소수주주의 주식매수청구권 박탈로 인한 주주총회결의의 무효 여부

김성진(Sung-Jin Kim) 한국기업법학회 2011 企業法硏究 Vol.25 No.3

When there are certain fundamental corporate changes, appraisal rights provide dissenting shareholders the option to sell their shares back to the corporation for fair value. Examples of fundamental corporate changes are following; mergers, acquisition, divisions-mergers, consolidations, serious charter amendments, sales of substantially all the corporation"s assets and so on. The purpose of appraisal rights is to protect minority shareholders who do not want fundamental changes nor be forced to invest in new corporations against their free will. If proposed corporate action for fundamental corporate changes requiring appraisal rights becomes effective, the corporation must give a notice to all shareholders who are entitled to assert appraisal rights before shareholders" meeting. However, in the Supreme Court"s case(대법원 2010. 7.22. 선고 2008다37193 판결), minority shareholders who held about 9% of the total corporation"s shares were deprived of their appraisal rights because the corporation missed to give them a notice about fundamental corporate changes requiring appraisal rights before shareholders" meeting. Superior court of New Jersey in Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., held that majority shareholders, no matter however overwhelming it may turn out to be, may not deprive appraisal rights of minority shareholders, no matter how few they may be in number. Like this decision, the dissenting shareholders have right to object to corporation"s plan and obtain appraisal right of their respective shares. To do so, the corporation should have given minority shareholders (no matter how few they may be in number) a notice about fundamental corporate changes requiring appraisal rights before shareholders" meeting. This article focuses on discussing whether defects which deprived minority shareholders of appraisal rights make resolution at shareholders" meeting void or voidable. Part II reviews detail facts of the Supreme Court"s case to clarify the issues of this article. This part also overviews history and role of dissenter"s appraisal rights and finds out that shareholders in division-merger cases are able to have statutory appraisal rights like shareholders in merger cases. Part III addresses whether defects which deprived minority shareholders of appraisal rights make resolution at shareholders" meeting void or voidable under the Supreme Court"s case laws. Part IV discusses whether defects which deprived minority shareholders of appraisal rights make resolution at shareholders" meeting void or voidable under the U.S. case laws. Part V compares the Supreme Court"s case with another Supreme Court"s case(대법원 1993. 10. 12. 선고 92다28235, 28242 판결) which is factually similar to the former. Lastly, part VI, as a conclusion, proposes that defects which deprived minority shareholders of appraisal rights should make resolution at shareholders" meeting void to protect minority shareholders.

美國會社法上 株式買受請求權의 機能

李成雄 한국기업법학회 2001 企業法硏究 Vol.8 No.-

In the modern corporate law, appraisal remedy is one of the most important rights to protect minor shareholders in fundamental changes of a corporation. Korea has developed amendment of act for corporate reorganization or restructuring. Simultaneously, appraisal was expanded to other corporate changes, e.g. diversion merger, stock exchange and transfer. But it has not yet studied that appraisal actually accomplishes what kinds of function to shareholders as investors. In USA, the research for the function or role of the appraisal carve out several times. In USA, the specifics of appraisal differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, most state appraisal statutes share several basic features: they confer appraisal rights upon shareholders who object to transaction such as mergers and consolidations, sale of all or substantially all, the corporation's assets and serious charter amendments, such as those altering the purpose for which the corporation is organized; they define fair value as the value of the shares prior to giving effect to the transaction from which the shareholders dissent; and they include a market out that withdraws appraisal rights when the objectors' shares are publicly traded. Traditionally, commentators viewed appraisal rights as necessary to protect shareholders who object to fundamental changes from being forced to invest in new firms against their will. Bayless Manning, however, challenged this traditional view of appraisal, as a remedy necessary to protect shareholders from the effects of fundamental change. He argued that the traditional view of appraisal had to be flawed because appraisal statutes were not broad enough to achieve that goal. Several commentators have taken up Manning's challenge to explain appraisal rights, most notably Fischel, Kanda and Levmore, and Gilson. For the most part, these commentators have argued that appraisal remedy should be viewed as a check on misconduct by managers and controlling shareholders. But their efforts have fallen short for three principal reasons. First, each of more of the basic features of the appraisal remedy. Second, none explains the evolution of the appraisal remedy over time, particularly the introduction and expansion of the market out. Third, none of these theories carves out for appraisal a function that is distinct from that served by other corporate law remedies, such as the shareholder's action for breach of fiduciary duty. Recently, a new theory of appraisal was proposed by Letsou. This theory focuses on the capacity of appraisal rights to reconcile differing shareholder preferences. This new theory has a lot of merits in understanding for the various statutes in USA and behaviors of investment shareholders in the stock market. In value rule of the dissenters' stocks, this theory, however, inconsistent with Weinberger methods that did not conclude pre-transaction price but price with premium due to merger synergy. Despite of it's flaw, this new theory has current events in regard with appraisal's function in the stock market. It may be possible to view the future of appraisal through this new theory.

