자금수탁자의 신인의무 - 인정 필요성 및 적용영역에 관하여

김병연 사법발전재단 2015 사법 Vol.1 No.32

Fiduciary Duty of Financial Trustees - The Need for Its Acknowledgement and the Scope of Its Applicability Kim, Byoung-youn Both directors under the Commercial Act and financial investment businesses under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act (hereinafter “Capital Markets Act”) hold the authority to manage, operate, and dispose of the assets of the shareholders or customers. Though the substance of the fiduciary duty of financial investment businesses may differ by the specific type of their business operation, such difference is only due to the fiduciary duty relationship’s intrinsic flexibility. In light of the importance of their status, it is no surprise that “fiduciary duty” is imposed on financial investors, requiring them to fulfill their duty of loyalty by performing their duties in a manner reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the beneficiary consistent with their duty of good faith, duty of care, and the prevention and avoidance of conflict of interests. It would be an oversight of the significant status of directors and financial investment businesses to treat their judicial status merely under the general delegation doctrine. Taking account of the increasing responsibility of directors and financial investment businesses, there is nothing to be surprised by granting them the status of fiduciary based on the Anglo-American legal doctrine of trust. Several issues need to be tackled to improve the protection of shareholder and investor interests based on the legal doctrine of financial trustees. First, any effort should be preceded by a discussion of legal theory to distinguish the legal doctrine of delegation already existing in the continental European civil law system and that of trust, less familiar to such a legal system. Second, in light of the civil law system’s judicial practices grounded in explicit statutory basis, a discussion of legal institution should follow, to introduce the legal doctrine of trust as an explicit statutory legal provision. A good starting point would be to clarify the legislative implications of directors’ duty of loyalty under Article 382-3 of the Commercial Act of 1998, and to discuss ways to amend Article 382(2) of the Act to which the delegation provision of the Civil Act applies mutatis mutandis as to the director-corporation relationship. Third, efforts should be made to restructure the statutory provisions related to fiduciary duty under the “Common Rules of Business Conduct” and “Rules on Business Conduct by Financial Investment Business Entities” of the Capital Markets Act. Such efforts should encompass the attempt to define the fiduciary duty of each individual financial investment companies in a more differentiated way, taking account of their individual business practices, as well as an attempt to clarify the fiduciary status of investment investors. Finally, courts are expected to play an active role with regard to the so-called “fact-based fiduciary,” as well as typical trustees, given the features of a fiduciary relationship. Courts are expected to play a constitutive role in establishing the law by actively applying fiduciary duty as necessary, even in the absence of an express provision. 상법상 이사와 자본시장법상 금융투자업자는 주주 혹은 고객의 자산을 관리·운용·처분하는 권한을 가지고 있다는 점에서 동일하다. 금융투자업자는 그 영위하는 영업의 유형별로 다소 다른 내용의 신인의무를 부담하지만, 그것은 신인의무관계의 탄력성이라고 하는 본질적인 특성에 기인하는 것일 뿐이다. 이러한 지위의 중요성을 고려하여 업무수행에 있어서 선량한 관리자의 주의의무와 이해관계의 충돌을 방지하고 회피함으로써 수익자의 이익을 위해서만 행동하여야 하는 충실의무를 부담하도록 하는, 소위 ‘신인의무’를 부담시키는 것은 당연한 일이다. 이사와 금융투자업자의 사법상 지위를 일반 사법상 위임의 법리에 의해 처리하는 것은 이사와 금융투자업자의 중대한 지위를 소홀히 보는 것이다. 점차 강화되고 있는 이사와 금융투자업자의 책임이라는 경향을 고려한다면 이들에게 영미법상 신탁의 법리에서 기인하는 신인의무자의 지위를 부여하는 것은 전혀 이상한 일이 아니다. 요컨대 자금수탁자의 법리에 기해 주주 및 투자자의 이익을 보호하기 위해서는 넘어야 할 과제가 있다. 첫째, 대륙법계에 이미 존재하는 위임의 법리와 대륙법계에 친숙하지 않은 신탁의 법리를 구별하려는 법 이론적 논의가 먼저 선행되어야 한다. 둘째, 명문의 규정에 근거하여 판단하는 대륙법계의 특성상 실정법의 명문규정으로 신탁의 법리를 도입하려는 법 제도적 논의가 뒤따라야 한다. 특히 1998년 상법상 이사의 충실의무(제382조의3)의 입법적 함의를 찾으려는 노력에서 시작하여 이사와 회사와의 관계에 대하여 민법상 위임의 규정을 준용하고 있는 제382조 제2항의 개정방향을 논의하여야 한다. 셋째, 자본시장법상 신인의무와 관련된 금융투자업자의 공통 영업행위규칙과 금융투자업자별 개별 영업행위규칙의 법체계를 정리하려는 노력이 필요하다. 여기에는 금융투자업자의 신인의무자로서의 지위를 분명히 밝히려는 시도와 함께 각 금융투자업자의 영업행위의 특성을 고려하여 차별적으로 신인의무를 정립하려는 노력도 함께 있어야 한다. 마지막으로 신인관계의 특성상 전형적인 자금수탁자는 물론이고 다양한 상황에서 발생하는 소위 ‘비전형적 신인의무자(fact-based fiduciary)’에 관해서도 법원의 적극적인 역할이 기대된다. 명문규정이 없는 상황에 있어서도 필요한 경우 적극적으로 신인의무를 적용하려는 법형성자로서의 기능을 법원이 발휘하길 기대한다.

