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      • KCI등재

        프랜차이즈시스템 내 체인본부 비전 선행요인과 거래만족, 성과 간의 관계에 대한 연구

        이창원 전북대학교 산업경제연구소 2022 아태경상저널 Vol.14 No.1

        The Chinese franchise industry is growing rapidly. And Korean companies are increasing their presence. However, the risk of companies hoping to enter China still exists, and the failure rate is also increasing. This is due to the lack of research on factors such as chain headquarters and franchisees' conflict and transaction satisfaction to improve performance within the Chinese franchise system, and the chain headquarters' vision and influence to improve transaction satisfaction and confidence of franchisees. The purpose of this research is to examine the satisfaction of transactions between the chain headquarters and franchisees to maximize performance between the franchisees. It also looks at the vision of the chain headquarters, the relationship of transaction satisfaction, the vision of the chain headquarters and the relationship of influencing factors. As a result of this study, we found that the level of chain headquarters control, the degree of duty recognition of franchisees, and the efforts of franchisees all affect the vision of the chain headquarters. Second, we could see that the vision of the chain headquarters, the level of control of the chain headquarters, and the efforts of the franchisees to influence the satisfaction of the chain headquarters were all statistically significant. Finally, the relationship between the performance of the chain headquarters and the satisfaction of the chain headquarters transaction was also significant. Therefore, in order to maximize the performance of the franchise system in China, the level of chain headquarters control over the vision of the chain headquarters, the degree of mandatory recognition of franchisees, and the efforts of franchisees should be accompanied. It was also seen that transaction satisfaction levels should be raised through clear message delivery of the chain headquarters vision. 중국 프랜차이즈 산업은 급격히 성장하고 있으며, 한국 기업의 진출도 늘어나고 있다. 그러나, 중국진출 희망 기업들의 위험은 여전히 상존하며 실패율 또한 증가하고 있다. 이는 중국 프랜차이즈 시스템내에서 성과 향상을 위한 체인 본부와 가맹점주의 갈등 유발 및 만족 요인, 체인 본부에 대한 가맹점주들의 만족과 신뢰 향상을 위한 체인 본부의 비전과 영향요인 등에 대한 연구 부족에서 기인한다. 본 연구에서는 체인 본부와 가맹점주 간의 성과 극대화를 위한 거래만족, 체인 본부 비전과 선행 요인간의 관계를 살펴 보는데 목적이 있다. 본 연구 결과 첫째, 체인 본부 비전에 영향을 미치는 체인 본부 통제 수준, 가맹점 의무 인식 정도, 가맹점주 노력은 모두 영향을 주는 것을 알 수 있었다. 둘째, 체인 본부 만족에 영향을 미치는 체인 본부 비전, 체인 본부 통제 수준, 가맹점주 노력은 모두 통계적으로 유의한 것을 알 수 있었다. 마지막으로 체인 본부 성과와 체인 본부 거래 만족 간의 관계도 모두 유의한 것을 알 수 있었다. 따라서, 중국 내 프랜차이즈 시스템의 성과 극대화를 위해서는 체인 본부 비전에 대한 요인 변수인 체인 본부 통제 수준과 가맹점주 의무 인식 정도와 이에 대한 가맹점주 노력이 동반되어야 한다. 또한 체인 본부 비전의 명확한 메시지 전달을 통한 거래 만족 수준을 높여야 한다는 것을 알 수 있었다.

