일본의 군사전략 변화에 따른 한국의 대응

임정혁 한국동북아학회 2012 한국동북아논총 Vol.17 No.4

This thesis aims to present a responding strategy of Korea that copes with the future promotion of modernization of Japanese defense policy and military strategy by looking into the promotion of modernization of defense policy and military strategy in Japan, which intends to restore the regional leadership in Northeast Asia by becoming a military power that corresponds to the status of political and economical power with modernization of military strength. Japan, which was the defeated nation in the Second World War, could do its best in economic growth by depending so much on the United States of America for security according to the U.S.A-Japan Security Treaty based on the pacifist constitution. Japan approved the basic bill for national security on the seventh of July, 2012, which made it possible for Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense without constitutional reform. This thesis analyzed the changing process of defense policy and military technology in Japan, which aims for normal country and military power, and the direction for promoting modernization of Japanese military strength. The defense policy of Japan in the Cold War era designated the Soviet Union as a major threat, reinforced the U.S.A-Japan security system, and placed emphasis on building up the military strength of the Self-Defense Forces. In addition, Japan continued the propagation and promotion that gives an impression of the forces restricted to defending the territory by expressing the national post-war defense policy as "defense" rather than "national defense". Japan Self-Defense Forces broke away from the existing passive defense concept, the exclusively defensive security policy and adopted the local defense concept, which is a more extensive concept, starting from 1978. Japan achieved rapid progress in the field of military technology on the basis of economic strength and technical skills. Therefore, Korea has to take a realistic action against modernization of Japanese military strategy, not to mention of changing security environment in Northeast Asia, in order to protect national interest. To this end, Korea needs to be capable of playing a leading role by enhancing national power as well as proactively responding to regional environment. 본 논문은 정치․경제대국지위에 상응하는 군사대국화로 동북아시아의 역내 주도권을 회복하고자 하는 일본의 방위정책과 군사전략 현대화 추진을 연구함으로써 향후 일본의 방위정책과 군사전략 현대화 추진에 따른 한국의 대응전략을 제시하는데 목적이 있다. 제2차 세계대전의 패전국 일본은 평화헌법을 바탕으로 미․일 안보조약에 따라 안보의 상당한 부분을 미국에 의존함으로써 경제성장에 전력을 경주할 수 있었다. 일본은 2012년 7월 7일 국가안전 보장 기본법안을 승인하여 헌법 개정 없이도 집단적 자위권 행사가 가능하게 되었다. 냉전기 일본의 방위정책은 소련을 주요 위협대상으로 설정하고, 미․일 안보체제를 강화하는 한편, 자위대의 전력을 증강하는데 역점을 두어 왔다. 뿐만 아니라 일본은 전후의 국방정책을 ‘국방’이 아닌 ‘방위’라고 표현 하여 영토를 지키는 일에만 한정된 군대라는 인상을 각인시키는 선전 및 홍보활동을 계속해 왔다. 일본 자위대는 1978년을 기점으로 전수방위라는 기존의 소극적 방어개념에서 벗어나 보다 광범위한 개념인 지역방위 개념을 도입하였으며, 경제력과 기술력을 바탕으로 군사과학기술분야에서도 비약적인 발전을 이룩하였다. 따라서 한국이 국가이익을 수호하기 위해서는 동북아시아의 안보환경변화는 물론 일본의 군사전략 현대화 추진에 대해서는 냉철하게 대응해야 한다. 이를 위해서는 주변환경에 능동적으로 대처함은 물론이고 국력을 배양하여 동북아시아의 세력균형자로서 주도적인 역할을 수행 할 수 있는 능력을 가져야 할 것이다.