주식매수청구권에 관한 상법 개정론 - 상법 개정안의 내용 및 평가 -

손창완 한국경영법률학회 2024 經營法律 Vol.34 No.2

상법은 주주의 이해관계에 중대한 영향을 미치는 일정한 사항에 대하여 그 결의에 반대하는 주주(반대주주)에게 출자를 회수하여 회사에서 탈퇴할 수 있는 주식매수청구권을 인정하고 있고. 이를 반대주주의 주식매수청구권이라 한다. 최근 법무부는 반대주주의 주식매수청구권에 관한 상법 개정안을 입법예고하였고, 상법 개정안에는 학계와 실무계에서 제기되었던 주식매수청구권 제도의 체계상 문제점을 개선하려는 목적의 개정사항이 포함되었다. 반대주주가 회사에 대하여 주식매수를 청구하여 회사와 반대주주 간에 주식매매계약이 성립하면, 회사와 반대주주 간의 법률관계는 단체법적 법률관계에서 거래법적 법률관계로 변경된다. 이러한 법률관계에서 반대주주가 주식매매대금일 지급받기 전까지 주주의 지위를 유지하고 매수가액에 대한 협의가 되지 않은 경우에도 회사에 지체책임을 지우는 현행 판례의 태도는 반대주주의 이익보호의 관점에서는 타당하다. 다만 반대주주의 기회주의적인 행동을 통하여 조직재편행위시 신속한 종결이 지체된다면 입법정책적으로 반대주주의 이익을 해치지 아니하는 범위에서 기업활동의 효율성을 제고하기 위한 방안을 마련할 필요가 있었다. 이러한 이유에서 이번 상법 개정안은 반대주주의 주식매수청구권에 관하여 다음과 같은 내용의 상법개정안을 제시하였고, 상법 개정안은 상법상 주식매수청구권 제도를 개선하는데 크게 기여할 것으로 기대된다. 첫째, 주주가 주식매수청구권을 행사하는 경우 회사에 대하여 공정한 가액의 지급을 간접적으로 강제하기 위하여 그 산정근거와 함께 매수가역을 사전에 명시하도록 하고, 명기가액에 관한 자료에 대한 주주의 열람등사권을 보장한다. 둘째, 주식매수의 효력과 매매대금의 지급을 분리하는 해외 입법례와 달리 상법 개정안은 주식매수의 효력과 매매대금의 지급을 연계 또는 결합하여 효력발생일까지 명시가액의 전부 지급ㆍ공탁을 조건으로 주식매수의 효력이 발생하도록 규정하여 조직재편행위의 신속한 종결이라는 회사의 이익과 매매대금의 조기 지급이라는 주주의 이익을 조화롭게 보호한다. 셋째, 상법에 일부 공탁의 예외를 허용하는 규정을 신설하여 매매대금의 조기 지급을 통하여 반대주주의 이익을 도모하는 한편 회사가 매수가액에 관한 협의가 지체되어 발생하는 지체책임에서 벗어날 수 있도록 하여 기존의 주식매수청구의 법률관계에서 발생하는 문제점을 합리적으로 조정한다. 넷째, 양도제한주식의 주식매수청구권과 지배주주의 매도청구권 및 소수주주의 매수청구권에서 주식매수청구에 관한 법리의 통일적 적용을 위하여 반대주주의 주식매수청구권과 같은 내용을 규율을 일부 신설하거나 개정한다. 다만 이들 법률관계는 본질적으로 개별적ㆍ거래법적 법률관계에 가깝다는 점을 감안하여 반대주주의 주식매수청구권과 같이 효력발생일에 일률적으로 주식매수의 효력이 발생하도록 하지는 않고 기존 법리 그대로 매매가액 지급시에 주식이 이전되는 것으로 한다. The Korean Commercial Act(KCA) grants dissenting shareholders the right to demand the repurchase of their shares if they oppose resolutions on certain matters that significantly affect their interests. This right is referred to as the dissenting shareholder's appraisal rights. Recently, the Ministry of Justice announced a legislative proposal regarding amendments to the KCA concerning appraisal rights. The proposed amendments aim to address systematic issues raised by academia and practitioners related to appraisal rights. According to current rules and precedents, if a dissenting shareholder requests the repurchase of shares from the corporation, a stock purchase agreement is automatically concluded and the legal relationship between the corporation and the dissenting shareholder changes from a collective relationship to a transactional relationship. In this legal relationship, the current judicial precedents, which places responsibility on the corporation until the dissenting shareholder receives the stock purchase price, is appropriate and proper from the perspective of protecting the interests of dissenting shareholders. However, it was necessary to establish legislative policies that do not compromise the efficiency of corporate activities from the viewpoint of protecting the interests of dissenting shareholders if delays occur due to opportunistic actions by dissenting shareholders during organizational restructuring. For this reason, the proposed amendments include the following provisions related to appraisal rights, and these provisions are expected to significantly contribute to improving appraisal rights system in the KCA: 1. In the case of a shareholder exercising appraisal rights, the proposed amendments require the specification of the purchase price along with the basis for calculation and ensure shareholders' right to inspect documents related to the specified amount. 2. Unlike foreign legislative examples that separate the effectiveness of stock purchases from the payment of the purchase price, the proposed amendments regulate that the effectiveness of stock purchases is contingent on the full payment and deposit of the specified amount, combining or linking the effectiveness of stock purchases with the payment of the purchase price until the effective date. 3. A new provision is introduced to the KCA, allowing exceptions to partial deposit. This provision aims to reasonably address issues arising from delays in negotiating the purchase price, enabling the corporation to avoid liability for delays in addition to promoting the interests of dissenting shareholders through early payment of the purchase price. 4. To achieve uniform application of legal principles regarding appraisal rights for restricted transfer shares and controlling shareholders' sale demands, or minority shareholders' purchase demands, the proposed amendments either establish or modify provisions to regulate dissenting shareholders' appraisal rights with similar content. However, recognizing the essentially individual and transactional nature of these legal relationships, the proposed amendments do not uniformly provide for the automatic effectiveness of stock purchases on the effective date, but rather maintain the existing legal principles that the transfer of shares occurs upon the payment of the purchase price.