영국회사법상 이사의 수임자의무

이기욱 ( Ki Wook Lee ) 한국법정책학회 2011 법과 정책연구 Vol.11 No.1

영국의 회사제정법은 역사적으로 오랫동안 이사의 일반적 의무, 즉 우리법상이사의 선관주의의무나 충실의무에 상당하는 일반적 의무는 규정하고 있지 않았고, 이사의 이익충돌거래나 경업에 관련한 의무에 대한 규정도 법문상으로 마련하고 있지 않았다. 이들에 관해서는 오랫동안 판례법이 그 문제 해결을 맡아 왔던 것인데, 2006년 회사법이 이들을 성문화 하였다. 한편, 영국에서 이사가 부담하는 의무는 보통 이면적으로 논의되고 있다. 하나는 회사에 대한 신임관계에 근거한 수임자의무이고, 또 하나는 회사의 업무집행에 관련한 보통법상의 주의의무이다. 이 글에서는 이러한 이사의 의무 가운데 수임자의무의 개념을 개괄하고, 이것이 전통적으로 ``금지적 명제``로서 표현되어 온 점을 고찰하였다. 그리고 이를 바탕으로 수임자의무의 근저에 존재하는 ``no conflict rule``과 ``no profit rule``을 2006년법상 이사의 일반적 의무 규정과 관련하여 검토하기로 한다. 그리고 영국회사법상 수임자의무가 불충성을 금지하는 자기이익부인의 ``금지적 의무(proscriptive duty)`` 접근방식과 널리 이사에게 어떠한 행동을 요구하는 ``지시적 의무(prescriptive duty)`` 접근방식 사이에서 논란의 대상이 되고 있는 상황을 검토한 바, 수임자규제의 법리가 널리 사법체계 전체에 미치고 있다고 생각되는 입장에서라면 많은 수임자 유형에 적용 가능한 ``금지적 의무`` 접근방식이 지시적 의무`` 접근방식보다 논리적으로 유효하다고 생각된다. The law relating to the fiduciary duties owed by directors and employees to companies is complex and involves several overlapping areas of law. It is, however, a relatively commonplace cause of action; individuals in positions of trust within a company are often tempted to abuse their position in order to steal company secrets, set up in competition, and poach staff and customers. Fiduciary duties have historically defied easy characterisation. This area of law as it relates to directors and employees is developing and complex. Directors and employees of companies acting out of self-interest have generated an increasing number of claims alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The issue in this area which has long been debated is that of the appropriate standard of care to be required of directors. Historically, the common law was based upon a very low standard of care, because it was subjectively formulated. The contents of this paper can be summarized as follows. The concept of fiduciary duty varies with the way of grasping the concept of duty of loyalty. The approach of proscriptive duty which is based on ``no conflict rule`` and ``no profit rule`` regards fiduciary duty as clearly limited sense, inadequate availability to ban the concept of self-interest, looking ``prescriptive duty`` approach to the Board concerning a wide range of actions it needs to look into the concept. Specifically set forth Companies Act 2006 general obligation of the directors of these seven kinds of discourse perspective, the ``prescriptive duty`` to see that approach is taken, as, according to § 178(2), only § 174 which is so-called duty of care to be non fiduciary duty, including § 172 those outside the fiduciary duty is to become. On the other hand, according to the authors opinion who`s position of proscriptive duty approach, § 175 - § 177 are to be fiduciary duty, and § 171 - § 174 are to be non fiduciary duty. However, there is a difficulty underlying § 170(3) and (4), arising from the fact that, as we shall see, the statutory statement is more than simply a restatement of the commom law. In some cases it clarifies areas of uncertainty in the commom law, for example, in relation to the standard of care expected of directors, whilst in other cases it adopts a different approach from that of the common law, for example, in relarion to the authorisation by independent directors of conflicts of duty. Where there is a departure in the statutory statement from the previous common law, it will obviously be inappropriate for the courts to refer to that common law in the interpretation of the statutory duties. I think that the concrete verification is required to the reasoning and effectiveness of proscriptive duty approach, regarding the remedy for the breach of fiduciary duty in company law or the application of fiduciary duty on employment like as in adjoining company law.

