이 없으며 가능한 완전공시가 최적의 방법일 것이다. 그러나 공시와 관련하여 기업의 공시부담과 투자자들의 정보획득이라는 요인은 서로 저촉되는 면이 있으므로 이를 어떻게 적절하게 조화시켜야 하는지가 중요하다. 즉 공시제도는 인위적인 규제로서 소기의 목적을 달성하는 경우에만, 즉 그로 인한 편익이 비용을 상회하는 경우에만 정당성을 인정받을 수 있고, 편익이 비용을 상회하는 경우에도 항상 그 비용을 줄이려는 노력이 요구된다. 결국 공시의 편익과 비용을 비교·형량하여 투자자들에게 제공되는 정보의 수준을 최적화하는 것이 중요한데, 특히 이러한 요인들이 회사의 규모에 따라 달리 적용되어야 할 것인지, 그리고 달리 적용되어야 한다면 어떠한 방법으로 할 것인지, 그리고 공시규제의 적절한 범위는 어디까지로 설정할 것인지 등이 최근 증권거래가 발달한 선진 각국의 관심사로 등장하고 있다. 이 글은 공시제도가 가장 잘 발달되어 있다고 할 수 있는 미국의 중견·중소공개기업에 관한 자문위원회가 2006년에 SEC에 제출한 보고서에 초점을 맞추면서 회사의 규모에 따라 공시규제를 달리하고 있는 나라들이 있는지, 그렇다면 이들 나라들은 어떤 방법으로 차등규제를 하고 있는지, 그리고 그것들이 우리나라에 어떠한 의미를 가지는지 등에 대하여 살핀 후, 우리나라에서의 회사규모에 따른 공시규제방식을 검토하되, 횡령, 배임 등 시장 건전성 등과 관련한 공시는 유지하면서 발행 및 유통공시 부담을 경감시킬 수 있는 방안을 모색하고, 그 규제방식은 어떻게 할 것인지, 그 분류기준은 어떻게 할 것인지, 공시완화 대상 항목과 내용은 어떻게 할 것인지 등에 대하여 적고 있다.