      • KCI등재

        통합적 재난대응을 위한 중앙재난안전대책본부의 역할 재정립

        양기근(Gi Geun Yang)(梁奇根) 위기관리 이론과 실천 2012 Crisisonomy Vol.8 No.2

        본 연구의 목적은 통합적 재난대응 방안을 중앙재난안전대책본부를 중심으로 제시하고자 하는데 있다. 현재 중앙재난안전대책본부는 대규모 재난시 통합적 재난 대응 및 관리에 있어 중앙사고수습본부와 함께 핵심적인 역할을 하고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 중앙재난안전대책본부의 역할 및 구성시기 등에 대한 명확한 법적 규정이나 매뉴얼상의 내용이 미흡한 실정이다. 따라서 효율적인 대규모 재난관리를 위해서는 중앙재난안전대책본부의 명확한 역할의 이론적 정립과 법적 근거를 마련하고 관련 위기대응 실무매뉴얼에 반영하여야 한다. 오늘날 대규모 복합재난이 증가됨에 따라 재난관리에 있어서 중앙재난안전대책본부의 역할 및 중요성은 커질 것이다. 그러나 현재의 중앙재난안전대책본부는 그 역할의 필요성과 중요성에도 불구하고 통합적 재난대응에 있어서 다음과 같은 문제점이 있다. 첫째, 재난 및 안전관리 기본법과 위기관리 매뉴얼상의 중앙재난안전대책본부와 중앙사고수습본부간의 역할과 구성시기의 불명확성으로 인한 중앙재난안전대책본부의 실효적 가동의 어려움이 있다. 둘째, 중앙재난안전대책본부 운영규정에서도 재난 및 안전관리 기본법 제14조에서 규정하고 있는 중앙재난안전대책본부의 중요한 역할인 '총괄ㆍ조정 및 필요한 조치'에 관한 구체적 규정이 없는 가운데 중앙재난안전대책본부 구성원의 임무, 운영 및 근무체제, 통합지원체계 등에 관해서만 규정하고 있는 문제점이 있다. 이러한 문제점을 개선하기 위해서는 첫째, 통합적 재난대응을 위하여 여러 재난 참여기관들이 중앙재난안전대책본부를 중심으로 협력할 수 있도록 하여야 하며, 둘째, 중앙재난안전대책본부와 중앙사고수습본부의 명확한 역할 정립, 셋째, 중앙재난안전대책본부의 구성과 운영시기의 명확화, 넷째, 통합적 재난대응지원시스템의 구축 및 효과적 커뮤니케이션 채널 확보, 다섯째, 재난관리계획 등 사전 준비 및 점검 철저 등이 시급히 개선되어야 한다. The purpose of this paper is to provide the integrated disaster countermeasures directions focused on central disaster and safety countermeasures headquarters. Presently, central disaster and safety countermeasures headquarters and central accident headquarters has a key role in the integrated disaster countermeasures when major disaster occurs. Nevertheless, the information on the specific legal provisions or the manual about role and organization time of central disaster and safety countermeasures headquarters is lacking. Therefore, it is required to establish the specific role of central disaster and safety countermeasures headquarters in emergency laws and manuals of crisis countermeasures for efficient major disaster management. Today as grand complex disaster is growing up, role and importance of central disaster and safety countermeasures headquarters in national disaster management will be larger. Nevertheless, effective actions of central disaster and safety countermeasures headquarters are difficult because of the role and organization time between central disaster and safety countermeasures headquarters and central accident headquarters in "Disaster and Safety Management Basic Act" and crisis manual are ambiguousness. The improvements of central disaster and safety countermeasures headquarters for the integrated disaster countermeasures are as follows: first, roles of central disaster and safety countermeasures headquarters in "Disaster and Safety Management Basic Act" and crisis manual have to clearly defined. second, disaster agencies must collaborate centre around central disaster and safety countermeasures headquarters for the integrated disaster countermeasures, third, the role and organization time between central disaster and safety countermeasures headquarters and central accident headquarters have to be clearly defined, fourth, the integrated disaster countermeasures support system and communication channel have to be secured, finally, disaster plan for the integrated disaster countermeasures have to be improved.

