한국의 원자력 외교: 쟁점과 과제

정옥임 평화문제연구소 2007 統一問題硏究 Vol.19 No.1

This paper addresses the key issues and options in South Korea``s atomic energy security. South Korea``s nuclear energy policy has evolved since the 1950s, with much assistance from the US in technology, let alone the provision of nuclear materials and related facilities. In the meantime, South Korea has become sixth in the world in terms of nuclear energy usage, while searching for diplomatic and technological breakthroughs in terms of solving the problem of spent fuel accumulation. Related to this, the US initiative toward GNEP(Global Nuclear Energy Partnership) is both a challenge and opportunity for South Korea``s future atomic energy vision. This initiative opens the door for close cooperation with the United States, particularly in pyroprocessing, which is a very attractive technological option in resolving the high-level nuclear waste. However, the US attempt at constraining the rights of nuclear fuel cycle activities impose serious obstacles to South Korea``s peaceful use of nuclear energy activities. Therefore, it is an imperative for South Korea to earn the trust of the US in terms of South Korea``s nuclear energy activities, including the recycling of spent fuel. South Korea must actively involve itself in multilateral cooperation on the nuclear fuel cycle, while heightening its credential and transparency as a trustworthy nuclear energy country. It is of utmost importance to deepen diplomatic coordination and technological cooperation with the United States, the very provider of original nuclear technology for South Korea. The most significant task at hand is obtaining programmatic prior consent from the US in the atomic energy cooperation agreement, that is soon to be renewed by 2014.

MAKING THE CASE FOR SAFE STORAGE OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME: COMBINING NEAR-TERM EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSES WITH LONGER-TERM CONFIRMATORY DEMONSTRATIONS

Sorenson, Ken B.,Hanson, Brady Korean Nuclear Society 2013 Nuclear Engineering and Technology Vol.45 No.4

The need for extended storage of used nuclear fuel is increasing globally as disposition schedules for used fuel are pushed further into the future. This is creating a situation where dry storage of used fuel may need to be extended beyond normal regulatory licensing periods. While it is generally accepted that used fuel in dry storage will remain in a safe condition, there is little data that demonstrate used fuel performance in dry storage environments for long periods of time. This is especially true for high burnup used fuel. This paper discusses a technical approach that defines a process that develops the technical basis for demonstrating the safety of used fuel over extended periods of time.

Making the Case for Safe Storage of Used Nuclear Fuel for Extended Periods of Time: Combining Near-Term Experiments and Analyses with Longer-Term Confirmatory Demo

KEN B. SORENSON,BRADY HANSON 한국원자력학회 2013 Nuclear Engineering and Technology Vol.45 No.4

The need for extended storage of used nuclear fuel is increasing globally as disposition schedules for used fuel are pushed further into the future. This is creating a situation where dry storage of used fuel may need to be extended beyond normal regulatory licensing periods. While it is generally accepted that used fuel in dry storage will remain in a safe condition, there is little data that demonstrate used fuel performance in dry storage environments for long periods of time. This is especially true for high burnup used fuel. This paper discusses a technical approach that defines a process that develops the technical basis for demonstrating the safety of used fuel over extended periods of time.

EXTENDED DRY STORAGE OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL: TECHNICAL ISSUES: A USA PERSPECTIVE

Mcconnell, Paul,Hanson, Brady,Lee, Moo,Sorenson, Ken Korean Nuclear Society 2011 Nuclear Engineering and Technology Vol.43 No.5

Used nuclear fuel will likely be stored dry for extended periods of time in the USA. Until a final disposition pathway is chosen, the storage periods will almost definitely be longer than were originally intended. The ability of the important-tosafety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to continue to meet storage and transport safety functions over extended times must be determined. It must be assured that there is no significant degradation of the fuel or dry cask storage systems. Also, it is projected that the maximum discharge burnups of the used nuclear fuel will increase. Thus, it is necessary to obtain data on high burnup fuel to demonstrate that the used nuclear fuel remains intact after extended storage. An evaluation was performed to determine the conditions that may lead to failure of dry storage SSCs. This paper documents the initial technical gap analysis performed to identify data and modeling needs to develop the desired technical bases to ensure the safety functions of dry stored fuel.