반대주주의 주식매수청구권의 문제점

안택식 한국경영법률학회 2014 經營法律 Vol.24 No.4

According to the view of majority, the company has obligation to pay price of dissenting shares within 2 months after the appraisal right being exercised by dissenting shareholders. The obligation is based on cash payment, which is under no-fault liability without culpa compensatio. This is not reasonable, so it is better for company to consult the price of dissenting shares after the appraisal right being exercised. Under this understanding the company will be exempted from no-fault liability, when he has made timely preparation for payment of price of dissenting shares. In this connection I will suggest revision of commercial law article 374.2 as follows. “The company should pay the fair price of dissenting shares suggested by the company within 2 months after agreement between the company and shareholder not being made. When the price is paid, the shares are considered to be transferred to the company.”For the listed non-voting shares, appraisal right is permitted in express provision. For the non-listed non-voting shares major view permits the appraisal right. In case of non-listed and non-voting shares, it is somewhat questionable whether the appraisal right should be given to the shareholders, who do not attend shareholders’ meeting after submitting his opposing opinion about the fundamental corporate change such as a merger and a disposition of assets etc. In this connection it is better, to give appraisal right to non-listed and non-voting shareholders also by express provision in commercial law. Under the express provision of commercial law, it is not clear whether the appraisal right could be withdrawn or not. I think opposing shareholders could withdraw the appraisal right within 20 days after general meeting. The reason is because the opposing shareholders could express their consent in the general meeting, although they have submitted their opposing opinion before the meeting. However after 20 days from the general meeting opposing shareholders could not withdraw the appraisal right without consent of the company, because the company should bear excessive burden such as fund refunding and preparation of general meeting etc. In any case the opposing shareholders could not withdraw the appraisal right after they accept the payment of share price from the company. In this connection I will suggest the revision of commercial law article 372.2 (1) as follows. “The opposing shareholders could not withdraw the appraisal right without consent of the company after 20 days from the general meeting.”