      • KCI우수등재

        서간도 대한광복군사령부와 대한광복군총영에 대한 재검토

        윤대원(Yun Dae-Won) 한국사연구회 2006 한국사연구 Vol.133 No.-

        This study analyzes the organizational structure of the Headquarters of the Korean Independence Army(光復軍司令部) established by the Korean Provisional Government and of the General Camp of the Korean Independence Army(光復軍總營) set up in Western Gando (間島, Jiandao) in July and August of 1920 respectively, as well as the relationship that existed between these two entities. To this end, a review of the relationship between the Korean Provisional Government's military policy, its Kando Policy, and the independence groups operating in Western Kando is conducted. In accordance with these results. a thorough analysis of the structure and actual features of the Headquarters of the Korean Independence Army and of its General Camp in Western Kando was in turn carried out. The Headquarters of the Korean Independence Army was a local command post set up under the Minister of Defense of the Provisional Government in Shanghai in August 1920. This structure was established in keeping with the latter's desired goal of integrating the Gando-based Korean Youth Corps(大韓靑年團聯合會, Daehan cheongnyeondan yeonhaphoe) and Korean Independence Corps(大韓獨立團, Daehan Dongnipdan) with the Uiyongdan operating out of Korea. This new body was originally designed as part of the Provisional Government's Gando Policy and as part of the Provisional Government's new military structure. The Gando Policy established by the Provisional Government. which had been preparing for the eventual war of independence since the end of 1919, was designed to separate military and civil affairs in the Western and Northern areas of Gando and N Noryeong(露領), while retaining overall government control over these areas. In turn, the Provisional Government's new military system was designed to separate the army groups operating within these areas into a Western Gando Militia. Northern Gando Militia, and Eastern Gando Militia, with all of these forces integrated under a local headquarters. However, as the Provisional Government failed to negotiate an agreement with the Hanjokhoe(韓族會) in Western Gando, it proceeded to organize its local headquarters around the independence groups which were concentrated solely in the Andong(安東, Dandong) area. On the other hand, the General Camp of the Korean Independence Army was established in Western Gando on July 1, 1920, or one month prior to the establishment of the Provisional Government, under the guises of the Korea Liberation Corps(光復團, Gwangbokdan), which made the decision to do so in the aftermath of the 2nd Session of the Korean Youth Corps held in April 1920. Thereafter, the activities of the Korean Liberation Corps in Western Gando were carried out under the name of the General Camp of the Korean Independence Army, which was in actuality the local headquarters of the Provisional Government's Ministry of Defense in Western Gando. Therefore. the Headquarters of the Korean Independence Army and the General Camp of the Korean Independence Army were in fact both local headquarters of the Ministry of Defense that had been established in Western Gando. The only difference was in the composition of the main actors involved in their establishment. The Daehan Gwangbokgun chamnibu(大韓光復軍參里部, constabulary force) established during this same period was another agency which was under the direct control of the Ministry of Defense. Although the General Camp of the Korean Independence Army was set up as the Ministry of Defense's local headquarters in Western Gando, there remains some doubt as to whether the Ministry actually exercised control over this body or not. Internal and external crises during this period greatly reduced the Provisional Government's ability to exercise its leadership over independence army units in Western Gando. As a result, the General Camp of the Korean Independence Army was in likelihood only nominally under the control of the Ministry of Defense. In reality, it carried out its own independent activities. This assertion is

      • KCI등재

        한국 다국적기업 본사의 다층구조에 관한 탐색적 연구

        김치풍 ( Chipoong Kim ) 한국국제경영학회 2021 國際經營硏究 Vol.32 No.3

        Research on the relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries has been a very important topic in the field of International Business. However, from the perspective of subsidiaries, it has not been discussed in depth what kind of organization specifically means a headquarter organization. The headquarters of a multinational corporation can be various organizations, including a holding company, a corporate control tower, an affiliate's headquarter, or regional headquarters. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the multiple layered structure of headquarters in South Korean multinational corporations based on a case study of six companies. In this study, the main roles of headquarters are explained by drawing a global integration perspective, bounded rationality, and a resource dependency theory. Furthermore, the relationship the team functions of subsidiaries and their collaboration with headquarters are explored. Finally, theoretical and practical implications for establishing strong relations between headquarters and subsidiaries are presented.

      • KCI등재

        17~18세기 도감의 고가(雇價) 마련과 군문재원(軍門財源)의 활용

        나영훈(Na, Young-hun) 한국역사연구회 2017 역사와 현실 Vol.- No.103

        Examined in this article is the fact that newly established “Gun’yeong” Military headquarters in the 17th and 18th centuries were utilized not only as military entities but also as financial resources. There are evidences which show us that some of the military headquarters’ budget were diverted to the Dogam offices (temporarily established ones for specific projects like dynastic rituals or large scale constructions by the government), allowing in the process the headquarters’ own budget to be utilized by several Dogam offices, which had nothing to do with the headquarters’ functions. Until 1674 Dogam offices were financially supported by other governmental offices or even local districts as well, but never by military headquarters. But later, although the size of the Dogam budget varied by its mission and its functions, they began to be funded by military headquarters and at times the overall size of (headquarters’) funding rose to almost 50% of the Dogam office’s entire budget. This was probably because the Gun’yeong military headquarters had many resources to tap into in the first place, and the “Northern campaign” was turning into a lost cause coming into king Sukjong’s reign. And the changing climate (literally) was accommodating such change in the government’s practice of funding some of its own offices, as severe draughts hit Joseon at the time and made it imperative for the government to divert military budgets to other purposes such as lifting heavy stresses off of the population. We can say that the Gun’yeong Amun military headquarters after king Sukjong’s days were no longer expanding their budgets in preparation for the upcoming Northern campaign, and were beginning to use their reserve resources to aid dynastic relief projects or constructions, serving as de facto financial offices.