EXTENDED DRY STORAGE OF USED NUCLEAR FUEL: TECHNICAL ISSUES: A USA PERSPECTIVE

PAUL MCCONNELL,BRADY HANSON,MOO LEE,KEN SORENSON 한국원자력학회 2011 Nuclear Engineering and Technology Vol.43 No.5

Used nuclear fuel will likely be stored dry for extended periods of time in the USA. Until a final disposition pathway is chosen, the storage periods will almost definitely be longer than were originally intended. The ability of the important-tosafety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to continue to meet storage and transport safety functions over extended times must be determined. It must be assured that there is no significant degradation of the fuel or dry cask storage systems. Also, it is projected that the maximum discharge burnups of the used nuclear fuel will increase. Thus, it is necessary to obtain data on high burnup fuel to demonstrate that the used nuclear fuel remains intact after extended storage. An evaluation was performed to determine the conditions that may lead to failure of dry storage SSCs. This paper documents the initial technical gap analysis performed to identify data and modeling needs to develop the desired technical bases to ensure the safety functions of dry stored fuel.

국제 핵 비확산 체제의 맹점 및 개선방안

장동희(Chang Donghee) 대한국제법학회 2018 國際法學會論叢 Vol.63 No.4

북한 핵문제를 둘러싸고 숨 막히는 외교전이 펼쳐지는 가운데, 미국이 이란 핵협정(JCPOA) 탈퇴와 대 이란 제재 복원을 발표함으로써, 북한과 이란의 핵문제가 다시 국제적 관심사로 부각하고 있다. NPT탈퇴를 선언한 후 6차에 걸친 핵실험을 감행한 북한과 NPT하 원자력의 평화적 이용권리를 주장하며 우라늄 농축을 시도한 이란은 각기 다른 측면에서 국제 핵 비확산 체제에 대한 심각한 도전이다. 국제 핵 비확산 체제란 핵무기의 이전 및 획득 금지, 원자력의 평화적 이용, 핵보유국의 핵군축이라는 3개 축을 기본으로 하는 NPT 및 NPT와 관련된 보다 광범위한 규칙, 원칙 및 규범을 포함하는 것으로 볼 수 있다. 2002년 8월 이란 반정부단체가 이란의 비밀 핵시설 건설을 폭로하면서 부터 시작된 이란 핵문제는 2015년 7월 P5+1과 이란간 포괄적 공동행동계획(JCPOA)에 합의하면서 일단락 되는 것으로 보였으나, 최근 미국의 JCPOA탈퇴와 대이란 제재 복원조치로 새로운 국면을 맞게 되었다. JCPOA는 이란의 우라늄 농축규모나 원심분리기 축소를 규정하고 있으나 여전히 농축을 허용하고 있고, JCPOA채택일로부터 15년이 지나면 중수로 건설 금지나 사용후 핵연료 재처리 금지도 해제되기 때문에 그 이후 이란의 핵 활동에 대한 우려가 있을 수 밖에 없다. 북핵문제는 1993년 북한이 핵 의혹 해소를 위한 국제원자력기구(IAEA)의 특별사찰 요구를 거부하며 NPT탈퇴를 선언하면서 시작되었다. 북한은 1994년의 미북 제네바 합의, 6자회담 틀 속에서의 9.19 공동성명과 그 이행 합의서를 통하여 모든 핵 프로그램 폐기를 약속한 이후 6차에 걸친 핵실험을 감행하였다. 이란과 북한의 핵문제는 각기 다른 차원에서 국제 핵 비확산 체제의 맹점을 여실히 보여 주는 것으로서 이러한 맹점을 극복하기 위하여 아래와 같은 조치를 취할 필요가 있다. 첫째, 핵 비보유국에 대한 소극적 안전보장(NSA)과 적극적 안전보장(PSA)을 조약 형태로 제공하여야 한다. 둘째, NPT비회원국에 대하여 원자력 관련 기술이나 장비, 원자력 관련 프로젝트에 대한 금융지원 등 일체의 원자력 관련 거래를 금지시키는 방안을 적극 검토할 필요가 있다. 셋째, 안전조치를 비롯하여 핵 확산 방지를 위한 검증체계를 강화하여야 한다. 넷째, 수출통제체제를 강화하고 확산방지구상(Proliferation Security Initiative: PSI)을 더욱 발전시켜 나갈 필요가 있다. 다섯째, IAEA관할 하 국제LEU은행 설립 등 핵연료의 국제통제를 강화할 필요가 있다. 여섯째, NPT 및 안전조치 위반시 이에 대한 제재조치를 강화하여야 한다. 일곱째, NPT탈퇴 요건 및 절차를 엄격히 하고, 탈퇴국이 “평화에 대한 위협”이 되지 않는다는 것을 입증하지 못하는 한, 탈퇴자체를 유엔헌장 7장에 따른 강제조치 대상이 되도록 탈퇴에 대한 강력한 제재조치를 도입할 필요가 있다. 여덟째, 핵보유국은 2010년 NPT평가회의에서 채택한 13개 조치를 이행함으로써 핵군축 의무를 성실히 수행하여야 한다. 상기 NPT의 맹점을 보완하기 위해서는 NPT를 골격조약(Framework Agreement)으로 한 새로운 이행 의정서(a new protocol)채택을 통한 방법이 가장 현실적 방안이 될 수 있으리라 생각한다. The nuclear issue of North Korea and Iran is drawing anew the attention of the international community. In addition to a diplomatic game surrounding North Korea`s nuclear problem, the United States has announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) and the reinstatement of the sanction regime on Iran. North Korea and Iran have posed a serious challenge to the NPT regime from a different perspective. NPT regime includes an extensive rules, principles and regimes related to the NPT as well as the NPT itself which is based on the three pillars: no-transfer and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament. The Iranian nuclear problem which began with a disclosure of clandestine nuclear facilities by an anti-government group in August 2002, seemed to settle down with the conclusion of the JCPOA. However, it faces a new phase with