전후 일본의 방위 구상: 일본 우익 세력의 자위대 구상과 그 실천 과정

서민교 서울대학교 일본연구소 2014 일본비평 Vol.- No.10

This paper analyzes the process of rearmament in postwar Japan from 1948 to 1950s during which the Self-Defense Force was established, and tries to understand how Japan’s rearmament was designed and what characterized its practical procedures. As the rearmament process became fully in progress in the 1950s, the recruitment of the military officials of the Imperial Army, the idea which was originally rejected, became inevitable. In this sense, it is essential to pay attention to the activities of the cooperative organizations such as Hattori Group (formerly organized by Imperial Army officials) as well as military advisor to prime minister Yoshida. On the other hand, even though both army and navy were “officially” dismissed after the war ended, the minespweeper units of the Imperial Navy remained undissolved. Unlike the case of the army, the networks of the navy personnel which centered around Japan Coast Guard was administered in a unified manner, and it is noteworthy that some of the former military personnel who assumed office had close personal connection with Yoshida. That is why this paper sheds light on the role of “Commssion Y.”Japan promised a large-scale rearmament to the US after the two signed MSA agreement in March 1954, which obliged the US to provide support for its allies and the US allies to strengthen their military capabilities. The SDF, often called “military without name” or “non-militaristic military,” which was the product of this agreement, began to function as a physical apparatus to take over Japan’s defense. Recently, there have been two conflicting arguments regarding Japan’s right of collective self-defense. When we look at the overall framework of these arguments, however, most agree that Japan should provide defense to the US “in such times as the United States is under attack by a third party.” In this reasoning, however, there still remains a crucial question as to whether defending of the United States is to be classified as “individual” or “collective” self-defense. If Japan accords itself the right of “collective” self-defense, the possibility for Japan to get involved in international conflicts led by the US becomes higher, because virtually there would be no restrictions on the use of force. After all, all these issues can be resolved if Japan takes on the constitutional revision. Yet there still remains a strong anti-revisionist sentiments among the Japanese people. Under these circumstances, it is crucial to pay attention how far the “interpretational revision” can suffice in dealing with Japan’s changing defense framework.

일본의 집단자위권 행사를 향한 기나긴 여정 개관

김대순 ( Kim Dae Soon ),김민서 ( Kim Min Seo ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 2016 法學硏究 Vol.26 No.3

It is one of the basic principles of international law that states have the natural or inherent right to self-defense, individual or collective. Apparently, the debates within Japan look rather unique: the present cabinet headed by Prime Minister Abe is trying to legalize Japan`s exercise of collective self-defense. The traditional approach of Japan towards its self-defense since the end of World War II has been that when it comes to “collective” self-defense, it has the right thereto but cannot exercise it. Article 9 of its self-styled “Peace Constitution” lies in the heart of this approach. Prime Minister Abe is attempting to subvert the up-to-now interpretation of this Article under the pretext that now is the time for Japan to become a “normal state”. This paper surveys how and where the internal logic of Japan about its collective self-defense is moving.

박정희 대통령의 자주국방 표방과 주한미군 철수 문제 간 연계성에 관한 소고

김지일 사단법인 한국평화연구학회 2020 평화학연구 Vol.21 No.1

Why did President Park Chung-Hee adopt an ambivalent attitude on the issue of the withdrawal of the United States Forces Korea (USFK), claiming to advocate self-reliance in national defense? This study aims to infer President Park Chung-Hee’s perceptions and reaction on the issues of self-reliance in national defense and the withdrawal of the USFK by historical records. The research utilizes as its basis the theoretical framework of ‘reaction to the fear of crime.’ The analytical findings show the following. First, to Park, self-reliance in national defense was ‘protective behavior’ in response to the fear of having to deal with threat, rather than expression of confidence. Second, an analysis of public speech materials shows that the emphasis on self-reliance in national defense as the threat from North Korea escalated was closely connected to the issue of the withdrawal of the USFK. Lastly, it is inferred that Park’s ambivalent attitude was a reaction of fear in response to the breakaway of ‘collective behavior.’ 왜 박정희 대통령은 자주국방을 표방하면서 주한미군 철수 문제에 대해 양면적인 태도를 취했나? 본 연구의 질문이다. 연구의 목적은 연구 질문을 중심으로 현재까지 공개된 사료를 토대로 박정희 대통령의 자주국방과 주한미군 철수 문제 간 그의 인식과 반응을 추론해 내는 것이다. 또한 본 연구는 학계에서 다루는 ‘범죄의 두려움에 대한 반응’을 논문의 이론적 근거로 활용한다. 연구를 진행하면서 다음과 같은 사실이 명확해졌다. 우선 박정희 대통령에게 있어 자주국방은 자신감의 표현이라기보다는 ‘방어적 행위(Protective Behavior)’로 위협에 대처하기 위한 두려움의 반응이었다. 다음으로 공개된 연설문 자료를 분석한 결과, 북한의 위협적 상황이 심화되면서 표방된 자주국방은 주한미군 철수 문제와 밀접한 연계성을 갖고 있었다. 끝으로 박정희 대통령의 양면적인 태도는 ‘집합적 행위(Collective Behavior)’의 이탈에 대한 대응으로, 자주국방을 표방한 반응에서 드러난 바와 같은 두려움에 대한 반응이라는 추론이다.