주식매수청구권 행사 주체에 관한 고찰

張貞愛(Jung-Ae Chang) 한국기업법학회 2016 企業法硏究 Vol.30 No.2

주식매수청구권은 소수주주의 권익을 보호할 뿐만 아니라 회사의 조직변경을 원활히 하기 위한 기능으로 작용하고 있다. 하지만 최근 주식매수청구권이 일종의 풋옵션(put option)으로 작용하여 남용적 행사와 투기적인 행동으로 이어지고 있다. 소수주주가 주식매수청구권을 다량으로 행사할 경우, 기업은 주식매수청구 대금의 부담으로 조직변경을 무산시킬 수도 있고, 조직변경 후 찬성주주들이 오히려 손실을 보는 경우도 발생할 수 있다. 이러한 남용의 문제는 결국 어느 단계에서 주식매수청구권을 행사할 수 있는 주주의 자격을 부여할 것이냐의 문제로 귀결된다. 주식매수청구권 행사를 위한 반대주주의 시간적 범위는 기준일 이후의 주주, 사후취득주주, 주주총회결의 후의 주주로 구분할 수 있다. 기준일 이후의 주주와 사후취득주주의 경우, 소수주주의 권익 보호와 경영자에 대한 견제 역할이라는 주식매수청구권의 기능적 측면에서 보았을 때 주식매수청구권을 인정하는 것이 바람직하다. 하지만 주주총회결의 후의 주주는 우리 법문상으로도 맞지 않고 보호할 필요도 없으므로 주식매수청구권을 인정하여서는 아니될 것이다. 사후취득주주에게 주식매수청구권을 인정함에 따라 야기되는 투기 악용은 결국 주식매수청구의 절차 제한과 공정한 가격 결정의 문제로 접근하여야 한다. 즉 주식매수청구권이 효율적으로 운영되기 위해서는 공정한 가격이 담보되는 신속한 결정 및 절차의 진행이 보장되어야 한다. 먼저 주식매수청구절차를 신속하게 진행하기 위하여 청구기간을 일정 기간으로 제한하고, 그 기간의 경과에 주주 자격의 이전이라는 효과를 부여하여 매수절차를 종료할 필요가 있다. 또한 일단 주식매수청구권을 행사하였다면 회사의 동의를 요건으로 그 철회를 제한할 필요가 있다고 생각된다. 이러한 철회제한은 투기적 목적으로 주식매수청구권제도를 이용하려는 유인을 억제할 것이다. 아울러 매수가격이 공정성을 갖춘다면 투기적인 주식매수청구권 행사가 방지될 것이다. 따라서 자본시장법도 상법과 균형을 맞춘다는 차원에서 ‘공정한 가격’을 매수가격의 기준으로 설정하여야 한다. 특히 사후취득주주에게 주식매수청구권의 행사를 인정하되, 그 매수청구가격은 당해주주의 매수가격을 초과하지 못하도록 제한할 필요가 있다. The function of appraisal right is to protect the rights of minority shareholders as well as promote the organizational transformation. Recently, however, appraisal right is used as some kind of ‘put option’ leading to abusive acts and speculative behavior. If the minority shareholders can exercise appraisal right in large quantities, the company could thwart organizational transformation since stock purchase payment would be huge and Pros-shareholders losses can be significant. This abusive act of appraisal right question as to at which stage to certify shareholders’s qualification. Temporal scope of the dissident shareholders for appraisal right differentiate after-fixed-date shareholder, after-acquired shareholder, and after-general assembly resolution-shareholders. For afterfixed-date shareholder and after-acquired shareholder, appraisal right should be granted at the point of protecting the rights of the minority shareholders and checking with the resposibilities of the management. However, appraisal right should not be allowed for after-general assembly resolution-shareholders since it isn’t aligned with our Code and no need to protect them. The problem of abuse as after-acquired shareholder accept the appraisal right, should be solved with fair value and effective procedures of appraisal right. For abuse prevention, ① limiting the period of exercising appraisal right ② admitting the qualifications for shareholders, assigned after the transitional period ③ allowing the withdrawal of appraisal right only with the company’s approval are required. In addition, if the purchase price is in ‘fair value’, speculative appraisal right will be prevented. Especially, after-acquired shareholder should not exceed the purchase price, since the purchase prices need to be limited.