      • KCI등재

        치킨 프랜차이즈의 가맹본부의 경영지원이 가맹점 만족도에 미치는 영향에서 가맹본부 신뢰의 조절효과에 관한 연구

        한종헌,홍경옥,박진영,이송민 한국외식산업학회 2023 한국외식산업학회지 Vol.19 No.5

        This study aimed to investigate how the management support provided by chicken franchise headquarters influences the satisfaction of franchisees and to empirically verify the moderating effect of franchisee trust in franchise headquarters on the relationship between franchise headquarters’ management support and franchisee satisfaction. An empirical analysis showed that among the four factors of franchise headquarters’ management support (information provision, sales promotion support, training, and compensation), sales promotion support and information provision had significant effects on franchisee satisfaction. Conversely, training and compensation did not have significant effects. Since two of the four factors positively influenced franchisee satisfaction, Hypothesis 1 was partially accepted. Moreover, franchisee trust had a moderating effect on the relationships between all four factors of franchise headquarters’ management support and franchisee satisfaction. Training and compensation, which had no direct impact on franchisee satisfaction, also influenced satisfaction through the moderating effect of trust.

      • KCI등재

        1802년 장용영의 혁파와 영향

        박범(Park Beom) 한국역사연구회 2018 역사와 현실 Vol.- No.107

        In the wake of political switches between leading parties after King Jeongjo’s death, the Jang’yong-yeong headquarters was abolished. Examined in this article is how it was treated in the early years of King Sunjo’s reign, and how it was dismantled. After King Sunjo was enthroned, the Jang’yong-yeong headquarters were ordered to spend a lot of money, in amounts it had never actually spent before (during King Jeongjo’s reign for example). The government’s policy concerning the headquarters was apparently shifting. The biggest economic issue in the early years of King Sunjo’s reign was the abolishment of the Naeshi-affiliated Slave figures. The issue (to free them) was discussed for more than a few times during Jeongjo’s reign, but never came to fruition before the king’s demise. After Jeongjo’s death, Queen Jeongsun wanted to close the matter for good, claiming the will of the former king, and went ahead with the abolishment. The problem was how to resolve the salary issue after abandoning the practice of treating them as slaves. Queen Jeongsun wanted to use the budget of the Jang’yong-yeong headquarters to pay for it, and citing Jeongjo’s will she shut down the headquarters, displaying a blatantly different view on the Jang’yong-yeong headquarters. With Jang’yong-yeong gone, the Ministry of Revenue(Hojo) and the Seon’hye-cheong office were both able to secure a large amount of resource, but not before long (around the 1810s) they ran out of their budgets again. For example, the Hojo Ministry spent all the money diverted from the late Jang’yong-yeong headquarters in irretrievable expenditure. And as new resources to recruit soldiers were never secured, no new military headquarters were either conceived. Coming into the 19<SUP>th</SUP> century, only remained was the image of Jang’yong-yeong, which had once served as one of the guardians of the kings’ ruling authority.

      • 프랜차이즈 가맹지원본부의 지원과 경영성과 관계 분석 연구

        김선희(Sun-Hee Kim),채병권(Pung-Kwon Che) 목원대학교 산학협력단 2022 창업경영교육연구 Vol.1 No.1

        오늘날 프랜차이즈 경영 환경은 빠르게 변화하고 있다. 프랜차이즈 가맹사업은 가맹지원본부가 제품·서비스, 교육, 경영, 판매 등 가맹사업 전반에 걸쳐 요구되는 사업지도및 제품·서비스를 가맹점에 제공하는 시스템으로 운영된다. 프랜차이즈 환경의 변화로 프랜차이즈 가맹지원본부는 신규창업 가맹점에 다양한 지원을 하고 있다. 본 연구는국내의 프랜차이즈 가맹지원본부가 가맹점에 제공하는 다양한 지원이 경영성과(매출) 에 어떤 영향을 미치는지에 대한 관계를 분석하는 것이다. 프랜차이즈 가맹지원본부의 지원 요인들은 상품공급, 고객관리, 슈퍼바이저 컨설팅, 교육훈련, 마케팅 등의 지원이다. 각각 요인이 가맹점 경영성과에 어떤 영향을 미치는지 연구함으로써, 가맹지원본부와 가맹점이 서로 상생할 수 있는 효과적인 서비스 지원에 대한 전략적 방법과 가맹점 경영성과 간의 관계를 분석하고자 하였다. 분석결과 프랜차이즈 가맹지원본부의 상품공급 지원, 슈퍼바이저 컨설팅 지원, 교육훈련, 마케팅 지원 요인이 경영성과에 영향을 미치는 것으로 분석되었다. The franchise business environment today is changing rapidly. The franchise business is operated as a system in which the Franchise Support Headquarters provides business guidance and products and services required throughout the franchise business, including products and services, education, management, and sales, to franchisees. Due to changes in the franchise environment, the Franchise Franchise Support Headquarters is providing various support to newly established franchisees. This study is to analyze the relationship between the various supports provided by the franchise support headquarters in Korea to the franchisees and how they affect the business performance (sales). The support factors of the Franchise Franchise Support Headquarters are support for product supply, customer management, supervisor consulting, education and training, and marketing. The purpose of this study was to analyze the relationship between the strategic method for effective service support for the franchisor support headquarters and franchisees to coexist with each other and the business performance of franchisees by studying how each factor affects the franchise business performance. As a result of the analysis, it was analyzed that the franchise support headquarters' product supply support, supervisor consulting support, education and training, and marketing support factors affect business performance.