투자신탁과 부당이득

권영준 법무부 2021 선진상사법률연구 Vol.- No.96

This article examines the relationship between investment trust under the Capital Markets Act and unjust enrichment under the Civil Code, particularly in relation to the responsibility of investment brokers to return the proceed of the investment product as unjust enrichment to investors. This article is written in relation to the Supreme Court Decision 10 June 2021 Case Number 2019Da226005, which dealt with several legal issues arising from investment trust that was later found out to be defective. In order to review the issue of investment trust and unjust enrichment more in depth, the analysis of the legal nature of investment trust is required. The investor entrusts the management of the assets to the collective investment entity (the first trust), and the collective investment entity entrusts the storage of such assets to the trust company (the second trust – namely, investment trust under the Capital Markets Act) while reserving its authority in operating the invested assets. The investor becomes the beneficiary of the investment trust, and the beneficiary rights therefrom are transferred to the beneficiary in the form of securities issued by the collective investment entity to the investor. Collective investment entities operate the invested assets by giving instructions to the trust company and distribute profits generated from such investment to investors. The process of acquiring securities by the beneficiaries is generally described as the sale of beneficiary securities, but its genuine legal nature is not that of the ordinary sale but rather that of trust. Within this structure of investment trusts, investment brokers play various and proactive roles as stipulated by the Capital Markets Act. Investment brokers recruit investors based on directions provided by collective investment entities in the form of consignment sales contracts. They invite potential investors to invest their assets and provide them with relevant information acquired from collective investment entities. When an investor decides to invest, the investment brokers receive an investment application form and invested money from the investor and immediately transfer the investment to the account of a trust company. In addition, investment brokers bear various obligations and responsibilities imposed by the Capital Markets Act to protect investors. However, this does not mean that investment brokers are in the same position as sellers of sales contracts. Investment brokers mainly play a role as an intermediary between investment company and investors while bearing special obligations imposed by law to better protect investors. In light of the substance of the investment trust relationship and the status of an investment broker, such broker (or the sales company under prior law) cannot be evaluated as the pure seller or the recipient of the invested money in the context of unjust enrichment law. Further, mere fact that the invest money was temporarily received and stored by the broker for a short time does not make the broker an unjustly enriched party. Rather, from normative perspective, the invested money is to be evaluated as payment vis-a-vis collective investment entity (investment company) and subsequently to the trust company although the invested money is physically transferred to the trust company without going through the account of the investment company. In short, an investment broker may be the subject of various obligations and responsibilities prescribed by the Capital Markets Act and may be held liable for damages due to violation of such obligations, but does not bear liability as an unjustly enriched party. Current court precedents and decisions by financial authorities take the position that the investment broker (selling company) is responsible as an unjustly enriched party in the case of canceling a‘sales contract’. This position, so far has remained undisputed even among scholars. However, I am of the view that it ne... 이 글은 대법원 2021. 6. 10. 선고 2019다226005 판결을 계기로 자본시장법상 투자신탁과 부당이득의 관계, 특히 투자중개업자의 투자자에 대한 부당이득 반환책임에 대해 살펴본 글이다. 이 문제를 검토하기 위해서는 투자신탁 법률관계의 실질을 규명할 필요가 있다. 투자자는 집합투자업자에게 투자금 운용을 위탁하고(제1차 신탁), 집합투자업자는 신탁업자에게 투자금의 보관과 관리를 재차 위탁한다(제2차 신탁 – 즉 자본시장법상의 투자신탁). 투자자가 투자신탁의 수익자 지위에 기해 가지는 수익권은 집합투자업자가 투자자에게 발행하는 수익증권에 화체되어 투자자에게 귀속된다. 집합투자업자는 신탁업자에 대한 운용 지시를 통해 투자재산을 운용하고 이로부터 발생하는 수익을 투자자에게 배분한다. 이처럼 투자자가 수익권 내지 수익증권을 취득하는 과정을 일반적으로 수익증권 판매라고 표현한다. 그러나 그 법적 실질은 매수인이 투자중개업자에게 매매대금을 지급하고 투자중개업자로부터 매매 목적물로서 수익증권을 취득하는 것이라고 보기는 어렵다. 오히려 그 실질은 투자자가 투자중개업자를 통해 집합투자업자 및 신탁업자에게 투자금을 맡기고 집합투자업자로부터 수익증권을 발행받은 뒤 이를 기초로 수익을 배분받는 쪽에 가깝다. 물론 투자신탁관계에서 투자중개업자는 자본시장법이 정하는 바에 따라 다양하고 적극적인 역할을 수행한다. 투자중개업자는 집합투자업자와 위탁계약을 체결하고 집합투자업자로부터 교부받은 투자설명서에 기초하여 투자자에게 필요한 정보를 제공하고 투자자를 모집한다. 투자중개업자는 투자자가 투자를 결심하면 투자자로부터 투자신청서와 투자금을 받아 그 투자금을 곧바로 신탁업자 계좌로 이체한다. 이 과정에서 투자중개업자는 투자자 보호를 위해 자본시장법에 의해 부과된 각종 의무와 책임을 부담한다. 그렇다고 투자중개업자가 민법상 매매계약의 매도인과 같은 지위에 서는 것은 아니다. 투자중개업자는 투자 주체와 자산 운용주체를 연결 내지 중개하고 이에 수반되는 각종 업무를 처리하되 투자자 보호를 위해 자본시장법에 따른 각종 의무와 책임을 부담하게 되는 특수한 지위의 당사자이다. 이러한 투자신탁관계의 실질과 투자중개업자의 지위와 역할에 비추어 보면, 투자중개업자는 급부 수령 주체도 아니고 이익 보유 주체도 아니다. 물리적 관점에서는 투자자가 출연한 투자금이 투자중개업자를 거쳐 신탁업자에게 교부되지만, 급부의 관점에서는 투자자 – 집합투자업자 – 신탁업자 간의 연쇄적 급부 실행을 위해 투자중개업자가 도관(導管)이 되어 투자자로부터 신탁업자에게로 단축급부가 행해진 것이다. 따라서 투자중개업자는 부당이득의 관점에서는 급부수령주체가 아니다. 또한 투자중개업자는 투자금을 잠정적, 일시적으로 보관할 뿐이므로 투자금으로 인한 이익을 받았다거나 그 이익을 보유하는 주체라고 보기도 어렵다. 요컨대 투자중개업자는 자본시장법상 의무를 부담하고 그 의무 위반을 이유로 손해배상책임을 부담할 수는 있으나, 투자금에 관한 급부부당이득의 반환주체가 될 수는 없다. 만약 부당이득 반환이 문제된다면 투자자는 급부 상대방인 집합투자업자를 대위하여 그 투자금을 보관하는 신탁업자에게 부당이득반환을 구하거나, 신탁법 제43조 제3항에 따른 이득반환청구를 할 수 있다. 궁...