민법상 대리인과 수임인의 신인의무

이지민 전남대학교 법학연구소 2015 법학논총 Vol.35 No.1

No one can be an expert in every area. In order to avoid wasteful duplication of effort, people generally rely on other members of society who expertise in that field. Yet reliance and trust pose risks for the trusting and dependent persons. When people notice such risks, they will either take extra steps to verify the truth or avoid the use of other people's services. Eventually, the cost to both society and its members are likely to rise. However, recognition of fiduciary duties in entrusting relationship may facilitate reliance among members in society by reducing the risks for entrusting members. Although the current Korean Civil Code does not explicitly recognize fiduciary duties in agency and mandate relationship, agent and mandatee have duties similar to those of fiduciaries. However, considering the fact that agency and mandate relationships are based on reliance and trust between principal and agent or mandator and mandatee, the scope of mandatee's duties need to be expanded. For example, mandatee currently has duty to account, duty not to delegate the fiduciary services to others, duty to follow instructions, duty to transfer objects acquired for mandator, and duty of care. However, the scope of mandatee's duties need to be expanded to include duty to avoid self dealing, duty not to compete, duty to keep confidential information, and duty to keep separate account. For the agent, Korean Civil Code imposes duty to avoid self dealing, duty not to compete, duty to follow instructions, duty not to delegate the fiduciary services to others, and duty of care. This needs to be expanded to include duty to account, duty to keep separate account, duty to keep confidential information. However, recognition of general rules of fiduciary duties would not be required. In addition, the scope of fiduciary's duties should be different based on characteristics of each entrusting relationships. Some fiduciary relationships are undoubtedly more intense than others. So the greater the independent authority to be exercised by the fiduciary, the greater the scope of his fiduciary duty. For instance, a trustee should be under a stricter duty of loyalty than an agent upon whom limited authority is conferred or a corporate director who can act only as a member of the board of directors. However, considering the fact that agency and mandate relationships are also entrusting, fiduciary, relationships which pose risks of abuse of power, these relationships should be subject to the fiduciary principle, although not to the same extent. 오늘날의 사회에서는 모든 일을 스스로 처리하기 어렵다. 그에 따라 스스로 일을 처리하기 보다는 신임할 수 있는 다른 사람에게 이를 맡기는 것이 더 효율적인 경우가 많다. 그러나 이와 같은 타인에 대한 신뢰와 신임에는 남용의 위험이 따른다. 그리고 이러한 위험이 존재하는 경우, 사실을 확인하기 위해서 추가적인 노력을 들여야 하거나 다른 사람을 이용하는 것을 기피하게 될 수도 있어, 결국 비용의 증가로 이어지게 된다. 그러나 신인의무의 법리가 인정된다면 구성원들 간에 신뢰를 형성하는데 도움을 줄 수있고, 이와 같은 비용을 낮출 수 있다. 결국 우리 사회에서 신임관계의 중요성이 커지면서 이와 같은 신인의무법리에 대해 검토해 볼 필요가 생긴 것이다. 현재 민법에서도 이미 대리인과 수임인에게 일정부분 신인의무와 유사한 의무가 인정되고 있으며, 대리와 위임 모두 특별한 신뢰관계를 기반으로 한다는 점에서 현재보다는 넓은 범위에서 신인의무가 인정될 필요가 있다. 예를 들어, 위임인에게는 기존에 인정되고 있는 보고의무, 자기복무의무 및 지시에 따를 의무, 취득물 등의 인도의무 및선관주의의무 외에 자기거래의 금지 및 경업피지의무, 비밀유지의무 및 분별관리의무가 인정되어야 하며, 대리인의 경우에는 자기거래 및 쌍방대리 금지와 경업피지의무, 지시에 따를 의무 및 자기복무의무, 선관주의의무에서 더 나아가 보고의무, 분별관리의무, 비밀유지의무도 인정될 필요가 있다. 그러나 그렇다고 하여 일반규정으로서의 충실의무를 규정할 필요까지는 없을 것이다. 왜냐하면 각각의 관계에 따라 그 신인의무의내용과 범위에서 차이가 있을 수 있는데, 대리와 위임은 일반적으로 충실의무가 인정되고 있는 신탁에 비해서는 신인의무가 인정될 필요성이 적기 때문이다. 또한 신인의무에 있어서 그 내용 및 범위는 각각의 신임관계의 성격에 따라 차이가있어야 한다. 신인의무의 인정 취지 중 하나가 신인의무자의 권한남용의 방지라는 점에서 신인의무자가 행사할 수 있는 재량, 즉 위탁받은 권한이 크면 클수록 신인의무의 범위도 크고, 그 재량이 작으면 의무의 범위도 작어야 한다. 예컨대 제한적인 권한이 수여되는 대리인 또는 이사회의 구성원으로만 행위할 수 있는 이사보다는 수탁자가 더 엄격한 충실의무를 부담하여야 한다. 심지어 같은 위임관계일지라도 실제로는 간단한 사무의 처리를 맡은 경우와 같이 고도의 신뢰관계가 반드시 필요하지 않고, 재량의 여지도 크지 않은 경우도 있다. 그러므로 획일적으로 신인의무의 정도를 결정하기 보다는같은 종류의 신임관계에 있어서도 각각의 경우에 서로 다른 신인의무의 정도를 인정할필요도 있다. 그러나 당사자가 스스로를 타방 당사자의 남용으로부터 합리적으로 보호할 수 있다면 굳이 신인의무 법리의 보호를 인정할 필요는 없을 것이다. 그러므로 위임과 대리의 경우 신탁과 같이 획일적으로 충실의무에 대한 일반규정을 둘 필요는 없을것이다. 다만, 위임과 대리 또한 충실의무를 필요로 하는 신임관계에 기초로 하는 관계이고, 권한남용의 여지가 존재한다는 점에서 이를 방지할 수 있는 최소한의 충실의무를구체화한 규정의 도입은 필요해 보인다.