상법상 조직변경과 반대주주의 주식매수청구권 - 법원에 의한 공정한 가액산정과 관련하여 -

양만식 한국경영법률학회 2013 經營法律 Vol.23 No.4

Commercial law allows dissenting shareholders appraisal right to sell his or her shares back to the corporation at a “fair value” in the event that a fundamental change occurs in the corporation. Since this legal activity has a significant effect on the corporate structure and its shareholders, disposal of its shares can cause a conflict of interests among shareholders. Corporate transformation requires special resolution at shareholders' meeting, and shareholders who consent or dissent the agenda are likely to have different interests. In the Korean commercial law, dissenting shareholders have appraisal right in the case of corporate transformation or amendment of articles. When the dissenting shareholders ask the company to buy his or her shares, the company talks with them over the price and buys the shares at a fair value. To exercise the right, the dissenting shareholders must give a written notice before the shareholders' meeting except small scale of merger and share trading. They can also dissent in person at the meeting. Not only those who have voting rights in the meeting but also those who don't are allowed the dissenters' right, which is a common view in Korea. The appraisal right is becoming more important because it serves to check special resolution at the shareholders's meeting. The right can be viewed to provide fair profit between major and miner shareholders. The law says the company should buy the shares at a fair value if the company and dissenting shareholders don't have agreement on the value, and so there are arguments over how the fair value is determined, regarding which the court position is not clear. Although there are different opinions over whether the dissenter's right should be allowed in the law or not: some argue the right is necessary and others don't agree with that, I would rather say it is necessary in the consideration that the big reason the right is allowed is to protect minor shareholders from major shareholders.