중소기업 M&A의 ROE 변화: 전략적 투자자 대 재무적 투자자

이상은,김문겸 한국재무관리학회 2021 財務管理硏究 Vol.38 No.2

This paper is to analyze the effect of the type of investor on the M&A performance of the SME targets. To this end, regression analysis was conducted by setting the ROE change for 5 years before and after the M&A as a dependent variable for 175 SME M&A companies from 2011 to 2016, controlling the investor type as a dummy variable and M&A performance as an independent variable. The type of investor is divided into strategic and financial investors, and the factors that affect M&A performance are the direct factors that affect the financial performance of the company (operating profitability, activity, and stability) and financial performance through interactions by investor type. Was classified as an indirect factor that amplifies. As a result, the ROE of SMEs from M&A declined in both types of investors, as in previous studies, and the ROE of the acquired companies of financial investors fell more significantly than those of strategic investors. In addition, in the analysis of the interaction effect between dummy variables and direct factors by investor type, it was confirmed that the synergy effect, which is an indirect factor of strategic investors, occurs more significantly. This study is meaningful in that it attempted a new approach to M&A research of SMEs by confirming the M&A performance of unlisted SMEs and examining the effects of strategic and financial investors on M&A of SMEs. 본 논문은 중소기업의 M&A에 있어서 투자자 유형이 피투자기업의 M&A 성과에 미치는 영향을분석하고자 하였다. 이를 위하여 2011년부터 2016년까지 175개의 중소기업 M&A 기업을 대상으로M&A 전후 5년간의 ROE 변화를 종속변수로 설정하고 투자자 유형을 더미변수로, M&A 성과를독립변수로 통제하여 회귀분석을 실시하였다. 투자자 유형을 전략적 투자자와 재무적 투자자로 구분하고, M&A 성과에 영향을 미치는 요인을 기업의 재무적 성과에 영향을 미치는 직접 요인(영업수익성과활동성, 그리고 안정성)과 투자자 유형별 상호작용으로 재무적 성과를 증폭시키는 간접 요인으로구분하였다. 그 결과 M&A에 따른 중소기업의 ROE는 두 유형의 투자자 모두에서 하락하였으며, 재무적 투자자의 피인수기업 ROE가 전략적 투자자 대비 더 크게 하락하였다. 또한, 투자자 유형별더미변수와 직접 요인의 상호작용 효과 분석에서는 전략적 투자자의 간접 요인인 시너지 효과가 더크게 일어나는 것으로 확인되었다. 본 연구는 비상장 중소기업의 M&A 성과를 확인하고 중소기업의M&A에 있어서 전략적 투자자와 재무적 투자자가 미치는 영향을 살펴봄으로써 중소기업의 M&A 연구에 새로운 접근을 시도하였다는 점에 의의가 있다.