수임자의무(Fiduciary Duty)에 대한 영미법의 해석론 비교연구

박기령 이화여자대학교 법학연구소 2009 法學論集 Vol.13 No.3

1998년 상법개정을 통해 영미법에서 이사의 책임에 관한 중요한 기본원리라고 설명하는 수임자의무(fiduciary duty)를 충실의무라는 명칭으로 우리 법에 도입하였다. 그렇지만 이 충실의무가 기존의 선관주의의무와 어떤 상관관계가 있는가에 대한 연구가 충분히 이루어지지 않은 상황에서 법원은 충실의무를 사실상 선관주의의무와 동일한 의미의 규정으로 해석하고 있다. 그렇다면 충실의무의 입법적 기원이 되는 수임자의무를 영국법과 미국법은 어떻게 해석하고 있는가에 대한 의문이 제기된다. 이에 대한 연구가 선행되어야만 우리 법에서 해석하는 선관주의의무와의 비교가 가능하기 때문이다. 이 논문은 이러한 의문에서 출발하여 다음의 두 가지 내용을 확인하였다. 먼저 영국법과 미국법은 수임자의무를 동일한 내용으로 해석하지 않으며, 심지어 이 의무를 해석할 때 그 시작점 자체를 달리하여 진행한다는 것을 확인하였다. 그리고 두 법이 수임자의무의 역할 또는 본질에 대하여 어떻게 달리 해석하고 있는지 구체적으로 비교·연구하였다. 미국법은 수임자의무를 열린 개념으로 해석하여 수임자의 지위에 있는 자가 부담하는 의무 전반을 수임자의무로 해석한다. 반면에 영국은 수임자의무라고 특징지을 수 있는 의무가 존재한다는 전제하에 충성의무(duty of loyalty)야말로 진정한 수임자의무라고 해석한다. 수임자의무에 대한 미국법과 영국법의 이러한 해석태도의 차이는 결국 수임자의 범위와 그의 역할에 대한 평가, 구제수단의 차이를 야기한다. 영국법과 미국법의 수임자의무이론에 대한 비교법적 분석은 우리 법원이 이사의 책임에 관한 상법 제382조의3을 해석하는 새로운 시각을 제시해줄 수 있다. The economic crisis of the late 1990s greatly affected the Korean corporate law including other financial rules. One of the significant changes for corporate law is the rule regarding directors' liabilities. Aside from the existing duty of care as a good manager for directors, the fiduciary duty concept in Anglo-American law was incorporated into the Korean corporate law system. Without an expansive review of fiduciary principle in Anglo-American law, the Supreme Court interpreted the new fiduciary duty as an identical concept as the duty of care as a good manager. This article focuses on the judicial review of the fiduciary principle and proceeds in two substantive sections. Under the American legal system, all duties owed by a fiduciary are appropriately treated as fiduciary duties. Moreover, academic researches including cases regarding fiduciary relationship and duties, consider the boundary of a fiduciary position as open-ended. On the other hand, fiduciary law in UK and Commonwealth made an effort to pursue the existence of peculiar fiduciary duties, which are the duties that fiduciaries owe but not owed by non-fiduciaries. Considering the duty of loyalty as the peculiar fiduciary duty, the fiduciary doctrine in UK emphasize that the fiduciary duty is designed to protect proper performance of the non-fiduciary from inconsistent influences and prohibits the fiduciary from acting in a situation where he has a personal interest which is inconsistent with his non-fiduciary duty. The distinction between the American legal system and the English legal system regarding the fiduciary principle generated divergence in the scope of a fiduciary position, the function of fiduciary duties and remedies for the breach of the fiduciary duties. This comparative research on the interpretation of fiduciary doctrine suggest Korean courts how to review the article of 382-3 of Commercial Law for directors' liabilities.