‘보통국가’ 일본의 군사적 함의: 집단적 자위권, 적 기지 공격론을 중심으로

김재엽 국방대학교 국가안전보장문제연구소 2019 국방연구 Vol.62 No.2

제2차 세계대전 이후 일본은 자체 방어만을 위한 최소한의 군사력을 보유, 운용하는 전수방위 원칙을 추구해 왔다. 하지만 냉전이 종식된 1990년대 초부터 일본은 '보통국가'라는 구호 아래, 미국과의 동맹 강화와 국제적인 안보 질서에 기여할 수 있도록 군사력의 지리적·기능적인 역할, 임무를 확대하고 있다. 집단적 자위권의 허용, 적 기지 공격론의 공론화 등이 그 대표적인 사례다. 보통국가 노선에 입각한 일본 군사력의 역할, 임무 확대가 중국의 공세적, 현상타파적인 대외 전략에 맞서 동아시아 지역의 전략적 안정에 기여하는 측면이 존재함은 사실이다. 그러나 역사 수정주의로 대표되는 일본 지도세력의 전략적 의도에 관한 불확실성, 공격형 군사력의 추구는 일본 군사력의 역할, 임무 확대가 역내 안보 질서에 또 다른 불안정 요인으로 작용할 가능성을 보여준다. 지정학적으로 일본과 밀접한 관계에 있는 한국은 일본의 군사적인 역할, 임무 확대가 야기할 수 있는 전략적 영향을 면밀히 주시하고, 이에 효과적으로 대응할 수 있는 방안을 모색해야 할 것이다. Since the end of World War II, Japan has sought the "exclusively defense-oriented policy", which maintains minimum armed capabilities limited to its own defense. However, from 1990s, shortly after the Cold War ended, the idea of “normal state” has begun to prevail in Japan; calling for expanded role in military arena, in terms of both geography and functions, to support a stronger alliance with the United States and international security. Japan’s legalization of collective self-defense and growing publicized debates on enemy base strike are typical examples. It may be true that Japan’s expanded military role, according to the idea of “normal state”, can contribute to strategic stability in East Asia by countering China’s assertiveness in the region. On the other hand, however, the uncertainty on Japanese leadership's strategic intentions, represented by historical revisionism, and the pursuit of offensive military capabilities show a possibility that Japan’s expanded role in military arena will be another destabilizing factor for regional security in East Asia. Korea, which is in close geopolitical relations with Japan, needs to keep attentions to possible strategic influences by Japan’s move for expanding its military role and seek effective policy alternatives.

Chrysanthemum Withered: The Faded Yoshida Doctrine and the Shift in the Japanese Security Policy Under the Abe Cabinet

윤준일 한국사회과학협의회 2019 Korean Social Science Journal Vol.46 No.1

In the post-war period, Japan adopted a deliberate and incremental approach in its security policy. To respect the post-war pacifist constitution and deeply rooted nationwide anti-militarism, Japan persistently adhered to the principle of “exclusively defense-oriented policy (senshu boei).” Such a minimalist approach to security policy was, in fact, the key to the Yoshida Doctrine, as it freed Japan from security burdens and brought about unprecedented economic growth. However, the rise of China caused Japanese elites to demand a stronger security policy, depart from the traditional engagement strategy toward China, and start balancing against the emerging threat. Such demand was particularly notable the Second Abe Cabinet. The cabinet decision to allow the exercise of collective self-defense and the security bills that followed signified a great change in Japan’s security policy and an end to the Yoshida Doctrine. This research focuses on the domestic developments that caused this shift, particularly in the Second Abe Cabinet.