      • KCI등재

        임진왜란기 한산도(閒山島) 통제영(統制營)에 관한 연구

        노승석(Seungsuk RO) 한림대학교 태동고전연구소 2024 泰東古典硏究 Vol.52 No.-

        1593년 8월 한산도에 통제영이 처음 설치되고, 이순신이 약 3년 7개월 동안 삼도수군통제사로 근무한 사실은 대부분의 역사 사료와 국내 DB자료에서 다수 확인된다. 그런데 몇 년 사이 최초의 삼도수군통제영이 여수 본영이라는 설이 나옴에 따라 본고에서는 역사사료 중심으로 임진왜란기의 한산도 통제영에 대한 연구를 진행하였다. 계사년 6월 이순신은 견내량 해협과 한산도 바다에서 일본함선을 방어할 전략을 세웠다. 여수 본영이 해상방어에 한계가 있자, 이순신은 7월 15일 진영을 한산도로 옮기고, 8월 통제영이 창설되어 통제사로서 삼도수군을 지휘하였다. 이에 관한 대표적인 기록으로 『이충무공전서』 소재 「행록」, 「시장」, 「신도비」, 박홍미의 「두룡포기사비」와 정운희의 행장, 송시열의 「통제영충렬사기」를 들 수 있다. 이순신이 체찰사 이원익에게 보낸 편지에서 이순신이 휴가 신청한 사유는 이순신이 통제사로서 한산도 통제영에 상주한 것을 증명해 준다. 이분의 『행록』에 소재한 기록에는 한산도를 큰 진영으로 이룬 치적이 확인된다. 한산도가 최초 삼도수군통제영이라는 설의 근거는 대표적으로 선조가 내린 선유호궤교서의 제목에 ‘경상도한산도겸삼도통제사’라는 직함과 두룡포기사비 등의 기록 내용을 들 수 있다. 신자료를 통해 임진왜란기 한산도 통제영의 규모와 운영 상황을 유추해 볼 수 있었다. 요컨대 한산도가 대장의 작전본부로 사료에 분명하게 확인되므로, 한산도 내의 통제영 존재를 결코 부정할 수 없을 것이다. It is found in a great deal of historical material and domestic database data that Tongjeyeong or Regional Naval Control headquarters was first established on Hansan Island (閒山島) in August 1593 and Yi Sun-sin(李舜臣) served as the commander of the three provinces' naval forces for about 3. 7 years. Over the years, a theory was raised that the first Samdo naval control camp was Yeosu headquarters. Thus, this researcher conducted a research on Tongjeyeong or Naval Control Headquarters in Hansan Island during the Japanese invasions against Korea, relying on historical records. In June of that year, Yi Sun-sin developed a strategy to defend against Japanese ships in the seas of Gyeonnaeryang and Hansan Island. As Yeosu main camp had limitations in sea defense, he moved his camp to Hansan Island on July 15 and commanded the Samdo naval forces in August. In June of the same year, Yi Sun-sin developed a strategy to defend against Japanese naval ships in the seas of Gyeonnaeryang and Hansan Island. Finding that there had been the limitations for the Yeosu main camp to defend the seas, he moved his camp to Hansan Island in July 15 and commanded the Samdo naval forces in August. Records regarding this include Record, Markets, and Memorial Stone Monuments in The Collected Works of Admiral Yi, Sun-sin, Duryongpogisabi by Park, Hongmi, Haengjang by Jeong Wunhee, and Tongjeyeongchungryeolsagi by Song, Si-yeol. In a letter sent by Yi Sun-sin to Inspector Lee Won-ik, the reason for Admiral Yi Sun-sin's request for leave proves that Yi Sun-sin was residing at Tongjeyeong in Hansando as a Control Officer. The record in this person's Haengrok confirms his achievements that won a great victory in Hansan Island. It is said that Hansan Island is the first naval headquarters. This assumption is provided based mainly on the title of ‘Naval Commander of Hansan Island and Samdo’ in ‘Seonyuhogyegyoso’ that Seonjo, the 14thking of the Joseon Dynasty had issued, and the record in Duryeonggisabi. Through new data about it, the scale and operation of the Naval Headquarters Handsan Island, during the Japanese invasion, can be inferred. Considering that Hansan Island has been reconfirmed as the operational headquarters of the naval commander, the existence of Tongjeyoung can never be denied.