美國法上 理事의 責任과 義務 - Fiduciary Duty를 중심으로 : 美國法上 理事의 責任과 義務

賈政埈(Jung-Joon Ka) 한국비교사법학회 2007 비교사법 Vol.14 No.1

This paper has mainly examined the fiduciary duties. Since I am not an expert of commercial law, it is not comfortable to do my research under the duties of director. However, everybody has claimed that the fiduciary duties of director have originated from ones of trustee. It has added that even the fiduciary duties of director in Korean law come from the ones of trustee in common law. Nevertheless, it is not easy to find the Korean articles on the fiduciary duties of trustee in common law. This is the main reason why I began to research this topic and introduce this article to this Law Review. This paper consists of five chapters. First and last one are the introduction and conclusion, respectively. Second one explored the fiduciary duties of trustee in trust. Third one studied the duties of director in commercial law. Fourth one was about the comparison of fiduciary duties between a trustee and director in the point of view under law and economics. In the second chapter, I introduced the traditional fiduciary duties of trustee. These duties are mainly classified into the duties to res and beneficiaries. The duty to res is more detailed with the followings; the duty collect in the assets, the duty to invest, the duty to distribute, the duty to maintain equality, and the duty to provide accounts and information. The trustee is required to perform these kinds of duties with utmost diligent. On the other hand, the duty to beneficiaries is summarized as the duty to manage trust only for beneficiaries. It is so called the duty of loyalty. This duty of loyalty requires a trustee to do his or her duty more than with good faith and reasonable standard. In the third chapter, I explained the duties of directors based on the fiduciary duties of trustee. Like the duties of trustee, the ones of director are summarized into the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Especially, they are called fiduciary duties of director. They are required to perform these duties with the care of an ordinarily prudent person and good faith. However, it is likely that the standards of director to do these duties are lower than those of trustee. In the fourth chapter, I tried to show the differences of fiduciary duty between trustee and director in the point of view under law and economics. Mainly, such differences are explained with the theory for the asymmetry of information. This theory tells a lot of reasons for such differences. It is unlikely to assume an asymmetry of information under the relationship between directors and shareholders and the structure of the corporation. On the other hand, it is likely to assume the asymmetry of information under the relationship between trustees and beneficiaries and the structure of trusts. The likelihood for the asymmetric information requires trustees to have a higher standard for fiduciary duties than directors. In conclusion, it is more necessary to do research for the fiduciary duties of trustees because of enormous changes in using trusts. Recently, many people have used trusts as the means of investment rather than the means of management and inheritance. In such these circumstances, the fiduciary duties of trustees should be redefined.