일본 외교안보정책의 특징과 동학: 요시다 시대와 아베 시대를 중심으로

신정화 국가안보전략연구원 2022 국가안보와 전략 Vol.22 No.4

This paper analyzes the characteristics and shifting dynamics of foreign policy and national security during the Yoshida era in the Cold War and the Abe era during the US-China rivalry. Firstly, the Yoshida cabinet developed the “Yoshida Doctrine,” a national philosophy that placed an emphasis on economic development. In accordance with the exclusively defense-oriented policy dictated by the U.S.-Japan security alliance, Japan’s foreign policy and national security at the time were primarily focused on the Asia-Pacific region. This policy was ‘one country pacifism’ Meanwhile, during the Abe era, Japan actively led foreign policy and national security, aiming to contain China. Abe’s diplomacy allowed Japan to expand its scope of areas to the Indo-Pacific region, strengthen the US-Japan alliance, and exercise the right to collective self-defense. It can be called ‘proactive pacifism’ pacifism’ in contrast to the Yoshida era. 본 논문의 목적은 냉전기 55년체제하 요시다 시대와 미중경쟁기 자민당일당우위체제하 아베 시대의 외교안보정책의 특징과 동학을 비교⋅제시하는 것이다. 먼저, 요시다 시대는 경제 발전을 최우선시 하는 「요시다노선」 이 국가의 기본 노선이었다. 외교안보의 주된 지역은 아시아태평양으로, 미일동맹에 안보를 의존하면서 전수방위에 전념하는 ‘일국 평화주의’였다. 한편, 아베 시대는 중국 견제를 목표로 지리적 범위를 인도⋅태평양으로 확장하고, NSC의 주도하에 미일동맹을 강화하면서 집단적 자위권 행사를 가능하게 했다. 요시다 시대와는 대비되는 ‘적극적 평화주의’라고 할 수 있다.