the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the reimposition of sanctions on Iran. The JCPOA could not have got rid of all the concerns about Iranian nuclear program as it allowed the enrichment of uranium even though its volume has been scaled down. Furthermore, most of the restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing of spent fuel expires in 15 years. North Korean nuclear problem has surfaced in 1993 with its refusal of the IAEA special inspection, which was followed by North Korea"s declaration to withdraw from the NPT. Having reneged on its promise to denuclearization made under the 1994 Agreed Framework or September 19 Joint Statement of 2005, North Korea has conducted nuclear test as many as six times. While North Korea has conducted nuclear test six times after the withdrawal from the NPT, Iran tried to enrich uranium on the pretext of a legitimate peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Iranian and North Korean nuclear problem clearly showed the loopholes inherent in the NPT regime. In order to plug up the loopholes, it is recommended to take the following measures: First, nuclear-weapon states should provide non-nuclear-weapon states with the NSA(Negative Security Assurance) and the PSA(Positive Security Assurance) in the form of international treaties. Second, It is worth taking into serious account the prohibition of all nuclear-related trade with the NPT outliers, including trade in nuclear-related technology, equipments and facilities and financing of nuclear-related project. Third, the verification system including safeguards to prevent nuclear proliferation should be strengthened. Fourth, It is necessary to reinforce the export control system and to further develop the PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative). Fifth, it is necessary to strengthen international control on nuclear fuel and to take into consideration the establishment of universal IAEA-administered LEU Bank. Sixth, stricter and heavier sanctions should be imposed on the violation of the NPT or its safeguards agreement. Seventh, the conditions and procedures of the withdrawal from the NPT should be strictly enforced. The withdrawal should be interpreted as a “threat to the peace” under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as long as the withdrawing state does not prove itself to the contrary. Eighth, the nuclear-weapon states should implement nuclear disarmament faithfully by taking the 13 practical steps which were adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. As a way to implement above-proposals, it is recommended to adopt a new Protocol to the NPT.

Critical Juncture and Nuclear-Power Dependence in Japan: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis

( Sung Chull Kim ) 서울대학교 통일평화연구원 2013 Asian Journal of Peacebuilding Vol.1 No.1

The institution of nuclear power in Japan appears to be drifting; nevertheless it persists. For the past 60 years, conservative politicians, technologists, and electric companies have acted in concert, for different reasons, to achieve a full nuclear fuel cycle: specifically technology for reprocessing and uranium enrichment. Their pursuit has eroded the bottom-line spirit of peaceful use; to be sure, it has been excessively ambitious for Japan`s status as a non-nuclear-weapon state. The mastering of the full nuclear fuel cycle has resulted in a competency trap, excluding or delaying development of alternatives to nuclear power. Furthermore, this situation has heightened nuclear power`s sunk costs. The critical conjuncture of the March 11, 2011 incident has had a limited impact only. Anti-nuclear activists, the weakest concerned actor, try to dramatize their movement for “exit from nuclear,” but they have failed to bring about electoral changes.