이사의 선관의무와 충실의무의 법사학적 기원에 관한 고찰

박기령 한국상사법학회 2011 商事法硏究 Vol.30 No.2

In Korea, the 1998 amendment to the Korean Commercial Code introduced a catchall provision which is analogous to the director’s duty of loyalty in U.S. corporate law. Prior to the amendment, Article 382(2) of the Korean Commercial Code provided that the relationship between a corporation and its directors was to be governed by the provision of mandates in the Korean Civil Code. According to the mandates, mandatories are assigned the duty of care as a good manager, therefore, as mandatories,directors also have the duty to conduct the business of the corporation with reasonable care as a good manager. Since 1998, there has been extensive theoretical debate over the significance of the catchall provision about duty of loyalty. As to whether the distinction between the duty of loyalty and duty of care as a good manager should be recognized under the Korean corporate law, two competing views have developed. Some scholars argues that the catchall provision is only one facet of the duty of care as a good manager,notwithstanding the fact that Article 382-3 is remarkably similar to the fiduciary duty of loyalty in Anglo-American law. On the other hand, there is an emerging view arguing that the catchall provision of Article 382-3 should be distinguished from the duty of care as a good manager. However, this theoretical debate seems to have overlooked the significance of the historical origin of the duties. To begin with, this study traced back to bonus paterfamilias in Roman law to find the historical origin of duty of care as a good manager. Bonus paterfamilias means good or diligent father of family, and comprise the classical definition of the Civil law’s culpa levis in abstracto. Moreover,bonus paterfamilias and part of culpa levis in abstracto strays into common law language in the late nineteenth century, as a device to intensify the duty of care. Meanwhile, the concept of fiduciary duty of loyalty originates from the law of trust, more specifically, the English Equity. Roman idea such as fideicommissum or fiducia may have helped to provide vocabulary for fiduciary itself. However, the prototype of fiduciary duty of loyalty begins with Keech v. Sandford(1726) which is the case of the Chancery Court. Fiduciary duty of loyalty is typically described as : a fiduciary must avoid conflict fiduciary’s duty and his personal interest and must not derive any unauthorized profit from his fiduciary position. Fiduciary duty of loyalty’s strict characteristics explains the vulnerability of human nature which is likely to be swayed by personal interest rather than by duty as a fiduciary. As a result, the corporate directors’ duty of care as a good manager, the duty to conduct the business judgment with the reasonable care has substantially different nature and historical origin in comparison with the duty of loyalty as a duty to avoid to conflict of interest and duty. Therefore, having confirmed a basic difference of the historical origins and the nature between the duty of care as a good manager and the duty of loyalty, there is an opportunity to highlight one particular aspect of the duty to avoid conflict of interest and duty as a fiduciary duty of loyalty.