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        ꡔ육군운수부군속명부ꡕ를 통해 본태평양전쟁기 일본육군운수부의 조선인 군속 동원

        심재욱(Shim, Jae-Wook) 한일민족문제학회 2017 한일민족문제연구 Vol.33 No.-

        本稿は、太平洋戦争期に日本陸軍の海上輸送を担当した陸軍輸送部(船 舶司令部)に強制動員された朝鮮人1,159人の資料であるꡔ陸軍運輸部軍属名 簿ꡕを分析し、日帝強制占領期間広範囲で行われた朝鮮人強制動員の実態 の一部を明らかにしようと試みたものである。本稿を通じて、「陸軍内の海軍」と 呼ばれた運輸部(船舶司令部)への動員が確認された1,159人が、特定の時期 に、特定地域で、集団的に動員され、特定の部隊に投入されたという実態が 明らかになった。その代表的な例が、1943年5月20日と1944年1月20日の二つ に時期に548人が投入された第4船舶輸送司令部パラオ支部、1943年10月20 日に230人が投入された海上輸送第6大隊、1944年11月20日に111人が投入 された第3船舶輸送司令部などである。彼らは多くの場合、運搬工または運輸 工のような工員の身分で、海上輸送第6大隊の場合は北千島と北海道のような 日本の北方地域に、第3船舶輸送司令部の場合はインドシナ半島一帯に、第 47碇泊場司令部の場合は西部ニューギニアおよびインドネシア地域に投入され た。連合軍の爆撃と空腹、日本軍による殴打などの劣悪な条件の下で、彼ら は船舶関連業務をはじめとした各種労役に投入された。 以上の内容はꡔ陸軍運輸部軍属名簿ꡕという限定的な資料の分析を通じて 明らかになった限られた事例に過ぎない。しかしここで把握された実態は、今後行われる強制動員関連名簿資料の分析で得られるデータと共に、全体強制 動員の実態を把握する上での基礎データとして、貴重な役割を果たすことが期 待できる。 This study analyzes the “The Register of the Civilian in Military Employment in Military Seas Transportation Head Office” which confirmed that 1,159 Korean civilians were coerced to labour in the MSTHO(Military Vessel Headquarters: MVH) during the Pacific War. Based on the Register, this paper is aimed at revealing some of the extensive forced labour of Korean civilians by the Imperial Japanese Military. 1,159 civilians were confirmed to be among victims of the forced labour in MSTHO(MVH), which was called “Navy in the Army.” A massive number of Korean civilians were pressed into specific corps of a specific region over a specific period of time. These are representative examples of the forced labour: 548 Korean civilians were pressed into the Palau Branch of the 4 th Ship Transport Headquarters on May 20, 1943 and January 20, 1944; 230 were pressed into the 6 th Sea Transport Battalion on October 20, 1943; 111 were pressed into the 3 rd Ship Transport Headquarters on November 20, 1944. Most of them worked as factory workers like transportation workers or stevedores. The 6 th Sea Transport Battalion was deployed at Northen Kuril Island and Hokkaido. The 3 rd Ship Transport Headquarters was alloted to Indochina. And the 47 th Anchorage Headquarters was deployed at Western New Guinea and Indonesia. Under the bombing of the Allied Forces, beating by Japanese soldiers and hunger, the Korean civilians were forced to labor for its military vessels as well as other chores. This study is made based on the limited data of “The Register of the Civilian in Military Employment in Military Seas Transportation Head Office”. But the outcome of this study is expected to provide basic data to understand the forced labour of Korean civilians along with analysis of related register and materials.

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