전후 일본의 안보체제와 집단적 자위권 -안보조약과 신안보조약을 중심으로-

유지아 동국대학교 일본학연구소 2014 일본학 Vol.39 No.-

This paper examines under the point of view that Japan’s military actions and right to collective self-defense have been realized through Security Treaty of 1951 and New Security Treaty of 1960. San francisco Peace Treaty and Security Treaty of 1951 acknowledged “inherent right to individual and collective self-defense” at that time. Nevertheless, Japan took a position that it was impossible for Japan to exercise the right of self-defense according to the clause of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution that Japan discarded possession of military power and the right of belligerency. In the end, Japan’s security issue has been left in an ambiguity by showing the action of suspension for Japan’s right to self-defense as well as rearmament because Peace treaty to Japan was the negotiation between Japan’s early peace settlement and the US’ troops stationing. After signing U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, both nations, the U.S. and Japan, desired to realize “collective defense actions” in an administrative agrement which was an implementation agreement of safeguards agreement related to the issue of taking collective military actions of both nations for emergency. However, Japan’s position of the right of collective self-defense maintained the position in which Japan did not exercise practically the right by restriction of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, although Peace treaty to Japan and U.S.-Japan Security Treaty recognized Japan’s right of collective self-defense. The full text of New security treaty defines stationing of the U.S. military troops for the right of individual and collective self-defense without the provision of premises. Furthermore, it contains Article 3 which maintains and develops the ability of each nation resisting to armed attacks and Article 5, the clause for the right of collective self-defense which could support the U.S. military troops that does not station in Japan domestic. Accordingly, the issue relating to exercise the right of collective self-defense became the matter of discussion limited to overseas dispatch of self-defense forces and Kishi did not bring in overseas activities of self-defense forces at the time. As suggested above Japan has been the position that it could not exercise the right of collective self-defense due to the restriction of Japanese Constitution, although Japan possesses precisely the right of collective self-defense thorough Peace treaty to Japan, Security Treaty, and New Security Treaty. Nevertheless, Japan currently exercises overseas dispatch through enacting the separate law related to the status and activities of self-defense forces. Now, the issue of exercising of collective self-defense that is being promoted by Abe’s administration can be said as the action to reconcile the Japan Constitution and the issue of exercising of the right of collective self-defense and as a result, is closely related to constitutional amendment of Japan. 본고는 일본의 군사적 행동과 집단적 자위권은 1951년의 안보조약과 1960년 신안보조약 개정으로 인해 점진적으로 현실화해나갔다는 관점에서 살펴보았다. 1951년 샌프란시스코 강화조약과 안보조약 당시 이미 “개별적 및 집단적 자위의 고유한 권한”을 가지고 있음을 인정하고 있다. 그러나 일본은 헌법제9조에 일본은 군력보유와 교전권을 방기한다는 조항에 의해 집단적 자위권의 행사는 불가능하다는 입장을 취하였다. 결국 대일강화조약은 일본의 조기강화와 미국의 군대주둔이라는 목적이 확실하게 이루어지는 교섭이었기 때문에 일본의 재군비를 비롯한 이러한 자위권에 대한 부분도 보류하는 모습을 모임으로써 이후 일본의 안보문제를 애매한 상태에 놓이게 한 것이다. 미일안보조약 체결 후 유사시에 미일양국이 군사적으로 어떠한 공동행동을 취할 것인가 하는 문제에 대해 안전보장협정의 실시협정인 행정협정에서 ‘집단방위조치’로 실현하고자 하였다. 그러나 집단적 자위권에 대한 입장은 대일강화조약과 미일안보조약 당시에 취했던 입장, 즉 집단전 자위권을 보유하고 있다는 것을 명확하게 인정은 하지만 헌법제9조의 제약에 의해 현실적으로 행사할 수 있는 상태는 아니라는 입장을 유지하고 있다. 신안보조약에서는 전문에 개별적 및 집단적 자위권에 대해 미국군대의 주둔이라는 전제조항 없이 서술하고 있으며, 무력공격에 저항하는 각각의 능력을 헌법상의 규정에 따르는 조건으로 유지하고 발전시킨다는 제3조와 일본국내가 아닌 지역에도 미군을 지원할 수 있다는 집단적 자위권 항목인 제5조를 담고 있다. 따라서 집단적 자위권 행사에 관한 문제는 자위대를 해외에 파병할 경우에 한해서 논의해야 할 사안이 되었으며, 기시는 당시에 자위대의 해외활동 그 자체를 상정하지 않고 있다. 이와 같이 대일강화조약부터 안보조약, 신안보조약을 거쳐 일본은 집단적 자위권에 대해서늠 명확하게 보유하고 있음을 인정하지만 헌법상의 제약으로 인하여 행사할 수 없다는 입장을 취해왔다. 반면, 자위대의 위상과 활동에 대해서는 별도의 법을 만들어 해외파병까지 실현하고 있는 상황이다. 현재 아베정권이 추진하고 있는 집단적 자위권 행사문제는 헌법과 자위대의 행동을 일치시켜려는 조치라고 할 수 있으며, 따라서 집단적 자위권 행사 문제는 개헌과도 밀접한 관련이 있다고 할 수 있다.

일본의 집단적 자위권 행사와 평화헌법의 위반 문제

이장희 ( Jang-hie Lee ) 한국외국어대학교 법학연구소 2015 외법논집 Vol.39 No.1

This article consists four parts : 1) Right of collective self-defense in international law, 2) Its exercise & review concerning Violation possibility of Preamble and Aricle 9 of Japanese constitution(1947), 3) The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and Its Legal issues concerning Japanese Pacifist Constitution, 4) Evaluation. In as much as the essence of the exercise of the right of self-defense is use of armed force, which may endanger the international peace and security, that should be subject to some limitations. For an exercise of armed force to be justified as self-defense, It should meet, in particular, two most important requirements: necessity and proportionality. On July 1,2014,on the 60th anniversary of establishment of Japan’s Self-defense Forces, Shinzo Abe decided on the reinterpretation of its constitution to allow its collective self-defense through a cabinet council decision. The current japanese constitution(1947) which is commonly called the pacifist constitution denies the Japanese people national forces, the use of force collective self-defense alongside in principle. According the initial interpretation of constitution by the Japanese government, even a war for ‘individual’ self-defense was renounced to dispell the disgrace of a warlike country as confirmed in the National Assembly records. Article 9 Clause 2 does not recognize any armaments and right of belligerency, thereby a war to exercise self-defense and the right of belligerency are renounced. Two Legal instruments for the exercise of the right of self-defense in Japan are The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation(1997) and the Situations in Areas surrounding Japan Law(1997) based on the new revised guidelines in 1997. The defense guidelines set forth general roles for the U.S. military and the Self- Defense Forces to engage in joint operations. They mainly forcus on the defense of Japan and emergencies in the nearby region, presumably including the Korean Peninsula,though this not stated explicitly. Controversies arose out of its rear area support, which was questioned to be collective self-defense and thus unconstitutional. Japan and the United States released interim report quite recently (October 8, 2014) on revising their bilateral defense cooperation guidelins by the year’s end, in which they call for more global military cooperation between two countries that will benefit the Asia-pacific region and beyond.” The new interim report emphasize the “global nature” of the Japan-U.S. military alliance. But this means expansion of military role of Japanese SDF. which could be unconstitutional against the pacifist constitution. It implies that Japan pushes for collective self-defense by circumventing the amendment of the Constitution which even Japanese people oppose.