주식매수청구권의 행사와 매수가격결정에 관한 연구

오창석(Oh Chang-Seog) 숭실대학교 법학연구소 2010 法學論叢 Vol.24 No.-

주식매수청구권은 다수결의 원칙에 의하여 운영되는 회사의 경영상의 효율성 확보와 이에 반대하는 소수주주의 이해조절을 위하여 도입된 제도이다. 즉, 소수주주에게는 출자할 당시에 전혀 고려하지 못했던 새로운 상황속에서 자신의 투하자금을 공정한 가격으로 보상받고 회사로부터 이탈할 수 있는 기회를 제공해주는 기능을 하며, 다수주주에게는 회사의 경영상의 효율성을 확보하기 위한 계획실현에 있어서 정당성을 확보하게 되는 것이다. 이 제도가 우리나라에 도입된 초기에는 실제로 주식매수청구권이 행사된 예는 거의 없었으나 기업간 합병사례의 증가와 빈번한 기업재편이 이루어짐에 따라 주식매수청구권이 행사되는 예가 늘어나고 있는 추세이다. 따라서 주식매수청구권제도의 운영이나 해석을 함에 있어서는 다수주주와 소수주주의 이해조정이라는 측면에서 다루어야 할 것이다. 이 논문은 우리나라에서의 비상장회사의 경우에 대해서 상법상의 주식매수청구권제도에 관하여 다루었으며, 필요한 부분에서는 상장회사의 경우에 적용되는 자본시장과 금융투자업에 관한 법률상의 문제점들도 함께 다루었다. 특히, 주식매수청구권의 법적성질에 대하여 형성권이라는 견지에서 다루었으며, 인정범위에서 무의결권주주의 경우와 사후취득주주의 경우에 대하여 살펴보았다. 그리고 주식매수가격의 결정과 관련하여서는 우리 상법상의 2단계 결정구조와 상장회사에서의 3단계 결정구조에 대하여 다루었으며, 공정한 가격산정을 위하여 고려되어야 할 요소들에 대하여 살펴보았다. There are many occations upon which the shareholders of a corporation will object to, or dissent from types of corporate fundamental transaction such as merger and a disposition of all or the greater part of the assets. Many people believe it is unfair to require someone to become a shareholder in a new corporation that may be totally different from the one in which he or she originally invested. Therefore, korean commercial law gives dissenting shareholders appraisal right. Appraisal rights allow dissenters to sell their shares back to the corporation for cash for its fair value. In order to pursue the appraisal right, a shareholder must complete several procedural steps. The dissenter must send a written notice of his or her objection to the merger before the meeting at which the merger will be considered. The shareholder must make a written demand on the corporation for the fair value of the shares in 20 days after the merger has been approved. The corporation must buy the share within 2 months. If the corporation and the dissenting shareholder disagree about the fair value of the shares in 30 days, either party may petition a court to determine the fair value in an appraisal proceeding. The Korean Commercial Law requires that a shareholder be paid “fair value” for the shares subject to appraisal, but no guidance is given, how to “fair value” is to be determined. The definition of fair value must include not only the present value of the corporation's existing assets, but also the future opportunities to reinvest free cash flow, including reinvestment opportunities identified, even if not yet developed, before the merger. On the other hand, any value that may created as a result of the merger that caused appraisal, should not be included in determining fair value. The appraisal is of the company exactly as it was being run.