Critical Juncture and Nuclear-Power Dependence in Japan: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis

김성철 서울대학교 통일평화연구원 2013 Asian Journal of Peacebuilding Vol.1 No.1

The institution of nuclear power in Japan appears to be drifting; nevertheless it persists. For the past 60 years, conservative politicians, technologists, and electric companies have acted in concert, for different reasons, to achieve a full nuclear fuel cycle: specifically technology for reprocessing and uranium enrichment. Their pursuit has eroded the bottom-line spirit of peaceful use; to be sure, it has been excessively ambitious for Japan's status as a non-nuclear-weapon state. The mastering of the full nuclear fuel cycle has resulted in a competency trap, excluding or delaying development of alternatives to nuclear power. Furthermore, this situation has heightened nuclear power's sunk costs. The critical conjuncture of the March 11, 2011 incident has had a limited impact only. Anti-nuclear activists, the weakest concerned actor, try to dramatize their movement for "exit from nuclear," but they have failed to bring about electoral changes.

용융탄산염을 이용한 고농도 염소 및 염화수소가스 처리 및 재활용에 관한 연구

은희철 ( Hee Chul Eun ),최정훈 ( Jung Hoon Choi ),조인학 ( In Hak Cho ),양희철 ( Hee Chul Yang ),박환서 ( Hwan Seo Park ) 조선대학교 공학기술연구원 2014 공학기술논문지 Vol.7 No.4

A high concentration of Cl2 and HCl gas is generated from the solidification process of chlorinated metal wastes from the pyrochemical process of used nuclear fuel. In this study, a treatment test of a high concentration of Cl2 and HCl gas was performed using the molten carbonate equipment. A high concentration of Cl2 and HCl gas was captured as a from of LiCl in the molten carbonate (Li2CO3), and the Cl2 and HCl gas was not detected in the flue gas from the equipment. After the treatment test, the used carbonate from the equipment was composed of Li2CO3 and LiCl. The used carbonate was effectively divided into LiCl and a mixture of Li2O and Li2CO3 through a vacuum distillation process. It is considered that LiCl is possible to recycle to the pyrochemical process and the mixture can be reused for the treatment of Cl2 and HCl gas.

Evaluation of the reutilization of used nuclear fuel in a PWR core without reprocessing

Zafar Iqbal Zafar,박윤서,김명현 한국원자력학회 2019 Nuclear Engineering and Technology Vol.51 No.2

Use of the reconstructed fuel assemblies from partially burnt nuclear fuel pins is analyzed. This reutilizationoption is a potential candidate technique to make better use of the nuclear resources. Standardtwo step method is used to calculate node i.e. fuel assembly average burnup and then pin by pin h valuesare reconstructed to ascertain the residual reactivity in the used fuel pins. Fuel pins with h >1:0 are usedto reconstruct to-be-reused fuel assemblies. These reconstructed fuel assemblies are burnt during thecycle 3, 4, 5 and 6 of a 1000MWPWR core by replacing fresh, once burnt and twice burnt fuel assembliesof the reference core configurations. It is concluded that using reconstructed fuel assemblies for the freshfuel affect dearly on the cycle length (>50 EFPD) when more than 16 fresh fuel assemblies are replaced. However, this loss is less than 20 days if the number of fresh fuel assemblies is less than eight. For thecase of replacing twice burned fuel, cycle length could be increased slightly (10 days or so) providedburnt fuel pins from other reactors were also available. Reactor safety parameters, like axial off setð<±10%Þ, Doppler temperature coefficient ð <0Þ, moderator temperature coefficient at HFP ð <0Þ arealways satisfied. Though, 2D and 3D pin peaking factors are satisfied ð <1:55Þ and ð <2:52Þ respectively,for the cases using eight or less reconstructed fuel assemblies only