일본의 집단적 자위권 행사 문제에 관한 소고: 일본의 안보법안과 스나가와(砂川) 판결을 중심으로

오미영 사단법인 한국평화연구학회 2016 평화학연구 Vol.17 No.4

On 1 July 2014 the Japanese Cabinet held ad hoc session and adopted the decision that allows exercising the right of collective self-defense through a new interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. In April 2015 amended “the Directives on Mutual Defense cooperations between the U.S.A. and Japan to support exercising the right of collective self-defense. On 16 July the same year, the House of Representatives of Japan (Japanese Parliament) adopted total 11 bills on national security (hereinafter “National Security Bills”) that make possible for Japan to exercise the right of self-defense in a collective manner. The bills were passed by the Japanese Senate on 19 September 2015 and entered into force on 29 March 2016. In addition, Abe Shinzo’s Government completed national legislation to exercise the collective self-defense. This study analyses, at first, the Supreme Court’s judgment in Snagawa to clarify whether the judgment is relevant to the issue of collective self-defense or not, and then tries to give the answer to the question: whether the right of collective self-defense is already settled as an inherent right of statehoods or not. Finally, this research deals with the unconstitutionality of the National Security Bills and the exercise of the right of collective self-defense under the current Peace Constitution of Japan. 2014년 7월 1일 일본 내각은 임시 각의를 열어 헌법 제9조를 재해석하여 ‘집단적 자위권’을 허용하는 결정문을 채택하였고 이어 2015년 4월에는 ‘집단적 자위권’ 행사를 뒷받침하는 미일방위협력지침을 개정하였다. 그리고 같은 해 7월 16일 집단적 자위권 행사를 포함한 11개 안보 관련 법안(이하 ‘안보법안’이라 함)이 중의원본회의에서 가결되었으며, 같은 해 9월 19일에는 안보법안이 참의원을 통과하였고 이 법안은 2016년 3월 29일 발효하였다. 이로써 이제 일본은 집단적 자위권을 행사할 수 있는 국내법적 장치를 완비하게 된 것이다. 일본의 안보 법안 통과는 일본의 집단적 자위권 행사가 가능해지면서 해외로의 무력행사를 무제한으로 넓힐 가능성이 있다고 생각되며, 장래 한반도에 분쟁이 발생했을 경우 자위대의 한반도 개입에 대해서도 여지를 남겼다고 볼 수 있다. 아베정권이 제창하는 집단적 자위권 행사 용인론에 대해 헌법 제9조와 입헌주의 위반이라는 비판이 거세지는 가운데 최근 들어 아베총리는 1959년 최고재판소 판결을 합헌의 근거로 들고 있다. 그러나 스나가와 사건의 최고재판소 판결은 개별적 자위권을 인정한 것일 뿐, 집단적 자위권에 대해서는 다루지 않았다는 것이 일반적 견해이다. 이 글에서는 먼저 아베정부가 합헌의 법적근거로 들고 있는 스나가와 판결이 집단적 자위권 문제와 관련이 있는지 어떻게 판시하고 있는지 살펴보고, 집단적 자위권 행사가 국제법상으로 국가의 고유한 권리로 확립되어있는지, 마지막으로 최근 발효된 안보법안과 집단적 자위권 행사의 위헌성에 대해 살펴보고자 한다.