주식매수청구권에 관한 증권거래법 규정에 대한 비판적 검토

이승철(LEE Seung-Cheol) 한국법학원 2008 저스티스 Vol.- No.105

주식매수청구권제도는 합병이나 영업양도 등 회사의 조직이나 경영을 근본적으로 변경하는 회사행위가 있을 경우 이에 반대하는 소수주주들이 회사로 하여금 그들이 보유한 주식을 공정한 가격에 매수하도록 하여 회사관계로부터 탈퇴할 수 있도록 하는 권리이다. 이러한 주식매수청구권제도를 통하여 소수주주는 다수주주의 횡포로부터 그들의 이익을 보호받을 수 있고, 다수주주나 경영진은 소수주주와의 마찰 없이 회사의 거래를 원활하게 추진할 수 있게 된다. 우리나라는 미국에서 최초로 발전된 이 제도를 1982년에 증권거래법에서 처음 도입한 이래 1995년에는 상법에서도 이 제도를 도입하였으나, 입법화된 법률의 많은 부분에서 해석상 논란이 있을 뿐만 아니라 입법론적인 논의도 분분하다. 특히 주식매수청구권제도의 핵심이라 할 수 있는 매수가격의 결정절차와 결정방법에 관하여는 아직까지 판례나 연구의 축적이 미흡한 것이 사실이다. 우선 가격 결정절차가 여러 법에 걸쳐 상이하게 규정됨으로써 이를 간이하게 통일할 필요가 있고, 가격 결정방법도 상장주식과 비상장주식이 다르게 규정되어 있는데 과연 바람직한 입법태도인지 검토할 필요가 있다. 특히 증권거래법상 매수가격결정 절차는 여러 단계를 거치도록 되어 있어 각 절차를 모두 밟을 때까지의 비용이나 장기간의 대립을 감당할 만한 여력이 없는 소수주주들로서는 불만족스럽더라도 회사가 제시하는 가격을 받아들일 수밖에 없는 상황에 놓일 수 있게 된다. 한편, 증권거래법은 매수가격결정 방법을 일정기간의 시장가격을 조정한 가격으로 구체적으로 특정해 놓음으로써 합병 등 당해 회사행위의 적절성 여부를 떠나 주식시장의 상황에 따라 매수청구권의 행사 여부를 결정하게 되는 결과가 발생하게 되고, 이는 결국 반대주주들에게 확정수익을 보장하거나 바람직한 합병 등이 좌절되는 결과를 가져오기도 한다. 따라서 이 논문에서는 우리나라의 주식매수청구권제도 중 특히 증권거래법상의 매수가격결정 절차와 매수가 격결정 방법에 대하여 비판적으로 검토해 보고자 한다. The shareholder's right of appraisal refers to the shareholder's right to coerce the corporation into buying her shares at fair value and be released from her duties if she dissents to various fundamental corporate changes like merger or the transfer of all assets. Through the right of appraisal, the minority shareholder can protect her rights from the arbitrary actions of the majority shareholders while the majority shareholders and the board of directors can in turn initiate corporate transactions without instigating any conflicts with the minority shareholders. Although South Korea incorporated this aspect of American corporate law into their Securities and Exchange Act in 1982 and their commercial law in 1995, there has been significant legal dispute as to its interpretation as well as its legislation. This is especially true in regards to the issue of formulating procedure for determining what exactly is fair value for the shares of a dissenting shareholder who decides to exercise her right of appraisal. This can be considered the nexus of the shareholder's right of appraisal and not enough judicial precedent as well as legal research has been initiated on this subject to flesh out its intricacies. Due to the fact that the current method of determining fair value is based on a variety of different and conflicting regulations, there is a need to unify the procedure under one legal body. Moreover, it is necessary to determine whether the current legislative approach of applying different regulations regarding fair value in accordance to whether the share is sold publicly or privately is legally sound. Especially, since the procedure of the appraisal of shares as set forth under Securities and Exchange Act is complicated, comprising of a number of steps, the minority shareholder who cannot afford to pay costs or expenses related therewith or endure long-term conflict with the corporation throughout the procedures has no choice but to accept the share price proposed by corporation even though such price is unsatisfactory to her. On the other hand, the Securities and Exchange Act prescribes that the fair value of the share shall be the adjustment of market prices during a certain period of time, whereby the shareholder determines to exercise of the appraisal right depending on the market circumstances, bringing the effect of guaranteeing the fixed gains to the opposing shareholders or frustrating a positive merger. In this regard, this treatise attempts to critically review the procedure of, and the valuation method of appraisal of shares under Securities and Exchange Act.

주식의 포괄적 교환으로 교부된 신주에 대해 재차 명의신탁 증여의제 규정을 적용할 수 있는지 여부 ― 대법원 2013. 8. 23. 선고 2013두5791 판결에 대한 평석 ―