영미법상 신인의무법의 발전과 신인의무의 본질적 요소에 관한 소고

장명 사법발전재단 2023 사법 Vol.1 No.65

신탁법의 정비와 맞물려 국내에서 신탁 시장의 규모가 지속적으로 확대됨에 따라 신탁을 둘러싼 각종 법적 분쟁 역시 증가하는 추세에 있고, 특히 수탁자의 의무 위반 여부는 분쟁의 해결에 있어 중요한 쟁점이 되는 경우가 적지 않다. 현행 신탁법의 중요한 특징 중 하나는 구 신탁법상 명시적인 규정이 없었던 충실의무에 관한 규정(신탁법 제33조)을 마련함과 아울러 수탁자의 이익충돌행위(신탁법 제34조)와 이익향수행위(신탁법 제36조)를 엄격하게 금지하는 한편, 만약 수탁자가 이러한 의무에 위반하여 부당한 이득을 취득한 경우 취득한 이득을 모두 신탁재산에 반환하도록 하는 책임을 부과(신탁법 제43조 제3항)하는 등 수탁자의 의무와 관련하여 영미법상 신탁을 중심으로 발전한 신인관계 및 신인의무에 관한 법리를 적극적으로 도입하고 이를 체계화하였다는 점에 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 아직까지 영미법상 신인관계 내지 신인의무에 관한 심도 있는 논의는 많지 않은 실정이다. 본고는 이러한 점에 착안하여 신탁 및 신인의무법의 발전과정을 되짚어 보는 한편, 신인관계 내지 신인의무를 구성하는 본질적 요소에 관한 영미법상의 주요 논의들을 고찰하였다. 신인관계 내지 신인의무의 본질에 관한 논의는 신인관계와 비신인관계를 구분할 수 있는 기준을 제시한다는 점에 그 의의가 있다. 신인관계 내지 신인의무는 수인자가 그 지위를 남용하여 자신의 이익을 도모하는 행위를 억제함으로써 본인의 신뢰를 보호하는 역할을 수행하지만, 이는 반대로 신인관계로 인해 신인의무를 부과받는 수인자의 자유가 축소되는 것을 의미하기도 한다. 또한 신인의무에 관한 법리를 무분별하게 확장하는 경우 구성원들의 도덕이나 윤리에 의하여 해결할 영역까지 법이 침투하여 법과 도덕의 경계를 모호하게 만들 우려가 있다. 한편 신인관계 내지 신인의무의 본질을 지나치게 엄격하게 파악하는 경우에는 다양성과 가변성을 특징으로 하는 신인의무에 관한 법리의 확장성에 장애요인이 될 수 있고, 이는 궁극적으로 신인의무법의 규율이 반드시 필요한 법률관계를 적절히 보호하지 못하는 결과를 초래할 수 있다. 영미법 국가의 법원은 전형적인 수인자의 지위에 있는 수탁자를 포함하여 이사, 대리인, 후견인, 유언집행자, 변호사, 의사 등과 같이 다양한 법률관계에서 신인관계를 인정하고 있다. 나아가 설령 당사자에게 신인관계가 인정되는 전통적인 지위가 존재하지 않는다고 하더라도 당사자의 관계, 일방에 위탁된 재산이나 정보의 내용 및 그 중요성, 일방이 보유하고 있는 권한의 크기와 재량의 정도 등을 종합적으로 고려하여 당사자 일방이 타방의 이익을 우선시하는 것이 타당하다고 판단되는 경우에는 신인관계를 인정함으로써 신인의무법의 영역을 확장하고 있다. 국내에서는 상법상 이사의 충실의무(상법 제382조의3)의 도입을 계기로 이사의 신인의무에 관한 논의는 비교적 이루어졌으나, 여전히 타인의 사무를 처리하는 다른 제도와 관련하여서는 신인의무에 관한 논의가 충분하지 않다. 현대사회에서 타인의 신뢰를 기반으로 타인의 사무를 처리하는 경우가 급속하게 증가하고 있다는 점을 고려하면, 신인의무법은 장차 우리 사회가 신뢰 사회로 정착하는 과정에서 중요한 역할을 담당할 수 있다고 생각한다. 향후 타인의 사무를 처리하는 다양한 법률관계에서 신인의무에 관한 논의가... Trustees must comply with No-Conflict Rule and No-Profit Rule in handling trust affairs. If the trustee obtains an unjustified profit by violating the above obligations, the trustee must return all of the acquired profit to the trust property. As such, The Current Trust Act introduced a significant portion of the Anglo-American’s fiduciary law in relation to the trust affairs of the trustee. Nevertheless, there are not many in-depth discussions about the fiduciary duty. Based on this awareness of the problem, this study reviewed the development process of the trust and the fiduciary law, and further examined major discussions on the essential elements of the fiduciary relationship or the fiduciary law in the Anglo-American law. The discussion on the essential elements of the fiduciary duty is meaningful in that it presents a criterion for distinguishing a fiduciary relationship from a non-fiduciary relationship. The fiduciary duty serves to protect the principal's trust by restraining the fiduciary from abusing their authority to promote his/her own interests. Conversely, this also means that the fiduciary's freedom to bear the fiduciary duty is curtailed. On the other hand, if the fiduciary duty is defined too restrictively, it may become an obstacle to the expansion of the fiduciary law, which is characterized by diversity and variability. Ultimately, this may result in failure to adequately protect legal relationships that require the discipline of the fiduciary law. Courts governed by Anglo-American law recognize fiduciary relationships in a variety of relationships, such as directors, agents, guardians, executors, lawyers, doctors, including trustees. Furthermore, the above court expands the scope of the fiduciary law by acknowledging the fiduciary relationship by comprehensively considering various circumstances, even if the parties do not have the traditional status of fiduciary relationships. In Korea, there is not enough discussion about the fiduciary duty in relation to other systems that handle other people's affairs, except for directors under the Commercial Act. Considering that the case of handling other people's affairs based on trust is rapidly increasing in modern society, the fiduciary law can play an important role in the process of our society settling into a society of trust in the future. It is hoped that there will be active discussions on the fiduciary duty in various legal relationships in the future.

충실의무와 선관의무의 작동방식; 충실의무의 선관의무 보충 역할에 대하여

이중기 ( Choong Kee Lee ) 홍익대학교 법학연구소 2015 홍익법학 Vol.16 No.4

In English law, fiduciary duties are considered to be proscriptive in nature. They operate negatively by prohibiting the fiduciary from acting in a particular way that could harm the principal``s interest, such as self-dealing with the principal. On the other hand, non-fiduciary duties of the fiduciary such as a fiduciary``s duty of care are to be prescriptive in effect, and operate positively by ordering the fiduciary to act in a particular way that could benefit the principal, such as paying due attention to or managing properly the principal``s affairs or properties. In this article, firstly, the function of the proscriptive fiduciary duties and that of the prescriptive non-fiduciary duties are compared, and then their relationship is investigated. It is argued here that the proscriptive fiduciary principles came into existence to ensure that a fiduciary will perform his non-fiduciary duties properly. In other words, fiduciary duties, derived from the concept of loyalty, are supplementary or subsidiary to non-fiduciary duties - their very existence is to secure that a fiduciary complies with their existing non-fiduciary duties.

