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- 검색키워드
- 주제어 : Patron-client Structure (검색결과 3 건)
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Hoon Jaung 한국의정연구회 2015 의정논총 Vol.10 No.2
This article explores sources of party underdevelopment in South Korea by examining the historical origins of weak parties since the 1960s. To unravel the historical origins of weak political parties, this article focuses on the rise of and fall of Democratic Republican Party, the governing party during the authoritarian era in South Korea. It argues that the strong state and patron-client structure worked against DRP’s experiment for strong party. Lacking stable social roots and extensive party organizations across the country, DRP had to rely upon the traditional patron-client structure of society and state administration organizations for electoral mobilization. Yet the U. S. pressure, domestic demand and factional strife within the regime served to mitigate those constraints. The gradual decline of DRP and electoral politics from the mid-1960s resulted not solely from the influence of the environmental factors such as the weakening of U.S. influence and factional conflict which were powerful and intense until the mid-1960s, but also from Park’s own effort to build up authoritarian regime. The implication of the fall of the DRP has to do with its lasting legacy on party politics in Korea. Initially, the DRP represented a new experiment in Korean party politics that had long been plagued by the lack of programmatic coherence, organizational stability and linkage to the civil society. Eventually, DRP turned out to be not an exception to traditional Korean political parties. Highly centralized power structure around personal network, subsequent organizational frailty and incompetence on policy matters characterized the DRP.
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The Historical Origins of Frail Party Politics in South Korea
장훈 한국의정연구회 2015 의정논총 Vol.10 No.2
This article explores sources of party underdevelopment in South Korea by examining the historical origins of weak parties since the 1960s. To unravel the historical origins of weak political parties, this article focuses on the rise of and fall of Democratic Republican Party, the governing party during the authoritarian era in South Korea. It argues that the strong state and patron-client structure worked against DRP’s experiment for strong party. Lacking stable social roots and extensive party organizations across the country, DRP had to rely upon the traditional patron-client structure of society and state administration organizations for electoral mobilization. Yet the U. S. pressure, domestic demand and factional strife within the regime served to mitigate those constraints. The gradual decline of DRP and electoral politics from the mid-1960s resulted not solely from the influence of the environmental factors such as the weakening of U.S. influence and factional conflict which were powerful and intense until the mid-1960s, but also from Park’s own effort to build up authoritarian regime. The implication of the fall of the DRP has to do with its lasting legacy on party politics in Korea. Initially, the DRP represented a new experiment in Korean party politics that had long been plagued by the lack of programmatic coherence, organizational stability and linkage to the civil society. Eventually, DRP turned out to be not an exception to traditional Korean political parties. Highly centralized power structure around personal network, subsequent organizational frailty and incompetence on policy matters characterized the DRP.
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Wong Pak Nung 서울대학교행정대학원 2008 Asian Journal of Political Science Vol.16 No.2
This article serves as a critique of a recent American foreign policy formulation proposingto eradicate ‘warlordism’ and asserting that democratic institutions can be directlycreated out of the post-eradication anarchic chaos. Against this background, recent yearshave indeed seen a bourgeoning literature on ‘warlord politics’ in Southeast Asia. Themajority commonly portray political actors as faithful followers of economic rationalityand self-interest. Therefore, most are conceived as selfish predators who ruthlessly useviolence for private gains at the expense of public interest. By suggesting that comparativestudies on warlordism have been heavily influenced by the political economy perspective,the article develops a more comprehensive analysis of warlord politics. Along the lines ofpatronclient network analysis, insights from moral economy and agency-structuresociological dualism are considered. Contrasting case studies are used to illustrate howthe alleged warlords of Southeast Asia do not fit entirely into the political economyperspective. Caught in a vast patronclient network of competing interests and diversepowers across state and society, one’s agency is constantly constituted by discursive arraysof contending interests, juxtaposing rationalities and multiple intentions. In statebuilding, this complication is regarded as paradoxically necessary for compelling thealleged warlord-actor to re-define and elevate multiple private interests into publicinterest.
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