노미리 서울시립대학교 서울시립대학교 법학연구소 2019 서울법학 Vol.26 No.4

The Supreme Court ruling unlike the court below, showed that it was possible to apply the provision of Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act Article 45-2 to new shares issued through All-Inclusive Share Swap. The ruling presented 4 reasons for an argument. The first reason was that the parent company’s new shares which were issued to title trustees did not correspond to substitute for the shares which title trustees held. However, in light of Article 360-11 and Article 360-14 of the Commercial Act, etc., it is reasonable to consider the parent company’s new shares as substitute for the shares which trustees held. The Second reason was that it could be interpreted that the Share Swap Contract was made on the basis of shareholders’ will because they did not exercise their appraisal rights of dissenting shareholders. However, regarding the legal nature of the All-Inclusive Share Swap, it is considered as organizational transaction of company, and in case of small-scale share swap, appraisal rights are not allowed. In addition to that after exercising their appraisal rights, it is not free to withdraw the intention of appraisal rights. In light of the fact that above mentioned, it is not proper to relate the formation of share swap contract to whether to exercise their appraisal rights or not. The third reason was that there was a nominal trust agreement between a title truster and a title trustee regarding parents company’s new shares. However, share swap ratio is uniformly determined, there is no room for shareholders to make intention. Above all, there is no action that a title truster use nominal trust regarding new shares. Therefore it must be interpreted that there was no agreement about a nominal trust. Finally, the ruling showed that there was a possibility of tax avoidance through an all-inclusive share swap. However, according to the Supreme Court, Feb. 1, 2017; Decision 2011Du10232, it is not appropriate to apply the provision of Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Act Article 45-2 to new shares issued through All-Inclusive Share Swap. 대상 판결은 원심과 다르게 주식의 포괄적 교환으로 교부된 신주에 대해 재차 명의신탁 증여의제 규정을 적용할 수 있다고 보았다. 대상 판결은 그 논거로 4가지를 들었다. 첫 번째 논거는, 명의수탁자가 교부받는 완전모회사의 신주는 종전에 보유하던 주식의 대체물이나 변형물에 해당하지 않는다는 점이다. 하지만 상법 제360조의11 제2항, 상법 제360조의14 제4항 등에 비추어 보았을 때 완전모회사의 신주는 종전 주식의 대체물이나 변형물로 보는 것이 타당하다. 두 번째 논거는, 주식매수청구권을 행사하지 않은 이상 주주의 의사에 기하여 주식교환계약이 이루어진 것으로 볼 수 있다는 것이다. 그런데 주식의 포괄적 교환의 법적 성질에 대해서 회사의 조직법적 행위로 보는 것이 다수의 견해이고, 소규모 주식교환처럼 주식매수청구권이 인정되지 않는 경우가 존재한다는 점, 주식매수청구 의사 철회가 자유롭지 못하다는 점 등에 비추어 보았을 때 주식매수청구권의 불행사를 주주의 의사에 기하여 주식교환계약이 이루어진 것으로 보는 것은 타당하지 못하다. 세 번째 논거는, 완전모회사의 신주에 대하여 명의신탁자와 명의수탁자 간에 명의신탁 합의가 있었다는 것이다. 그런데 앞서 언급하였듯이 주식의 포괄적 교환은 주주의 의사와 관계없이 주식이 강제적으로 이전되는 회사의 조직법적 행위에 해당한다. 뿐만 아니라 주식교환비율 역시 일률적으로 정해지기 때문에 주주의 의사가 관여될 여지가 없으며, 명의신탁자가 명의수탁자에게 신주를 명의신탁하는 행위 자체가 존재하지 않는다. 그러므로 명의신탁 합의는 없었다고 보아야 한다. 마지막으로 대상 판결은 주식의 포괄적 교환으로 인하여 조세회피의 가능성이 있다는 점을 논거로 들었다. 현행 상증세법 하에서 명의자가 조세회피목적의 부존재를 입증하는 것이 매우 어렵다. 한편 대상 판결 이후에 판시된 대법원 2017. 2. 1. 선고 2011두10232 판결은 ‘시기상 또는 성질상 단절’이 없다면 새로이 명의신탁이 있었다고 볼 수 없다고 판시하였다. 대법원 2011두10232 판결에 의하면, 주식의 포괄적 교환으로 인해 재차 명의신탁된 주식을 증여세의 과세대상으로 하는 것은 타당하지 못하다고 할 것이다.

의사결정(意思決定)의 반대수익자(反對受益者)를 위한 신탁수익권매수청구권(信託受益權買受請求權) -일본(日本) 신신탁법(新信託法)의 검토(檢討)를 중심(中心)으로

최현태 ( Hyun Tae Choi ) 한양대학교 법학연구소 2009 법학논총 Vol.26 No.4

The Trust law will be amended by Ministry of Justice. There are some considerable contents in relation to translation of Trust. In particular, it is significant issue that the protections of the beneficiaries which belong to minority party. In this dissertation, I will inquire into the way of protection through following issues. ⅰ)What is the meaning of `a beneficiary right` which has the beneficiary? ⅱ)If the beneficiaries are in large part, and where a property in trust was divided or merged, what is the way of decision among the beneficiary? ⅲ)What is the legal protection for the party who appeals against the decision above-mentioned or the beneficiaries which belong to minority? ⅳ)What is a controversial point on the assumption that `a Appraisal rights of the dissenting beneficiary` will be introduced? I wish that this discussion will be a lively argument.