주주의 충실의무

김정호 한국경영법률학회 2014 經營法律 Vol.24 No.4

It is well known, that the shareholders in a corporation have also a fiduciary duty to the corporation and other shareholders. In U.S. and German jurisdiction, we can find many cases on the controlling shareholders’ fiduciary duty. The famous ‘Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype’ Case of the Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized the fiduciary relationship between the shareholders in a closely held corporation like in a partnership. The Delaware Chancery and Supreme Court released many useful cases on the law of controlling shareholders, in which the fair price had to be decided by court ruling. The German Federal Supreme Court released in 1988 the ‘Linotype’, the first german case, in which the court recognized the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders in a German stock corporation. Seven years later the same court released the ‘Girmes’, where the court emphasized also the fiduciary duty of minority shareholders in a situation, where they can have a decisive role through their voting right. Judicial Courts in South Korea do not have any comparative cases on the same issue until now. But the Korean Commercial Code has recently established, after the 2011 revision, several legal institutes on the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders (ss. 360-24, 398 etc). The fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders has played an important role especially in the following sections. First of all, the self-dealing between the controlling shareholder and company reveals a good example for conflicting transaction. Almost all the jurisdiction employes the entire fairness standard or requests preapproval by independent directors. Secondly, the institute of ‘de facto directors’ can be used for the controlling shareholders who actively intervene in corporate affairs. Thirdly, there are many cases of violating the shareholders’ fiduciary duty in a ‘going private’ transaction. In especially in the 1980s U. S., there were a number of ‘two tier front loaded tender offer’. Finally we can find a good example for the fiduciary duty of controlling shareholders in German Konzernrecht. The German law of corporate groups(Konzernrecht) has the most elaborate device. Corporate parents have the power to instruct their subsidiaries to follow group interests. They must indemnify for any losses that stem from acting in the group’s interest. The German law of corporate groups grants the subsidiaries the Ausgleichsanspruch (an indemnification right). The author is eagerly waiting for the first Korean case on the shareholder’s fiduciary duty.

미국 투자자문업법상 주의의무에 대한 법적 쟁점과 그 시사점 분석

김용재 한국경영법률학회 2014 經營法律 Vol.25 No.1

This paper deals with duties of investment bankers except broker-dealers, which include investment advisors, fund managers and trustees (hereinafter investment advisors) under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act in Korea (hereinafter the Act). Traditionally, broker-dealers have been always subject to the duty of care and sometimes a fiduciary duty. Thus, the most important issue regarding their duty is when they are subject to either the duty of care or the fiduciary duty. In a latter case, they should prove that they did their best to pursue the benefit of clients and otherwise they should compensate damages which are based on a simple calculation method provided by the law. In contrast to broker-dealers, investment advisors are always subject to the fiduciary duty in principle. Thus, it is a very rare case where investment advisors are not liable under safe harbor provisions beyond the fiduciary duty. The main reason why they are more liable than broker-dealers is that they have a firsthand duty to protect the interest of clients as fiduciaries and should not stand on a conflicting and contrary position in order to enhance their own interest. The Act proclaims the duty of care and the fiduciary duty against investment advisors, fund managers and trustees separately. Thus, a relationship between the duty of care and the fiduciary duty should be clarified. Some one may argue both duties are so different that all the business of conduct regulations, including regulations prohibiting conflicting interests, should be clearly divided into two parts under both duties. This paper argues that both duties are fundamentally same in terms of investment advisors, so that division works above based on a different view of both duties are meaningless. Traditional arguments regarding inter-relationships between both duties are also unnecessary in these investment advisor sectors. The concept of the fiduciary duty either under the Corporation Act or the Act is quite different since the former has treated the fiduciary duty as a kind of the duty of care but the latter has acknowledged the fiduciary duty as a more weighted one than the traditional duty of care. Nevertheless, nobody understands a reason why the Corporation Act and the Act are using the same word. Key rules such as the best interest rule and the best execution rule should be adopted since these rules are fundamental and significant in the fiduciary duty context. Strict rules severely limiting rights and imposing duties should be provided by the Act in essence especially under the rule of law and the due process philosophies. Soft dollar related provisions are not exceptions to these philosophies. All these arguments are modeled on the U.S. Investment Advisors Act of 1940.